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The gender wage gap is the difference between ¯f(Ĉt) and ¯f(ĈM ). Since
at the steady state women leave the labour market with higher probability
than men, and wages are decreasing with this probability - see derivative
(4)- the previous result arises.
Comparative statics
The determinants of the distribution of preferences within the women’s
population at the steady state ˆq s ( µ, and F )affect the firm training in
female jobs and, consequently, the gender wage gap in the long run.
First, a lower probability to exit the labour market µ of f women results
in a higher fraction of job-priority women in the long run. Implicit
´
´
differentiation of (25), where w 2
³Ĉ (qs ; δ,µ) = f
³Ĉ(qs ; δµ) , yields:
h
1
dˆq s
dµ = F
1 − 1 F
f 0 ³Ĉ(·)´
∂Ĉ(·)
∂µ
i
∂w 2(Ĉ(qs;δ,µ))
∂ ˆq s
< 0,
which is negative because: (i) the denominator is positive since condition
(27) is verified at the steady state and (ii) the numerator is negative given
that the first-order condition for optimal training (2) implies ∂Ĉ
∂µ < 0.
Second, a lower non-monetary payoff of family care and housework F
leads to a higher fraction of job-priority women in the long run:
dˆq s
dF =
1 − 1 F
w 2(Ĉ(·))
F 2
∂w 2(Ĉ(qs;δ,µ))
∂ ˆq s
< 0;
this expression is clearly negative arguing, as before, with respect to the denominator.
The evolution and changes of this psychological payoff is beyond
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