Sequentielle Verteilungsspiele ¨Uberblick Das Ultimatumspiel ...

Engelmann und Strobel (2004): Weitere SpieleSie sind weiter Spieler 2.TreatmentR P EyA B C A B C A B CSp. 1 11 8 5 14 11 8 21 17 13Sp. 2 12 12 12 4 4 4 9 9 9Sp. 3 2 3 4 5 6 7 3 4 5Verteilung der Entscheidungen (in Prozent)27 20 53 60 7 33 40 23 27Potentielle EntscheidungskriterienU-Avers × × ×Effizienz × × ×Falk, Fehr und Fischbacher (2003)22 ECONOMIC INQUIRYMini-Ultimatumspiel: Spieler 1 kann nur aus zwei möglichen UltimatenwählenFIGURE 1The Mini-Ultimatum GamesEs kann auch passieren, dass sich die Mehrheit gegenUngleichheitsaversion und Effizienz entscheidet.Selbst eine Mischung der beiden kann nicht alles erklären. Ist es vielleichtetwas ganz anderes?24 ECONOMIC INQUIRYErgebnisse FIGURE 2TABLE 124Rejection Rate of the (8/2)-Offeracross GamesECONOMIC INQUIRYExpected Payoffs for the Proposersfrom Different OffersFIGURE 2Expected ExpectedTABLE payoff Percentage 1Rejection Rate of the (8/2)-Offerpayoff Expected of of thePayoffs alternative for of the(8/2)-Proposersacross Games Game the 8/2-offer fromoffer DifferentproposalsOffers(5/5)-game 4.44 Expected 5.00 Expected31payoff Percentage(2/8)-game 5.87 payoff 1.96 of of the alternative 73 of (8/2)-(10/0)-gameGame7.29the 8/2-offer1.11offer100proposals(5/5)-game 4.44 5.00 31(2/8)-game 5.87 1.96 73the rejection rate from 18% to roughly 45%(10/0)-game 7.29 1.11 100in the (5/5)-game suggests that intentionsdrivenpunishment behavior is a major factor.Thus, ithe seems rejection that reciprocity rate from 18% is actually to roughly 45%driven by both in the outcomes (5/5)-game and intentions. suggests that intentionsdrivenwe takepunishment a look at the behavior proposers’ is a major fac-Finally,(4 subjects) in the (10/0)-game. 7 The nonparametricCochran Q-test confirms that thetor. Thus, the varying it seemsacceptance that reciprocity rate is actuallybehavior. Givenof the (8/2)-offerdifferences in rejection rates across the fourdriven by theboth expected outcomes return andfromintentions.Je günstiger die Alternative für denthis Responder, offer alsogames are significant (p < 0001). It alsoFinally, varied desto we across take weniger games. a lookTable zufrieden at the1proposers’ ist(4 subjects) in the (10/0)-game. 7 The shows non-thaparametric 2) the difference between thebehavior. Given the varying acceptance rateit was least profitable to proposeconfirms er mit (8, that Cochran Q-test confirms that (8/2) the in the (5/5)-game and most profitable in(5/5)-game and the other three games isof the (8/2)-offer the expected return fromdifferences in rejection rates across the the four (10/0)-game. The expected payoff of thestatistically Es geht significant also nicht (p < nur 0001). umPair-wiseAuszahlungen this offer also varied across games. Table 1games are significant (p < 0001). It alternative also offers exhibits the reverse order.comparisons that rejection rateshows that it was least profitable 8to proposeFFF: Scheinbar confirms that interpretieren the difference die between Spieler Thistheindicates u.a. that given the rejection behaviorofisthe responders, the payoff-maximizingin the (5/5)-game is significantly higher than(8/2)diein theIntention(5/5)-gamedes and mostProposersprofitable in(5/5)-game and the other three gamesin (Wählt the (2/8)-game statisticallyer (8,(p 2) = significantaus 017, Freundlichkeit two-sided) (p < 0001). and Pair-wiseoder aus the Egoismus?)(10/0)-game. The expected payoff of thechoice is (5/5) in the (5/5)-game, (8/2) in thethat the difference comparisons between confirm the that (2/8)- theandalternative offers exhibits the reverse order.rejection (2/8)-game, rate8and also (8/2) in the (10/0)-game.the (10/0)-game in the is(5/5)-game also highly is significantly (p =This indicates that given the rejection behaviorof the responders, the payoff-maximizinghigher The than last column in Table 1 shows that the017, two-sided). in the The (2/8)-game difference (p between = 017, two-sided) thevastandmajority of the proposers made indeed(2/8)- and that the (8/2)-game the difference is, however, between onlychoice is (5/5) in the (5/5)-game, (8/2) in thethe (2/8)- theandpayoff-maximizing choice in each game.(weakly) significant if one is willing to apply(2/8)-game, and also (8/2) in the (10/0)-game.9the (10/0)-game is also highly significant Although (p = this proposer behavior is consistentthewith the assumption that the majoritya one-sided017, test two-sided). (p = 068, The one-sided). difference TheThe last column in Table 1 shows that thebetweendifference between (2/8)- and the the (8/2)- (8/2)-game and the (10/0)-vast majority of the proposers made indeedis, however, of only the proposers maximized their expectedgame is clearly not significant (p = 369, two-the payoff-maximizing choice in each game. 9Ablehnungswahrscheinlichkeit von (8, 2) hängt am Wert der Alternative(8, 2) wird auch abgelehnt, wenn die Alternative (8, 2) ist – reine U-AversionÄhnliche Ergebnisse in Brandts and Sola (2001, GEB). Aber . . .2426y is (5/5). This game is therefore called the(5/5)-game. Game (b) is called the (2/8)-gamebecause the alternative offer y is to keep 2points and to give 8 points to R. Note that inthe (2/8)-game P has only the choice betweenan offer that gives P much more than R (i.e.,8/2) and an offer that gives P much less thanR (i.e., 2/8). 4 In game (c) P has in fact noalternative at all, that is, he is forced to pro-Charness und Rabin (2002)the case of an x- and for the case of a y-offer,without knowing what P had proposed. 5At the beginning subjects were randomlyassigned the P or the R role, and they keptthis role in all four games. Subjects faced thegames in a varying order, and in each gamethey played against a different anonymousopponent. They were informed about theoutcome of all four games, that is, about theSehrpose ähnliche the offer (8/2). Spiele We call it(mit the (8/2)-game. den experimentellen choice of their opponents, Ergebnissen only after they had an den Ästen):Finally, in game (d) the alternative offer is made their decision in all games. This procedurenot only avoids income effects but also(10/0), hence it is termed the (10/0)-game.To get sufficient data we employed the strategymethod, that is, responders had torules out that subjects’ behavior is influencedspec-Pl. 2Pl. by 1 previous decisions of their opponents. Pl. 1ify complete strategies in the game-theoreticsense. Thus, every responder hadOut to : indicate 41% 5. In In: principle, 59% it is possible that the strategy Out : 73% methodhis action at both decision nodes, that is, for induces different responder behavior relative to a situationwhere Pl. responders 2 have to decide whether 7.5, to7.5 acceptL : 100% R : 0%5, 54. The payoff structure of this game is similar to the a given, known, offer. However, Brandts and CharnessIn : 27%Pl. 2so-called best-shot game, which was first studied by Harrisonand Hirshleifer (1989) and subsequently by Pras-L : 91% cating that the strategy R : 9% method does not induce differentL : 88% (2000) and Cason and Mui (1998) report evidence indinikarR : 12%and Roth (1992).behaviors.8, 2 0, 08, 2 0, 08, 2 0, 0Mit ganz anderen Ergebnissen(8, 2) wird nur sehr selten abgelehntselbst neben der (7.5., 7.5), wo dieser Vorschlag besonders egoistisch wirktWert der Alternative spielt fast keine RolleOhne Alternative (Spiel ganz links) verschwindet die Ungleichheitsaversion!Einziger methodischer Unterschied zu FFF: dort waren die Rollenvorgegeben, hier (CR) wurden sie erst nach der Entscheidung ausgelostWie soll man die Unterschiede zu FFF (45% Ablehnung von (2, 8)) undzum Standard-Ultimatumspiel (75% Ablehnung von (2, 8)) erklären?2527