Airman Scholar Sp05-1.indd - United States Air Force Academy

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Bibliography Calkins, Raymond. The Morality of the Air Force Academy Honor Code. Washington, DC: 1966. Charles, William. Honor Codes: Can They Develop Integrity in Future Military Leaders? Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: 1968. Earley, Pete. “Family of Spies: The John Walker Jr. Spy Case.” Crime Library: Criminal Minds and Methods. . 19 October 2003. “Ex-colonel of USA Trofimoff’s Arrest.” Timeline: On Behalf of National Security. . 20 October 2003. “George Von Trofimoff Biography.” Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive. . 19 October 2003. Goldman, Darryl. “The Wrong Road to Character Development?” Military Review, Jan/Feb 98, Vol. 78, Issue 1. EBSCOHost Searchable Database. 18 Oct 2003. 30 “MIND OVER MATTER: THE CASE FOR DECEN- TRALIZING PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP) IN MODERN WARFARE” BY C1C KRISTEN L. FAGEN INTRODUCTION Statement of Research Question “There are but two powers in the world, the sword and the mind. In the long run the sword is always beaten by the mind,” stated Napoleon Bonaparte, describing the power of the mind in battle over the physical aspects of war. 1 Psychological warfare involves the use of mental persuasion in manipulating the enemy to give in to military objectives without the use of weapons or destruction. Psychological operations (PSYOP) have been utilized in military conflict since the beginning of warfare. The importance of PSYOP is evident in the writings of Sun Tzu and documented in the military theory and doctrine of such historic figures as Clausewitz and Napoleon. PSYOP have been officially utilized under organized commands in the U.S. military since World War I and is likely to play an ever increasing role in military operations into the future. 2 The organization and use of PSYOP in the U.S. military has been inconsistent throughout the last century as a result of the fluctuating requirements for PSYOP in different conflicts and varying combat situations. This leads to my thesis question: “Has the U.S. military developed the optimum organizational potential for the delivery of psychological operations in an era of expanding contingency operations?” This question demands an examination of current U.S. military PSYOP organization and of the roles PSYOP play in military operations. In addition, the need for better PSYOP organization and defined PSYOP roles will be analyzed and our present PSYOP capabilities will be determined. This paper will evaluate how well the U.S. is prepared to utilize PSYOP in the future. On the basis of this analysis, recommendations will be offered on ways to improve the conduct and organization of PSYOP. Sophisticated and well-organized PSYOP are critical to a modern U.S. military that is prepared to fight the wars of the twenty-first century. Background and Significance of the Problem PSYOP has the potential to play a vast role as a force multiplier and a combat reducer in the post-Cold War era. 3 PSYOP allow a military force to mentally counteract and overcome the enemy with limited manpower, limited physical fighting, and limited carnage. Serving as a force multiplier, PSYOP expands force capability without the need for more personnel. Also, PSYOP reduces the need for combat since the enemy can be persuaded to surrender without physically
fighting. Sun Tzu stated “that the most noble victory [is] to subdue the enemy without a fight”. 4 PSYOP seeks to do this. As an adjunct to conventional warfare, PSYOP are used to facilitate a country’s war fighting capability by mentally weakening the enemy forces or civilian population in order to reach a military goal without the spilling of enemy or friendly blood. PSYOP virtually persuade an adversary to give up the fight. Despite the attractiveness of successful psychological warfare, the use of organized PSYOP in U.S. military operations was limited in the twentieth century and is still limited today, partially due to a lack of PSYOP organization. The lack of organization can be linked to the inconsistent use of PSYOP in past U.S. military operations. The U.S. military limited its use of PSYOP in the twentieth century. This is evident in the rise and fall of PSYOP use during and after wars or conflicts. 5 Interest in PSYOP would rise during war then fall after the conflict was over, making PSYOP a forgotten form of warfare in the interwar periods. This lack of interest yielded limited PSYOP organization efforts, and left the Army the only military service with permanent operational PSYOP groups. Currently, the only existing active PSYOP group in the U.S. military is the Army’s 4 th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. 6 Their mission is “to deploy anywhere in the world on short notice, and plan, develop, and conduct Civil Affairs and Psychological operations in support of Unified Commanders, coalition forces, or other governmental agencies as directed by the National Command Authority”. 7 Reserve and guard units also participate in PSYOP delivery, including the Pennsylvania Air National Guard’s 193 rd Special Operations Wing and a number of Army Reserve components. 8 The Air Force’s 39 th Information Operations Squadron at Hurlburt Field is involved in information warfare training which contributes to PSYOP strategy, but the squadron does not have an active, operational PSYOP component that is involved in the delivery of PSYOP. 9 As the only U.S. military PSYOP forces, the 4 th PSYOP group and reserve and guard PSYOP units, are tasked with several PSYOP roles. One of the key roles of PSYOP is to “ensure a seamless information effort by designing an organization that can coordinate PSYOP efforts at the strategic, operational and tactical levels”. 10 This task requires the coordination of PSYOP among multiple PSYOP units, since one unit cannot seek to control all combat levels at once. A defined PSYOP organization is necessary to direct the activities of multiple PSYOP units at the varying levels of war. PSYOP can be utilized at all levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical, and they can also be utilized in all phases of war, including operations preceding war, during war, and 31 after war. 11 PSYOP are also applicable to any type of military operation, including the support of conventional warfare, special operations, peacetime efforts, major military conflicts, or small, less intense military contingencies. 12 While PSYOP may be relevant to several types of military operations, phases, and levels of war, PSYOP efficacy and use are limited by poor organization of forces responsible for PSYOP delivery. A better-organized and better-defined PSYOP force would result in a more modern and better-prepared U.S. military. Limitations The limitations surrounding this study pertain to PSYOP aspects that do not directly influence the organization and the roles of PSYOP. PSYOP doctrine will be discussed, but equipment, technology, and training aspects of PSYOP will be disregarded, since these categories do not apply to the organization of PSYOP delivery. Equipment and advanced technology are critical to successful PSYOP but they are not critical to the study of PSYOP organization. While equipment and technology play a large role in the modernization of PSYOP, description of these elements would only add complex scientific information to the study. Finally, the importance of training this study is negligible since training cannot be a focus until PSYOP organization is determined. This study will focus on U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force PSYOP doctrine and organization. The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps’ use and organization of PSYOP will not be considered in depth. While the Navy and Marine Corps have PSYOP capabilities, those services play a very limited PSYOP role at this time. For the purposes of this study, it is assumed that the Air Force and the Army will be the key actors in military PSYOP in future contingencies. Accordingly, recommendations for PSYOP organization will center on Air Force and Army needs. Relevance to current problems involving PSYOP organization will determine selection of specific case studies. Moreover, specific emphasis will be given to the most recent U.S. military operations, specifically Operation Desert Storm and Operation Allied Force, since they appear to hold the most significance for the future of PSYOP organization. While earlier operations involving the role of PSYOP do pertain to historical PSYOP organization, they are not as applicable to this study regarding the future of the PSYOP organization. Definitions and Assumptions Several definitions are critical to the analysis and arguments proposed in the study. The following terms will be used throughout the study: Information Operations (IO). According to Joint Publication 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations, Information Operations are
Page 1 and 2: In this issue… This publication i
Page 3 and 4: IS MISSILE DEFENSE A GOOD IDEA? By
Page 5 and 6: Several United States Congressmen a
Page 7 and 8: WHERE DO PRIORITIES LIE, WITH MEN O
Page 9 and 10: Sprague had to give the order to ma
Page 11 and 12: “THE ANATOMY OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT
Page 13 and 14: consider multiple possible answers
Page 15 and 16: The CAS skeletal system provides ab
Page 17 and 18: Combat Plans division “builds”
Page 19 and 20: Diagnosis All the systems I have di
Page 21 and 22: unwilling to let go of it option to
Page 23 and 24: Command and Staff College, 1998), 2
Page 25 and 26: y government’s myriad postmodern
Page 27 and 28: MORALLY BOUND TO NATIONAL SECURITY
Page 29: over others through exploitation of
Page 33 and 34: changed in nature or psychology sin
Page 35 and 36: esulted in 73 thousand Iraqis reach
Page 37 and 38: mander or Geographic Combatant Comm
Page 39 and 40: support operations. Instead of bein
Page 41 and 42: tions, Joint Pub 3-35. Washington,
Page 43 and 44: 93 Ibid. 94 Ibid. 95 Ibid. 96 Celin
Page 45 and 46: an essential element in how the U.S
Page 47 and 48: that it avoids the heated issue of
Page 49 and 50: satellites as high as 1,000 km exce
Page 51 and 52: to blame. Tracking the signal is di
Page 53 and 54: or violating international agreemen
Page 55 and 56: 2 Clayton K. S. Chun, Shooting Down
Page 57 and 58: NO COERCION HERE: THE SOVIET MILITA
Page 59 and 60: was an attack on Islam. 27 Radical
Page 61 and 62: Asia in general and Afghanistan in
Page 63 and 64: Brassey’s, 2002). Bodansky, Yosse
Page 65 and 66: ETHICS IN WARFARE By C3C David Schi
Page 67 and 68: war perfectly. Besides utterly deva
Page 69 and 70: The political nature of war is esse
Page 71 and 72: Why is coercion important, however?
Page 73 and 74: 50,000 regular troops. The army of
Page 75 and 76: forces. Airpower was a shock to the
Page 77 and 78: ase to mop up after the airpower ha
Page 79 and 80: ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Special thanks go
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FALLOUT: THE QUESTION OF NEXT GENER
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cent civilians and noncombatants th
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taining a robust deterrent against
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of the men in the armies which I ha
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onmental hazard and risking the liv
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is not nearly deep enough for the e
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Audit, ed. Stephen I. Schwartz (Was
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may have a fundamental breakdown be
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improved over time. After three yea
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preparation that the enemy cannot m
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man to, “Love each other as I hav
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