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and Spain are less significant. In those countries, other thresholds must be reached to change the articles. For instance in France 2/3 of the votes is sufficient. Table 5: Concentration of the voting block of the largest shareholder (1999) Voting block of the largest shareholder Belgium France Germany Italy Spain U.K. average 41.71 51.98% 46.13% 48.14% 37.91% 18.26% st. dev. 21.72 25.55% 26.60% 22.20% 26.95% 13.51% median 40.94 54.94% 47.00% 51.53% 30.02% 14.15% maximum 88.99 99.66% 100% 100% 100% 78.12% minimum
Figure 1: Distribution of the voting blocks of the largest shareholder 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% >75% 50-75% 25-50% 10-25%
Page 1 and 2: Financial Law Institute Working Pap
Page 3 and 4: Scale of corporations, industryspec
Page 5 and 6: voting power is not uniform. It see
Page 7 and 8: II Data construction 1. Data source
Page 9 and 10: elatively frequent in the database.
Page 11: III. Results 1) Descriptive analysi
Page 15 and 16: majority shareholder. 14 The same c
Page 17 and 18: Table 8: Average voting block of th
Page 19 and 20: 2) Empirical analysis The first par
Page 21 and 22: Table 11: One way anova for voting
Page 23 and 24: Finally, Real estate corporations (
Page 25 and 26: industry-specificity influences the
Page 27: References Bebchuk, L., 1999, A Ren

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