Airman Scholar Sp05-1.indd - United States Air Force Academy

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AIRMAN SCHOLAR Published by the 34th Education Group at the United States Air Force Academy Spring 2005 Vol XI, No 1 Commandant of Cadets Commander 34th Training Wing Brig Gen Johnny Weida Commander and Professor of USAFA 34th Education Group Col Thomas A. Drohan Editors Glenn Ferguson John Farquhar Brent Talbot The 34th Education Group’s mission is to oversee curriculum development and instruction in Military Strategic Studies for the cadets of the US Air Force Academy. This consists of courses covering Military Theory and Strategy, Officership, Airmanship, Aerospace Theory and Doctrine, and Joint and Coalition Operations. Group personnel conduct research on a variety of topics, including international security, space-related issues, military service culture, and educational modeling. Research activities are coordinated through the 34th Education Group Research Office. The opinions expressed in AIRMAN SCHOLAR do not represent any official policies of the Commandant of Cadets, US Air force Academy, US Air Force, or US government. They are presented to stimulate discussion on military issues and domestic and international affairs. AIRMAN SCHOLAR is published twice annually. If you have comments concerning articles, would like to contribute an article for publication, or desire to receive AIRMAN SCHOLAR, please contact us at: 34th Education Group att: AIRMAN SCHOLAR 2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 2A2 USAF Academy CO 80840-6264 (719) 333-3255 or DSN 333-3255 e-mail: glenn.ferguson@usafa.af.mil 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 From the Editor By Glenn Ferguson 3 IS MISSILE DEFENSE A GOOD IDEA by C4C Rob Auflick 7 WHERE OD PRIORITIES LIE, WITH MEN OR WITH THE MISSION? By C4C Michelle Bonneau 11 THE ANATOMY OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT by C1C Brandon Burns 24 IS DEMOCRATIC IMPERIALISM VIABLE? ASSESSING THE VALIDITY OF THE BUSH DOCTRINE. By C4C Whitney Camp 27 MORALLY BOUND TO NATIONAL SECURITY By C3C Brady Cilo 30 MIND OVER MATTER: THE CASE FOR DECENTRALIZING PSYCHOLOGICAL OERATIONS (PSYOPS) IN MODERN WARFARE By C1C Kristen L. Fagen 43 SPACE ASSETS: THE ACHILLES HEEL IN NATIONAL DEFENSE By C1C Alexander K. Goldfein 57 NO COERCION HERE: THE SOVIET MILITARY EXPEDITION IN AFGHANISTAN, 1979-1989 By C3C Roland W. Olmstead 65 ETHICS IN WARFARE By C3C David Schill 69 AIR CONTROL: THE FALLACY OF COER CIVE AIR STRATEGY IN BRITISH COLO NIAL ADMINISTRATION, 1919-1924 By C1C Colby Sullins 81 FALLOUT: THE QUESTION OF NEXT GEN ERATION NUCLEAR WEAPONS By C1C Damon A. Wagoner 94 THE MYTH OF ISSUE NETWORKS: A REBUTTAL TO GIBSON AND SNIDER By C1C William L. Wisehart 98 THE JUST WAR TRADITION AND EAST ERN MILITARY THEORY: APPLICATIONS TO IRAQ By C3C Matthew H. Yan
IS MISSILE DEFENSE A GOOD IDEA? By C4C Rob Auflick The Cold War was in full swing. Both the United States and the Soviet Union were positioning themselves to be the world’s one and only great superpower. In 1983, one side thought that they had come up with a weapon which would give them the upper hand in the military realm of this ideological conflict. “Obe Ron Kanobi strapped on his cape, headed up to the podium, and announced his plan to slay the evil Dark Side, or the Soviet Union with the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), known then as ‘Star Wars’ (Freedman 57).” “Star Wars” was to be a multi-layered missile defense system which would protect the United States in case of an attack by thousands of Soviet warheads. “Since 1983, the U.S. has spent more than $55 billion trying to make President Ronald Reagan’s dreams a reality (Information 22).” This program, once considered abandoned and a relic of the Cold War, has found itself once again the center of national security. While the end of the Cold War signaled a reduction in the likelihood of global conflict, the threat from foreign missiles has grown steadily as sophisticated missile technology becomes available on a wider scale. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the ballistic and cruise missiles that could deliver them pose a direct and immediate threat to the security of U.S. military forces and assets in overseas theaters of operation, our allies and friends, as well as our own country. “Since 1980, ballistic missiles have been used in six regional conflicts (Report 3).“ Basics of Ballistic Missile Defense All ballistic missiles share a common, fundamental element. “They follow a ballistic trajectory that includes three phases. These phases are the boost phase, the midcourse phase, and the terminal phase (Project 4).” The boost phase is the portion of a missile’s flight in which it is thrusting to gain the acceleration needed to reach its target. This phase usually lasts between three to five minutes. During this phase the rocket is climbing against the earth’s gravity and either exiting the earth’s atmosphere, or in the case of shorter range missiles, only reaching the fringes of outer space. Once the missile has completed firing its propulsion system, it begins the longest part of its flight, which is known as the mid-course phase. During this phase the missile is coasting, or freefalling towards it target. This phase can last as long as 20 minutes in the case of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Most missiles that leave the atmosphere 3 shed their rocket motors by this time in order to increase the range that the missile’s weapon, known as a warhead, can travel. For medium and long range missiles this phase occurs outside the earth’s atmosphere. The final phase of a missile’s flight is the terminal phase. During this phase the missile’s warhead re-enters the earth’s atmosphere at incredible speeds, some at over 2,000 mph. This phase lasts approximately 30 seconds for ICBM class missiles. There are advantages and challenges to set up engagement opportunities against an incoming missile in each of these phases. “The capability to defend against an attacking missile in each of these phases is called a layered defense, and it may be expected to increase the chances that the missile and its payload will be destroyed (From18).” “By attacking the missile in all phases of flight, we capitalize on opportunities that could increase the advantage of the defense (Project 30).” A capability to intercept a missile in the boost phase, for example, can destroy a missile regardless of its range or intended aim-point and provide a global coverage capability. In addition, the destroyed missile would threaten the launching nations territory with debris. A midcourse intercept capability can provide wide coverage of a region or regions, while a terminal defense reduces the protection coverage considerably to a localized area. When we then add shot opportunities in the midcourse and terminal phases of flight to boost phase opportunities, we increase significantly the probability that we will be successful. “Improving the odds of interception becomes critical when ballistic missiles carry weapons of mass destruction (Project 52).” “When defending against more lethal payloads, a capability to intercept a missile near its launch point is always preferable to attempting to intercept that same missile closer to its target (Missile 40).” Figure 1.
Page 1: In this issue… This publication i
Page 5 and 6: Several United States Congressmen a
Page 7 and 8: WHERE DO PRIORITIES LIE, WITH MEN O
Page 9 and 10: Sprague had to give the order to ma
Page 11 and 12: “THE ANATOMY OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT
Page 13 and 14: consider multiple possible answers
Page 15 and 16: The CAS skeletal system provides ab
Page 17 and 18: Combat Plans division “builds”
Page 19 and 20: Diagnosis All the systems I have di
Page 21 and 22: unwilling to let go of it option to
Page 23 and 24: Command and Staff College, 1998), 2
Page 25 and 26: y government’s myriad postmodern
Page 27 and 28: MORALLY BOUND TO NATIONAL SECURITY
Page 29 and 30: over others through exploitation of
Page 31 and 32: fighting. Sun Tzu stated “that th
Page 33 and 34: changed in nature or psychology sin
Page 35 and 36: esulted in 73 thousand Iraqis reach
Page 37 and 38: mander or Geographic Combatant Comm
Page 39 and 40: support operations. Instead of bein
Page 41 and 42: tions, Joint Pub 3-35. Washington,
Page 43 and 44: 93 Ibid. 94 Ibid. 95 Ibid. 96 Celin
Page 45 and 46: an essential element in how the U.S
Page 47 and 48: that it avoids the heated issue of
Page 49 and 50: satellites as high as 1,000 km exce
Page 51 and 52: to blame. Tracking the signal is di
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or violating international agreemen
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2 Clayton K. S. Chun, Shooting Down
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NO COERCION HERE: THE SOVIET MILITA
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was an attack on Islam. 27 Radical
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Asia in general and Afghanistan in
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Brassey’s, 2002). Bodansky, Yosse
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ETHICS IN WARFARE By C3C David Schi
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war perfectly. Besides utterly deva
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The political nature of war is esse
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Why is coercion important, however?
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50,000 regular troops. The army of
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forces. Airpower was a shock to the
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ase to mop up after the airpower ha
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Special thanks go
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FALLOUT: THE QUESTION OF NEXT GENER
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cent civilians and noncombatants th
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taining a robust deterrent against
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of the men in the armies which I ha
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onmental hazard and risking the liv
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is not nearly deep enough for the e
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Audit, ed. Stephen I. Schwartz (Was
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may have a fundamental breakdown be
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improved over time. After three yea
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preparation that the enemy cannot m
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man to, “Love each other as I hav
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Airman Scholar Sp05-1.indd - United States Air Force Academy

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