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tip of the spear (pdf) - The Air Commando Association

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Tip <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Spear<br />

20<br />

U.S. ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND<br />

SOF Fire Supporters Enhance<br />

Special Forces Battlefield Effects<br />

Fire Mission! Indirect fire from 105 mm artillery engages<br />

Taliban fighters during Operation Nam Dong. Battalion fire<br />

support NCOs coordinated <strong>the</strong> forward deployment <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong>se guns as well as <strong>the</strong>ir employment throughout <strong>the</strong> 10day<br />

operation. Courtesy photo.<br />

By Maj. David Mann<br />

USSOCOM Special Forces Joint Planner<br />

<strong>The</strong> employment <strong>of</strong> tactical and operational fires has always<br />

been critically important to Special Operations Forces throughout<br />

our military history. <strong>The</strong> Global War on Terrorism is no<br />

exception as it demands our SOF warriors employ fires with a<br />

degree <strong>of</strong> unprecedented precision and lethality. For several<br />

years, a small group <strong>of</strong> U.S. Army Fire Support Officers and<br />

NCO's known as a Fire Support Element (FSE) have played a<br />

crucial role in enhancing and maximizing this fires capability<br />

within <strong>the</strong> USASOC community.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Special Operations FSE concept began to gain traction<br />

during <strong>the</strong> early stages <strong>of</strong> Operation Iraqi Freedom within <strong>the</strong><br />

Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-West.<br />

“From <strong>the</strong> beginning, <strong>the</strong> success <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CJSOTF-W TST’s<br />

mission depended directly upon its ability to plan, request and<br />

control Joint Fires Support,” said Col. Robert Green, Assistant<br />

Chief <strong>of</strong> Staff for JFK Special Warfare Center and School.<br />

“During early operational planning, based on lessons-learned<br />

from Operating Enduring Freedom, it was determined that a<br />

separate entity would have to be created within <strong>the</strong> CJSOTF-W<br />

operations staff to manage this very complex Joint Fires<br />

environment.”<br />

Greene went on to say, “<strong>The</strong> success <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Joint Fires<br />

Element in coordinating joint fires support for CJSOTF-W can be<br />

measured in <strong>the</strong> operational results. Over <strong>the</strong> 27 days <strong>of</strong> initial<br />

combat operations in <strong>the</strong> western desert <strong>of</strong> Iraq, 393 Joint Fires<br />

deconflictions were conducted by <strong>the</strong> CJSOTF-W JFE, with zero<br />

instances <strong>of</strong> fratricide or injury by friendly fire. Concurrently,<br />

CJSOTF-W prosecuted <strong>the</strong> highest percentage <strong>of</strong> dynamic target<br />

strikes within <strong>the</strong> Iraqi Area <strong>of</strong> Responsibility, as reported in <strong>the</strong><br />

initial CENTAF OIF After Action Report.”<br />

As a result <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se initial FSE successes, in <strong>the</strong> 3rd quarter<br />

<strong>of</strong> fiscal year 2005, Human Resources Command in coordination<br />

with United States Army Special Operations Command and <strong>the</strong><br />

United States Field Artillery Center and School, approved a<br />

Directed Military Over-strength document authorizing <strong>the</strong><br />

organization <strong>of</strong> a Fire Support Element within <strong>the</strong> 7th Special<br />

Forces Group (<strong>Air</strong>borne). <strong>The</strong> purpose <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> new organization<br />

was two-fold: first, to resource a requirement, identified by both<br />

CJSOTF-Afghanistan and CJSOTF-Arabian Penninsula, for fire<br />

support personnel to support Special Forces elements in <strong>the</strong><br />

GWOT campaigns; second, to validate <strong>the</strong> concept for potential<br />

inclusion in <strong>the</strong> fiscal year 2008 Special Forces Group Band III.

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