GCE History Teachers' Guide - Unit 3 - WJEC

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DOCUMENT 3 DOCUMENT 4 GCE AS and A HISTORY UNIT 3 Teachers' Guide 31 [A cartoon titled 'Watchful Waiting' published in an American newspaper, The Daily Californian (October 1938)] 'We, the German Fuhrer and Chancellor, and the British Prime Minister, have had a further meeting today and are agreed in recognising that the question of Anglo-German relations is of first importance for the two countries and for Europe. We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German Naval agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again. We are resolved that the method of consultation shall be the method adopted to deal with any other questions that may concern our two countries, and we are determined to continue our efforts to remove possible sources of difference, and thus to contribute to assure the peace of Europe.' [Neville Chamberlain, British Prime Minister, in a public statement given on his return to London after the Munich conference (30 th September 1938)]
GCE AS and A HISTORY UNIT 3 Teachers' Guide 32 DOCUMENT 5 'Hitler's comments at the Hossbach meeting had already made it plain. He was aiming not just at the incorporation of the Sudetenland into the German Reich, but at destroying the state of Czechoslovakia itself. By the end of May, this aim, and its timing meant war – certainly against Czechoslovakia, and probably against the Western powers. Hitler, it became unmistakenly plain, actually wanted war. "Long live war – even if it lasts from two to eight years," he would proclaim to the Sudeten leader Konrad Henlein. Hitler felt cheated of the greater triumph which he was certain would have come from the limited war against the Czechs, which had been his aim all summer. Even military action for the more restricted goal of attaining the Sudetenland by force had been denied him.' [Ian Kershaw, an academic historian and specialist in the Nazi period, writing in a specialist book, Hitler: a Profile in Power (1991)] DOCUMENT 6 'After his meeting with Chamberlain, the Fuhrer spoke a long time to me and Schmundt over the results of the agreement. My impression is that he really liked the old gentleman and desires to negotiate more with him. The Fuhrer expressed the thought that things could now finally quieten down. He himself at present is in no way thinking on any kind of a step which might politically become dangerous. First, at the very least, the newly won prizes must be digested. And then too the solution of the controversial question with Poland won't run away. At a given time, he would proceed to soften up the Poles, for which task he would use the same methods that have now proven useful with the Czechs. In the long run however, peaceful quiet could be maintained only if the entire Versailles Treaty were annulled.' [Major Gerhard Engel, Hitler's army adjutant from 1938-1943, writing in his diary entry on October 1 st 1938. His diaries were published in German in 1976 and first published in English in 2006 and called At the Head of the Reach: the Secret Diaries of Gerhard Engel] DOCUMENT 7 'It was on the eve of Munich that I realized beyond a doubt that the enemies of the Third Reich were determined to have our hide at all costs and that there was no possibility of coming to terms with them. When that arch-capitalist bourgeois Chamberlain, with his deceptive umbrella in his hand, put himself to the trouble of going all the way to Berchtesgaden to discuss matters, he knew very well that he really intended to wage ruthless war against us. He was quite prepared to tell me anything which he thought might serve to lull my suspicions. His one and only object in undertaking this trip was to gain time. What we ought then to have done was to strike at once. We ought to have gone to war in 1938. It was the last chance we had of localizing the war. But they gave way all along the line and, like the poltroons that they are, ceded to all our demands. Under such conditions it was very difficult to seize the initiative and commence hostilities. At Munich we lost a unique opportunity of easily and swiftly winning a war that was inevitable in any case. Although we were ourselves not fully prepared, we were nonetheless better prepared than the enemy. September 1938 would have been the most favourable date.' [Adolf Hitler, in an alleged conversation with an unknown acquaintance, recorded by Martin Bormann, Hitler's secretary on February 1945. The transcript was found in Bormann's notes in the bunker]
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GCE History Teachers' Guide - Unit 3 - WJEC

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