Quick Fix or Quicksand? Implementing the EU Sahel Strategy - FRIDE

Nº114 

november 2012 

working paper 

Quick Fix or 

Quicksand? 

Implementing the 

EU Sahel Strategy 

Oladiran Bello

About FRIDE 

FRIDE is an independent think-tank based in Madrid, focused on issues related to democracy and human rights; 

peace and security; and humanitarian action and development. FRIDE attempts to influence policy-making and inform 

public opinion, through its research in these areas. 

Working Papers 

FRIDE’s working papers seek to stimulate wider debate on these issues and present policy-relevant considerations.

Quick Fix or 

Quicksand? 

Implementing the 

EU Sahel Strategy 

Oladiran Bello 

Researcher at FRIDE 

FRIDE acknowledges the generous support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 

Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, for this project.

© Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE) 2012. 

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ISSN: 2172-5829 (Print) 

ISSN: 2172-5837 (Online) 

Legal Deposit: M-45320-2010

Contents 

I. The EU approach: integrating development and security 2 

II The ‘core countries’ of the Sahel 5 

III. Algeria and Nigeria: pivotal ‘outliers’ still missing 11 

IV. Resetting EU engagement 15 

Conclusion 17

QUICK SHIFT OR QUICKSAND? 

1 

IMPLEMENTING THE EU SAHEL STRATEGY OLADIRAN BELLO 

Introduction 

The implementation of the EU Strategy for Security and Development in the 

Sahel 1 has coincided with dramatic changes in the region. Shifts in the Sahel’s 

geopolitical configuration – especially after the Libya conflict – have pushed the EU 

to recalibrate its implementation plans better to fit the transforming context. However, 

changes in the strategy’s geographical orientation and policy approach have been 

neither consistent nor flexible enough. The concerns that underpinned the design of 

an EU strategy for the region included threats from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 

(AQIM) and transnational criminal activities in the region’s ungoverned spaces. The 

establishment in early 2012 of a de facto theocracy in Mali by a coalition of radical 

Islamist groups linked to AQIM has greatly exacerbated those initial concerns. 

Far from being a remote outpost abutting the EU’s outer neighbourhood, a reconfigured 

Sahel is now a functional part of the reshaped post-Arab spring North Africa. With many 

Sahelian states faced with worsening insecurity and a declining regional capacity to 

address the potential negative spill-over effects, the need for effective EU re-engagement 

cannot be over-emphasised. EU interests in the region include the security of key 

energy suppliers, 2 trans-Saharan gas pipelines 3 and associated commercial interests, 4 as 

well as curtailing clandestine migration and tackling latent threats to contiguous EU 

territories 5 and Europe’s mainland. However, by initially focusing the Sahel Strategy on 

the weakest regional states like Mali, Niger and Mauritania – to the neglect of Nigeria 

and Algeria, the region’s two pivotal players – the EU incurred a serious geostrategic 

error. Recent developments have highlighted the limits of European action without a 

coherent engagement of regional powers. 

This paper analyses four interlinked sets of challenges facing the implementation of 

the Sahel Strategy. The first part looks at the EU’s shifting approach to the region, 

aimed at reconciling policy inconsistencies and geographical imbalances. The second 

section analyses the crisis in Mali following the Western intervention in Libya and its 

dampening effects on cooperation among Sahelian states. Third, the paper examines 

how the limited role originally envisaged for Nigeria and Algeria became a critical 

missing piece that constrained the strategy’s impact. Lastly, this paper offers some 

thoughts on how the EU can recalibrate its engagement better to reflect the region’s 

new geopolitical realities. >>> 

1. Henceforth, the ‘Sahel Strategy’, the EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel region was published in September 2011. Available 

at: http://eeas.europa.eu/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf 

2. Algeria, the home country of AQIM’s core leadership, is a strategic energy supplier to the EU. 

3. For example, Nigeria’s Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) supplied through trans-Saharan pipelines is projected to grow in importance as the EU seeks 

to diversify energy sources. 

4. These include DESERTEC, the €400 billion solar energy project based largely in the Sahara desert with an estimated capacity to provide 17 per 

cent of Europe’s power by 2050. See The Africa Report, September 2012, p.18. 

5. The Spanish enclaves (Ceuta and Melilla, both bordering Morocco), Spain’s Canary Islands, and several Mediterranean islands belonging to EU 

member states are all within close proximity to territories directly impacted by conflict and instability in the Sahel.

2 

WORKING PAPER 114 

I. The EU approach: integrating 

development and security 

The Sahel Strategy argues that allied terrorist and criminal groups in the Sahel 

represent immediate and longer-term risks to European interests because of 

their growing ability to take advantage of weak state presence and other prevailing 

conditions in the region, including ‘extreme poverty… frequent food crises, rapid 

population growth, fragile governance, corruption [and] unresolved internal tensions’. 6 

To address these challenges, it advocates policy interventions that better integrate 

the development and security dimensions of EU policies. In March 2011, the EU 

Foreign Affairs Council adopted the Sahel Strategy and welcomed the identification 

of three ‘core’ countries – Mali, Mauritania and Niger – as its primary focus. 7 AQIM’s 

recent consolidation in northern Mali is pushing the EU to pay closer attention to this 

evolving security threat alongside the longer-standing governance and development 

challenges in the Sahel, and engage through its Common Security and Defence Policy 

(CSDP). 

One year into the implementation of the Sahel Strategy and amidst a deteriorating 

security and humanitarian outlook in the Sahel, the Foreign Affairs Council meeting of 

23 March 2012 restated the Council’s commitment to helping address the challenges 

facing the region. From the outset, the strategy relied on a poorly defined geographic 

framing that barely reflects the complex interactions among interlinked conflict systems 

spanning the Sahel. As one commentator notes, ‘the EU tends to consider the Sahel as 

an issue with a vertical orientation from North to South. Indeed, one can stretch the 

region from Northern Niger to Nigeria [through] Chad’. 8 In addition, development 

instruments have been disproportionately emphasised in the EU’s implementation 

efforts to the detriment of more security-based responses adapted to the mounting 

insecurity in the region. 

The drivers of recent changes in the Sahel are manifold. Libya’s regional role has been 

transformed post-Muammar Gaddafi; Nigeria’s Boko Haram (BH) is now a major 

player in Sahelian insecurity, whilst Algeria is staunchly opposed to EU security 

involvement in the area. Europe’s regional engagement has also been selective: regional 

bodies such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the 

African Union (AU) have only been gradually drawn into implementation efforts. 

At the same time, Mali’s destabilisation and the establishment of Islamist rule in its 

northern territories undercut the EU’s hope that democratic stability will undergird 

partnership with fragile Sahelian states. The increasingly fluid regional environment, 

in which both state authority and regional cooperation have been weakened, challenges 

6. Sahel Strategy, op. cit., p.2. 

7. Council Conclusions on an EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, 21 March 2011, para. 3. 

8. Bérangère Rouppert, ‘The European Strategy for Development and Security in the Sahel: Rupture or Continuity?’, Switzerland: GRIP, 16 January 

2012, p.12.


3 


key assumptions underlying the Sahel Strategy. As the EU contemplates with regional 

partners and other stakeholders steps to re-establish the rule of law and rebuild the 

foundations of de facto statehood in the weakest Sahelian states, it is vital that lessons 

are learnt from the latest developments. 

As part of recent EU efforts to adapt to the new realities on the ground, a Task Force 

Sahel charged with evaluating the performance of the strategy was set up by the 

European External Action Service (EEAS). It recommends ways in which the strategy 

could be improved to deliver concrete results on the ground. Among its members 

are the EU counter-terrorism coordinator, relevant geographic desks, the military 

planning staff and representatives of the Instrument for Stability (IfS). The group 

meets informally about two or three times each month. The recently created position 

of Regional Coordinator for the Sahel also plays a key role in this process. 

During the Swedish (2009) and Spanish (2010) presidencies of the EU, a series of factfinding 

missions were dispatched to Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Algeria. A second 

round of visits was organised to Nigeria, the AU and ECOWAS. In conceiving the 

strategy, however, neither ECOWAS nor other regional organisations had direct policy 

inputs as such. 9 Whilst the EU itself stresses regional ‘ownership’, the fact-finding 

missions did not fully compensate for the lack of a genuine EU dialogue with regional 

states on the strategy as a way of taking on board their specific concerns. Recent efforts 

to more closely involve regional organisations reflect the EU’s growing appreciation of 

interconnected regional dynamics, the cost of uncoordinated efforts, and the dampening 

effect these are having on the EU’s modest development cooperation gains. Reflecting 

the renewed instability in the Sahel after the Libya conflict, the strategy’s geographical 

focus has also been expanding, albeit reactively. 

In September 2011, the EU began prioritising governments’ commitment to efforts to 

tackle terrorism in the Sahel as a determining criterion for funding allocations. Mauritania 

and Niger have been closely courted as a result. The amount committed has also increased, 

including through the European Development Fund (EDF), which granted an additional 

sum of €150 million to the end of 2013. 10 This increase was partly aimed at fostering the 

operational involvement of local stakeholders. The Red Cross for example has undertaken 

implementation contracts on behalf of the EU in northern Niger. 

Last year, the EU estimated that approximately €650 million of its existing or pipeline aid 

allocations were directly contributing to the objectives of the Sahel Strategy. 11 Yet, direct 

investment in security sector reform (SSR) in the region was not prioritised until recently. 

In parts of the Sahel Strategy, rule of law and law enforcement challenges were conflated 

with SSR challenges. 12 The unclear EU perspective on security constrained European 

field activities. Major difficulties emerged in terms of recruiting experienced personnel 

to dangerous frontline roles without adequate security. 13 Progressive adaptations are 

however allowing the EU gradually to address these gaps. >>> 

9. This especially sits at odds with the strategy’s declared aim of strengthening African responsibility and ownership. See Sahel Strategy, op. cit., p. 4. 

10. Ibid., p.8. 

11. Ibid., p.8. 

12. Ibid., section 2 on ‘Challenges’, p.3. 

13. Interview at the EU Delegation to Niger, 11 November 2011.

4 


In this sense, SSR efforts have emerged as a policy priority to bridge the security shortfalls 

in the strategy’s initial approach. A civilian CSDP mission was deployed to Niger in the 

summer of 2012. EUCAP SAHEL Niger is expected to last two years with an estimated 

budget of around €8.7 million in its first year. The mission is mandated to strengthen the 

capacity of Niger’s security forces to counter the threats of terrorism and organised crime 

via training, mentoring and advising. AQIM’s repeated attacks on European citizens and 

interests in Niger have long demonstrated the government’s weak capacity vis-à-vis the 

Islamist threat. 14 Following the Niger deployment, the Foreign Affairs Council of 15 

October requested that the planning of a military CSDP operation be pursued, with a 

view to deploying 150 senior military trainers to help reorganise the Malian army. 

These country-based deployments are modelled on the well-tested SSR format, rather 

than an armed counter-terrorism or stabilisation mission. 15 However, there are concerns 

that the missions are too small to be effective. EUCAP SAHEL Niger will comprise 

fifty international staff at full operational capacity, most of them civilian judicial and 

police experts embedded within the EU delegation. Because of their limited scale 

and piecemeal approach, it is also not clear exactly how the Niger mission and the 

envisaged operation in Mali will link up with enforcement actions currently being 

contemplated by sub-regional actors within ECOWAS. 

Despite the Task Force Sahel’s efforts, serious blind spots continue to limit the impact 

of the strategy. One major challenge has been the difficulty for the EEAS to fulfil its 

expected coordination role of the overall European presence and action in the region. 

In particular, France and to a lesser extent a number of other EU member states with 

important interests in the region often operate in parallel to the Union. In France’s 

case, the country has been trying to ‘Europeanise’ its efforts by pushing for CSDP 

missions in Niger and Mali. Nevertheless, Frances’s role in the Sahel has also been 

one of the greatest obstacles to securing comprehensive regional backing for the EU 

strategy. For example, Algeria distrusts France and oftentimes equates French positions 

to those of the EU. Beyond Algeria, France’s hyperactive diplomatic role in the Sahel, 

its ubiquitous and often complex ties to various regional actors and its role as virtual 

spokesperson for the EU in the high politics of Malian crisis diplomacy at the UN 

Security Council (UNSC) have entrenched this impression. 

It is also questionable whether the EU’s broad objectives in terms of weakening 

extremist forces and helping to rebuild regional states’ capacities have been helped 

by specific actions of individual EU member states. This is illustrated for example by 

the controversial Spanish-Italian decision to pay ransom to Islamist insurgent groups 

in northern Mali in July 2012 to secure the release of aid workers kidnapped by Al- 

Qaeda affiliated groups. Both the EEAS and the Commission remained silent amidst 

criticisms of the ransom payment. It would appear that regardless of the concerted 

efforts going into the strategy implementation, the long-running search for a coherent 

EU approach to the Sahel continues. 16 

14. ‘EUCAP SAHEL Niger’, EU Common Defence and Security Policy (CSDP), 16 Jul 2012. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/ 

security-defence/eu-operations/eucap-sahel-niger?lang=en 

15. The EUNAVFOR deployment to tackle piracy off the Somali coast and the Indian Ocean is distinct in that it is a sea-based, enforcement operation 

to complement other multinational forces present in the Indian Ocean. 

16. Thomas Renard, Terrorism and other Transnational Threats in the Sahel: What Role for the EU?, Brussels: Centre on Global Terrorism Cooperation, 2010, p.5.


5 


The fallout from the conflict in Libya also remains a key challenge to the strategy’s 

functional coherence on the ground. The AU has been proven right in warning against the 

security implications of the campaign in Libya on the Sahel region. A related but largely 

unanticipated side-effect of the Libya campaign is the dampening effect that growing 

instability has had on regional cooperation. The latter has plummeted to a new low since 

the outbreak of the Malian impasse and the regional division created in its wake. 

II. The ‘core countries’ of the Sahel 

The Sahel Strategy confronts major challenges in terms of the complexity of 

the region, the divergent approaches of key players to Mali’s crisis, and the EU’s 

slow pace of adjustment to the new realities on the ground. Whilst the Sahel Strategy 

hinges on improved regional cooperation to make a real difference, it has papered 

over the widening regional cracks, particularly since the Libya conflict. Meaningful 

cooperation among local and international actors in the Sahel is now arguably at the 

lowest it has been in recent decades. This situation is not helped by the EU’s failure 

to link the strategy to existing regional initiatives or explicitly complement them. 

Fragmented regional responses to challenges in the Sahel are therefore compounded 

by European as well as regional actors’ actions. 

In truth, divisions in the Sahel have deeper roots connected to the region’s realities. 

First, assessments of the security threats facing the region have long been dominated 

by the concern over AQIM. However, understandings of the threat and needed 

responses often diverge. 17 Second, Algerian reticence undoubtedly remains a problem 

for the EU but Algiers’ single-mindedness on crisis management in Mali is only one 

of the many challenges. General distrust among regional actors is compounded by the 

lack of capacity and vision among the weakest states. 

2.1. Mali’s crisis: new crucible of instability 

Mali is at the epicentre of the reshaped Sahel in the wake of the Libya conflict. Strategic 

calculations and actor configurations are being redefined. Arms and militant flows 

have exacerbated existing insecurities in states like Niger and Mauritania, but the 

most devastating effects have been visible in Mali. 18 The EU’s significant investment 

there has not been rewarded. Mali received substantial aid allocations under both the 

EDF and the IfS. This stood at €244 million at the end of 2011, by far the largest 

of all the three ‘core’ countries in the Sahel Strategy. Throughout 2011, the EU 

17. Some analysts argue that besides posing a negligible extra-regional threat, AQIM’s strength is overestimated by Western intelligence agencies. 

Some experts estimate AQIM’s southern battalion at just about 300 fighters before the 2012 rebellion in northern Mali. See http://www. 

aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/07/20127119230807934.html 

18. The EU Council meeting of 22-23 March 2012 underlined its determination to support Sahelian countries in addressing the spill-over effects of 

the crisis in Libya. 

>>>

6 


complained about Bamako’s lax attitude towards terrorism in the Sahel, but all the 

while expressing readiness to help restore the rule of law and extend central authority 

to contested zones in its north. Instead of the hoped for improvement, a January 2012 

rebellion saw northern Mali fall to the control of a Taliban-like coalition of jihadists 

and nationalists. This development carries serious implications for the country, the 

region and the EU. 

First, the scale and capacity of the rebel offensive led by the Tuareg National 

Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA) 19 is certainly unprecedented. 

Bolstered by sophisticated arms from Libya, the rebellion quickly overwhelmed Mali’s 

under-equipped and demoralised army. The scale of the crisis also dwarfs the limited 

regional capacity for a military response. Most crucially, the Malian government’s 

handling of challenges old and new has been incompetent. Whilst moderate Tuaregs 

have reached out to the central government in Bamako, the Malian military has 

maintained an uncompromising stance even though it lacks the capacity to impose 

a military solution in the north. This continues a long established pattern: in 2010, 

the government rejected offers from Tuareg rebel leaders to fight and expel AQIM 

from the north of the country. Bamako’s lukewarm reception had undoubtedly been 

influenced by the long-standing distrust between the two sides. 

Second, with terror groups and separatist movements in the Sahel now resurgent and 

strengthened, the generalised insecurity is undermining needed cooperation among 

regional states. In particular, AQIM-allied groups have opportunistically ousted the 

Tuareg separatists to consolidate Islamist control over northern Mali. 20 AQIM is also 

proving increasingly adept at projecting influence across the region, from Libya’s 

unstable south, through Mauritania and Niger to Nigeria’s volatile northern fringes. 

Previously marginal or little known groups such as the Ansar Deen and Nigeria’s 

Boko Haram have therefore gained strength on the back of the Malian upheaval. 

These developments have further complicated the EU’s ability to master the terrain. 

Third, regional and international responses to Mali’s territorial disintegration are inchoate 

and potentially worsening insecurity levels. As AQIM evolves from a local group to the de 

facto government, ruling an enclave the size of France in northern Mali, huge implications 

are emerging for the Sahel Strategy’s implementation. Mali’s state institutions have been 

strained by the multi-level political and military crisis, challenging the strategy’s focus on 

working with and strengthening state actors in the region. Whilst EU non-humanitarian 

aid to the country was suspended in the aftermath of a 21 March military coup in the 

capital, the gradual resumption of development cooperation is essential to shore up 

social service delivery and the fragile new transitional administration. 

Regional diplomatic efforts have meanwhile failed to make a breakthrough. AQIMaffiliated 

groups such as the Movement for Oneness of Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) 

and Ansar Deen have been able to use de facto control of territory in Mali’s north as 

leverage in ECOWAS led diplomatic negotiations with insurgents. Fragmentation 

19. The group’s name in French is the Mouvement National pour la Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA). 

20. The Al-Qaeda allied MUJAO and Ansar Deen aim to extend the sharia throughout Mali as a whole, as opposed to the MNLA’s secularist objective 

of founding an Azawad home-state in Mali’s north.


7 


Guinea 

Bissau 

Senegal 

Mauritania 

Mali Niger 

Burkina Faso 

Ghana 

Benin 

Note that the Cape Verde Islands, although not included in the map, are also defined as Sahel 

Nigeria 

among the insurgent groups in the north is also diminishing the prospects for a 

negotiated political settlement as the violent uprooting of MNLA nationalists by 

their erstwhile Islamist allies shows. The circumstances appear inauspicious for 

meaningful diplomatic progress. ECOWAS has therefore hedged its diplomatic efforts 

with parallel military preparations. The central plinth in ECOWAS’s efforts is the 

deployment of a 3,300-strong regional intervention force to protect Mali’s wobbly 

transitional government and to guarantee stability during the transition period. 

This potentially antagonises Algeria and its strong opposition to external military 

deployment in Mali. Promoting Malian SSR towards re-establishing a professional 

military force capable of leading the onslaught against Islamist rebels in the north has 

also emerged as an element of ECOWAS crisis management. On 12 October, the UN 

Security Council adopted resolution 2071, which requested from ECOWAS a clear 

outline of the means and modalities for its Mali intervention. 

2.2. The EU’s shifting approach to Mali’s crisis 

Togo 

S A H E L 

Cameroon 

Chad Sudan 

Central African Republic 

The outbreak of crisis in northern Mali has exposed the weakness of EU efforts to 

integrate development and security policies towards the Sahel. The EU’s piecemeal 

approach to crisis diplomacy in Mali contradicts the oft-repeated EU determination 

to play a more robust role in the region. The Malian crisis has significantly set back 

plans for the economic regeneration and political reintegration of northern Mali. 

The Sahel Strategy envisaged increased funding for the EU’s short-term crisis response 

through the IfS, alongside interventions geared to more long-term goals. The Special 

Programme for Peace, Security and Development in the North 21 (to which the EU 

21. Officially known as the Programme spécial pour la paix, la sécurité et le développement dans le nord du Mali (PSPSDN), the 32 billion CFA franc (US$ 

69 million) programme has components including governance, security, development, communication and management. 

>>>

8 


contributes through the IfS) was launched in 2010 with a view to strengthening state 

functions. Initiatives under the programme, including plans to construct roads, have now 

been suspended. 22 Its aim of providing alternative opportunities to northern youth most 

prone to recruitment by AQIM remains as valid as ever. Future efforts to re-launch the 

programme must tap into emerging insights on the diverse positions of different actors in 

the north. More targeted initiatives beyond state-led interventions are needed to strengthen 

groups such as youth leaders who have spoken out against violent Islamist extremism. Also, 

as shown by the divided reaction following the Tuareg led declaration of a Republic of 

Azawad in April 2012, opportunities do exist to identify secularists, moderates and Malian 

nationalists more amenable to the EU’s vision of progress and development. 

One of the EU’s ongoing actions includes support for a recently created Northern 

Mali Network for Peace and Security. This brings together individuals from different 

communities, factions and professions. The network currently serves as the main point 

of contact for Malian authorities and international partners. The latter include the Swiss 

Embassy in Bamako, the EU and the United Nations Development Programme. 

The intervention in Libya proved to be a serious humanitarian blind-spot for the EU. By 

January 2012, the more than 200,000 Malian Tuaregs who fled chaos in Libya arrived in 

food-vulnerable areas of the Sahel. This exacerbated humanitarian conditions and fuelled 

existing communal tensions in northern Mali. The EU has joined international efforts to 

address the serious food crisis in the Sahel by improving the area’s long-term resilience. 

This presents a major opportunity for the EU to implement programmes with a clear 

development-security linkage. 

In this respect, on 18 July the EU scaled up its assistance through the launch of the Alliance 

for Resilience in the Sahel initiative. 23 Senegal, Gambia, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina 

Faso, Niger, Chad and Nigeria are among several international and local partners and 

organisations involved. 24 EU funding was also increased by €40 million to bring the total 

response to the Sahel food crisis to €337 million. Whilst obviously still in need of traction, 

a rejuvenated Sahel Strategy could have significant value-added in the humanitarian field 

where the EU has unparalleled resources and expertise. 

The Malian crisis now challenges the EU to move beyond its own self-image as a ‘soft power’ 

in the region. This might require the integration of a more robust military dimension into 

the EU policy mix, not least in support of a possible ECOWAS deployment. For the time 

being, as noted above, the planning of a CSDP military operation tasked with reorganising 

and training the Malian security forces is ongoing. 

2.3. Niger and Mauritania: the fragile ‘core’ 

In Niger, a national counter-terrorism strategy to tackle domestic insecurity and 

respond to crisis in the Sahel was finally implemented in October 2011. The strategy 

focuses on social and economic development in six of the country’s eight northern 

22. Interview with senior EU official, 8 March 2012. 

23. This is also known in French as the Alliance Globale pour l’Initiative Résilience (AGIR). 

24. ‘Sahel food crisis – Commission scales up assistance and launches a Partnership for Resilience in Sahel’, see http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleases 

Action.do?reference=IP/12/613&type=HTML


9 


regions. 25 Its five main areas of intervention are the strengthening of security of 

goods and persons, the creation of economic opportunities for the population, 

the improvement of the access to basic services (water, education, and health), the 

enforcement of local governance, and the integration of returnees from Libya, Nigeria, 

and Ivory Coast. 26 

Nigerien President Mahamadou Issoufou has been at the forefront of efforts to drum 

up Western support for ECOWAS military action in Mali, stating poignantly on his 

tour of European capitals in June that Mali could become the next Afghanistan. 27 

While his country welcomed the deployment of the civilian CSDP mission EU 

SAHEL Niger, the Nigerien president also argued that more should be done by the 

EU and others to help contain Mali’s jihadist threat. Niger’s disquiet is understandable 

for many reasons. Due to the proximity of conflict-affected areas, Niger has received 

a large influx of refugees. The discontent among its own Tuareg population is not 

dissimilar to the one that triggered the Mali conflict. Historically, Tuareg uprisings in 

both countries have tended to follow similar patterns. Moreover, Niger feels hemmed 

in by violent Islamist groups in both Nigeria and Mali and opposes Algerian rejection 

of ECOWAS intervention plans. 28 

Since the ascension of Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz to the Mauritanian presidency in 

July 2009 and despite subsequent improvement in relations with Morocco, Algeria 

has been concerned about being outflanked or even encircled by its long-standing 

rival Morocco. For example, Mauritania’s counter-terrorism crackdown of July 

2010-February 2011 was met with Algerian ambivalence. Similarly, Algeria showed 

hostility towards the French-Nigerien joint operation in relation to the kidnapping 

of two young French citizens in 2011. To head off the risk of destabilisation from 

the Libya conflict, Mauritania has been committing resources to a Programme for 

the Prevention of Conflicts and the Consolidation of Social Cohesion (led by black 

Mauritanian returnees from Libya). This provides a vital opportunity for the EU to 

work with the government on several areas of internal policy that are key to greater 

domestic stability and wider security in the Sahel. Even then, Mauritania’s regional 

position has often ranged from cooperation with Niger, through bristling tensions 

with Mali, to support for Algeria’s obstruction of ECOWAS. 

2.4. Burkina Faso 

The EU’s vision of Burkina Faso’s role in its strategy implementation remains unclear. 

Not one of the original ‘core’ countries, it was nevertheless one of the four Sahelian 

states whose foreign ministers attended talks with the EEAS in December 2011. 

Burkina Faso’s expanding role in Malian crisis diplomacy has pushed the country 

to the forefront of ECOWAS diplomatic initiatives. Its president, Blaise Campaore, 

was appointed by ECOWAS to be its chief mediator very early in the Mali crisis. The 

25. Rouppert, op. cit, p.8. 

26. Ibid., p.8. 

27. ‘Mali: Dangers of dealing with ‘Afghanistan of West Africa’, BBC website, published 13 June 2012. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldafrica-18427541 

28. ‘Mali an international terrorist base’, North Africa United. Available at: http://www.northafricaunited.com/Northern-Mail-an-international-terrorist- 

base_a1691.html [Accessed on 27 August 2012]. 

>>>

10 


Burkinabe foreign minister, Jibril Bassole, has also played a key role in the negotiations 

with insurgents in Mali. 

Burkina Faso’s bilateral cooperation with the EU and its member states has revolved 

mainly around development issues such as energy and electricity generation. Unlike 

the ‘core’ states, the EU acknowledged only that the strategy ‘affects’ Burkina Faso 

and Chad. At the same time, the EU Sahel Strategy recognises Burkina Faso’s 

frontline role in combating terrorism in the region. A strip of Burkina Faso’s northern 

territory is geographically within the Sahel zone, with a sizeable population of ethnic 

Tuaregs. Given the EU’s recent refocus on rewarding Niger and Mauritania for ‘best 

practices’ on security, Burkina Faso has receded further into the background of EU 

aid priorities. Yet, some estimates now put the number of Malian refugees in Burkina 

Faso at around 62,000. 

In addition, EU aid distributed to refugee camps in Burkina Faso has created tensions 

between refugees and locals – who also suffer from food shortages but receive no aid 

as they do not qualify as victims of a crisis. Meanwhile, outsiders have voiced concerns 

regarding Ouagadougou’s expansive interpretation of its negotiating mandate. Some 

find it suspicious that Foreign Minister Bassole’s dialogue with insurgents in Mali 

has excluded some groups, including MUJAO. He has instead pursued extensive 

discussions with Iyad Ag Ghali, leader of the Ansar Deen group. Arms supplies to 

MUJAO have also allegedly passed through Burkina Faso. 29 The French Ambassador 

has meanwhile voiced disquiet about the country’s role in negotiating ransom 

payments. Such payments have risen in importance since the Islamist takeover in 

northern Mali. 

The Spanish and Italian governments allegedly paid €15 million to militants in Mali 

for the release of three European hostages on 18 July 2012. 30 Critics doubt whether 

the Burkinabe foreign minister prioritises ECOWAS’s or his country’s views in these 

negotiations. 31 Reasserting the strong historical ties between both countries, France 

has recently reaffirmed its role as ‘facilitator’ of Burkina Faso’s lead role in regional 

crisis diplomacy. On 9 August, the UN secretary-general’s special representative for 

West Africa, Said Djinnit, also endorsed Burkina Faso’s role whilst cautioning that the 

country and its ECOWAS neighbours should embark on military intervention only 

at the request of Mali’s government. To stimulate regional cooperation and partner 

effectively with the UN and regional organisations working to stabilise Mali, the EU 

must better engage with Ouagadougou. 

29. ‘Qui livre des armes au MUJAO?’, Jeune Afrique 2695, 2-8 September 2012, p.7. Other sources pinpoint Qatar as the provenance of these arms. See 

Africa Confidential 53/18, 7 September 2012. 

30. ‘Three European hostages freed in Mali, FOR $15m’. See http://au.news.yahoo.com/world/a/-/world/14276733/three-european-hostages-freed-inmali-islamists-say-ransom-paid/ 

31. Justifying such suspicions, Burkina Faso pushed for a greater diplomatic role for Qatar in the Mali crisis, a position swiftly rebuffed by France. See Africa 

Confidential 53/18, op.cit.


11 


III. Algeria and Nigeria: 

pivotal ‘outliers’ still missing 

The limitations of a ‘core Sahel’ approach have become evident as Mali descends into 

chaos and the EU strategy has proved inadequate to nudge regional actors towards 

more coherent and effective cooperation. Success in the Sahel Strategy implementation 

requires that engagements with states, regional organisations and assorted grassroots 

stakeholders are complementary rather than exclusive. Dynamics in the ‘core’ Sahel cannot 

be easily separated from those in neighbouring states viewed as ‘outliers’. For too long, the 

EU’s distinction has rendered implementation of some aspects of the strategy difficult, 

particularly those requiring economic, security, humanitarian and governance cooperation 

within coherent regional frameworks. Without integrating meaningfully the pivotal 

‘outliers’ as central players in the Sahel Strategy, European cooperation with regional actors 

including ECOWAS is likely to remain diluted and ineffectual. 

3.1. Algeria: northern pivot 

A reluctant interlocutor, Algeria remains one of the weakest links in the EU’s envisioning 

of regional coordination and collaboration in the Sahel. Despite the recent improvement in 

relations, EU-Algeria dialogue on the Sahel has yet to bear tangible fruit. Even after attending 

a presentation by Algeria on its Fusion and Liaison Unit (FLU), which coordinates security 

with neighbours, EU officials admit they remain unclear about the functioning of the 

unit. 32 Given AQIM’s central role in promoting terrorism and radicalisation in the Sahel, 

the EU requires more than stinting cooperation from Algiers to make significant headway. 

AQIM has its roots in Algeria, which is also the country of origin of the organisation’s 

senior leadership. 

The group has been a useful tool for Algerian geopolitics. For example, Algeria 

instrumentalises jihadist activities to extract military assistance and support from the US, 

especially since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. Algeria also uses AQIM to boost 

its regional prestige by posturing as a bulwark against terrorism in the Sahel. In reality, 

the country suffers very little from the direct effects of AQIM’s violence and criminality. 

Kabylie on the Mediterranean coast is the only part of Algeria in which the group maintains 

a latent operational presence. 

Algeria’s insistence that dialogue and regional coordination exclude external powers like 

the EU is probably intended to create space for Algerian hegemonic projections and the 

consolidation of a sphere of influence over weaker states in the Sahel. 33 The country’s 

commitment to counter-terrorism has been repeatedly called into question. In northern 

Mali, for example, Algeria is seen as having played a double-game through its tolerance of >>> 

32. See Rouppert, op.cit, p. 9. Algeria ostensibly runs the Fusion and Liaison Unit (FLU) on behalf of other Sahel states. 

33. Laurence Aida Ammour, ‘The Sahara and Sahel after Gaddhafi’, CIDOB Briefing 44, January 2012.

12 


low-intensity instability. This was ostensibly to prevent the oil exploration that adequate 

security conditions would permit. Algiers worries that the discovery of oil in Malian wells 

could deplete oil reserves on its own southern frontiers. 34 

European suspicions of Algeria have also grown given the country’s inconsistent policy 

towards the Islamist insurgents controlling northern Mali since early 2012. Iyad Ag Ghali, 

head of the Ansar Deen group affiliated to AQIM, is known to maintain communication 

lines with Algeria’s intelligence service. Algiers supported only equivocally initial 

regional and international efforts to craft a regional military response towards restoring 

government control in Mali’s north. For example, whilst Algeria officially deplores 

Islamist control over Malian cities such as Gao, where seven Algerian diplomats were 

kidnapped in April, Algiers has maintained its vehement opposition to ECOWAS’s 

deployment of a stabilisation force there. 

The sources of Algerian non-cooperation with the EU are as deep-seated as they are 

varied. In April 2010, Algeria established a Joint Military Command with Mali, Niger and 

Mauritania. This move, ostensibly to chart a common approach through the pooling of joint 

monitoring forces totalling about 75,000, was part of Algiers’ attempt to curtail European 

security involvement. By the outbreak of the Malian crisis in 2012, participating states had 

yet to commit the needed troops. On 2 June 2011, Algeria led regional preparations for 

the fallout from the Libya conflict with a tri-border drill involving Mauritania and Mali, 

followed a week later by a joint Mauritanian-Malian attack against AQIM’s supply camp 

in a forest near Segou, Mali. 

In December 2011, Algerian instructors were sent to northern Mali even though Algeria 

had repeatedly voiced strong opposition to Mali’s role in facilitating ransom payments to 

terrorists. Meanwhile, Mali and other regional states point to certain controversial Algerian 

policies. First, it was the Algerian intelligence service that drove Algerian jihadists into 

Mali’s north. The same service has allegedly supported various Tuareg rebellions to counter 

Muammar Gadaffi’s influence. In December 2010, Mali’s President Toure, fearing a coup, 

removed Malian officers who were regarded as close to Algeria’s intelligence service. 

As noted above, Algeria seems keen to maintain perceptions of an ongoing threat of 

terrorism to further its own self-interests. Algeria’s attitude towards AQIM units operating 

deep in the Sahel away from its capital could be seen as a midway strategy between Mali’s 

evasive tactic and Mauritania’s blunt confrontation. Even as the Sahel faces widening 

destabilisation, a meeting of the Arab Maghreb Union scheduled for October 2012 in 

Tunisia was postponed. 35 Lingering differences between Morocco and Algeria have held up 

plans for a Maghreb summit since leaders from across the region last met in 1994. 

Algerian suspicion of EU intentions is further connected to historical animosities with 

France as a leading European state. As one analyst observed: ‘Algeria boasts reserves 

estimated at $230 billion. If France wants to play a role in the Arab world, it… knows full 

well that reconciliation with Algeria is an essential prerequisite. A more outward looking 

34. Annette Lohmann, ‘Who Owns the Sahara? Old Conflicts, New Menaces: Mali and the Central Sahara between the Tuareg, Al Qaida and organised 

crime’, Peace and Security Series 5, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2011. 

35. ‘Maghreb summit risks another delay’, Al Magharebia, 13 August 2012. Available at: http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/ 

features/awi/features/2012/08/13/feature-01


13 


and confident Algeria would have a very positive impact on the future of the North West 

African and broader West Mediterranean region. A key piece on the region’s chessboard, at 

the age of 50, Algeria can master its future. Yet, the question remains open: would Algeria 

dare?’ 36 Indeed, Algeria’s inconsistent positions on the Mali conflict have confounded many 

observers especially as the country’s broader interests are better served by a stable Sahel. 

As ECOWAS was working to secure the UNSC’s authorisation for the use of force against 

Islamist groups in northern Mali, the Joint Military Staff Committee of the Sahel Region 

met in Mauritania on 11-12 July under Algerian leadership. The meeting gathered military 

chiefs from Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. The declared aim of the meeting was to 

find a common solution to shared security problems in Mali and beyond, but it left out 

ECOWAS and other important diplomatic players like Senegal, Burkina Faso and Nigeria. 

Algeria also insists on the inclusion of all parties in diplomatic negotiations, including 

the Ansar Deen radicals led by Iyad Ag Ghali. 37 Yet, it is notable that under US pressure, 

Algeria appears to have been softening its stance as preparations for international military 

action in Mali shift into top gear. 

3.2. Nigeria: southern pivot 

The expansion of Boko Haram and the growing sophistication of its attacks have helped to 

crystallise the threats it poses not just to Nigeria itself but also to broader regional stability. 

Initially regarded as a wholly Nigerian phenomenon with little external connections, the 

group’s involvement in combat operations in Mali has drawn Nigeria further into efforts 

to stabilise Mali and the broader Sahel. 38 Until early 2012, EU officials insisted Abuja was 

not a Sahel power. 39 Evidence of BH’s growing involvement in Mali and Nigeria’s direct 

exposure to negative security spill-overs is gradually changing that outlook. For Nigeria, 

Boko Haram’s involvement in the conquest of Gao in northern Mali by Islamist groups 

represented a serious escalation. 

Unlike Algeria, which has long pursued a successful strategy of confining AQIM to its 

southern fringes and northern Mali, BH’s new found strategic depth in Mali and alliance 

with Al-Qaeda affiliated groups there exposes much of northern Nigeria to an existential 

terrorist threat. The country’s perceived lack of counter-terrorism experience was evident 

in the disagreement with the US over proposals to classify BH as an international terror 

group. 40 To the extent possible, Nigeria seemingly prefers to keep responses to BH local, 

which in part explains its slowness to mobilise ECOWAS for military action in Mali. As 

the regional anchor state on the southern Sahel fringes, the case for a more proactive EU 

engagement with Nigeria on the Sahel Strategy could not be clearer. As Nigeria’s multiple 

conflicts gradually become overlaid by the Islamist insurgency in the north, prudence 

dictates that Abuja must become more centrally involved in EU efforts to contain transborder 

instabilities and contagions from Mali. >>> 

36. Francis Ghilès, ‘Algeria 1962-2012: more questions than answers’, Opinión CIDOB 154, 3 July 2012. Available at: http://www.cidob.org/es/publicaciones/ 

opinion/mediterraneo_y_oriente_medio/algeria_1962_2012_more_questions_than_answers 

37. Al Magharebia, 16 July 2012. 

38. Before Mali, the only sign of Boko Haram’s possible international ambitions was the massive car bomb attack on UN headquarters in Nigeria’s capital, 

Abuja, in 2011. 

39. Interview with senior EU official, 24 February 2012. 

40. ‘Boko Haram: Jonathan under fresh US pressure’, The Guardian (Nigeria) [Accessed on 29 July 2012].

14 


The BH insurgency is rooted in local political dysfunction and economic grievances. Yet, 

evidence points to the emergence of logistical, ideological and operational outreach between 

Boko Haram and international jihadist groups. Recent Western intelligence assessments 

have further reinforced Nigerian concerns. In June 2012, the commander of the US 

military’s Africa Command highlighted evidence pointing to operational cooperation 

between Boko Haram and Al Shabab militants in Somalia. 41 In response, the EU has 

recently intensified its security engagement with Nigeria. 

The EU has been conducting high-level dialogues with Abuja, including a meeting between 

the EU counter-terrorism coordinator and Nigeria’s National Security Adviser in early 

March 2012. In addition, in February a Nigeria-EU dialogue was held in Abuja. However, 

the EU’s narrow approach of using development aid to improve governance in Nigeria may 

need scaling up to address inequality and economic grievances in the north where BH has 

attracted sympathisers. Plans for a strategic partnership between Nigeria and the EU have 

also long been in the pipeline. Reactivating these plans for a structured and comprehensive 

strategic engagement is vital for both partners and for security in the Sahel. In spite of this, the 

needed urgency has not been demonstrated to date. The 2009 EU-Nigeria Joint Way Forward 

document merely restates broad joint undertakings such as the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. A 

more focused approach, which prioritises Nigerian issues as a basis for launching broader 

dialogues on Nigerian contributions to shared regional objectives including security, is needed. 

Moreover, significant opportunities for scaling up current development engagements have 

not been fully explored. When Nigeria’s absolute size and needs are considered, more 

generous economic exchanges with the EU are needed to reduce poverty substantially. As 

home to roughly one-sixth of Africans, focusing on challenges such as job creation, social 

welfare and effective public governance in Nigeria can go a long way to contributing to 

overall EU development cooperation success in Africa. 

The Nigerian reaction to the Mali crisis and regional responses to Nigeria’s Boko Haram 

threat are still evolving. In November 2011, Nigeria joined the Algerian-led FLU. 

Closer EU cooperation with Abuja and Algiers, accompanied by more robust support 

to ECOWAS, would give a strong boost to the Sahel Strategy and significantly improve 

regional cooperation. For example, Nigeria’s Boko Haram militants were allegedly recruited 

by an Algerian, Khaled Bernaoui, for training in southern Algeria as early as 2006. Further, 

suspicion of BH presence in Lagdo (Cameroon) led to the closure of Cameroon, Chad 

and Niger’s borders with Nigeria in January 2012. Chadian President Déby also visited 

Cameroon on 29 December 2011 to discuss cooperation against the Islamist threat. 

Shortly after, both countries implemented a common defence programme run by joint 

border security commissions. 42 Highlighting the lack of a clear division of labour between 

the AU and sub-regional organisations, the government of Chad proposed sending its 

poorly equipped troops to Mali, sparking outcry from the country’s opposition. 43 

Because the long-mooted idea of African regional brigades remains a paper tiger, 44 an adhoc 

ECOWAS force drawn mainly from Nigeria will likely lead regional intervention in 

41. ‘Africa militant groups training fighters together and sharing funds, explosives’, Reuters [Accessed on 26 June 2012]. 

42. Ammour, op. cit. 

43. Radio France International (RFI) report, 20 August 2012. 

44. ‘Standing by to Standby: the African peacekeeping force with more problems than solutions’, The Daily Maverick (South Africa), 14 August 2012.


15 


Mali. If the Sahel Strategy is to have transformative effects, it must invest more directly and 

systematically in internal issues vital to Nigerian stability to strengthen the West African 

giant’s hand better to fulfil a regional stabilising role. 

IV. Resetting EU engagement 

The inadequacy of the EU’s focus on the ‘core’ states and the need to tackle 

challenges in the Sahel within a broader framework embracing both West 

Africa and the Maghreb have become evident. Uncertainties about how to bring 

Algeria and Nigeria fully on board therefore remain critical weaknesses in the 

strategy’s implementation. Although the strategy’s architects now acknowledge this 

is essential, suggestions along these lines were for long dismissed as distracting from 

the ‘core’ countries. Whilst closer engagement with Nigeria and Algeria has long 

been discussed at EU level, 45 it has not been effectively pursued or prioritised. Some 

studies have underlined the need to overcome mutual suspicion between the EU 

and Algeria as part of efforts to develop a meaningful engagement with the region’s 

‘indispensable partners’. 46 

Both Algeria and Nigeria are hegemons within the respective Maghreb and West 

African sub-systems bordering the Sahel. Increasingly, they both have direct interests 

in addressing security challenges there. Algeria feels that it possesses enough clout to 

unilaterally shape the Sahel’s cooperative architectures. 47 Furthermore, EU prioritisation 

of the ‘core’ states unhelpfully closed avenues for a region mobiliser like Nigeria to 

lead ECOWAS into crisis management in the increasingly unstable Sahelian backyard. 

ECOWAS’s dense institutional links to affected states – the original ‘core’ of Mali, 

Mauritania and Niger, plus Burkina Faso, Senegal and Nigeria – would have justified 

involving the sub-regional body in the Sahel Strategy’s design from the outset. Yet, 

notwithstanding the EU’s goal to ‘support the Sahel countries and their initiatives 

and not to substitute them’, 48 substantive engagement with ECOWAS did not begin 

until well after the strategy had been drafted. 

ECOWAS is regarded as one of the EU’s privileged regional partners in Africa. 

Increasingly, it is benefiting from the EU’s counter-terrorism assistance including on 

intelligence gathering and general capacity building. Qualifying projects have so far 

included the ECOWAS Peace and Security Project and the ECOWAS Drug and Crime 

Action plan, which together will receive €60 million in EU funding from 2012-2017. 

45. EEAS presentation, Transatlantic Symposium on Dismantling Transnational Illicit Networks, Lisbon, 18 May 2011, p.6. 

46. See Luis Simon, A. Mattelaer and A. Hadfield, ‘A Coherent EU Sahel Strategy’, Study for the European Parliament, DG External Policy, 2012, p.32. 

47. Such region-organising ambitions are evident in Algerian-led frameworks like the Joint Military Command based in Tamanrasset and set up in 2009 to 

coordinate counter-terrorism cooperation between Algeria, Mauritania, Mali and Niger. 

48. EEAS presentation, op. cit., p.13. 

>>>

16 


Also, the EU has been supporting multilateral initiatives amongst regional actors 

including the Sahel Security College and the West Africa Police information system. 

In spite of these programmes the terrorist threat in the region has grown, leading to 

calls for a more robust EU presence. Specific proposals include an EU contribution to 

surveillance and air mobile assets to strengthen regional capacities. 49 

Following the EU’s decision to start planning for a CSDP mission to Mali, ECOWAS 

has stepped up requests for additional European military support. After highlevel 

meetings on the sidelines of the General Assembly in September 2012, the 

UNSC moved towards authorising an ECOWAS intervention, arguably increasing 

the pressure for more muscular EU engagement either directly or through support 

for ECOWAS forces. Earlier in the crisis, the EU in a statement issued by the 

High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy on 23 July had declared its 

support in principle for ECOWAS’s military action. 50 The October Foreign Affairs 

Council invited the High Representative and the Commission to explore options for 

additional support, including in the field of planning, and the European Council on 

19 October endorsed the principle of EU support to an international military force 

in the region. The EU should urgently move towards supporting ECOWAS’s plans 

as part of a more coordinated, forward-looking engagement jointly to contain the 

Mali crisis. This can prove decisive, as ECOWAS itself has considerable experience 

in regional peace enforcement. 

For ECOWAS, the insurgency in northern Mali has reached a critical unprecedented 

threshold for intervening militarily. ECOWAS’s conditions for intervention include 

the existence of a conflict between its member states. Internal conflict occasioning 

a humanitarian disaster, a threat to peace or even mass atrocities such as large scale 

abuse of human rights could also be triggering factors. The Malian conflict though 

represents a watershed for ECOWAS which, unlike in its previous interventions, 

is seeking broad based international support including a UNSC authorisation to 

take action. 51 Eventual Security Council approval would also create greater scope 

for ECOWAS collaboration with non-member states like Algeria, Morocco, Libya 

and Chad. 52 It will also present opportunities to put to the test ECOWAS’s nuanced 

and expansive interpretation of the principle of responsibility to protect (R2P). 

The regional body has tried to segment measures related to R2P into three distinct 

elements, including the responsibility to prevent, react and rebuild. 

The Mali crisis and its potential regional ramifications strengthen the case for an 

ECOWAS led intervention with close EU backing. For example, one of the biggest 

threats to regional security and EU interests is a full scale alliance between statebacked 

narco-trafficking networks. This is already evident in the alleged collaboration 

between criminal organisations operating in West African states like Guinea Bissau 

49. See for example, Simon, Mattelaer and Hadfield, op.cit, p. 29. 

50. ‘EU ready to back African stabilisation force in Mali’, EUbusiness, 23 July 2012. Available at: http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/mali-politics.hu8/ 

51. Reflecting this effort, the African Union provided early endorsement for all of ECOWAS’s decisions on Mali. See http://news.ecowas.int/presseshow. 

php?nb=198&lang=en&annee=2012 

52. The UNSC resolution 2056 of 5 July 2012 expressed willingness to review ECOWAS’s mandate request, but emphasised the need for sanctions to restore 

peace.


17 


and jihadist groups in Mali. 53 Moreover, well calibrated EU incentives and pressures 

can encourage Algeria to engage more regionally, potentially kick-starting a barely 

existent ECOWAS-Algeria dialogue on regional security. 54 

Over time, recalibrating the EU’s engagement with ECOWAS could complement 

Algeria’s influence in the Sahel. This is vital since Algeria’s dominance of existing 

security arrangements with the smaller ‘core’ states has proved problematic. Suspicions 

of Algerian intent run deep among its contiguous neighbours. Left unaddressed, this 

risks stifling cooperation when decisive collaboration is needed. Part of the evidence 

lies in the Algerian insistence that the planned regional joint counter-terrorist force 

of about 75,000 men explicitly excludes the possibility of extra-regional involvement. 

More skilful EU engagement with regional powers such as Algeria and Nigeria and 

regional bodies like ECOWAS would provide voice and reassurance to smaller states 

whilst blunting the adverse effects of Algeria’s asymmetrical power advantages and 

Nigeria’s internal crises and distractions. 

Conclusion 

The EU Sahel Strategy has been slowly adapting to the rapidly changing 

dynamics of a very complex region. In spite of its shortcomings, it is gradually 

evolving into a project that could help mobilise fragmented regional actors around 

shared security objectives. A major challenge though remains for the EU in terms 

of how it can successfully engage all the important regional actors – ECOWAS, 

Nigeria and Algeria included – that are indispensable for a viable regional approach. 

The negative feedback loops connecting conflict systems at the ‘core’ and peripheral 

areas of the Sahel mean that more holistic EU approaches beyond narrow bilateral 

engagements are needed. The EU therefore needs proactively to harness the regional 

potential of key states like Nigeria and Algeria. 

Inadequate geographical scope, unclear operational connection with wider regional 

frameworks and initial reluctance to consider a more serious and direct security 

commitment have all limited the strategy’s impact. Unforeseen developments include 

the destabilising shockwaves from regime change in Libya and Mali’s implosion. These 

have not been prevented by EU actions and have affected the smooth implementation 

of the strategy. The Sahel Strategy requires greater operational flexibility in order 

to respond to the evolving outlook, but adaptation is complicated by long standing 

coordination problems in the region. 

53. See Ammour, op.cit. 

54. Melanie Cathelin, ‘EU’s Africa policy after Lisbon’, conference report, 18 October 2011, p.3. Available at: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/ 

media/Conference_Report_EU_Africa_Foreign_Policy_FINAL.pdf 

>>>

18 


On the humanitarian front, the region will be better able to cope with its worsening 

humanitarian crisis if international assistance focuses on promoting meaningful 

resilience. The Libya conflict triggered massive displacements whilst diffusing arms 

and militants throughout the region. In early 2012, these displacements have in turn 

exacerbated long standing ecological vulnerabilities like food insecurity to create 

one of the worst humanitarian emergencies seen in the region in decades. Incipient 

international efforts to strengthen regional and local coping mechanisms, including 

through the EU-led Partnership for Resilience in the Sahel, must be more targeted. 

Such efforts have mostly failed to leverage the region’s natural resilience capacities. 

Up-scaling investments in initiatives such as the Great Green Wall Initiative for the 

Sahara and the Sahel could help generate positive spinoffs to underpin community 

self-sustenance. 

Actions by the FAO, the UN and others also risk failing the long term sustainability 

test unless experience and insights from the grassroots levels are more systematically 

taken on board. There is a need more clearly to synthesise the ground level perspectives 

from NGOs, communities, campaigners and experts to better inform external 

involvement in the management of the environment, agriculture, food security and 

climate change issues as key conflict drivers in the Sahel. 

If the EU is to ultimately have a sustained impact in redressing interlinked challenges 

in this vast region bordering Europe’s southern neighbourhood, it must vigorously 

pursue steps towards providing unprecedented levels of military support to ECOWAS 

and the region. At a minimum, this should involve committing serious military and 

logistical support to a regional force with a clear UNSC enforcement mandate. 

More immediately, EU funding to Mali suspended after the coup should be restored. 

Without it the country has no chance of breaking its deepening political impasse 

and it will not be able to halt the widening deterioration on both the political and 

security fronts. The October Foreign Affairs Council has conditioned resumption 

of aid on a political roadmap and tangible progress in the Malian transition. Yet, 

EU assistance to expedite the deployment of an international force to Mali offers 

one of the best hopes of overcoming the stalemate in Mali’s ruling triumvirate of 

junta leader Amadou Sanogo, transitional President Dioncounda Traore and Prime 

Minister Cheik Modibo Diarra. 

To be sure, Mali’s crisis is of a different kind – and potentially of a far greater dimension 

– than West Africa has experienced so far. As such, containing its potential regional 

contagion should now rank as a top EU priority. As global jihadist involvement 

emboldens regional insurgent groups like BH, swathes of the region risk serious 

destabilisation from Senegal through Niger to Chad. At the same time, national 

and regional security response capacities appear grossly insufficient. Moreover, the 

potential danger of a geopolitical power rivalry between regional players like Algeria 

and ECOWAS, precisely when closer regional cooperation is needed, must encourage 

the EU more closely to bind both actors to the Sahel Strategy implementation efforts. 

The EU should therefore better target its political dialogue and financial leverage 

to push major regional stakeholders towards harmonising their often fragmented 

political, diplomatic and military initiatives.


19 


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