Apollo-The Last Few Miles Home - AIAA Info

Apollo-The Last Few Miles Home
Charles H. Lowry
May 19, 2012
1

Jules Would Be Pleased
3

Manned Spaceflight Timeline
• 1865—Jules Verne “From The Earth To The Moon”
• 1869—E. E. Hale “The Brick Moon”, Also Proposed “GPS”
• 1897—H. G. Wells “War of The Worlds”
• 1948—H. E. Ross, British Planetary Soc. Plan for Lunar Landing and Return
• 1952—Von Braun “Man on The Moon, The Journey”
• 1954—Von Braun “Can We Go To Mars?”
• 1961—First Manned Mercury Flight
• 1965-- First Manned Gemini Flight
• 1968—First Manned Apollo Flight
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• A Look Around
– $2000 Buys New Car
– Cigarettes 25 Cents/Pack
– Minimum Wage $1.00/Hr
– $15/Night In Nice Hotel
– Many Scientists Believed—to the Moon by end of
Century
• Engineering Profession
– Pipes / Cigars / Starched Shirts / Jackets / Ties
– 1 Secretary/1 Phone Per Group
– No Repro Machines—later Thermofax
– Slide Rules / Friden / Marchant Calculators
– IBM 704—not for General use
– 17x 22in /Felt Pen Briefing Charts
– Hey-day Of Aircraft, Escape Systems
• Parachute Profession
– WADC Center Of Excellence
– Dr. Heinrich, Theo Knacke, Others
– Lots of Basic Research
– Nylon Ruled
– 1956 Parachute Handbook
– MIT, University of Minnesota Conferences
– El Centro
The Times--The 1950s/1960s
First hp
handheld/baz
5

Space Race Progression
• 57-58 International Geophysical Year—Sputnik/Explorer 1
• July 58 NASA Created
• Apr 61 Yuri Gagarin orbital Vostok 1
• May 61 Alan Shepard sub-orbital Mercury
• Jul 61 Initial NASA Apollo ITB
• Nov 61 Announcement NAA Awarded Apollo CSM Contract
• Dec 61 NASA SOW
• Dec 61 Northrop Awarded ELS Contract
• Feb 62 John Glenn Orbital Mercury
• Jul 62 LOR Decision
• Jul 62 1 st Main Chute Drop Test
• Nov 62 1 st Main Chute cluster and 1 st Boilerplate Drop
• Sep 63 Lost Boilerplate 3
• Jan 67 Apollo 1 Fire
• Oct 68 1 st Manned Apollo Flight
• Dec 68 1 st Manned Circumlunar Flight
• Jul 69 1 st Manned Lunar Landing
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Trip To The Moon
• Getting Started
– Contracts/subcontracts for all elements
– Many support studies, universities, etc.
– NASA guidance
– Presidential DX priority
– Money
• Approach
– Start running—figure it out as we go
– Hire people—lots of people
– Build facilities
– Develop organizations
– Develop specs, procedures, system architectures
– Schedules, budgets
– Go Do It
• Reality
– Much chaos—slowly settled
– Many changes, weights, management directives/tools
– Driven by what’s on pad
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Apollo VAB-Launch Complex
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• Use Existing Technology
• Robust Designs
• Try Alternate Designs
• Extensive Acceptance Testing
• Extensive Off-Limit Testing
• Attention to Details
• Control Changes
• Analysis of Discrepancies
• Personal Responsibility
• Management Honesty
• Customer Close to Us
• Tangible Proof of System Integrity
Apollo Hallmarks
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Apollo Stack
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CSM
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CM/Boilerplate Dimensions
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Max Rate of Descent-2 mains
Orig—30fps at 5000ft
Later—35fps at sea level
Finally—38fps at sea level
Performance Requirements
Drogue and Main Chute
Deployment Envelope
Reliability
Tolerate 1 Drogue/1 main out
Goal--.99994
CM Weight Growth
History
13

Early Apollo ELS Architecture
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ELS Configuration Evolution
• Pre-block 1—started out
– Boilerplates, 7,800-8,150 lbs.
– Single 13.7 ft. drogue
– 3 pilot chutes, 10 ft. diameter
– 3 mains, 88.1 ft. diameter, 72 gore, 1.0 D O lines, single reefing
– 4-leg harness attached to top of tunnel, textile risers, confluence fitting
• Block 1
– No docking provisions, 9,500 lbs., intended 1 st manned flight
– 7.2 ft. diameter pilot chutes
– Slotted mains, 83.5 ft. diameter, 68 gores, midgore reefing, 1.4 D O lines
– 2-leg harness on deck
– Dual drogues, reefed 8 seconds
• Block 2
– Docking provisions, redesigned forward compartment, 11,000 lbs.
– Steel risers
– Flowerpot
• Block 2 HW
– 13,000-13,500 lbs.
– High density packing
– Special materials
– 2-stage main reefing, 6 & 10 seconds
– Larger (16.5 ft.) drogues reefed 10 seconds
– Beefed up pilots
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Normal Landing Sequence
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Abort Landing Sequence
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ELS Installation
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-Y Bay
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+Z Bay
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-Y to +Z Bays
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+Y Bay
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Flowerpot/Steel Risers (-Z Bay)
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Steel Cable Risers
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• 1 x 7.2ft Ringslot, perm reefed
Forward Heatshield Jettison
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ELS Schematic
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6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Apollo Component Environmental Acceptance Test Failure Rates
Vibration ATP Percent Failure
Design Workmanship Total
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
Thermal ATP Percent Failure
Design Workmanship Total
11447 tests on 166 different components 3685 tests on 127 different components

Mode Percent Failed
Electrical
Mechanical
Contamination
Other
Total
Apollo Component Failures
57.3
27.4
11.6
3.8
100
Apollo 7 22
Apollo 8 8
CSM LM
Apollo 9 14 12
Apollo 10 23 15
Apollo 11 9 13
Environmental ATP Failure Modes Number of Apollo Flight Anomalies

Apollo CM –to—LEM Docking
30

Apollo Docking System
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Apollo Docking System Removal
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Apollo Soyuz Test Project
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ASTP Docking System--USA
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Apollo CM Uprighting System
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ELS Test Programs
• Lab Tests
– Humidity, thermal cycle, thermal vacuum, vib, accel, structural
– Wind tunnel
• 1/10 th scale drogues
• Scaled and full size mains
• Drop Tests
– C-119, C-130, B-57, B-66, B-52, C-133
– Mostly El Centro, CA,-joint test facility
– Northrop ran tests with military
• NAA / Rockwell, NASA participation
– High visibility test program (July 1963 to July 1968)
• Block 1, 93 dev, 12 qual (70 total planned)
• Block 2, 6 dev, 4 qual
• Block 2HW, 25 dev, 7 qual
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Instrumented Bomb Test Vehicle
39

PTVs
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Boilerplate rigged for drop.
Note external programmer chute
Boilerplate Drop Equipment
C-133 with boilerplate
installed-ready to drop
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Programmer Parachute
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Boilerplate Drop Test
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• 6 WSMR Launches
– Launch Escape System
– All Abort Modes
– 5 B/P, 1 CM, all Block 1
• 4 KSC Block 1 CM Launches
– Aero
– Heatshield
– RCS
– G & N
• 1 st Manned, Block 2
– System Verification
• 2 nd Manned
– Circumlunar
• 5 th Manned
– Lunar Landing
• 15 Total Manned Flights
Apollo ELS Progression to Manned Flight
44

• Chutes are different
Chutes Are Harder
• Chutes operate to a narrow set of precise rules
– Except when they don’t
• It’s mostly about deployment
• Complex systems require Hi fidelity mock-up
• Flight test lots and at higher levels of assembly
• Program management doesn’t know or believe all this

• Vehicle Stability
– Boilerplate 3
– Steel Cables
• Vehicle Weight Growth
– Stowage Volume
– High Density Packing
– Vt=30fps @5kft to 38fps @ SL
Big Problems Within ELS
46

• Cluster Non-Uniformity
– 3 Mains—40-30-30%
– 2 mains—65-35%
Big Problems Within ELS
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• Forward heat shield re-contact
– Never understood wake
– Added parachute
• Block 1
• Block 2
Big Problems Within ELS
48

• Apollo 15
Big Problems Within ELS
– Effects of Reaction Control System
– Crew Technique
49

Lessons Learned
• Be wary of programs that think
– Vehicle is stable
– Weight will not increase and volume will not decrease
– Wake is understood
• Its mostly about deployment
– Simplicity, neatness=reliability
– Rounded corners/ no snags
– HiFi mockups required
– Installation training/closeout photos
• How to live with steel risers
• Drop tests—important but difficult
– Need lots of tests to “wring out” system
– Get to system level as soon as possible
– Skipped stage/structural/attitude hard to do
– Free-fall is dangerous
– Must budget for significant retests & lost vehicles
• More Ringsail development needed re lead/lag
• Pilot riser dynamics
• Better analytical tools needed
• Many failures materials & processes
• Intra-system influences can be serious
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What Makes Programs Successful?
• Apollo 20,000 firms, 400,000 people—George Low says
– Reliable hardware
• Design
• Test
• Control of changes
• Interpretation of discrepancies
– Flt missions well planned and executed
– Flt crews skilled and well trained
• Also Emphasized
– Attention to detail
– Dedication to getting the job done
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What About the SR-71----How Did They Do It?
• Urgent National Need
• Visionary Government and Industry
• Willingness to Take Risks
• Tolerance for Failure
• Minimum People and Paperwork
• Individual Responsibility
• Cradle to Grave Ownership of Design
Skunk Works, Ben Rich, 1994
• Started Work 1959
• Mach 3, 90,000 ft. alt
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Looking Back On Apollo
• National goal & priority
• Excellent, experienced management & technical
• Work ethic
• Attention to detail
• Block 2 was a God-send, Block 2HW was not
• Lots of testing including pre-qual
• Always driven by something on pad
• Need tolerance for failure
• Wish we would have had Kevlar
• Intra-sys effects
• Worry a lot
53

Interesting Experiences / Failures
• Contamination
• Metallurgical problems
• Human failures
• Lack of robustness
• Exterior influences
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