Airman Scholar Sp05-1.indd - United States Air Force Academy

should prepare itself to better utilize PSYOP as the need for
this tactic increases, especially in operations at the lower end
of the spectrum of warfare. Following the model of Army
PSYOP, the Air Force should create its own PSYOP AFSC.
That would be the first necessary step to produce airmen
capable of planning and implementing PSYOP. Moreover,
the Marine Corps and Navy should also devote more attention
to PSYOP and its potential for contributing to joint
operations.
The efficient organization of PSYOP is crucial
because of PSYOP’s ever increasing role in military operations
today and in all likelihood, the future. In response to
the thesis question: “Has the U.S. military developed the
optimum organizational potential for the delivery of psychological
operations in an era of expanding contingency operations?”
the answer is the U.S. military has yet to achieve its
full PSYOP potential. Overall, current PSYOP organization
is not meeting operational requirements.
As we have seen, a well organized and highly trained
PSYOP force can be expected to increase prospects for future
military success. The recommendations set forth above are
reasonable and should be implemented to better utilize U.S.
PSYOP forces and capabilities. A tactically-based PSYOP
focus will promote the most effective use of PSYOP. In addition,
decisive and purposeful planning and practice of PSYOP
prior to a conflict will promote a higher level of operational
effectiveness when hostilities commence. With the excellent
examples of the Korean JTF model to draw upon, the U.S.
military should take timely action to strengthen its PSYOP
capabilities.
Future research on this topic will be essential in order
to determine the optimum organizational arrangements for
PSYOP. The arguments proposed in this thesis are based
entirely on unclassified research and the author’s limited interaction
with current PSYOP practitioners. As a cadet who
has yet to experience PSYOP on a firsthand basis, this writer
nevertheless does recognize the vast importance of PSYOP
in modern warfare. In addition to considering the PSYOP
structure adopted by JTF Korea, future research on this topic
should include careful examination of other joint PSYOP
offices for possible alternative organizational constructs.
Needless to say, many other key questions concerning PSYOP
cannot be addressed without access to classified information.
In conclusion, a fully capable PSYOP force can
have a lasting impact on adversary behavior. Accordingly, an
effective PSYOP organization will be critical to future military
success. Effective PSYOP can subdue the enemy’s mind in
a manner that promotes military success without physically
striking the enemy. As stated by German Field Marshall Carl
Gustav Baron von Mannerheim, “For a strong adversary the
40
opposition of twenty-four squadrons and twelve guns ought
not to have appeared very serious, but in war the psychological
factors are often decisive. An adversary who feels inferior
is in reality so”. 104
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