De menselijke beslisser - Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het ...

ibliografie
moreel handelen. oorzaken, sprookjes en redenen
Appiah, K.A. (2008) Experiments in Ethics, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Bransen, J. (2003) ‘De opvoedbare mens’ in Hees, M. van., Jonge, E. de., Nauta, L. (red.)
Kernthema’s van de filosofie, Amsterdam: Boom.
Bransen, J. (in druk) ‘Word zelf filosoof’, Veen Magazines.
Nahmias, E. Nadelhoffer S.M., T. en Turner J. (2005) ’Surveying Freedom: Folk intuitions
about free will and responsibility’, Philosophical Psychology xviii(5): 561-584.
Dennett, D.C. (2003) Freedom evolves, London: Penguins.
Dijksterhuis, A. (2007) Het slimme onbewuste, Amsterdam: Bert Bakker.
Fine, C. (2006) ‘Is the emotional dog wagging its rational tail, or chasing it?’, Philosophical
Explorations 1: 83-98.
Foot, P. (1967) ‘The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect’, Oxford
Reviews 5: 5-15.
Gazzaniga, M.S. (2005) The ethical brain, New York: Dana Press.
Gladwell (2000) The tipping point: how little things can make a big difference, Little Brown.
Greene, J. en J. Haidt (2002) ‘How (and where) does moral judgment work?’ Trends in
Cognitive Sciences 6(12): 517-523.
Greene, J.D. (te verschijnen) ‘Social Neuroscience and the Soul’s Last Stand’ in A. Todorov,
Fiske, S., Prentice, D. Social Neuroscience: Toward Understanding the Underpinnings
of the Social Mind, Oxford University Press.
Greene, J.D., Morelli, S.A., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L.E. en Cohen, J.D. (2008)
‘Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment’, Cognition,
107: 1144-1154.
Greene, J.D., et al. (2001) ‘An fmri investigation of emotional engagement in moral
judgment’, Science 293: 2105-2108.
Haidt, J. (2001) ‘The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to
moral judgment’, Psychological Review 108: 814-834.
Heath, J., Anderson, J. (te verschijnen) ‘Procrastination and the extended will’ in C.
Andreou en M. White (red.) The thief of time: philosophical essays on procrastination,
New York: Oxford University Press.
Hertzberg, L. (1975) ‘Blame and Causality’, Mind 84: 500-515.
Hindriks, F. (2009) ‘Opzet en morele verantwoordelijkheid in de experimentele filosofie’,
Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 101 (1): 49-55.
Hindriks, F. (te vershijnen) ‘Emoties en intenties in de experimentele filosofie’, Algemeen
Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte.
Hsee, C.K. (1996) ‘The evaluability hypothesis: An explanation for preference reversals
between joint and separate evaluations of alternatives’, Organizational behavior
and Human Decision processes 67: 247-257.
Libet, B., A. Freeman, et al. (1999) The volitional brain: towards a neuroscience of free will,
Horverton, Imprint Academic.
Libet, B., C.A. Gleason, et al. (1983) ‘Time of concious intention to act in relation to onset of
291