Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in South Asia after the Test Ban

More documents

Recommendations

Info

30 NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ARMS CONTROL, SOUTH ASIA A coalition of some determined laboratory scientists and hard-liners within and outside the government (many of them retired officials) had won the day, but that coalition had no unified view about what to do next. Having saved the option, should India go ahead and test? Opinion was divided. While this group was critical of the CTBT text as it finally emerged, no credible alternatives were suggested. The issue of the CTB became more firmly linked to a time-bound plan of complete nuclear disarmament but no concrete proposals as alternatives to the step-by-step US–Russian Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) process emerged. The day had been won but the future still remained uncertain. V. Prospects for the future The United Front Government, having rejected the CTBT categorically, has made this the established policy of the country. It would be extremely difficult for any future government to reverse course even if it wanted to do so. With weak coalition governments, a reversal would be impossible. Yet it cannot be called a robust policy worked out in all its details. Will a future government undertake tests and production of deliverable nuclear weapons? The BJP’s resolution states that if the security conditions so require it will deploy nuclear weapons, but it is unlikely to do so if it ever comes to power. This is in part because it is unlikely to emerge from any election with a decisive majority; rather it will be in coalition with several other parties. Furthermore, whereas it is easy for it to appear defiant when not in power, once in power other priorities would take precedence—economic considerations and international repercussions, for example. What if Pakistan tests a nuclear weapon? Domestic pressure in India then would mount to fever pitch as it did in the wake of the Chinese test of 1964. It is then possible that India would resort to a tit-for-tat test to assuage public opinion but without embarking on a fullyfledged programme of tests. Now that opposition to the CTBT has been signed and sealed as India’s firm stand—‘India will not sign it; not now nor later’ in the words of Ambassador Ghose—such opinion as supported the treaty in the past has now been effectively blunted. There is a long history in India of critics opposing government decisions in defence matters.
INDIAN POLITICS AND ARMS CONTROL 31 Deals to acquire aircraft-carriers, nuclear-powered submarines and deep-penetration strike aircraft, to give only a few examples, have been denounced, often by retired military officials, offering cogent arguments. Such criticism has made no difference whatsoever. The only possibility of India reversing its decision on the CTBT would arise if it became a major issue in a general election in the future. It is very unlikely that this can happen. The other possibility, even more remote, is that a change of heart on the part of the policy makers will be brought about by intense pressures and isolation which begin to hurt beyond what proud nationalism can bear. There have been occasions in the past when pressures have worked but the issues involved—the export of jute bags and water buffaloes to Viet Nam, for example—did not lend themselves to being exploited by opposition parties. The CTBT has now been elevated as a symbol of India’s standing up to the great powers; climbing down has become all the more difficult. The fissile material cut-off Just as Rao’s positive approach to the CTBT could have overcome the standard objections to the NPT, the FMCT could address many of India’s non-proliferation concerns if India decided to participate in the negotiations and sign it. In 1997, however, the same lobby which opposed the CTBT is opposing the FMCT as well. There is no possibility of the Indian nuclear establishment agreeing to bring existing stockpiles under the provisions of the treaty; that would completely remove the long-cherished element of ambiguity and perhaps expose the shortcomings in India’s nuclear programme. A useful diversion is to link it with complete nuclear disarmament within a fixed timeframe. The debate over the CTBT has made the fixed time-frame a near-sacred principle. India has always advocated complete nuclear disarmament and world opinion is on its side, but the insistence on a fixed time-frame is a new element in India’s approach. The Rajiv Gandhi plan of 1988 mentioned a tentative date (including conclusion of the CTBT by 1994) but not a fixed time-frame as such. A cynical interpretation of why India has lately made a fixed time-frame the major issue of principle could be that it was the most effective way of opposing the CTBT. The more charitable interpretation, of course, is that India
Page 1 and 2: Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in
Page 3 and 4: Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in
Page 5 and 6: Contents Preface vii Acronyms and a
Page 7 and 8: Preface SIPRI has assembled a team
Page 9: Acronyms and abbreviations AWAC Air
Page 12 and 13: 2 NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ARMS CONTROL,
Page 20 and 21: 10 NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ARMS CONTROL
Page 46 and 47: PUNJAB PAKISTAN N Karakoram Pass L
Page 90 and 91:
80 NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ARMS CONTROL
Page 92 and 93:
Page 94 and 95:
Page 96 and 97:
Page 98 and 99:
Page 100 and 101:
Page 102 and 103:
Index Afghanistan 60 Agni missile 4
Page 104 and 105:
Page 106 and 107:
Page 108:
show all

Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in South Asia after the Test Ban

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?