February - Fort Sill - U.S. Army

ON THE MOVE
Targeting and the
Targeting is the process the
maneuver commander uses to
focus the fire support, intelligence
and command and control (C 2 ) battlefield
operating systems (BOSs) to achieve his
intent. The process is tough, and we need
to get much better in our understanding
and execution of it.
MAJOR GENERAL FRED F. MARTY
(PIR) and information requirements (IR).
These priorities form the basis for the
intelligence collection plan and target
acquisition taskings.
The decide process also translates the
commander's intent into products used
by the fire support system. These
products include the HPT list, target
selection standards (TSS) matrix and the
attack guidance matrix (AGM). The end
result of the decide function produces a
clear articulation of the commander's
intent for his sensors and shooters.
D 3 Methodology Detect. This function focuses
D 3 Methodology
A critical means used to translate the
commander's intent into a plan is the
decide-detect-deliver (D 3 ) methodology.
The elements (called functions) of D 3
cause the commander to determine what
to attack with his fire support system, how
to acquire those targets, and when those
targets are found, how to attack them in a
way that disrupts, delays or limits the
enemy's ability to respond.
Decide. During this function, the
commander's intent for fire support and
maneuver is translated into targeting
guidance and priorities. Based on staff
analysis of which resources are critical to
the enemy for a given course of action
(called high-value targets, or HVTs), the
commander decides which targets he must
defeat for his plan to succeed. Analysis by
the intelligence and fire support staffs
determines whether a HVT can be
acquired and successfully attacked. Those
that can be are presented to the maneuver
commander as potential high-payoff
targets (HPTs). The commander selects
and prioritizes the most critical of these
targets. This is his HPT list.
The results of the decide function
produce the commander's targeting
guidance, priority intelligence
requirements
acquisition and surveillance assets at the
times and places necessary to acquire
HPTs for attack to ensure friendly
success. The flow of information from
the target acquisition assets to the
intelligence, targeting and attack cells
must be planned, coordinated and
rehearsed. Those assets that produce
targetable data should be linked directly
to the targeting cell. The cell evaluates
the data, based on the HPT list and
AGM, and forwards the information to
the attack system(s). Information that is
less than target quality—such as that
produced by shell reports from units
(ShellReps) and moving target locating
radar (MTLR) reports—is sent to the
intelligence cell to analyze and correlate
with various sources and produce targets.
The priorities developed in the decide
function guide and expedite the
processing of targets acquired in the
detect function.
Deliver. In this function, the fire
support system attacks the targets the
decide function identified as critical and
the detect function has located. When the
maneuver commander determines which
targets are HPTs, he also specifies what
effects (suppress, neutralize or destroy)
are necessary to disrupt, limit or delay the
enemy, as well as which HPTs require
target damage assessment (TDA).
Targeting is not solely, or even
primarily, fire supporters' responsibility,
though we are key players in the process.
D 3 is a tool used by the combined arms
force commander to coordinate and
synchronize the BOSs to achieve the
outcome he envisions. The quality of the
targeting effort often determines the
force commander's success or failure. To
succeed, he must be an active, informed
player in the targeting effort.
D 3 and Operation
Desert Storm
Desert Storm confirmed two things we
3
already knew about targeting. First, D is
difficult, particularly at echelons division
and above. Second, D 3 works.
As more decision makers and
acquisition, surveillance and attack
systems get involved, the process gets
tougher. This is particularly true when
joint assets are included. Competition for
assets is intense. Many intelligence
systems are capable of both target
acquisition and TDA but cannot do them
simultaneously. Establishing and adhering
to priorities becomes increasingly critical.
The success of our targeting effort is
evident in the incredible destruction
wrought by the fire support system in
Desert Storm and the consequent lack of
American and allied casualties. This
success was achieved because the D 3
methodology is sound and commanders
and staffs throughout the force worked
hard to master the process.
Before the war, the battle command
training program (BCTP) increased the
visibility and focus of the targeting
process for division and corps staffs. In
the desert, commanders filled the critical
jobs with quality people and used the
mobilization period to train the process
and develop and refine techniques.
An enemy who outgunned and
outranged us lost the war because he
could not target our forces. We won
because we could and did target the
enemy successfully. D 3 made that happen.
Conclusion
The D 3 methodology is the key to
success for the targeting process. To attain
that success, we must work closely with
the intelligence and maneuver
communities to ensure we identify,
acquire and attack those targets critical to
the success of the mission.
As fire supporters, we must be leaders
in the effort to focus all the battlefield
operating systems to achieve the
maneuver commander's intent.
Field Artillery—On Time, On Target!
February 1992 1