11 september - Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap

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was held approximately two hours after the first plane crash to World Trade Center. Actors at the Consulate in New York, however, experienced considerable pressure early on directly after the crasches, even from local Swedish media. Actors at the Cabinet Office and the Ministries reported feeling it was natural that the Swedish Prime Minister, Göran Persson, should comment on the matter, given the nature of the event. This meant that Persson appeared in a number of TV news programmes that evening. An additional press conference was called later in the evening, at which the country’s highest political leader expressed his more personal reflections. Interactions with the media seem to have gone rather smoothly. Several bodies besides governmental authorities made efforts towards crisis management. As concerns business contacts, the Swedish Trade Council was drawn into these efforts, as was Swedish Chamber of Commerce and Industry, both in Stockholm and in New York. The body in the US most active in connection with the attacks was the Swedish Church in New York City. It was responsible for extensive efforts during the first, most acute days, not least through relief talks for individual Swedes who had experienced the attacks, for staff at the UN delegation and in some respect the Consulate, and even for staff at Swedish companies in New York, among them some banks. Matters had a more immediate intensity when letters (what was thought to be) contaminated with anthrax began to appear, since this was happening within Sweden and, for some, at their own workplace at some of the ministries. Several of those interviewed indicated that the distance from the previous events had made things feel less problematic, but now, when they were involved on a more personal level, they perceived the situation as more dangerous. The attacks on the US primarily involved central Swedish governmental authorities. But even on the local level, we can expect that certain authorities were drawn in through, e.g., staff stationed in the US or – in the cases under study, Swedish universities/colleges – exchange programmes with Swedish students in the US and American students in Sweden. Most, though not all, universities/ colleges conducted crisis management for both categories of students, primarily in the form of opportunities to talk and free telephone service. In summary we can establish that based on analysis and evaluation of, firstly, the perceptions of involved actors, the relevant Swedish governmental authorities adequately managed those aspects of the terror attacks in the US on September 11, 2001 that pertained to Sweden. Isolated problems can be noted, however. For instance, government leaders in form of the prime, foreign and defence ministers were not immediately provided with information on the events because they were currently meeting in the advisory council on foreign affairs with the king at Stockholm Castle. There were also certain problems in instruction, e.g., regarding the government switchboards’ opening hours. On the other hand, the decision to keep the switchboards open around the clock led to contacts and communication with next of kin/involved others and the public that functioned much better than in previous cases of greater crisis events when the ministries faced massive contact traffic. 43
Litteratur Amnå, Erik & Nohrstedt, Stig Arne (1987): Att administrera det oförutsedda (Om Tjernobyl). Stockholm: Styrelsen för psykologiskt försvar, Rapport 137. Beck, Ulrich (1998): Risksamhället. En väg mot en annan modernitet. Göteborg: Daidalos. Dynes, Russell (1998): Coming to terms with community disasters. I: Quarantelli (red): What is a disaster? London: Routledge. Holmberg, Sören & Weibull, Lennart (2001): Institutionsförtroende. I: Holmberg & Weibull (red): Det våras för politiken (SOMrapport nr 30/2001). Göteborg: Göteborgs universitet. Jarlbro, Gunilla; Sandberg, Helena & Palm, Lars (1997): Ammoniakolyckan i Kävlinge. Stockholm: Styrelsen för psykologiskt försvar, Meddelande 142. Johansson, Anders (2002): Terror på Liberty Street (magisteruppsats i medie- och kommunikationsvetenskap). Örebro: Örebro universitet. Kumm, Björn (2001): Terrorismens historia. Lund: Historiska media. Lagadec, Patrick (1993): Preventing Chaos in a Crisis. Strategies for prevention, control och damage limitation. London: McGraw-Hill. 44 REFERENSER Larsson, Larsåke (2001): Tillämpad kommunikationsvetenskap. Lund: Studentlitteratur. Larsson, Larsåke & Nohrstedt, Stig Arne (1996): ”Det ser verkligen illa ut.” Kommunikationsproblem i samband med Estoniakatastrofen 1994. Stockholm: Styrelsen för psykologiskt försvar, Rapport 168-1. Larsson, Larsåke & Nohrstedt, Stig Arne (2000, red): Göteborgsbranden. En studie om kommunikation, rykten och förtroende. Stockholm: Styrelsen för psykologiskt försvar, Rapport 179. Lerbinger, Otto (1997): The Crises Manager. Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum. Mitroff, Ian (2001): Managing Crises Before They Happen. New York: Amacom. Nationalencyklopedin 1998, Band T. Nord, Lars (1998): Gasolyckan i Borlänge. Stockholm: Styrelsen för psykologiskt försvar, Meddelande 146. Norling, Anna (2001): Olycksplats Borlänge bangård. Stockholm: Styrelsen för psykologiskt försvar, Meddelande 158. Nohrstedt, Stig-Arne & Ottosen, Rune (2000): Journalism and the New World Order. Göteborgs universitet: Nordicom.
Page 1 and 2: Styrelsen för PSYKOLOGISKT FÖRSVA
Page 3 and 4: Utgiven av Styrelsen för psykologi
Page 5 and 6: 4 SPFs FÖRORD Attentaten mot World
Page 7 and 8: 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 KLOCKAN 14.46 - E
Page 9 and 10: Vanligen skiljer man på tre typer
Page 11 and 12: anden. Många tusen anhöriga och a
Page 13 and 14: grupper, exempelvis vissa etniska g
Page 15 and 16: 16.45 (10.45) Samtliga regeringsbyg
Page 17 and 18: har kört in i WTC i New York’. D
Page 19 and 20: som hade drabbats. Så vi bestämde
Page 21 and 22: och en tredje gång senare på kvä
Page 23 and 24: udsfrågor och uppgifter kring USAs
Page 25 and 26: I samband med presskonferensen dist
Page 27 and 28: agerande från Statsrådsberedninge
Page 29 and 30: Denna fruktbara diskussion mellan R
Page 31 and 32: uppfattades ganska snabbt ha fått
Page 33 and 34: Informationsenhetens presstjänst f
Page 35 and 36: Växjö universitet hade ett liknan
Page 37 and 38: Idag är det nästan svårt att beg
Page 39 and 40: SAMMANFATTNING OCH SLUTSATSER Atten
Page 41 and 42: tillsattes först under november m
Page 43: SWEDISH AUTHORITIES’ CRISIS COMMU
Page 47 and 48: Kortare intervjuer (telefon) eller
Page 49: 11 SEPTEMBER - Svenska myndigheters

11 september - Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap

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