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Major Export Enforcement Cases - Directorate of Defense Trade ...

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Department license. In carrying out the conspiracy, Khaki directed Yi and others to contact U.S.<br />

companies about purchasing U.S.-origin goods. Yi and other conspirators then purchased goods<br />

from various U.S. companies and had the goods exported from the United States through China<br />

and Hong Kong to Khaki and others in Iran. Yi and others made false statements to U.S.<br />

companies on behalf <strong>of</strong> Khaki to conceal that Iran was the final destination and end-user <strong>of</strong> the<br />

goods. For example, the indictment alleges that Khaki reached out to an individual in China, as<br />

well as to Yi, and to an undercover agent in the United States to obtain 20 tons <strong>of</strong> C-350<br />

maraging steel from the United States for Khaki’s customer in Iran. In late 2008, Khaki also<br />

reached out to an individual in China about procuring 20 tons <strong>of</strong> 7075-O aluminum alloy 80mm<br />

rods and 20 tons <strong>of</strong> 7075-T6 aluminum alloy 150 mm rods from the United States or Europe.<br />

Khaki also allegedly sought to obtain mass spectrometers from the United States, including a<br />

magnetic mass spectrometer for the isotopic analysis <strong>of</strong> gaseous uranium hexafluoride, which is<br />

used in the gas centrifuge process to enrich uranium. Khaki and Yi also conspired to obtain<br />

other items from U.S. companies that can be used for gas centrifuges, including measuring<br />

instruments, MKS Baratron pressure transducers, vacuum pumps and other accessories, according<br />

to the charge. Khaki also allegedly sought to obtain radioactive source materials from the United<br />

States, including barium-133 source, europium-152 source, cobalt-57 source, and cadmium-109<br />

source. Finally, the indictment alleges the defendants were able to successfully cause the illegal<br />

export <strong>of</strong> two Twister Speed Lathes as well as nickel alloy 120 wire from the U.S. through China<br />

to Iran. This investigation was conducted by ICE.<br />

Assault Rifle Magazines to Mexico – On July 9, 2012, Mexican national Teodoro Sanchez-Alejo<br />

and Alejandro Rivera-Ruiz <strong>of</strong> Laredo, Texas, pleaded guilty in the Southern District <strong>of</strong> Texas to<br />

attempting to illegally smuggle a total <strong>of</strong> 300 assault rifle magazines to Mexico. The magazines<br />

were designed for AK-47 type assault rifles and M-16/M-4/AR-15 type assault rifles. The<br />

investigation was conducted by ICE, ATF and CBP.<br />

Military S<strong>of</strong>tware Used For China’s First Modern Attack Helicopter -- On June 28, 2012, in the<br />

District <strong>of</strong> Connecticut, Pratt & Whitney Canada Corp. (PWC), a Canadian subsidiary <strong>of</strong><br />

Connecticut-based defense contractor United Technologies Corp. (UTC), pleaded guilty to<br />

violating the Arms <strong>Export</strong> Control Act and making false statements in connection with its illegal<br />

export to China <strong>of</strong> U.S.-origin military s<strong>of</strong>tware that was used in the development <strong>of</strong> China’s first<br />

modern military attack helicopter, the Z-10. In addition, UTC, its U.S.-based subsidiary<br />

Hamilton Sundstrand Corp. (HSC), and PWC all agreed to pay more than $75 million as part <strong>of</strong> a<br />

global settlement with the Justice Department and the State Department in connection with<br />

various export violations, including those related to the Z-10, and for making false and belated<br />

disclosures to the U.S. government about the illegal exports for the Z-10. A three-count criminal<br />

information was filed against the companies. Count one charged PWC with violating the Arms<br />

<strong>Export</strong> Control Act for the illegal export <strong>of</strong> defense articles to China for the Z-10 helicopter.<br />

Specifically, in 2002 and 2003 PWC knowingly and willfully caused HSC military s<strong>of</strong>tware used<br />

to test and operate PWC engines to be exported to China for the Z-10 without any U.S. export<br />

license. PWC knew from the start <strong>of</strong> the Z-10 project in 2000 that the Chinese were developing<br />

an attack helicopter and that supplying it with U.S.-origin components would be illegal.<br />

According to court documents, PWC’s illegal conduct was driven by pr<strong>of</strong>it. PWC anticipated<br />

that its work on the Z-10 attack helicopter in China would open the door to a far more lucrative<br />

civilian helicopter market in China potentially worth as much as $2 billion to PWC. Count two<br />

<strong>of</strong> the information charged PWC, UTC, and HSC with making false statements about these illegal<br />

exports to the State Department in their belated disclosures, which did not begin until 2006.<br />

Count three charged PWC and HSC for their failure to timely inform the State Department <strong>of</strong> the<br />

unlawful export <strong>of</strong> defense articles to China, an embargoed nation, as required by U.S. export<br />

regulations. This is the first case in which the provisions in count three have been enforced<br />

19

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