DANGEROUS CROSSING: - International Campaign for Tibet

INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR TIBET
dra to close the Tibet offices. 80 The closures of these offices were a blow to the
Tibetan refugee community. Deprived of representation and a link to the Tibetan
government in exile, foreign embassies and other organizations no longer had an
authoritative point of contact for various Tibetan concerns in Nepal. Then, in 2006,
the King was deposed and Nepal moved towards democratic elections in 2008.
The 2008 uprising in Tibet shook China’s political elite and created thousands of
would-be Tibetan refugees, keen to escape political detention or further repression
in Tibet. Since 2009, in a bid to mitigate the escape of Tibetans from Tibet and
freedom of speech of Tibetan refugees, China has been on a diplomatic offensivel 81
in Nepal, to ensure the latter’s adherence to a ‘one-China’ policy. No longer able to
approach a single entity (the monarchy) to effect change, China has had to reach
out to a range of stakeholders, from different sections of the Nepal government
to political party leadership, the Nepal army, Nepal police, the Armed Police Force
(APF), and media. In doing so, China follows the precedent, which India has long
set, of direct intervention in the running of the Nepali state. 82 In order to keep these
Nepali stakeholders on-side, China employs a range of political tactics and financial
incentives.
1) High-level diplomacy
To maintain a tight clampdown on people, protest and information, China
has extended its securitization plan across the Himalayan border into Nepal.
The implementation of this has been fast and blatant. Since 2009 onwards,
there have been a series of official high-profile meetings that have escalated
in stature. Nepal has responded by mounting high-profile visiting delegations
to Beijing from the Defense, Foreign and Home ministries, to counter-balance
any Delhi-bound trips. These interactions have now become a mechanism for
cooperation between the two states. Aware that power is fractured within
Nepal, China has also extended invitations to the heads of state security forc-
es, the Nepal army and all major political parties, all of whom, except the Nepali
Congress Party, have taken up the offer of strengthening political ties
through such delegations. 83 All these actors have also met regularly with the
Chinese Ambassador and visiting Chinese dignitaries. China’s bestowal of ac-
cess and political acumen on various Nepali actors has come at a price – one
which Tibetans have had to pay.
These interactions have been used to secure Nepali commitments to sup-
press ‘anti-China’ activities. In 2010, the first “Nepal-China Border Security
and Law Enforcement Talks” saw both sides agree to share information and
intensify policing on the basis of security, with China as financier. In Jun,
2011, China installed renowned specialist on regional security, Yang Houlan,
41