BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua

Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Introduction
according to prevailing public attitudes about the proper use of public office. On this
definition, bribery constituted an illegitimate use of public power for private profit. 15
With the rise of a market-centered approach to studying bribery, in recent decades
the problem of definition has been eschewed or, to be more precise, thought settled. On a
market-centered model, public officials are a kind of agent who, in abusing their power,
thereby violate the terms of a contract they have between themselves and their principal
(usually the people as a whole). By viewing public office through a principal-agent
relationship, political economists have reached some striking albeit conventionally
accepted conclusions: namely, that all public officials are inclined to use their office to
maximize private gain or influence provided the costs do not outweigh the gains; and
that, accordingly, bribery can be minimized but never completely eliminated. 16 The
significance of this model will be clear in a moment when we examine the problem of
intent. For now it is enough to point out that, in reality, a market-based approach is
predicated on a legalistic definition of bribery, as ‘bribery’ is always defined in reference
to the ‘contract’ between principal and agent. 17
Note how all of these definitions focus on the intent of the bribe. By positing that
private gain is the reason for the abuse of public power—however we define it—these
15 This is a modification of the categories set forth by Heidenheimer (1989); cf. Caiden and Caiden (1977),
Philp (1997, 2002), Johnston (2005) and Chapter One below. Instead of the public opinion, Heidenheimer
includes market-based approaches, on which see further below. Legalistic definitions: Leys (1965), Nye
(1967), Scott (1972). Public interest approach: Gronbeck (1978). The public opinion model set forth by
Peters and Welch (1972) and Gibbons (1989) never gained much traction with other scholars, but see the
recent legal anthropological approach in Pardo (2004a), Haller and Shore (2005).
16 Market-based model: Banfield (1975), Rose-Ackerman (1978, 1999), Goudie and Stasavage (1998),
della Porta and Vannuci (1999), Lambsdorff (2002). A principal-agent model is also employed in section 1
of the British Prevention of Corruption Act (1906). This kind of approach has been criticized both for
failing to explain collaboration and cooperation within politics (i.e. ‘altruistic’ acts at odds with an
inherently selfish rational actor) and for failing to predict the efficacy of certain anti-corruption reforms:
see DiIulio (1994) for the former and Robinson (1998) for the latter. Sarat and Simon (2001: 11-12) point
out that the turn to rational actor modeling is a broader shift in legal studies more generally.
17 On this point, Philp (1997: 445) is particularly helpful.
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