Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in South Asia after the Test Ban

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14 NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ARMS CONTROL, SOUTH ASIA IV. Pakistan’s domestic politics Pakistan’s inability to capitalize on the opportunity to put India on the diplomatic defensive has been as disconcerting as India’s volte-face on the CTBT. A decision by Pakistan to sign the CTBT would leave India isolated, since only North Korea has not yet signed among the other 42 states with nuclear reactors that must sign the treaty before it can enter into force. Pakistani policy on the CTBT has been reactive in the extreme, essentially ceding the initiative on the issue to India. When fears arose in the autumn of 1995 that India might conduct a nuclear test, Pakistan immediately threatened to test in response. No technical rationale for a test was put forward. When India refused to sign the CTBT, Pakistan said that it too would refuse. 19 Samina Ahmed explains the domestic context that gives rise to this thoughtless and counterproductive approach to arms control. It appears that the Pakistani Government has lost control of its policy domestically as well. In seeking to bolster support for the nuclear option and the costly decision not to sign the NPT, Pakistani politicians have created a dynamic in which any concession to international control of nuclear policy can be used as lethal ammunition in the debate that characterizes contemporary politics. In such a context, bold leadership—even when it could on balance serve the national interest—is tantamount to electoral suicide, as acknowledged in a moment of candour by President Farooq Leghari. It is tempting to imagine a more nuanced debate of the nuclear issue in Pakistan, a society that demonstrates a high calibre of thought in other areas. As Ahmed demonstrates, however, this is unlikely without further political reforms. While the return to civilian government and the recent strengthening of the prime minister’s position are important steps in the right direction, structural obstacles exacerbated by acute social problems remain daunting. Most importantly, the civilian government still relies on the military for political stability. Furthermore, independent critics are few and far between. Those who do emerge are hampered by a lack of information, 20 as well as a public that has a high rate of illiteracy and is not responsive to their message. 19 Perkovich, G., ‘Misperception and opportunity in South Asia’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, no. 19 (1996), pp. 417–18. 20 This lack of information makes it impossible to characterize Pakistani nuclear, security and science policies as carefully as has been done for India (section II). The poor reliability of Pakistan’s Kanupp reactor, which can be ascribed to its international isolation just as that
AFTER THE TEST BAN 15 Indeed, the response of the Pakistani public to the nuclear issue is the most fundamental concern, especially if political reform increases the electorate’s influence over policy in greater measure than it increases their sympathy with new perspectives. If so, the outlook for a change of approach is not good. Even if literacy and openness improved, it seems most likely that social conditions in Pakistan will continue to make the few apparent successes of the nation—the nuclear programme and the F-16s count high on the list—extremely popular and keep sceptics in an untrusted minority. 21 As a result, even a prime minister as strong and conciliatory as Nawaz Sharif in his second term is unlikely to take the step of unilaterally signing the test ban, even though it would be to the net advantage of the country. V. Steps towards greater stability The remaining question, then, is whether there are other steps that can be taken—either through negotiations or unilaterally—to reduce instability in South Asia. There are at least three sources of instability in the current South Asian situation which are generally overlooked in discussions of the region, as discussed in chapter 5. The first is a difference in perception between Indian and Pakistani élites regarding the risk of war. The second is a difference between Indian and Pakistani expectations of how a war would unfold. The third is the incentive which Indian war plans offer Pakistan to deploy ballistic missiles, which are generally agreed to be a threat to stability. The risk of war Recent statements and writings of Pakistani officials suggest that they underestimate the risk of war. Indeed, the perception is gaining currency that Pakistan’s nuclear option makes war in South Asia very of its Indian counterparts can, is shown in table 1.4. Pakistan’s annual budget for military R&D is only about $4 million, but the total cost of the nuclear programme is likely to be many times greater. On Pakistan’s military R&D policy, see Arnett, E., ‘Military research and development’, SIPRI Yearbook 1997 (note 18), p. 216; and Arnett, E., ‘Military research and development in southern Asia: limited capabilities despite impressive resources’, ed. Arnett (note 16), pp. 259–60. 21 As one critic has put it, Pakistan’s nuclear bomb ‘dispels the gloom’ of its failure to solve its other problems and rise above the lowest ranks of the world’s states in most indices of development and human well-being. Hoodbhoy, P., ‘Pakistan’s nuclear future: capping the nuclear program’, eds D. Cortright and S. Ahmed, Pakistan and the Bomb: Public Opinion and Nuclear Options (Notre Dame University Press: Notre Dame, forthcoming).
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