Revenge, Justice, and the Law

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40 THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:4 While seemingly separate criticisms, the two are really dependant upon the validity of one another, since under this argument, what makes revenge immoral on its face, is that it affords no true benefit to society or the victim. If, on the other hand, one could point to actual benefits which could arise from vengeance seeking, one could consequently argue the efficacy and thus argue, on balance, the morality of the act. Charles Barton, in his book Getting Even: Revenge as a Form of Justice, 167 attempts to do just that. He takes issue with both assertions, maintaining that there are positive emotional benefits which may accrue to the victim who exacts revenge, and that as such, revenge when it furthers the attainment of those benefits, is a moral response. For instance, Barton notes that some victims may experience a sense of relief after exacting their vengeance. 168 This relief may manifest itself in a number of ways. First, noting that victims often experience feelings of humiliation, resentment, and anger, he postulates that upon meting out vengeance, victims can experience a diminution of these “intense and taxing emotions,” and thus experience relief since they are no longer burdened by them. 169 Also, he suggests that a successful act of revenge can offer the victim a sense of security; a belief that he will be able to cope , if, sometime in the future, he is once again the victim of a crime. Thus one may experience relief in realizing that he will be able to defend himself, and thus survive, further victimization. 170 Another emotion which Barton suggests that a revenger may experience is the sense of satisfaction; not in a sadistic sense of experiencing pleasure from his victimizer’s suffering, 171 but rather as experienced by the avengers in Littell’s novel, 172 in the sense of regaining one’s sense of self-worth and identity. 173 In a similar vein, Professor Robert 167. BARTON, supra note 30. 168. Id. at 17-18. 169. Id. 170. Id. 171. Id. at 18. 172. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text; see also BARTON, supra note 30, at 106 (“A very important aspect of this empowerment would be that they [victims] would be able to establish a relationship of equality vis a vis their wrongdoers, which would spare them from the role of being helpless victims.”). 173. BARTON, supra note 30, at 18; see also Tamar Frankel, Lessons From the Past: Revenge Yesterday and Today, 76 B.U. L. REV. 89, 100 (1996) (“Crimes can be viewed as inflicting a ‘moral injury’ that devalues the victims. Revenge-like remedies can restore the
2005] VICTIM’S DESIRE FOR VENGEANCE 41 Solomon suggests that victims can also experience a sense of satisfaction by realizing that through their act of vengeance they have helped to achieve a sense of justice, and thus put “the world back in balance.” 174 A related psychological benefit of revenge is that it permits the victim to express, not only in word, but in deed, the sense of outrage and resentment which she experiences as a result of the offender’s actions. As a result of expressing such resentment, the victim acknowledges one’s own self-respect. 175 This relationship between vengeance, resentment and selfesteem is set out by the philosopher Jean Hampton, who writes that “the ability to feel resentment following a wrongdoing depends upon one’s having enough sense of one’s own worth to believe that the treatment is inappropriate and worthy of protest.” 176 Indeed, as Solomon writes, “the wholesale denial of vengeance as a legitimate motive may be a psychological disaster.” 177 Yet, even if one agrees that vengeance can provide a measure of solace and comfort to victims, does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it is the function of the law to provide such comfort. Apart from arguing that any victim satisfaction which comes from the suffering of her offender is per se, immoral, (an argument which has been rejected earlier), 178 one can still legitimately raise the question whether the law should be concerned with the well being of the victim. For instance, Professor Susan Bandes calls upon. “. . . us [to] be careful to distinguish the question of what victims need from the question of what the legal system ought to provide.” 179 She notes that some of the emotional benefits which victims need are available through other, and one could argue, more appropriate, sources, such as religion, psychological counseling, and family. 180 There is certainly merit to Professor Bandes’ position. Obviously, the law cannot provide to every victim, all that they need to recover. In fact, it is doubtful whether any one source is capable of fulfilling such an victims’ value in their own eyes and in the eyes of others. . . .[T]hus, revenge-like punishment can in some sense repair the violation of personal integrity that crime creates.”). 174. Solomon, supra note 11, at 252-53. 175. BARTON, supra note 30, at 28. 176. JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 55 (1988). 177. Solomon, supra note 11, at 253. 178. See generally supra notes 70-125 and accompanying text. 179. Susan Bandes, When Victims Seek Closure: Forgiveness, Vengeance and the Role of Government, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1599, 1605 (2000). 180. Id. at 1605-06.
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Revenge, Justice, and the Law

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