February - Fort Sill - U.S. Army
February - Fort Sill - U.S. Army
February - Fort Sill - U.S. Army
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Interview: Think Fire Support<br />
exercises through REFORGER [return<br />
of forces to Germany] and moves to and<br />
from training areas over those distances.<br />
I understand you used a technique to<br />
shrink the commander's decision cycle in<br />
the 3d Infantry Division, called the<br />
"One-Fifth—Four-Fifths Rule." Would<br />
you explain the concept and its impact<br />
on executing fire support?<br />
Our approach in the Marne Division<br />
was to try to be more timely in the<br />
decision making and orders process so<br />
we could maximize the time available<br />
to those who must prepare for and<br />
execute operations. Typically, one uses<br />
a rule of thumb of<br />
"one-third—two-thirds" to allocate the<br />
time from the commander's receiving<br />
the mission until he issues the order to<br />
subordinate commands, so that<br />
two-thirds of the time available can be<br />
used to prepare to execute the operation.<br />
Giving the commander a full one-third<br />
of the time seemed to me to be a<br />
disproportionate rule of thumb. It also<br />
gave us too much time, and we prepared<br />
overly complex orders and plans that<br />
were too difficult too execute.<br />
So we adopted the thesis that, for this<br />
operation, less is better. We maximized<br />
the time available for preparation and<br />
execution and emphasized executing an<br />
"about right" but simple plan. To do that,<br />
we allowed a commander only one-fifth<br />
of the time to issue the order.<br />
That created a challenge for the fire<br />
supporter. He clearly couldn't execute a<br />
measle sheet—plan a great number of<br />
detailed targets. So, in the 3d Division,<br />
we kept it very simple. We developed<br />
"about right" fire plans and groups of<br />
fires at the company, battalion and<br />
brigade levels, and used a process we<br />
called the "percolator." Just like a<br />
percolator, the commander's concept<br />
went from top to bottom, then each fire<br />
support echelon nominated and adjusted<br />
targets and sent them back up for<br />
integration, deconfliction, simplification<br />
and approval. Then they went from top to<br />
bottom again for final planning and<br />
preparation.<br />
It all starts from the commander's<br />
concept. The commander has to give<br />
you a concept for movement and fires.<br />
In fact, we used standardized<br />
subparagraphs to Paragraph 3B ["Tasks<br />
to Maneuver Units"] of the Operations<br />
Order. Subparagraph 3B(1) was always<br />
the commander's assessment of what<br />
the most probable enemy course of<br />
action would be; 3B(2) was the<br />
commander's scheme of maneuver; and<br />
3B(3) was the commander's scheme for<br />
fires.<br />
The commander must visualize and<br />
articulate what he wants his fire support<br />
to do as part of his concept of operations.<br />
That's not the fire support coodinator's<br />
job. The fire support coordinator's job is<br />
to make it happen.<br />
Where should the fire support<br />
coordinator [FSCOORD] position<br />
himself to be most effective on the<br />
battlefield?<br />
He needs to postion himself so the<br />
commander can best use fire support<br />
during the fight. Artillerymen have a<br />
great penchant for doing detailed<br />
planning and then being disturbed when<br />
the battle plan doesn't fit the situation. I<br />
know that from my own experience.<br />
Most plans don't fit the battle situation<br />
as it develops. It's a chaotic<br />
environment—some mistakes are made,<br />
but a lot of opportunities also present<br />
themselves. Through it all, the fire<br />
support coordinator's primary mission is<br />
to ensure fires are integrated into the<br />
operation as it goes down. Fire Support<br />
can make a big difference.<br />
We have many fire support<br />
coordinators, from the company through<br />
the corps levels, who want to build a<br />
nice, neat plan and then execute it in<br />
isolation. You can't do that. You must be<br />
relevant—and to be relevant, you've got<br />
to get fire and maneuver at the right place<br />
at the right time. So, the fire support<br />
coordinator must be wherever on the<br />
battlefield the commander is to influence<br />
his decisions.<br />
At the company level, the fire<br />
support coordinator—the FIST [fire<br />
support team] chief or COLT [combat<br />
observation lasing team] chief—is<br />
mainly in the execution business. He's a<br />
big-time shooter. He must see the enemy<br />
and pull the trigger. The maneuver<br />
company commander is also in the<br />
execution business. Both are very busy<br />
leaders upon whom the success of our<br />
operations hinges. Both must see and<br />
understand the battlefield the same.<br />
They need to have a common perception<br />
of the battlefield and good<br />
communications between them. That's<br />
one of the primary reasons for their<br />
being habitually associated. Effective<br />
teams speak a special shorthand with<br />
very clear, very specific understanding.<br />
But at the moment of execution, the<br />
company commander may need to be in<br />
one location and the FIST in another. So,<br />
if the FIST is in the business of<br />
executing, he may not be with the<br />
company commander. Occasionally he'll<br />
be able to be in the same location.<br />
Offensive operations and<br />
movements-to-contact pose different<br />
challenges than prepared defensive<br />
operations.<br />
At the battalion level and above, the<br />
fire support coordinator should be within<br />
arm's reach of the commander. He<br />
should be "cheek-by-jowl" with him<br />
when they're formulating the concept<br />
and executing the operation. During the<br />
planning and preparation phase,<br />
frequently the fire support coordinator<br />
will be out supervising the work of other<br />
fire support coordinators. But during the<br />
concept formulation and execution<br />
phases, he needs to be right beside his<br />
commander.<br />
What involvement did you have in the<br />
targeting process as the Commander of<br />
the 3d Infantry Division?<br />
That's a good question because the<br />
division commander's focus is basically<br />
a simple one. Though he fights as part of<br />
a corps on a complex battlefield and he<br />
isn't isolated, he primarily focuses on<br />
executing a number of close battles.<br />
Brigade commanders are the primary<br />
agents for integrating the combined arms<br />
teams and executing a particular battle<br />
given them by the division. The division<br />
commander must ensure enemy artillery<br />
is kept off their backs and the plan is<br />
adjusted as required to accomplish the<br />
mission. That type of targeting is fairly<br />
straightforward.<br />
That doesn't mean the division<br />
commander is oblivious to all else. He's<br />
always looking a day or two<br />
downstream—always posturing for the<br />
next battle. In doing so, he has a very<br />
active dialogue with the corps<br />
commander on what<br />
forces—targets—are going to show up<br />
and his preferences, needs and priorities<br />
to set up the battle so the division can best<br />
execute it. There's a dialogue between the<br />
staffs to ensure all have a common<br />
perception of future battles that must be<br />
set up.<br />
The division commander has great<br />
interest in what targeting the corps is<br />
doing. That's his business as well as the<br />
fire support coordinator's.<br />
As far as intelligence is concerned, the<br />
commander must be the best in the division<br />
8 Field Artillery