The Causes and Consequences of Miscommunication - Le Moyne ...

The Causes and Consequences 

of Miscommunication 

The Misunderstanding Between Britain and the United States 

Following the Nationalization of the Suez Canal 

1 

Shannon O'Toole 

HST 302 

Dr. Blaszak 

11 November 2009

Following the nationalization of the Suez Canal, the fracture in the American and British 

relationship formed as a result of each country's failure to communicate with and properly 

understand one another. The United States, while making it clear they would not support force or 

use it themselves, did not come out and say that they would actually oppose it. British Prime 

Minister Anthony Eden made it quite clear how focused and determined he was to take Nasser 

down. Given his obsession, the Prime Minister needed to be told pointblank that if he resorted to 

force, the United States would stand against him. Though the United States knew of the military 

planning taking place, they still counted on the special relationship they believed they shared 

with Britain. They could not see how Britain could take such drastic action without American 

support and felt Britain could easily be dissuaded from resorting to such drastic measures. 

Some fault also lies with the two most important men in the crisis in the United States: 

President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Eisenhower seemed 

to be in the background of foreign policy, and it was believed in Britain when military action 

took place, they could depend on the laidback American President to at worst just sit back and 

watch the events unfold. They never imagined that he would play a vital role in ending the 

military occupation. There were also claims on the British side that Dulles, who was prone to an 

eloquent and powerful use of words, confused the United States' stance at time. Dulles also had a 

rocky relationship with Britain's Prime Minster, which was certainly to blame for some of their 

miscommunication. 

Britain's part in this misunderstanding was its failure to see that the United States would 

not support diplomatically or militarily using force. Eisenhower made his disapproval of force 

very clear, but Britain was under the impression that he would not interfere, especially given the 

looming presidential election. 

2

A key factor in Britain's downfall in this crisis was its Prime Minister Anthony Eden 

whose poor physical health was taking a great toll on his mental state. He became focused to the 

point of obsession on taking down President Nasser. A lot of politics involves reading between 

the lines, and Eden failed to do that because he and his colleagues were so intensely focused on 

their militant objectives. They also depended on the special relationship. Eden felt that the 

history they had with the notably easy-going Eisenhower and the United States as a whole would 

prevent open opposition to military action. 

Prime Minister Anthony Eden had served under Winston Churchill, and when Churchill 

retired, it was Eden who took the position as Prime Minister. Eden, a man described as having "a 

strong temper and impatience" and a "hatred of criticism and obstinacy," navigated the House of 

Commons with ease, keeping his temperament in check. 1 He was able to control his nerves and 

moods in international situations and proved to be a highly skilled diplomat. This changed, 

however, when Eden suffered significant health issues. His tendency to be anxious and easily 

offended was only increased by these bouts of illness. In 1945 he had a duodenal ulcer, in 1952 

he had a bout of jaundice, and in 1953 he had two operations for gallstones that went terribly 

wrong. His bile duct was injured, causing him to be prone to fevers and jaundice. Though he was 

told by his doctor to not serve as Foreign Secretary, Churchill convinced Eden to take the 

position. Because Eden had handled being Foreign Secretary, when the opportunity arose for him 

to be Prime Minister, he felt that he was capable of handling it. 2 Due to his poor health, he 

carried with him "a great chest of pills" wherever he went and even had injections sometimes. 3 

Due to his health issues, his ability to deal with big issues was questioned by his colleagues and 

1 Hugh Thomas, Suez (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1967), 35. 

2 Keith Kyle, Suez (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 69. 

3 Kyle, Suez, 69. 

3

his growing "tendency to fuss" was noticed. 4 His health further deteriorated from working too 

much and getting little sleep due to calls in the middle of the night from different time zones. His 

exhaustion and illness were beginning to cloud his judgment and ability to handle an issue as 

complex as the Suez Crisis, and those who worked with him were beginning to notice. 5 In a diary 

entry, Lord Moran writes of the Prime Minister: "The political world is full of Eden's moods at 

No. 10. All this is known to Winston…At the back of his mind, as I keep finding out, is the 

disconcerting fact that he put Anthony where he is." 6 What is most unfortunate for both England 

and Eden himself is that "what England required in 1956 was a man such as Eden had been till 

then." 7 When Nasser nationalized the Canal, it only worsened Eden's deteriorating mental state. 

He became obsessively intent on the removal of Nasser, and "was out of sync with his old 

cautious, compromising self. He was obsessed, a driven man, his vast experience and intellect 

reduced to tunnel vision. At the end of that tunnel was Nasser." 8 

There was also a great deal of confusion in Britain as to who was in charge of foreign 

policy in the United States. Many believed that Eisenhower was not the one in power. He was 

perceived as being "a non-intellectual, rather too much given to the temptation to relax." 9 The 

written replies from his conferences were difficult to understand and he had also experienced 

some poor health, including a heart attack in his first term as President. Another reason he was 

seen as uninvolved was thanks to the "pronounced personality" of Secretary of State John Foster 

Dulles. 10 Dulles, who was once a religious leader, was inclined to give passionate and wordy 

speeches that could lead to some confusion as to both the message and as to who was making 


5 Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez (Brattleboro: Amana Books, 1988), 183. 

6 Thomas, in, Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez (Brattleboro: Amana Books, 1988), 278. 

7 Thomas, 36. 

8 Neff, 278. 



4

decisions. When the collusion among Britain, France and Israel came to light, however, it is clear 

that Eisenhower was indeed the man in charge and Dulles carried out the President's orders. 

Dulles's aptness to long-winded speeches is one of the reasons that he and Eden had a 

very poor relationship. The two statesmen had disliked one another for many years. Eden even 

requested that Eisenhower name someone else as Secretary of State instead of Dulles. They have 

been described as being "prima donnas," each in their own right. 11 Dulles thought things through 

and used reason, where Eden relied on his intuition to make decisions. Dulles's constant 

analyzing and excessive speeches left Eden bored and often annoyed. 12 It was also these 

excessive speeches that sometimes led the British to believe that the Secretary felt as strongly 

about Nasser as they did. 13 Eden even wrote of their inability to see eye to eye in his memoirs: 

My difficulty in working with Mr. Dulles was to determine what he really meant 

and in consequence the significance to be attached to his words and actions….A 

preacher in a world of politics, Mr. Dulles seemed sometimes to have little regard 

for the consequences of his words. 14 

Dulles’s way with words and Eden’s determination to rationalize using force proved to be a 

deadly combination. 

Before President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the waterway in July 1956, Britain 

and the United States were for the most part of the same mind in regards to dealing with the 

Middle East and presented a united front. Though tensions certainly existed, the two powers 

worked together to meet common goals in the region. The break took place directly after the 

nationalization when Britain turned immediately to a military response and the United States 

chose to address the issue diplomatically. 


12 Thomas, 54. 

13 Thomas, 54. 

14 Full Circle, in Louise Richardson, When Allie Differ: Anglo-American Relations During the Suez and Falklands 

Crisis (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 193. 

5

In spite of some tensions, the United States and Britain had a history of working together 

in the Middle East. Britain, for its part, felt a certain entitlement in the Middle East. After the fall 

of the Turkish Empire, Britain played a part in the successful conclusion to the World Wars in 

that area and had defended Egypt on two occasions. Britain also needed power in the Middle 

East due to its dependency on the oil found there. The Suez Canal itself was vital for the 

transportation of oil, among other things, from the Middle East to the greater empire. Although 

Britain seemed to have a greater stake in the region, the allies collaborated on many different 

issues there. They created plans for Arab-Israeli peace, worked together on the formation of the 

Baghdad Pact, and though they differed on how much of a threat Nasser was, they agreed that he 

was indeed a power that needed to be monitored and controlled. Prior to the nationalization they 

had worked together to weaken Nasser’s influence and power by refusing to send arms, delaying 

shipment of grains, oil, and aid, and also kept Nasser waiting for an answer in regards to funding 

the Aswan Dam. They strengthened surrounding states like Ethiopia, Lebanon and Jordon, and 

promoted anti-Nasser propaganda in other Arab states. 15 When Nasser made the Czech Arms 

Deal public, both nations were horrified to see the USSR's hand extending into the Middle East. 

With this new development, the two allies were much less keen to grant the proposed loan to 

construct the Aswan Dam and backed away from the agreement. 

The United States and Great Britain formally withdrew the loan proposal within two days 

of one another, providing a list of reasons why they had decided not to follow through with the 

offer as planned. They claimed that they could not see how Egypt could put the necessary 

resources towards the construction of the Canal. Britain and the United States also expressed 

concern that they might bear the brunt of the blame if anything, such as the economy and 

15 

Robert Bowie, “Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Suez Crisis,” in Suez 1956, ed. WM. Roger Louis and Roger Owen 

(Oxford: Clarendon Press), 191-2. 

6

standards of living in Egypt, were to go wrong during the dam construction. The withdrawal was 

met with shock in Egypt and Nasser felt that he had been betrayed. 

It was in light of this withdrawal and the desire to rid Egypt of imperial influences that on 

July 26, 1956, Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal. 16 Although so far the 

United States and Britain had acted together in spite of some minor differences, the view of the 

nationalization was markedly different in the two Western nations. The United States 

immediately wanted to negotiate, while Britain wanted to react swiftly with force. Bowie 

summarizes: 

Eden’s view of Nasser as a Soviet tool, and a deadly menace to British interests 

and position in the whole region (and even further afield), called for extreme 

measures to remove the threat one way or another. For Eisenhower, this view of 

Nasser and his potential was exaggerated. Nasser was seen as an Egyptian and 

Arab nationalist who was seeking to combat or undermine what he perceived as 

foreign domination…Since his activities often damaged Western interests and 

facilitated Soviet entry into the region, the United States wished to modify them 

or reduce his influence, isolate him, and bolster more co-operative regimes. 17 

Britain’s reaction may have been stronger for a number of reasons. The Suez Canal was of 

greater importance to Britain. By controlling it, Britain was able to keep the Soviet Union out of 

the Middle East, was able to keep the waterway secure so that British and other Western vessels 

could move through it freely, and in particular allow for a steady oil supply for Britain. 18 Their 

power in the Eastern Mediterranean, Africa, Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean regions was 

threatened as well. Specifically, Britain worried that the nationalization might lead the people in 

the Middle East and Africa to see that Britain was not as strong as it appeared. The Canal had 

served as a symbol of Britain’s power and with it wrenched from its grasp, its position in Egypt 

16 Michael C. Shupe, William M. Wright, Keith W. Hipel, Niall M. Frasser, “Nationalization of the Suez Canal: A 

Hypergame Analysis,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 23:3 (1980): 481-2. 

17 Bowie, 196. 

18 Shupe, Wright, Hipel, Frasser: 478. 

7

and abroad was considerably weakened. 19 Prime Minister Anthony Eden certainly played a part 

in Britain's strong reaction. Even before the nationalization, his health issues were taking a 

serious toll on his mental capacity. His temper shortened and his rationale clouded; he saw an 

external evil that he believed he had the power to fix. His health issues were irreparable, but 

Nasser was something he could focus his energy on and fix. 

The two countries did agree on a few things following the nationalization. Neither Britain 

nor the United States approved of the way Nasser had gone about nationalizing the Canal. It had 

taken them both completely by surprise. They also both had concerns over the sway Nasser had 

over other Arab nations, but the degree to which he was viewed as a threat was drastically 

different between the allies. He was viewed as an ardent nationalist in the United States, while in 

Britain he was compared to dictators such as Hitler and Mussolini. Finally, both wanted an 

international system to “monitor and control” Canal shipments, though later the fervor with 

which this endeavor was pursued would be quite dissimilar in Britain and in the United States. 20 

For Britain’s part, it was believed that Nasser had to be taken down. His action was 

viewed as a threat to their economy and their position in the Middle East. As head of the 

government, Eden's personal reaction was a major factor for the policy Britain would enstate. 

His failing health was beyond his control. After a botched surgery and a dependence on 

medication and shots to get by, the weakened Prime Minister had something external that he 

could fix while his body fell apart. When Britain learned that the United States was of a different 

mind, it believed that he United States was not as ready for a military response because the threat 

to them directly was not as extreme as it was for Britain. Eisenhower's easy-going nature was 

also seen as a source of the United States' calmer reaction. 

19 

Benjamin Nimer, “Suez, and Democratic Diplomacy,” The Western Political Quarterly 12:3 (1959): 785. 

20 

Cole C. Kingseed, Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 

1995), 59. 

8

When he learned of the confrontational stance Britain had taken, Eisenhower could find 

no legal grounds for Britain wanting to respond militarily. Nasser was well within his legal rights 

to nationalize the Canal and had even guaranteed that it would be efficiently run. Eisenhower, as 

well as many Americans, was opposed to colonialism. He did not want to play a part in 

strengthening European imperialism in Egypt. He also felt that if negotiations rendered no 

solution, the next course of action was to turn the matter over to the United Nations. Where 

Britain wanted to react militarily as soon as possible, Eisenhower was determined to seek every 

peaceful means first. 

Soon after the announcement was made, Eden met with members of the British 

government, French Ambassador Jean Chauvel, and the American chargé de affaires Andrew B. 

Foster. Eden expressed his desire to react strongly and swiftly, not caring that Nasser’s actions 

were legal. Eden was so fired up that he said to Foster that the “Egyptian has his thumb on our 

windpipe. Tell Mr. Dulles I can not allow that.” 21 At the direction of Eden, the military chiefs 

began to draw up plans to recapture the Canal. The moment Eden had a crisis before him he 

sought to end it swiftly and strongly. His statement to Foster shows his animosity toward the 

American Secretary of State. From the beginning Eden was ready to fight Dulles, believing that 

if Britain initiated military operations the United States under Eisenhower would fall into line. 

The United States also wanted to react quickly, but was determined to control the British 

and French reactions. When President Eisenhower received word from Foster about the Cabinet 

meeting he had attended in Britain, he realized he was in a precarious position. He had to 

maintain a good relationship with his European allies and defend the United States' position in 

21 The Inside Story of Suez, 1965, in Cole C. Kingseed, Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956 (Baton Rouge: 

Louisianna State University Press, 1995), 42. 

9

the Middle East. 22 If he did not support Britain, he risked alienating a valued ally of the United 

States. But if he went along with them, he could jeopardize the American position and standing 

in Arab countries, which could ultimately lead to the Soviet influence spreading in the Middle 

East. In spite of the vehement reaction of Eden and his colleagues, Eisenhower wanted to 

maintain peace to assure that the Soviet Union did not use unrest in the Middle East as an 

opening for anti-Western activity. He put more emphasis on “the containment dimension of 

foreign policy…than public solidarity with the British.” 23 

Early statements from the Department of State made it apparent that since the United 

States’ interests in the matter differed from Britain's, it was only natural that their policies and 

actions would as well. Dulles confirmed this sentiment when he said that shipping may be 

threatened in this matter, and that the United States had a stake in this as it was “one of the 

maritime nations.” 24 However, as long as commerce continued to move through the Canal, the 

United States was content. If Egypt closed the Canal to anyone, the issue would be discussed 

further. Unfortunately for the United States, keeping the Canal simply running smoothly failed to 

pacify the British. They would not accept anything short of international operation. Eden's mind 

was set on taking down Nasser by forcing him to reverse the nationalization, and he would not be 

steered from his course. 

On July 27, the US Embassy in London sent a message to Eisenhower to inform him of a 

meeting being held by Eden with “key Cabinet members, Chiefs of Staff, the French 

Ambassador, and the US chargé.” 25 It was obvious that Britain viewed the nationalization as a 

serious problem. Britain felt threatened economically, diplomatically, and militarily. Eden once 

22 Kingseed,44. 

23 Kingseed, 45. 

24 Press Release 415, 29 July, in Benjamin Nimer, “Suez, and Democratic Diplomacy,” The Western Political 

Quarterly 12:3 (1959): 786. 

25 Bowie, 197. 

10

more pressed for a strong reaction, even directing the Joint Chiefs to figure out exactly what was 

needed to recapture the Canal if use of force became necessary. Eisenhower held a meeting that 

same day, issuing a press release that expressed the alarm he felt in light of this development, but 

intentionally failed to give any clues as to what steps the United States planned to take. 26 He did 

not want to commit the United States to any action as the situation was developing. His 

vagueness at this juncture left plenty of room for the ailing Eden to hear what he wanted to hear. 

Eisenhower did not express any firm opposition to a military response, and Eden's obsession 

with removing Nasser certainly led him to believe that he had the freedom to act as he wished. 

Eisenhower's failure to commit only served in reinforcing the belief that he was a relaxed man 

and would let the British do as they pleased. It was soon after this meeting that Eden sent a 

message to Eisenhower stressing the importance of reacting strongly. He wrote: 

We are all agreed that we cannot afford to allow Nasser to seize control of the 

Canal this way, in defiance of international agreements. If we take a firm stand 

over this now, we shall have the support of all the maritime powers. If we do not, 

our influence and yours throughout the Middle East will, we are convinced, be 

irretrievably undermined….As we see it we are unlikely to attain our objective by 

economic pressures alone. I gather that Egypt is not due to receive any further aid 

from you….We ought in the first instance to bring the maximum political 

pressure to bear on Egypt. For this, apart from our own action, we should invoke 

the support of all the interested powers. My colleagues and I are convinced that 

we must be ready, in the last resort, to use force to bring Nasser to his senses. For 

our part we are prepared to do so. I have this morning instructed our Chiefs of 

Staff to prepare a military plan accordingly. 27 

From this letter, Britain’s objectives were made clear. The Chiefs of Staff had indeed been told 

to work on a military plan, and Britain desired the support of the United States. Though Eden 

mentioned political pressure, he made his ultimate intentions apparent when he wrote that they 

were already in the process of creating a military plan. Eisenhower was taken aback by the 


27 In folders marked “Eden (1-6),” 27 July-27 November, in Cole C. Kingseed, Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 

1956 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 46. 

11

combative tone, though he took some comfort in the fact that Eden had called for a tripartite 

conference with the two nations and France, whose position was as bellicose as Britain's.. 28 

When he read that Eden had called for a tripartite conference, Eisenhower undoubtedly believed 

that this would be a perfect opportunity to talk Britain out of carrying out its military 

preparations. 

On July 27, just one day after the nationalization was declared, the Cabinet in Britain 

decided that the nationalization of the Canal needed to be overturned using force if it was called 

for. The Egypt Committee, which was made up of Eden, Lord Salisbury, Harold Macmillan, and 

Selwyn Lloyd, among others, were to create a plan to make this a reality. 29 

On July 28, Undersecretary Robert Murphy went to London for a tripartite conference, 

where France, Britain, and the United States discussed the crisis. Eisenhower had instructed 

Murphy to stay “clear of any precipitate action with the French and the British, which might later 

tie his hands.” 30 Eisenhower made it clear that he wanted the maritime nations that were affected 

by the nationalization to have a say in the course of action. 31 During the discussions, Murphy 

informed Britain and France that the United States did not view military action as a reasonable 

solution given the present conditions. This statement most likely served in encouraging the 

collusion between Britain, France and Israel. If there was no reason for an invasion, then they 

would create one. Later, Murphy sent a cable message to Eisenhower, describing the mental state 

of their European allies: 


29 Bowie, 198. 



The British government has decided to drive Nasser out of Egypt. They are 

convinced that military action is necessary and inevitable. They wish the 

President to understand clearly that the decision is firm, and made calmly and 

without emotion. They see no alternative. (Both stressed these points repeatedly.) 

12

Preparations would require six weeks. While flexible as to the procedure leading 

up to a showdown, at the end they were determined to use force. 32 

Britain did not even want to attempt a peaceful solution to the crisis. Eden was virtually blind to 

all other options. He was on a mission to take Nasser down. When this message was read in 

Washington, it was met with shock. It was clear that Britain and France were both ready for war 

in their desperation to reclaim the Canal and overthrow Nasser in the process. 33 

On July 30, Dulles cabled Murphy telling him that there should be no ultimatum that 

threatened force should Nasser choose to not concede and internationalize the Canal. He felt that 

the ultimatum would only lead to Nasser's position being strengthened by growing Arab support, 

and if that happened, war would be unavoidable. 34 Eisenhower had already told Eden that US 

military action would need Congressional approval and that was unlikely as long as the Canal 

traffic passed freely and smoothly. Though Eisenhower expressed his doubt of Congressional 

support and his own personal misgivings, he did not tell Eden that the United States would 

actually contravene the use of force. The United States, in comparison to Britain, planned to have 

a “more moderate but firm” approach to solving the crisis. 35 The United States continued to have 

an unclear course of action. While Eden may have once been able to read diplomatic subtleties, 

his American allies did not adjust to his drastic change in health and failed to make their 

opposition to force clear. 

On July 30 “the Egypt Committee “took action regarding Egyptian sterling, payment of 

Canal dues, and military preparations.” 36 Britain had also decided that if the conference that the 

United States wanted so badly was held, the only result it would accept would be the issuance of 

32 

Diplomat Among Warriors, 1964; Riding the Storm, 1971; Eden, in Robert Bowie, “Eisenhower, Dulles, and the 

Suez Crisis,” in Suez 1956, ed. WM. Roger Louis and Roger Owen (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 197-8. 

33 

Kingseed, 51. 

34 

Kingseed, 51. 

35 

OH 250, in Cole C. Kingseed, Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956 (Baton Rouge: Louisianna State University 

Press, 1995), 51. 

36 

Bowie, 198. 

13

an ultimatum that could result in a military response. The Committee outlined the results Britain 

wanted to see: “While our ultimate purpose was to place the Canal under international control, 

our immediate [purpose] was to bring about the downfall of the present Egyptian Government.” 37 

With Eden on the Committee, it is no wonder that this was their main objective. Nasser was an 

unredeemable enemy in his ailing mind and the only option was to take him out. 

On July 31, Eisenhower held a meeting with his chief advisors to figure out their position 

given Murphy’s cable message and Eden’s letter. Eisenhower described the British position as 

being “very unwise” and “out of date.” 38 He feared how that position would affect oil shipments 

and views of the West in the Middle East. Dulles supported these fears by predicting that force 

on the West’s part would precipitate terrorist attacks on troops station in the Canal Zone, and 

said that he truly felt that Canal operations could be internationalized without resorting to force. 

Admiral Burke was the only one in attendance to view Nasser as a major threat to the West. He 

believed that first the United States and its allies had to try to overcome the issue of 

nationalization politically or economically, but if it came down to it, British armed military 

action should take place and the United States should offer its support, though not join in the 

attack. In spite of Burke’s more forceful stance, Dulles maintained that the United States could 

little by little convince Britain that it should not consider force as a serious option. 39 After 

hearing what his chief advisors had to say, Eisenhower decided that the Americans would 

approach the issue with caution. 40 This once again is a testament to the Americans heavy 

dependency on their sway over Britain. They fell back on that special relationship, believing that 

37 

Eden in, Robert Bowie, “Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Suez Crisis,” in Suez 1956, ed. WM. Roger Louis and Roger 

Owen (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 198. 

38 

Memcon, Pres., 31 July 1956, in Robert Bowie, “Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Suez Crisis,” in Suez 1956, ed. WM. 

Roger Louis and Roger Owen (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 198. 

39 

Bowie 198-9. 

40 

Kingseed, 53. 

14

the British could be persuaded towards peaceful means. Eisenhower's decision to merely use 

caution was incredibly vague, and his failure to outline a clear plan only served in reinforcing the 

British notion that he would not interfere with or oppose British military action. 

Eisenhower sent Dulles to London only three hours after the meeting’s end to tell the 

British government “how gravely we view this matter, what an error we think their decision is, 

and how this course of action would antagonize the American people.” 41 Within the first week, 

Eisenhower had told the British that while taking the nationalization’s consequences very 

seriously, the United States believed that military intervention would be a mistake. The President 

firmly believed that international, not military means, would solve the crisis. Even as the crisis 

was developing and coming to a head, Eisenhower did not plainly say that the United States 

would oppose a forceful course of action. He knew that he and Eden were of opposing mindsets 

on the matter and that this was a grave situation indeed; but, in Eisenhower’s view, simply 

allowing Britain to enter into a doomed war without trying dissuade them from what he viewed 

as a doomed path was not an option. 42 He depended on their relationship and his ability to 

convince the British that their plan to react forcefully was doomed. Eisenhower even sent a 

message to Eden himself, saying that while force may be called for in the distant future, it should 

only take place after “every peaceful means of resolving the difficulty had previously been 

exhausted.” 43 He truly believed that a peaceful agreement could be reached. He also expressed 

once more his desire to have a conference held with the maritime nations to work on making sure 

the Canal was run efficiently. Because the British mistakenly believed that Eisenhower was not 

the man in charge of foreign policy, his insistence that force was not an option was clearly not 

taken seriously by Eden and his colleagues. Their misreading of Eisenhower's power in foreign 

41 Memcon, Pres., in Bowie, 199. 

42 Kingseed 53. 

43 Memcon, Pres., in Bowie, 199. 

15

policy would prove to be a grave mistake. Some fault here also lies with Eisenhower. His 

somewhat relaxed nature and failure to make it clear the United States would oppose military 

action played a role in Britain's misreading his power in foreign affairs by giving Eden plenty of 

room to make assumptions. 

When Dulles arrived in London, he was able to convince Britain and France to attend a 

conference with the maritime nations even though their positions remained as extreme as 

Murphy had described. Chancellor of the Exchequer Harold Macmillan said that Great Britain 

would sooner go down fighting than face a slow and humiliating demise. Dulles also agreed that 

Nasser should yield and internationalize the Canal, but said that if the conference did not achieve 

the ends the Americans wanted, the United States would act independently as it saw fit, without 

their allies if need be. 44 Though he suggested an independent course of action on the United 

States' part, the usually eloquent Dulles did not tell Britain that the United States would contest 

military action. Reporting to Eisenhower, Dulles stated that Britain and France “had already 

frozen Egyptian financial assets, and the diplomatic tone that had prevailed in London was even 

more warlike than he had imagined.” 45 

by Dulles: 

Perhaps one of the mistakes made on the United States part was some confusion caused 

In spite of his rhetoric and his known sympathy for Great Britain and France, 

Dulles urged calm. Unfortunately, he confused the issue by occasional references 

of the necessity to force Nasser to “disgorge” the Suez Canal 

region....Understandably, Eden and Lloyd were somewhat perplexed by the 

contradictory position, and they later cited this statement as proof that the United 

States had not eliminated the resolution of the dispute by military force. 46 

44 Bowie,199; Nimer, 787. 

45 Kingseed 54-5. 


16

Dulles was rather prone to bombastic, long-winded, and impassioned speeches. This was one of 

the many reasons that the British believed that Eisenhower was not in charge of foreign policy 

and would therefore allow their military action to take place unhindered. Eden would later try to 

place some blame for the outcome of the crisis on this fact, but ultimately failed. President 

Eisenhower had on numerous occasions, both in public and in private letters to Eden, thoroughly 

expressed his desire for diplomacy instead of force. The guilt lay with Britain for miscalculating 

the foreign policy power the American President wielded. It must be taken into account, 

however, that Eden's intense focus on removing Nasser may have created the need for him to be 

told directly and clearly that if he chose to act without US support, Eisenhower would openly 

oppose his action and play a part in its conclusion. 

The Tripartite Conference ended with a plan in place for a maritime conference in mid- 

August to create an international system to operate the Canal. Nasser, however, refused to attend 

the conference because an international system for running the Canal was not acceptable to him. 

If anyone was to get involved, he wanted it to be the United Nations, perhaps due to the anti- 

imperialistic stance the United Nations was known to maintain. He also said he would assure the 

continued use of the Canal to all nations save Israel, who could not use it before the 

nationalization anyways. 47 

Eden had been pleased with the meeting with Dulles. He sent a letter to Eisenhower on 

August 5, writing that Britain wanted to “undo what Nasser has done and set up an international 

regime for the Canal.” He also made mention of Britain’s desire to see Nasser removed from 

power. Eden reiterated that if Nasser did not cooperate, force was necessary to maintain a 


17

position in the Middle East. 48 His fixation on removing Nasser from power did not waver, and 

still Eisenhower failed to adapt to the Prime Minister's altered health and judgment. 

Eisenhower felt that the London Conference would buy time and give him the much- 

needed opportunity to dissuade Britain from military action which he knew they were in the 

early stages of planning. The President still clung to the rapidly unraveling special relationship 

the two nations had in the past. By this time he had clear objectives that greatly differed from 

Britain. The President had no desire to overthrow Nasser; his only aim in the Middle East was to 

assure that the Canal operation be “smooth and efficient.” 49 He wanted those who had signed the 

1888 Convention, and other nations affected by the nationalization, to create an international 

system to run the Canal. Also of great importance to the United States was maintaining the 

relationship with Britain, which would serve in keeping NATO united. 50 Eisenhower and Dulles 

felt the strong need to mollify Eden and convince him that Nasser would face consequences for 

his actions, while also steering the Prime Minister from their his aggressive approach. 

Eisenhower and Dulles continued to put far too much stock in the influence they had over 

Britain. 

On August 12, Eisenhower held a conference with legislators to get advice from different 

committees. Here it was decided that “the American position in London would be to contribute a 

solution of the crisis with the objective of safeguarding the interests of those states dependent on 

the Canal, as well as recognizing the legitimate interests of Egypt.” 51 At the conference Dulles 

also shared his suspicions that Britain and France were planning to send troops to the Canal 

Zone. It would seem that in spite of the evidence staring the Americans in the face, they once 

48 Eden, in Bowie, 199-200. 


50 Kingseed, 58-9. 


18

again depended on their history and relationship with Britain to prevail. The Americans could 

not fathom the British acting without American consent and support and believed that their sway 

over the British was strong enough to convince them to use diplomatic means for arriving at a 

resolution. 

In the time between the tripartite meeting that had been held in London and the London 

Conference, Eden tried to convince Eisenhower that Nasser was a threat that needed to be 

removed. On August 8 the British Prime Minister even went so far as to compare Nasser to 

Hitler on the radio. Not everyone in the British government supported Eden at this point, but the 

planning for war had already been set in motion and Eden was determined to see this plan 

through. Eden was an intelligent man and had proven in the past to be a very skilled politician. 

His inability to see the problems with his plan are a testament to his worsening judgment. 

On August 13 a statement was issued that the three powers of Britain, the United States 

and France were on the same page when it came to arriving at a solution for the current crisis. 

Clearly both Britain and the United States were failing to see or ignoring the evidence to the 

contrary. The following day Dulles said that he and Eisenhower had reviewed a variety of 

possible approaches to the matter to "assure dependable operation” of the Suez Canal that would 

also protect Egypt’s rights. The Secretary made no mention of the Canal being internationalized. 

Through this statement, Dulles showed that Americans were willing to compromise when it 

came to the running of the Canal and that they continued to hold true to their rejection of force as 

a means to an end. In spite of Dulles's insistence that force was viewed as a poor option, he did 

not properly convey the United States' oppositional position. Putting their concerns resulting 

from this statement aside, Britain plowed ahead with its militant approach counting on the 

19

history it had with the United States and Eisenhower's easy-going nature to allow for a successful 

mission. 

By mid-August Eisenhower’s view had grown increasingly different from that held by 

Eden and his colleagues. First of all, Eisenhower’s aim was to guarantee that the Suez Canal ran 

smoothly; he had no intentions of playing a part in “the discrediting or unseating of Nasser.” 52 

He continued to believe that Britain was overreacting to the Egyptian President. It was becoming 

rapidly clear that the motive behind Eden's aggressive approach was more about removing 

Nasser than it was internationalizing the Canal. His obsession with this task grew by the day. 

Eisenhower believed that while international operation would be best, it was unlikely that Nasser 

would give up that power. The American President felt that supervision by an international group 

would suffice. Eden and his colleagues, meanwhile, were hell-bent on attaining at least 

international operation and wanted Nasser overthrown in the process. It was very clear that 

Britain was headed towards military intervention, but Eisenhower could not fathom the British 

betraying their alliance and acting without at least his knowledge and consent. Eisenhower felt 

that peaceful measures were necessary to solve the issue since Nasser’s decision to nationalize 

the Canal was his legal right, and that through discussion, Britain could be led to see this fact. 

Eisenhower thought that as long as Nasser was “(1) operating the Canal efficiently, and (2) was 

complying with the provisions of the 1888 Convention,” military action could not be justified. 53 

He had taken force off of the table completely, and Dulles after the fact said he agreed with the 

President regarding force, saying, “…I did not believe the situation was one which should be 

resolved by force. I could not see any end to the situation that might be created if the British and 

52 Bowie, 200. 

53 Bowie, 201. 

20

French occupied the Canal and parts of Egypt.” 54 Dulles also felt that by using force, they would 

risk making Middle Easterners into enemies and leaving a gap for the Soviet Union to enter the 

Middle East and Africa. The Secretary also believed that using force in this crisis could lead to 

force being used in similar situations and such constant resort to military action would be 

detrimental to the already suffering British economy. 55 

On August 18 the London Conference was held as planned. The plan that France, Britain 

and the United States had made called first for the formation of an international group to 

“operate, maintain, and develop” the Canal. 56 When Dulles informed Eisenhower that this board 

would be responsible for the operation of the Canal, Eisenhower told the Secretary that Nasser 

would be more likely to go for supervision than operation. Dulles told Eisenhower that many, 

including Britain, thought this was not good enough. He felt that it would be difficult to sway the 

obstinate British, but went on to say that supervision could perhaps be presented if international 

operation was refused. Eisenhower saw what a difficult position Dulles was in at the conference, 

and, fully trusting his colleague, gave him the liberty to act as he saw fit in regards to the 

proposal. Dulles was far more worldly when it came to foreign policy, and Eisenhower had told 

Dulles that less than international operation was acceptable and allowed the Secretary to present 

that as a resolution if international operation was not accepted. Though it was clear to other 

nations after the fact that Eisenhower was in charge, his decision at this juncture to cede such 

power to his Secretary of State supports the British belief that he was not necessarily the one 

making the big foreign policy decisions in the United States 

54 

Memcon, 30 August 1956, in Robert Bowie, “Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Suez Crisis,” in Suez 1956, ed. WM. 

Roger Louis and Roger Owen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 201. 

55 

Bowie, 201-2. 

56 

Bowie, 202. 

21

Britain and the United States had entered the conference supposedly united in their 

calling for an internationally operated Canal. But as the Conference wore on, there was 

discussion of an international board that would come to be known as the Suez Canal Board. 

Amendments were added from Iran, Pakistan, Ethiopia and Turkey that were pro-Egyptian in 

nature. The Board would be responsible only for monitoring the running of the Canal while daily 

operations were the responsibility of Egypt. By embracing these changes, Dulles had 

inadvertently chosen Africa and Asia over the two American allies and made it apparent that the 

United States would settle for less than international operation, which certainly only served in 

causing further injury to his already poor relationship with Eden. He made it clear that the United 

States viewed the grievances of Britain and France as matters of “prestige” and “power.” 57 

Throughout the conference the American view was still that Nasser had been a bit hasty, but he 

was only doing what he thought was best for his country and position. Dulles pointed out that 

Egypt using the Canal for national policy was wrong, but it had been wrong when Britain had 

done it as well. The fervent Eden certainly took this statement as harassment coming from 

Dulles, and his plan to use force against the United States' urging was only solidified. 

Dulles hoped that if Nasser turned down the proposal resulting from the London 

Conference, it would at least serve in jumpstarting negotiations. Meanwhile, Britain wanted to 

present the proposal to Nasser as a nonnegotiable ultimatum. For the duration of the Conference, 

the British kept their desire to remove Nasser from power to themselves. They were “not 

prepared to tell Dulles that if the operation of the Canal were not truly internationalized by a 

given date they would use force against Egypt, American wishes to the contrary none 

withstanding.” 58 The decision to not tell the United States demonstrated Britain's dependence on 

57 Nimer: 789. 

58 Nimer: 788. 

22

its supportive relationship with the United States and on Eisenhower not standing in the way. 

Eden was so intent on his plan that he failed to see just how much keeping the United States in 

the dark could harm the age-old relationship and Britain's standing in the world. The conference 

ended with Prime Minister Menzies being appointed to present the proposal to Nasser. 

About a week after the conference was drawn to a close, Eisenhower sent a letter to Eden. 

He told the Prime Minister point blank that their opinions on the nationalization of the Canal and 

on where to go were different. 

I am afraid, Anthony, that from this point [safeguarding international rights of 

passage in the Suez Canal] onward our views on the situation diverge. As to the 

use of force or the threat of force at this juncture, I continue to feel as I expressed 

myself in the letter Foster carried to you some weeks ago. Even now military 

preparations and civilian evacuation exposed to public view seem to be 

solidifying support for Nasser which has been shaky in many important quarters. I 

regard it as indispensable that if we are to proceed solidly together to the solution 

of this problem, public opinion in our several countries must be overwhelming in 

its support. I must tell you frankly that American public opinion flatly rejects the 

thought of using force, particularly when it does not seem that every possible 

peaceful means of protecting our vital interests has been exhausted without result. 

Moreover, I gravely doubt we could secure Congressional authority even for the 

lesser support measure for which you might have to look to us. 

I really do not see how a successful result could be achieved by forcible 

means. The use of force would, it seems to me, vastly increase the area of 

jeopardy. I do not see how the economy of Western Europe can long survive the 

burden of prolonged military operations, as well as the denial of Near East oil. 

Also, the peoples of the Near East and of North Africa and, to some extent, all of 

Asia and all of Africa, would be consolidated against the West to a degree which, 

I fear, could not be overcome in a generation….Before such actions were 

undertaken, all our peoples should unitedly understand that there were no other 

means available to protect our vital rights and interests. 59 

From this message, Eden could have easily read what he wanted to read. Though citing previous 

letters, Eisenhower places blame for the United States' decision to not respond militarily on 

Congress and American public opinion. He says that he cannot see a successful end to Eden's 

59 Eisenhower to Eden, 2 September 1956, Cole C. Kingseed, Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956 (Baton 

Rouge: Louisianna State University Press, 1995), 73-4. 

23

methods and that the people in both the United States and Britain must know that force was the 

only option, but he fails once again to tell Eden outright that if Britain goes forward with military 

intervention, the United States will actually challenge and humiliatingly force Britain to 

withdraw. When confronted with Eisenhower’s opinion, Eden felt that he and the American 

President failed to see eye to eye because they interpreted Nasser’s actions and saw the results of 

invasion ending differently. He also fell back on both Britain's relationship with the United 

States and his own relationship and knowledge of Eisenhower to rationalize his choice to move 

forward with military action. 

During the gap between the London Conference and Menzies’s mission in Egypt in the 

beginning of September, Eisenhower worried that in spite of Britain stating that it would refrain 

from using force until Menzies’s mission was complete, that Eden would find a way to resort to 

force. Talks in Washington made it clear that the United States was convinced that Britain was 

going to use force if it came down to it. British officials had even told Dulles that military action 

on their part was certainly not out of consideration. Though the United States government was 

dead-set against military action, Dulles felt it would prove difficult to steer Britain from its 

strong reactions as Britain's position as a foremost world power was directly threatened if Nasser 

was not confronted somehow. 60 Never the less, hopes that diplomacy would solve the criss and 

the conflicting American and British views prevailed in the United States. 

While the Menzies Committee was still in Egypt, Selwyn Lloyd concluded that the 

mission was going to fail. The doubts about the mission were heightened when, on September 5, 

Eisenhower had stated that he would not resort to force to solve the issue. 61 Britain believed that 

when the United States made this fact public, they had taken the winds of the Menzies 

60 Kingseed, 68-9. 


24

Committee's sails because there was no threat to coerce Nasser to internationalize the Canal. The 

British could not see how the mission could possible render the ends they wished to achieve. 

Any doubts they had about using force were eradicated enough to begin devoting significant 

energy to military plans once more. 

So sure was Lloyd of the mission’s imminent failure that while Menzies was still 

presenting the conditions in Egypt, he told Dulles that Britain wanted to go to the Security 

Council. He asked the United States to back “the Eighteen Power proposal for international 

Canal operation and to reject any watering down at the United Nations.” 62 Dulles said that the 

United States would support the proposal, but did not agree to anything other than that. He also 

warned Lloyd that he could not say that he would refrain from voting against military action if it 

came up at the United Nations. After Lloyd approached Dulles with this request, the Secretary 

believed that Britain was only going to the United Nations with the issue in hopes of being able 

to use force as a means to ending the crisis. In spite of his suspicions, Dulles and Eisenhower 

believed that the British could be dissuaded from military intervention. They believed that the 

relationship the United States had with Britain could lead Britain to an understanding that using 

force was both foolish and dangerous. They were depending on Eden's ability to be reasonable 

and see this fact. Neither the American President nor Secretary considered the toll Eden's health 

was taking on his mental state. 

Lloyd’s reservation regarding the Menzies mission proved correct. It did indeed fail. 

Nasser agreed to concede some power on certain fronts, but he found the idea of the Canal being 

internationally run unacceptable. While the British were moving back towards planning military 

intervention, in the United States Dulles and Eisenhower were glad that they had, at least for the 

time being, prevented Britain from using force. Their ability to at least stall the use of force 

62 Bowie, 203. 

25

through discussions and committees encouraged their belief that they could talk the British out of 

resorting to force. 

In early September, Eisenhower’s position remained unchanged. He told Dulles that he 

wanted to maintain the relationship with Britain but said that he was unable to “agree with these 

people in their extreme attitude.” 63 Eisenhower recognized how extreme the British position led 

by Eden was, yet continued to rely on the Americans' ability to calm the British mindset and 

steer them from such an aggressive course. During the early part of the month, Eden and 

Eisenhower, and Dulles and Lloyd, continued talks. 

With his ever-growing suspicions of British and French military plans, Dulles tried to 

find a diplomatic way to keep them from using force. On September 4 he presented the idea for 

the Suez Canal Users’ Association, or SCUA. He and Eisenhower did not see quite how SCUA 

would work, but had hopes that it would steer the British off the war path they were headed 

down and give the Americans time to continue attempting to pacify their enraged allies. The 

Foreign Office correctly thought that the United States was stalling and putting off British 

military action, but they had no choice but to go along to maintain appearances. 64 Dulles 

suggested another conference with pro-international nations. The conference was intended to 

present SCUA and its purposes to the maritime nations. SCUA would have its own pilots, have 

fees for passage, and be responsible for making sure the Canal ran smoothly. It was also 

expected to collaborate with Egypt in the proper running of the Canal. Eisenhower and Dulles 

hoped that in proposing SCUA to Nasser they would create a bridge between the users and Egypt 

63 

Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, 7 September 1956, 

in Cole C. Kingseed, Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956 (Baton Rouge: Louisianna State University Press, 

1995), 72. 

64 

Ray Takeyh, The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine: The US, Britain and Nasser’s Egypt, 1953-57 (New York: 

St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 133. 

26

to further negotiate. 65 After discussions of the specifics of SCUA between Dulles and British and 

French Ambassadors that spanned a few days, they arrived at some agreements. Members would 

pay SCUA directly, and Egypt would receive payment from SCUA. If Egypt somehow did not 

allow for the Canal to be run fairly and freely, members would be well within their rights “to 

take steps to assure their rights through the United Nations or through other actions appropriate 

to the circumstances.” 66 To a man as unhinged as Eden, this made force look like a reasonable 

option in spite of the United States' insistence to the contrary. With statements such as these, it 

surely made rationalizing military action easy for the Prime Minister in such a delicate mental 

state. 

In spite of the brave and independent stance Eden presented, in his heart he was not 

pleased with the prospect of acting without American support. Britain’s coffers were quite low 

and if Britain were to attack, they would not get oil from the Middle East. Britain would need to 

turn to the United States for aid. 67 In spite of these misgivings, the British went ahead with their 

military invasion. Clearly their objectives superseded their doubts. They counted on Eisenhower 

to stay out of their way and for their special relationship with the United States to prevail. 

Both Britain and the United States accepted SCUA for reasons that they believed would 

lead to completing their independent ultimate objectives. Britain thought that through SCUA, 

they could keep money from Nasser and run the chance of creating a need for force if the 

Egyptian President were to react poorly. Foreign Office Official Harold Bealey certainly 

confirmed this notion, saying, “We shall need any luck we can get in the way of provocation by 

Colonel Nasser and I would suggest that the concerted denial of Canal dues should still have a 

65 Bowie, 203. 

66 Memcon, Briefing of Senators, 27 September 1956, in Robert Bowie, “Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Suez Crisis,” 

in Suez 1956, ed. WM. Roger Louis and Roger Owen (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 204. 

67 Eisenhower to Eden, 2 September 1956, in Ray Takeyh, The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine: The US, Britain 

and Nasser’s Egypt, 1953-57 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 133. 

27

high priority among our immediate objectives.” 68 Macmillan also supported setting up SCUA 

because the “establishment of this users organization is a step toward the ultimate use of force.” 69 

Eisenhower, however, would still not resort to military action if SCUA did not complete its 

objectives. The United States also proposed that participation in SCUA was to be voluntary and 

users were allowed to pay dues directly to Egypt if they so chose. This basically rendered any 

power SCUA would have had null and void. The Americans true hope was that SCUA would 

create an opportunity for further negotiations with Nasser. The vastly different motives had by 

the United States and Britain only served to show that the two allies, even a month after the 

nationalization, could not agree how to proceed. 70 Britain and the United States continued to 

depend on the other to fall into line. 

When discussing SCUA, Dulles was sure to make it clear that if Nasser blocked passage, 

ships would instead sail around the Cape, not resort to force. Eden accepted this, but only 

because he suspected that using another route would insult Nasser. He also believed that toll fees 

would mostly be kept from Egypt, thus angering Nasser to the point of closing the Canal. This, in 

Eden’s opinion, would lead to a just reason to allow military action. Eden's fixation with 

internationalizing the Canal and removing Nasser gave him the ability to look at every possible 

course of action and see military intervention as the end result in every case. 

On September 6, Eden compared Nasser and his actions to Stalin’s Berlin blockade in a 

letter to Eisenhower. He felt that the nationalization served in completing Nasser’s goal to 

remove Western influence from the Middle East. His strong desire to maintain Britain’s prestige 

was revealed again when he wrote. “We have many times led Europe in the fight for freedom. It 

68 The Economic Diplomacy to the Suez Crisis, in Ray Takeyh, The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine: The US, 

Britain and Nasser’s Egypt, 1953-57 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 134. 

69 CAB 128/30 Part II CM64 (56). PRO, in Ray Takeyh, The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine: The US, Britain 

and Nasser’s Egypt, 1953-57 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 134. 

70 Takeyh, 134. 

28

would be an ignoble end to our long history if we accepted to perish by degrees.” 71 His 

statements show that he took the nationalization as a threat to his beloved Britain. 

Two days later, on September 8, Eisenhower replied to Eden’s letter, saying that he was 

viewing Nasser as more of a threat than he really was. He went on: 

The use of military force against Egypt under present circumstances might have 

consequences even more serious than causing Arabs to support Nasser. It might 

cause a serious misunderstanding between our two counties because I must say 

frankly that there is yet no public opinion in this country which is prepared to 

support such a move. 72 

Eisenhower failed to make anything definite in this message. He speaks of what might happen 

and only suggests a misunderstanding between the nations. He does not warn Eden that if he 

goes through with military action, the Prime Minister will be drawing a line with Britain on one 

side and the United States on the other. 

On September 12 Eden, speaking to Parliament, made alterations to the original wording 

regarding SCUA to give it a threatening tone. He pressed for the ability to keep the Canal open 

and operating by whatever means were fit. From the start the only means that were fit to the 

bellicose Eden involved using force. The next day, Dulles presented SCUA the way he felt it 

should have been presented. He mentioned the notion of going around the Cape if it came to that, 

and that “The President has authoritatively said that, in his opinion, force, if justifiable, is only 

justifiable as a last resort.” 73 At this point the United States did not want force to be necessary at 

all, fully believing that it would never come down to that because diplomatic discussions were 

the obvious and only way to solve the crisis. Apparently, if was not made obvious enough to 

71 Eden to Eisenhower, 6 September 1956, in Louise Richardson, When Allie Differ: Anglo-American Relations 

During the Suez and Falklands Crisis (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 59. 

72 Eisenhower to Eden, 8 September 1956, in Louise Richardson, When Allie Differ: Anglo-American Relations 

During the Suez and Falklands Crisis (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 59. 

73 Memcon Pres., 2 October 1956, in Robert Bowie, “Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Suez Crisis,” in Suez 1956, ed. 

WM. Roger Louis and Roger Owen (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 205. 

29

Eden, who felt “betrayed and humiliated” but moved forward with forceful actions none the 

less. 74 

As it turned out, there was no need for force. The Canal Authority kept the Canal running 

smoothly when Western pilots left on September 14, and was indeed running it better than the 

British had. 75 The next day SCUA faced condemnation by Nasser. 76 

The Second London Conference began on September 19. At the meeting, it was clear to 

Dulles that Britain and France had “isolated themselves from even their closest allies.” 77 Though 

the United States had hoped to steer Britain from their militant approach, Dillon told Dulles that 

Britain continued to feel that force was the only way to achieve their objectives and force would 

be used when it was deemed “politically feasible.” 78 Still, Dulles clung to his faith in the power 

of American diplomacy. 

The Second London Conference once again supported international operation. The 

majority, Dulles included, decided that following the rules of the Users’ Association was 

voluntary. Dulles drove yet another wedge between the United States and Britain by saying that 

if for some reason only Egyptians were legally allowed to pilot ships, it was the American 

people’s right to choose whether or not to let them do so instead of pressing for an Association 

pilot. . In this event, Americans could also use the Canal instead of taking a detour around the 

Cape. 79 This message would have been antagonizing enough to Eden, but coming from Dulles it 

certainly only added insult to injury. 

74 Bowie, 205. 


76 Bowie, 205. 

77 Kingseed, 75 


79 Nimer :791-2 

30

The Secretary also made it clear that maintaining a peaceful approach was the right thing 

to do. The conference ended with the agreement that SCUA was to become effective October 1 

and would attempt to solve the crisis with Egypt’s help. 80 When it drew to a close, the British felt 

like they had been stabbed in the back by the Americans and wondered just what that alliance 

was good for at this point. 81 

Shortly after the end of the Second London Conference, Britain, accompanied by France, 

approached the United Nations without American support on September 23 to discuss the crisis. 

They brought with them the Eighteen Power Proposal from the first conference and “called on 

Egypt to negotiate on that basis.” 82 They felt that until Egypt agreed to that proposal, SCUA 

should be in control. Britain, of course, saw SCUA as merely a precursor to military 

intervention. Upon learning of his allies going to the United Nations behind his back, 

Eisenhower was confused and shocked. He feared that if and when the Security Council was 

unable to come up with a solution, Britain and France might use its failure to justify use of 

force. 83 Still, the President did not warn Eden of the consequences Britain's actions would carry. 

On September 26 Dulles said that to solve the crisis they would need to find a way to 

marry the differing definitions of justice in this situation. He still held that a settlement was 

within reach without threat of force and that upsetting Egypt would not have any benefits. 84 

On October 2, mildly edited by the Department of State, a statement was released by the 

United States to the world addressing Britain and France: 


81 Nimer: 793. 

82 Bowie, 205. 


84 Nimer:793. 

There is some difference in our approach to the Suez Canal Problem. That 

difference relates to perhaps some fundamental things. In some areas we are 

bound together by treaty, certain areas such as the Atlantic Pact area, we are 

31

ound by treaty to protect. We stand together there and I hope and believe always 

will stand absolutely together. Other problems relate to other areas and touch the 

so-called problem of colonialism in some way or other. On these problems the 

United States plays a somewhat independent role. 85 

This press release made it apparent once again that the United States sought an independent 

course and viewed Britain’s stance as having to do with colonialism. It showed that the United 

States felt that while it had some requirements to meet for its Allies, it ultimately did not feel the 

need to put itself in any danger when its fate was not directly under siege. As always, though, 

independent action did not equate to opposition. Given Eden's preoccupation with removing 

Nasser, he did not understand that independent action could very well mean openly opposing 

positions. 

As late as October 5, Dulles spoke with British and French officials who gave their word 

to strive for a peaceful solution. That same day marked the beginning a series of meetings at the 

Security Council. Dulles said that the President believed that “less than international operation” 

was adequate. 86 

On October 14 the excuse for British invasion was finally found. Representatives from 

France and Israel came to Eden with a plan: Israel was to invade Egypt. Following the attack, 

Britain and Egypt could enter with claims of trying to bring peace and keep the Canal Zone 

secure. The United States was completely out of the loop on the collusion. Eden surely believed 

that Eisenhower's relaxed attitude would prevent serious American reaction and that eventually 

the United States would see things the way he did. 

Only days before the invasion, Dulles told Aldrich that “we are quite disturbed here over 

the fact that there is apparently an elaborate British plan of keeping us completely in the dark as 

85 Quoted Paraphrase in the New York Times, 3 October, in Benjamin Nimer, “Suez, and Democratic Diplomacy,” 

The Western Political Quarterly 12:3 (1959): 793-4. 

86 Bowie, 206. 

32

to their intentions with reference to the Middle East matters generally and in Egypt in 

particular.” 87 The allies used to keep each other informed, but this was no longer the case. It was 

putting serious stress on the Anglo-American relationship. 

Things began to move quickly. By October 26 there were mounting military preparations 

by Israel. They claimed that they were preparing in a defensive manner, and Britain suggested 

that Jordan could possibly be Israel’s target. 88 On October 27, Dulles maintained that the Canal 

was important for many in the world and force was not an option to solve the issue. On October 

28, Lloyd told Ambassador Winthrop Aldrich that he knew nothing of Israel launching an attack 

on Egypt and nothing of France playing a part in it. He claimed that in light of the Tripartite 

Declaration and Jordon Treaty, British involvement was unfeasible. All the while, military 

intervention was in the works. 

On October 29, Dulles sent a message to the US Ambassador in Paris saying that the 

British could know about a possible attack by Israel to open the way for a British and French 

invasion. Four hours later, word of the Israeli invasion was received in Washington. A few hours 

after the revelation, Eisenhower and Dulles met with chief advisors to discuss the developments. 

Dulles expressed his belief that Britain and French knew of and perhaps helped plan the initial 

Israeli invasion as a means for their own invasion. He also believed that the European nations 

expected the Americans to go along with them. 

By October 30, the United States was still unsure about the extent of Britain and France’s 

involvement in the invasion. They knew that they were backing Israel, but other than that their 

roles remained somewhat hazy. Eisenhower wanted to turn to the United Nations to solve the 

crisis at hand. When Britain and France issued their long-awaited ultimatum, Egypt expectedly 

87 FRUS, 1955-1957, in Ray Takeyh, The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine: The US, Britain and Nasser’s Egypt, 

1953-57 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 138. 

88 Bowie, 207. 

33

efused. The ultimatum called for the quarreling Egyptians and Israelis to withdraw to allow ten 

miles of space on either side of the Canal. This not only allowed Israel to stay in Egypt, but 

meant that they could continue to move their front forward. The British and French had now 

made their roles in the collusion clear by giving Israel the option to move the line forward. 

Eisenhower felt that had the Canal users used nonviolent pressure, they could have 

weakened Nasser. With these new developments, he felt that the Arabs would rally to Nasser 

since the West had attacked the Middle East. Soon after the ultimatum issuance, Eisenhower 

received a message from Eden asking the United States to back Britain up. The American 

President felt the British reaction was over the top and told them as much. 89 Still, he did not warn 

Britain what consequences the Americans would deliver if Britain invaded. 

At Egypt’s refusal, Britain and France joined in the attack on October 31. By this time, 

the British economy was in dire straits. Fifteen percent of British gold and dollar reserves were 

gone. There was an oil shortage in Britain because the Canal was impassable, and ships had to go 

around the Cape. This was also more expensive. Eisenhower had no plans to send funds since he 

felt that “the purpose of peace and stability would be served by not being too quick in attempting 

to render extraordinary assistance.” 90 British beliefs to the contrary, Eisenhower was indeed in 

control, was openly opposing Britain, and did not place the Anglo-American relationship above 

the United States' independent needs. 

The National Security Council met to decide how the United States should react. Dulles 

described the actions on the parts of Britain, France, and Israel as “concerted moves.” 91 Their 

89 Bowie, 209. 

90 Memorandum of Conversation with the President, 5 November 1956, in Ray Takeyh, The Origins of the 

Eisenhower Doctrine: The US, Britain and Nasser’s Egypt, 1953-57 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 140. 

91 Discussion at NSC, 1 November 1956, in Robert Bowie, “Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Suez Crisis,” in Suez 1956, 

ed. WM. Roger Louis and Roger Owen (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 209. 

34

plan had to be decided by that evening in time for the United Nations meeting. Dulles made a 

speech here, saying: 

If we are not now prepared to assert out leadership in this cause, then 

leadership will certainly be seized by the Soviet Union. But asserting our 

leadership would involve us in some very basic problems. For many years now 

the United States has been walking a tightrope between the effort to maintain our 

old and valued relations with our British and French allies on the one hand and on 

the other trying to assure ourselves the friendship and understanding of the newly 

independent countries who have escaped from colonialism. Unless we now assert 

and maintain this leadership, all of these newly independent countries will turn 

from us and to the U.S.S.R. We will be looked upon as forever tied to British and 

French colonist policies. 

Basically, we have almost reached the point of deciding today whether we 

think the future lies with a policy of reasserting by force colonial control over the 

less developed nations, or whether we will oppose such a course of action by 

every appropriate means. 

It is nothing less than tragic that…we should be forced to choose between 

following the footsteps of Anglo-French colonialism in Asia and Africa or 

splitting our course away from their course. 

Yet this decision must be made in a mere matter of hours – before five 

o’clock this afternoon. 92 

At the meeting it was also suggested that maintaining a good relationship with Britain and 

France should take precedence, but Eisenhower did not agree, saying, “My emphatic belief is 

that these powers are going downhill with the kind of policy that they are engaged at the moment 

in carrying out. How can we possibly support Britain and France if in doing so we lose the whole 

Arab world?” 93 Eisenhower was a stronger and more assertive leader in this crisis than the 

British could have imagined. 

Eisenhower stayed true to his belief that there were no grounds for invasion and would 

not support the British and French actions. If he were to do this, he would be going against the 

UN Charter, he risked estranging other Middle Eastern States, the Soviet Union could benefit 

92 Neff, 390. 

93 Neff, 391. 

35

from hostility in the Middle East towards the West, enmity could grow and spread, and he would 

risk losing the Canal’s effective operation. 94 

On November 1 the President sent a memorandum to Dulles in which he stated the goals 

the United States should had after the NSC meeting. He first and foremost wanted to have a 

cease-fire so that the situation could become manageable. He also wanted the United States to 

steer the course at the UN meeting for a number of reasons, including the desire to save face for 

Britain and France, to prevent the Soviet Union’s entry, and to maintain good relations between 

East and West. On November 2, the General Assembly took up the American resolution which 

called for a cease-fire and the pulling out of troops, showed that force was not the answer, and 

that stronger nations attacking weaker ones was not acceptable. 95 

On November 4, back in Britain, Macmillan informed those at a Cabinet meeting that 

“run on the pound and that gold reserve had fallen by 100 million pounds in the last week.” 96 

They did not have the means to keep the pound exchanging at $2.78 for an extended period of 

time. The United States was not sending supplementary funds for aids as Britain had hoped. Also 

of great concern to Britain was the United States, the country that deposited the most in the 

International Monetary Funds and therefore the country who made decisions on withdrawals, did 

not allow Britain to withdraw the sterling they had deposited there. The United States had every 

intention of boxing Britain into a corner with a cease-fire and withdrawal from Egypt as the only 

way out. 97 The United States said it would lend “$1.5 billion with interest payments deferred” if 

and only if Britain declared a cease-fire and pulled its troops out of Egypt. 

94 Bowie, 209-10. 

95 Bowie, 211. 

96 Neff, 409. 

97 Neff, 409-10. 

36

Eisenhower was taking charge and putting an end to the military action he had been 

against from the start. Clearly Britain did not expect such a forceful reaction from the United 

States. Fault for this lies with both Britain and the United States. In spite of insisting for a 

peaceful resolution, the United States consistently avoided telling Eden that it would actively 

oppose and put an end to the use of force. Britain, led by Eden, was so focused on its military 

endeavor that the idea that the even-tempered Eisenhower would put the Anglo-American 

relationship on the line seemed impossible. 

Finally, on November 6, Eden agreed to a cease-fire. The roadblocks to success for 

Britain at this point were insurmountable. Britain’s standing in the world was poor, the Canal 

was in shambles, and British currency was losing ground. 

On November 30, Eisenhower sent emergency oil to Britain and began to discuss giving 

the much needed funds to Britain. Lloyd declared the initiation of withdrawal on December 3, 

and by December 22 all European troops have evacuated Egypt. 

Although the relationship of Britain and the United States was repaired, the 

nationalization of the Suez Canal and invasion of Egypt revealed to Britain that it was no longer 

able to make decisions regarding “foreign policy independent of the USA.” 98 Britain also 

realized that it needed the United States to keep a reserve of currency and oil, and to ward off the 

Soviet Union. As Eisenhower had predicted, Nasser’s success led to Britain losing some of its 

prestige. In doing so, the United States gained considerable power in the Middle East. 

It is quite remarkable that the United States was shocked when the collusion came to 

light. Although they shut the Americans out towards the end, Eden and his followers had made it 

abundantly clear that they wanted to respond with force. The British believed their economic, 

political, and imperial positions were in danger and felt the need to react strongly. Eisenhower 

98 Thomas ,154. 

37

and Dulles failed to tell the mentally unstable Eden frankly that military action would result in 

American opposition. The poor relationship between Dulles and Eden places a significant 

amount of blame on the Americans and British as well. Also surprising is the betrayal felt on the 

part of Britain when the United States did not come to the rescue after the invasion had been 

initiated. Though Dulles may have muddled the message on more than one occasion, Eisenhower 

and Dulles, for the most part, were quite frank and open about their belief that force was not only 

uncalled for but would prove to be a detriment to solving the crisis. They maintained both 

privately and publically that diplomatic means, such as using economic sanctions and political 

pressure, would ultimately lead to negotiations and peace would follow. This was the course the 

United States would take. Britain's belief that Eisenhower was merely a figurehead and that the 

special Anglo-American relationship would win out, which was only promoted by Eden's poor 

health and resulting mental state, played a major part in the misunderstandings during the crisis. 

The break in the Anglo-American relationship took place directly following the nationalization 

of the Suez Canal due to a myriad of faults on either side – it just took a war to make the two 

allies realize it. 

38

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41

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