Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in South Asia after the Test Ban

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44 NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ARMS CONTROL, SOUTH ASIA and equipment [by the 1970s] . . . One third of [this] force was deployed along the Sino-Indian border.’ 19 Between six and eight of India’s 10 new mountain divisions were directed at China. The divisions in the eastern part were deployed in Nagaland, Mizoram and Manipur, and two corps were responsible for Kashmir, including Ladakh in the western part. In the 1980s, with an increase in military expenditure, its border arms were further modernized. Some Indians, however, argue that the lack of a network of roads to tactical points and shortage of aircraft are still a problem. The normalization with China, especially the border agreement, has provided an opportunity for India to introduce a degree of flexibility in military planning. While the ‘Chinese threat’ is still mentioned in the media from time to time, there has been no mention of any nuclear threat from China for the past several years in the Ministry of Defence’s annual reports. 20 Moreover, India does not want to face two battle fronts, which would be a huge burden economically and militarily. India has chosen to maintain its nuclear option policy and has not weaponized its nuclear capability. The dissolution of the USSR, the reduction of military expenditure and pressures from the international arms control community have all made their marks. The two countries have also been working on confidence-building measures. Chinese warships visited Bombay in 1994 for the first time in nearly 40 years. In 1995 the two countries held a joint military exercise along the border in the Himalayan region of Ladakh. Three border trade posts have been opened, including one at Nathu La in Sikkim. Additional confidence-building measures are under discussion, for example, expanding the range and increasing the frequency of military visits to each other’s military establishments beyond the meetings now being held at the Spanggur Gap in Ladakh and at Bumla in Arunachal Pradesh. Three more locations have been agreed upon for such meetings: Nathu La, Shipki La in Himachal Pradesh and Lipulekh in Uttar Pradesh. The groups are also to prepare a draft protocol to be signed by China and India on advance notification of military exercises and for prevention of air intrusions. China and India have renounced the use of force to settle their border disputes, and the possibility of war has practically disappeared. 19 Luo (note 12), p. 82. 20 Indian Ministry of Defence, Annual Report (Thomson: New Delhi, various years); and Chari, P. R., ‘Chinese threat?’, Economic Times (New Delhi), 4 Nov. 1993. Chari drafted several of the introductory chapters to the annual report.
III. The role of nuclear weapons SINO- INDIAN RELATIONS 45 So far, the improvement of Sino-Indian relations has not explicitly addressed the nuclear issue. The issue has special characteristics in the Sino-Indian context. China is a nuclear weapon state, while India has demonstrated its nuclear capability but refuses to produce nuclear weapons. Since China has undertaken not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons first, there is not necessarily any more for them to talk about. Increasing international efforts on nuclear arms control have coincided with the improvement of Sino-Indian relations, but both sides have good reason not to raise any issue which might be unnecessarily divisive. The nuclear issue is sensitive for both states, even if that sensitivity has little to do with their relationship to one another, and even if the topic were on the bilateral agenda there would not be much space in which to manoeuvre. In any case, the nuclear issue is not central to Sino-Indian relations. Neither country has accorded the issue a high priority in their meetings. 21 On both sides changes in their security situations have made domestic politics a more important factor in the nuclear weapon programmes. Since the nuclear issue is not yet a topic of public debate in China, its role in domestic politics remains largely one of state élites expressing the strength of the government and the skills of its scientists. 22 In India, domestic politics has an important influence over nuclear decision making, as demonstrated by the polarization of the debate over the test ban in late 1995 and 1996. 23 In the 1996 general election all parties, despite their differences on other issues, closed ranks on the nuclear issue. It is becoming harder for the Indian Government to participate in any nuclear arms control initiative, if it ever wanted to. Have nuclear weapons ever been significant in Sino-Indian relations? China appears relatively unconcerned about India’s nuclear enterprise. It has never seen India alone as a nuclear threat, although 21 Chakravarti, S., ‘Rao’s China visit to improve ties’, Times of India, 31 Aug. 1993. 22 Di Hua, ‘Threat perception and military planning in China: domestic instability and the importance of prestige’, ed. E. Arnett, SIPRI, Military Capacity and the Risk of War: China, India, Pakistan and Iran (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1997), pp. 31–32. 23 See chapter 2 in this volume; and Arnett, E., ‘India’s nuclear brownout’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Nov.–Dec. 1996.
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