Radionuclide Dispersal Device The “Dirty Bomb” - The 2012 ...

Radionuclide Dispersal Device
The “Dirty Dirty Bomb” Bomb
Joe Alvarez, PhD, CHP
Fun Fong, MD FACEP

Radiation Terrorism Options
Radiation Source to Expose Public
Radionuclide Dispersal Device /
Weapon (RDD / RDW)
Criticality Device
Improvised Nuclear Device (IND)
Nuclear Weapon

Overview
History of “Dirty Bombs”
RDD Mechanics
Sources For Potential Diversion
TRU RDD
Aldridge Scenario
Center for Strategic and International
Studies Scenario

Radiation Terrorism - 24 Nov
1995
Ismailovsky Park
Laboratory
Container 167 lbs
137 Cs
> 1m No Threat to
Health

Aum Shinri Kyo Cult
Shoko Asahara
www.vanguardjp.com/t3/Aum/Contents.html
17 Jun – Police Report
Large Operating
Budget
Bombs at Political
Targets
Failed Botulinus
Attack on 15 Mar 95
Sarin Gas Attack 25
Mar 95 12 died, 5000
injured
Mined Uranium on
Australian Sheep
Ranch

Radiation Terrorism
is a Credible Threat
Abdullah al Muhajir AKA Jose Padilla
Mission: Search for Radioactive Source for RDD
Arrested 8 May 02 at O’Hare Int’l Airport
Unsophisticated Background for Mission

Intelligence from
al Qaeda Leader
Abu Zubaydah
Met two weeks
prior with two
tasked with
making RDD

Any Dirty Bombs Used in
History?
Iraq (1987) – Attempted to Detonate “Dirty”
Bomb – Detonation left no detectable Radiation
– Iraq stated Dirty Bomb under development

RDD (RDW)
RDD = Source + Dispersal
Mechanism
– Obtain Radioactive Source
– Obtain Dispersal Mechanism
– Avoid Incapacitating Exposure before
Device is Fabricated
– Deliver Device to Target
– Detonate Device

RDD (RDW) Source Choices
Source Strength
– Low-Activity Source – No Acute Effects
– High-Activity Source – Possible Acute
Effects
Physical Form
– Metallic Shrapnel
– Pellets Shrapnel
– Powder Aerosolization

Potential RDD Sources of
Interest
Gamma Beta Alpha
Cobalt-60 Phosphorus-32 Americium-241
Iodine-131 Strontium-90 Plutonium-238 / 239
Cesium-137 Uranium
Iridium-192 Thorium

RDD (RDW) Dispersion
Underestimated Variable
Highly Dependent on
Source – Explosive Geometry
Technically Very Difficult
May Aerosolize or Fragment (Shrapnel)
May not Disperse as Intended

Radionuclide Diversion
IAEA – 400
known cases of
trafficking since
1993
Source: CNN.com

Sources
Medical
Industrial / Commercial
– Food irradiators
Scientific
Military

Transport of Radiation Sources
(1990)
500 Billion Packages/ yr in US (all goods)
100 Million Packages/ yr HazMat
2.75 Million Packages/ yr Radioactive
Use Packages (%) Curies (%)
Medical 62.2 34.3
Industrial 7.6 63.1
Misc (inc waste) 26.1 1.9
Nuclear Power 4.1 0.7
Jefferson RM, “Transporting Radioactive Materials and Possible Radiological Consequences from Accidents as might be Seen by
Medical Institutions in Eds. Mettler FA, Kelsey CA, Ricks RC, Medical Management of Radiation Accidents, CRC Press,
Boca Raton : 1990, p.33

Radiation Devices
Flow Gauge

Radiography Source
Actual Source 2mm x 2mm
Radiography Camera Unit

Teletherapy Source
~ 1400 Ci Co-60 Teletherapy Head
Disassembled Unit

Medical Radionuclides

Specialized Type “B”
Package

IF-300 IF 300 Type B Cask
Wt: 140,000 lbs
Capacity: 21,000 lbs
Modes: Rail, Truck, Water
Typical Cargo: Spent Nuclear Fuel

TRU – Transuranic Waste

TRU Shipments

Loading 55 gal Drums to
TRUPACT II Container

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

1982 DOE -Terrorism Terrorism Study
on Nuclear Fuel Rods in
Casks
Spent and Unspent Nuclear Fuel
Concentrated on Penetration /
Aerosolization of Fuel Pellets
Conclusion – Poor Dispersion of
Material using Shaped Charges

1980 – 1983 “Urban Urban” Study
Fracture Pattern from Plate Impact

Shaped Charges Cause
Focused Damage to Casks

Fissile Material Security
Russian Radioactive Material Diversion
“Potatoes [are] guarded better than
radioactive materials”
Russian Special Investigator

“Orphaned Orphaned” Transuranic Sources
15-kg TRU material in 5,400 sealed sources
– Pu-238: 1 kg
– Pu-239: 9 kg
– Am-241: 5kg
In RDD, would pose significant inhalation
hazard
– Material must become sub-micron size to be
inhalation-capable particles.
– Possible without grinding material
– Committed Doses on order of Gy to lungs possible in
this event.
Source: J. Andrew Tompkins, CHP

TRU Source Uses
Am/Be, Pu/Be – Neutron generators
Moisture / Density gauges –
45,000 sources
Oil, gas, water, “Well logging”-
12,000 sources
Other numerous applications

Aldridge - RDD Scenario (1998)
Rural Location
Football
Stadium
10 Ci of 137Cs Cl

Aldridge - RDD Exposure Data

Wash, DC - Scenario
Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies
4000 lb TNT
1.5 lb 137 Cs
School Bus
in Parking
lot

Wash, DC - Explosion
10,000 in
area of
explosion
10-15 mph
wind NW
Radiation
detected 20
min later

Wash, DC - Plume
50 – 60
block
area is
contamin
ated
Unsafe =
0.5 rem

Wash, DC – Area Affected
20% of
Downtown DC
contaminated
1 – 5 square
mi radius
affected

Cleanup
Highly Debatable
– Dire Predictions from TV Documentaries
– Chernobyl Scenario
– 1982 Spent Fuel Study – Vacuumed up Easily

Sandia National Laboratory
Research on RDDs
Some Unclassified
Involve 60 Co
Could pose health hazard from
imbedded 60 Co fragments for medical
providers.
Monitor Health Physics Periodical for
Publication
Source: CDC Communciation

RDD Summary
Occasional Medical Sources Stolen Now
Radioactive Source Security Most
Important
Aerosolized TRU material could pose
Health Hazard
Upcoming RDD studies will be important
for providers

RDD In a Nutshell
Effect – Potential Health Effects, Stigmatize
Area
Deaths from Detonation
Dispersion is Technically VERY Difficult to
Achieve
Radiation May Not be Initially Noticeable
Aerosolized TRU Material May be Respirable
Hazard
Shrapnel May have Significant Radiation Fields
Shaped Charges do not Aerosolize Spent Fuel
Well

Other Types of
Intentional Dispersion
Intentional Dispersion
Contaminate
– Water
– Food
Reactor Sabotage
Criticality Event from Fissile material
– Safe geometry to Unsafe geometry
– Several Radiation Accidents to study

References
Alvarez JL, Kaiser BB, Green RC et al., Waste Forms
Response Project, EGG-PR-5590 Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory, 1982
Alvarez JL, Defining, Explaining, and Detecting Dirty
Bombs, HPS.org (website):2004
J. Andrew Tompkins, CHP
Aldridge JP, Master’s Thesis. Atlanta: Georgia Institute of
Technology
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Sandoval, RP Weber JP, Levine HS, et al., An Assessment
of the Safety of Spent Fuel Transportation in Urban
Environs, SAND82-2365*TTC-0398 Sandia National
Laboratories, 1983
Version 1.4 – 19 Apr 04