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Download - Berlin School of Mind and Brain

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Georgina Torbet<br />

Cognitive Neuroscience Approaches to Freudian Repression<br />

This presentation will discuss the methods through which the empirical sciences may<br />

investigate psychoanalytic constructs, focusing particularly on repression. While<br />

repression is a well-known clinical phenomenon, it lacks a robust evidence base <strong>and</strong> is<br />

difficult to reconcile with current knowledge <strong>of</strong> experimental psychology. We have<br />

attempted to frame repression in terms <strong>of</strong> mechanisms which are well understood in<br />

cognitive neuroscience, in order to investigate this subject experimentally <strong>and</strong> to gather<br />

empirical data on it.<br />

We have built upon experiments in directed forgetting, in which people intentionally<br />

forget material which they had previously learned when instructed to do so. We have<br />

replicated this well-known effect, <strong>and</strong> exp<strong>and</strong>ed the paradigm to include cues given in a<br />

non-conscious way. Through innovative use <strong>of</strong> subliminal stimuli, we have attempted to<br />

demonstrate that unconscious cues can effect memory <strong>and</strong> induce forgetting. Some<br />

preliminary results will be presented, <strong>and</strong> implications for the empirical study <strong>of</strong><br />

psychoanalytic phenomena will be discussed.<br />

Joachim Lipski<br />

The Role <strong>of</strong> Neuroscientific Findings in Ascribing Intentional States<br />

The role <strong>of</strong> intentional terminology in neuroscientific contexts, one <strong>of</strong> the most crucial<br />

links between philosophy <strong>and</strong> the neurosciences, is still lacking a proper theoretical<br />

foundation. Available proposals range from a simple identification <strong>of</strong> intentional<br />

statements with corresponding neurological statements, to a more-or-less strictly causally<br />

moderated relationship, to denying the neurosciences the use <strong>of</strong> such terminology at all.<br />

Subscribing to any <strong>of</strong> these views will have a significant bearing on the role that<br />

neuroscientific findings play in the potential ascription <strong>of</strong> intentional properties, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

fact that these views are competing has led to many a controversial debate. Personally, I<br />

suggest that many <strong>of</strong> these proposals, while being mutually exclusive in their elaborated<br />

forms, have put forward valuable points which can be constructively integrated into a<br />

theory <strong>of</strong> translation between neuroscientific terms, ins<strong>of</strong>ar as they pertain to intentional<br />

phenomena, <strong>and</strong> intentional terms, such as they are being used in analytic philosophy.<br />

14

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