M/s. Kutch Chemical Industries Limited. - Gujarat Pollution Control ...

M/s. Kutch Chemical Industries Limited. 

Survey No 166/1,2,3, 171/1, 172,167,168, 

Village : Padana 

Gandhidham, Dist. Kutch 

RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY 

For Existing and Proposed Plan 

PREPARED BY 

VAIBHU SAFETY CONSULTANTS 

FF-11, Akshat Complex, 

Nr. Reliance Petrol Pump, 

High Tension Road, Subhanpura, 

Vadodara-390 023 

Phone: 9825756467/9427838021 (M) 

Prepared By M/s. Kutch Chemical Industries Limited Page : 1 

HSE Department Rev. : 00

CERTIFICATE 

We are pleased to certify that this Risk Assessment study of Company has been 

conducted by us. 

This is the first Risk Assessment report of this company for new project and it has 

been carried out during the month of March- 2010. 

Risk Assessment is a legal requirement u/r 12-c & 68-O of the Gujarat Factories 

Rules. 

The recommendations are based on information supplied to us by the company and 

our plant visits. 

The Executive Summary is given in the beginning to highlight the important 

summary of our report and methodology of the risk assessment carried out. 

We are thankful to the Mr. Shivlal Goyal (Occupier), Mr. D.S. Purohit (Factory 

Manager), Mr. R. K. Jha ( Dy. Manager HSE) and Officers of the Company for their 

all co-operation to prepared this report. In particular we acknowledge the continuous 

support given to us by Mr. R. K. Jha for completion of this report. 

FOR VAIBHU SAFETY CONSULTANT 

Authorized Signatory 



SECTION 

NO. 

CONTENTS 

CONTENTS 

1 Executive Summary 

2 Objectives, Philosophy and methodology of 

Risk assessment 

3 Introduction of the unit 

3.1 Company Introduction 

3.2 Details of Unit 

3.3 Project setting 

3.4 Organisational setup 

3.5 List Of product 

3.6 List of Raw Material 

3.7 Details of storage of Hazardous Materials in 

Bulk and control measures provided 

3.8 Hazardous Properties Of The Chemicals, 

Compatibilities And Special Hazard 

3.9 Facilities / System for process safety, 

transportation, fire fighting system and 

emergency capabilities to be adopted 

3.10 Brief Description of process plant 

4 Hazard identification 

4.1 Introduction 

4.2 DOW’s Fire and Explosion Index 

4.3 Failure Frequencies 

4.4 Identification of Hazardous area 

5 Risk Assessment 

5.1 Effects of Release of Hazardous Substances 

5.2 Identification of High Risk Areas 

5.3 Modes of Failure 

5.4 Damage Criteria for heat radiation 

6 Consequence Analysis 

6.1 Consequence Analysis 

6.2 Table of Consequences analysis results 

6.3 Comments 

7 Risk Reduction Measures 

7.1 Design 

7.2 Safety Devices 

NO. OF 

PAGES 



7.3 Operation and Maintenance 

7.4 Recommendations 

8 Disaster Management plan 

8.1 On site emergency Plan (OSEP) 

8.2 Scope of OSEP 

8.3 Elements of OSEP 

8.4 Methodology 

8.5 Emergencies Identified 

8.6 Others 

8.7 Emergency Organisation 

8.8 Emergency Facilities 

8.9 Emergency Escapes 

8.10 Assembly points 

8.11 Wind sock 

8.12 Emergency transportation 

8.13 Emergency communication 

8.14 Warning Alarm/ Communication of Emergency 

8.15 Emergency responsibilities 

8.16 Mutual Aids 

8.17 Mock Drill 



SECTION I 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

1.0 Executive Summary 

1.1 M/s. Kutch Chemical Industries Ltd. retained the services of Vaibhu Safety Consultants 

for carrying out Risk Assessment Studies for their Gandhidham plant. 

1.2 Experts from Vaibhu Safety Consultants visited the site on 23/05/2010 for inspection of 

facilities to be erected and commissioned at site as per site plan and the environs and for 

collection of relevant information about the installation and the operations will be carried 

out in the plant. They also held detailed discussions on various aspects including Chlorine 

tonner handling facilities, Solvent storage facilities, Oleum, Sulfur trioxide, Sulfuric Acid, 

Nitric Acid, Chloro sulphonic Acid storage area, Ethylene Oxide storage facilities, process 

safety, Finished product storage godown and tank farm area, HSE management system 

procedures( SOP) and it implementation, Emergency management plan, Emergency 

handling facilities, Emergency organization and action planet., with the officers of the 

company. 

1.3 In this plant Chlorine, Sulphur, Ethylene Oxide(EO), Caustic soda ( NaOH), Nitric Acid ( 

HNO3), Benzene, Methanol, toluene, and Paraffin Oil will be majorly used as raw 

materials and received through road tanker and stored in designated tank farm area. 

1.4 Flammable solvents receive through road tanker and stored in underground storage tank 

farm area as per petroleum Act and Rules. Ethylene Oxide will be received from road 

tanker and transferred in to tank by Nitrogen pressure and stored under Nitrogen 

blanketing. EO and Anhydrous ammonia storage facilities generated as per Static and 

mobile pressure vessel Rule (SMPV), Separate Acid storage area is located at Sulfuric 

Acid, CSA & Thionyl Chloride (TC) plant. 

1.5 Most of products are used as a raw material in one or the more products. Material transfer 

from one plant to other only by pumping and required quantity for one day is being stored 

at process plant in Day tank. 

1.6 Separate utility plant is provided for chilling cooling in each plant. Oil, Steam, Nitrogen 

and Air utilities are common for all plants. 

1.7 Based on the data furnished and the study of the installation, certain hazards have been 

identified and their consequences are modeled mathematically using HAMSGAP software. 

1.8 The study indicates that possible hazards associated with the plant are confined to (a) 

Under ground storage tank area, road truck unloading area (b) Chlorine tonner storage 

area. (c) Ethylene Oxide storage tank area, (d) Oleum, Sulfuric Acid, Nitric Acid, Thionyl 

Chloride, Sulfur Trioxide and storage tank area. Various hazard scenarios have been 

identified for Risk Assessment and the consequences modeled. The results of the analysis 

have been summarized in the table appended. 



1.9 It will be observed from the summary that the consequences of hazards associated with any 

possible spills / leaks except for catastrophic failure of Chlorine tonner, Ethylene Oxide, 

Anhydrous Ammonia and Oleum release scenarios would be of a relatively small in nature 

and would be taken care of with the proposed emergency facilities and the manpower 

deployed at the plant. 

1.10 The possibility of occurrence of such hazards and their effects could be further reduced by 

implementing the suggestions made in this report. 

1.11 Catastrophic failure of tonner resulting in major toxic releases is very unlikely events 

barring gross neglect of time tested safety standards and procedures set up by the industry. 

1.12 The possibility of occurrence of major toxic release and mishaps is considered very 

remote, considering the past operating performance of plant in relation to fire and safety 

and the field management’s total commitment to implementation of safety systems and 

procedures. 

1.13 However considering the potential for major hazards, however remote they may be, 

associated with storage area, some suggestions are made in the subsequent chapters for 

further improvement in the areas of safety, environmental impact, Emergency facilities and 

emergency preparedness plan. 

1.14 Conclusion Based on the 

1) Risk Analysis study and information regarding the layout plan and safety systems. 

2) Discussions with company officials, 



2.1 Objective : 

CHAPTER II 

OBJECTIVE, PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY OF RISK ASSESSMENT 

The main objectives of the Risk Assessment (RA) study is to determine damage due to 

major hazards having damage potential to life & property and provide a scientific basis to 

assess safety level of the facility. 

The principle objective of this study was to identify major risks in the manufacture of 

chemicals and storage of hazardous chemical at site and to evaluate on-site & off-site 

consequences of identified hazard scenarios. Pointers are then given for effective 

mitigation of hazards in terms of suggestions for effective disaster management, 

suggesting minimum preventive and protective measures & change of practices to ensure 

safety. 

2.2 PHILOSOPHY : 

This report is limited to the following: 

Identification of major risk areas. 

Hazard identification/Identification of failure cases 

Consequential analysis of probable risks / failure cases 

o Evaluation of heat radiation & pressure wave profiles for identified failure 

cases 

o Risk assessment on the basic of the above evaluation & risk acceptability 

o Minimum preventive & protective measures to be taken to minimize risks to 

maximum possible extent. 

Giving pointers for effective disaster management 

Suggesting other measures to further lower the probability of risk 

2.3 Methodology 

The procedure used for carrying out the Quantitative Risk Assessment Study is outlined 

bellow: 

Identify Credible Loss Scenarios for the facility under the study by discussion with KCIL. 

Simulate loss Scenarios to determine the vulnerable zones for toxic dispersion, pool fire or 

jet fire, ( Thermal Radiation ), Flash fire, Explosion over pressure ( Vapour cloud 

Explosion, Ball fire using software packages HAMSGAP. 

Suggest mitigating measures to reduce the damage, considering all aspects of the facilities. 

The flowchart of the methodology for the present study is shown in following page. 



RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY METHODOLOGY FLOWCHART 

START 

FACILITY, PROCESS AND METEOROLOGICAL DATA COLLECTION 

LISTING OUT OF HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS & STORAGE DETAILS 

IDENTIFICATION OF FAILURE SCENARIOS & QUANTIFICATION OF 

PROBABLE HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH THEM 

DEFINING OF PARAMETERS FOR EACH OF CHEMICALS & EACH OF 

HAZARDS 

DEFINING RELEASE TYPE (CONTINUOUS OR INSTANTANIOUS ) & 

DETERMINE RELEASE RATES 

SIMULATION OF SELECTED CASES FOR CONSEQUENCE MODELING 

PREPARATION OF SUMMERY OF CONSEQUENCE RESULTS 

EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL RISK TO THE SURROUNDING 

POPULATION 

DISCUSSION & RECOMMENDATION OF MITIGATIVE / REMEDIAL 

MEASURES 


HSE Department Rev. : 00 

END

3.1 COMPANY INTRODUCTION 

SECTION III 

INTRODUCTION OF THE UNIT 

M/s. Kutch Chemical Industries Ltd., is operating a manufacturing unit of various 

chemicals and dye intermediates at Survey No 166/1,2,3, 171/1, 172,167,168, Village : 

Padana, Gandhidham, Dist. Kutch 

Produce unit is classified as Major Accident Hazards unit ( MAH Installation ) based on 

the storage of the listed hazardous chemicals more than specified threshold 

quantities.(Schedule 3 under Rule 68-J of the Gujarat Factories Rules-1963 (2004). 

Kutch Chemical Industries Ltd, with spot light on export market potential was founded in 

2004 near the Global all weather ports of Kandla and Mundra. It consists of a well 

integrated chemical complex consisting of Chlorination, Nitration, Sulphonation and Dyes 

Intermediates products. 

In 2006, as a part of its backward integration plan M/s Kutch Chemical Industries Ltd, 

has set up a 400 TPD of Sulphuric Acid plant at Gandhidham. 

3.2 DETAILS OF UNITS 

Sr. 

No. 

Particulars 

1. Full Name & Address of : Kutch chemical Industries limited 

Unit 

Plot no- 165,166/1&3,168,171/1&172 

Village:Padana, Nr.Aquagel Chemicals, 

Gandhidham, Dist – Kutch 

Gujarat. 

2. Telephone No. : 02836-28551-52, Fax-02836-285233 

3. Month & Year of : 10 

Establishment 

TH June 2002 

4. Full name & Address of : Sh. Shivlal Goyal ( Director) 

the occupier 

2, Sri Ram Society, Gotri Road Baroda 

5. Full name & Address of : Sh. D.S.Purohit 

the Factory manager Plot no – 23, Ward -9B(D) 

New Bharat Nagar, Gandhidham 

Pin- 370201 

6. Man Power 

: 172 including all shift 

G Shift- 31 

A Shift- 47 

B Shift- 47 

C Shift- 47 

7. No. Of shift & Shift timing : Total no of shift :- 04 

General shift :- 09AM To 06 PM 



8. Environs (Nearest 

Facilities) 

9. Meteorogical Data 

Latitude 23º 10’N 

Longitude 70º 13’ E 

Temperature 

Maximum 48º C 

Minimum 7.2 º C 

Relative Humadity : 

Maximum 100 % 

Minimum 1 % 

Annual Rain Fall : 

Minimum 73.6 mm 

Maximum 1393 mm (1979) 

Seasonal wind directions : 

Jan- Feb N / NNW / ENE 

March – Sept SW / WSW 

Oct to Dec N / NNE 

First Shift “A”:- 07 AM To 03 PM 

Second Shift “B”:- 03 PM To 11PM 

Night Shift “C”:- 11PM To 07AM 

Wind Velocity : 

Maximum 100 km/hr NNW (26.10.1975) 

Minimum 132 km/hr NNW (26.10.1975) 

Avg. Wind Speed 14 Km/hr 

1. Railway Station : Gandhidham, Distance – 20 KM 

2. Police Station : Anjar, Distance – 20 KM 

3. Fire Station : Anjar , Distance- 20 KM 

4. Hospitals : Anjar , Distance- 20KM 

10. Total Land at Plant 50 ACRE 

11. Total Built-up area at the 

Factory 

30000 M2 



12. Power connection Demand : 3000 KVA 

13. DG Set KVA: 250 KVA 

14. Power plant details : DG Set - 2.5 MW 

Turbine – 4.2 MW 

15. Water Storage and source Capacity in m3:20000 M3, 

Source – Gujarat water infrastructure limited 

(GWIL) 

16. Boiler 

Type Model no Capacity Licence 

from 

Gujarat 

Govt. 

Combi pack CPB-80 8Ton/Hr GT 4879 

IB-1478- 10 Ton/Hr GT 5516 

Waste heat Maker no- 25 Ton/Hr GT-5207 

Recovery 21943 

AVU Make 

17. Chilled water plant Particulars Model No Capacity Location 

18. Cooling Tower 

VAM ------ 150 TR DMS 

Plant 

VAM SD30BHX/1 200TR OLD VS 

VAM SD30BHX/1 200 TR MCB & 

PNCB 

Ammonia 

compr 2 nos 

KC6-3 150 TR MCB 

Ammonia 

compr 2 nos 

KC6-3 150 TR PNCB 

Ammonia 

compr 2 nos 

KC6-3 150 TR PDCB 

Ammonia 

compr 5 nos 

KC6 300 TR New VS 

Ammonia 

compr 3 nos 

KC6 180 TR OLD VS 

Total 1480 TR 

Particulars 

Process 

cooling water 

Process 

cooling water 

Process 

cooling water 

Process 

cooling water 

Process 

cooling water 

Process 

cooling water 

Flow rate 

T R Plants 

4200M3/H 3260 Acid 

Division 

1300M3/H 1000 DMS 

Plant 

1200M3/H 1000 OLD VS 

1200M3/H 1000 MCB 

Plant 

1200M3/H 1000 Acetanili 

de plant 

600m3/H 500 PNCB 

Plant 



Process 600M3/H 250 PDCBPla 

cooling water 

nt 

Process 500M3/H 300 New VS 

cooling water 

plant 

Process 

cooling water 

1350M3/H 1100 TC Plant 

Total 9410 

19. Effluent treatment 

Plant 

Capacity: 50 M3 

20. Fire water source Water reservoir (GWIL) 

14 Fire Water Reservoir 

capacity : M3 

200M3 

21. Department wise List Departments Total nos of 

of fire extinguishers 

F/Extinguisher 

with mapping if Benzene storage 04 nos 

available 

Power plant 12 nos 

PNCB Plant 16 nos 

MCB Plant 07 nos 

PDCB Plant 02nos 

Ice plant 01 no 

New VS Plant 09 nos 

ETP 01 no 

Acetanilide plant 06 nos 

EO Storage 05 nos Capacity-25 kg 

FO Storage 02 nos 

VS OLD 06 Nos 

CSA Plant 02nos 

DMS Plant 18 nos 

Methanol storage 04 nos 

SAP Plant 15 nos 

Boiler house 09 nos 

ECC Room 10 nos as spare 

Total 129 nos 

22. SCBA sets 

Total Nos of SCBA Sets – 08 Nos 

availability and Acid division C/R- 01No 

location mapping Chlorine Shed- 02 Nos 

DMS Plant- 01 Nos 

TC Plant- 02 Nos 

Emergency Control centre- 02 nos 

23. OHC facilities Occupational Health Centre is declared near main gate 

and factory medical officer visit schedule is once in a 

week. 

Well equipment Ambulance VAN. 

Stretcher-01 

Oxygen cylinder with mask-01 

First aid box- 10 nos in all departments 

24. EMP Prepared as Per ISO-14000 



25. EMP plan ( Action 

Plan) one page 

Prepared and displayed in all department 

26. List of emergency facilities 

A. 

B. 

C. 

D. 

E. 

F. 

G. 

H. 

I. 

J. 

K. 

L. 

M. 

N. 

O. 

P. 

Q. 

R. 

Dry powder (50% of fire extinguishers ) 50 nos 

CO2 Cartridges ( 50% of fire extinguishers ) 

200 gms (10 kg DCP 

50 nos 

As above 2 Kg ( 75 Kg DCP ) 06 nos 

Sand scoops 50 nos 

Safety helmets 500 nos 

Water curtain nozzles 20 nos 

Stretchers 01 nos 

First aid box with anti snake serum 10 nos 

Rubber hand gloves 200 nos 

Explosive meter 01 no 

Fire entry suit w/o breathing apparatus 01 no 

Resuscitator 05 no 

Electric siren with 3 km range 01 no 

Hand operated siren Nil 

Water gel blandest NA 

Red/green flags for fire drill Nil 

Pressure type self contained breathing apparatus 

with spare cylinder (30 minutes) 

08 nos 

Safety Shower 14 nos 

27. Fire Water Reservoir :- 200 M3 

28. Other Source of Water : 

29. Fire Pump Details 

Gujarat water infrastructure 

limited , Anjar 

Pump Detail Number of Head Capacity KW/HP 

Pump 

(Flow) 

Jockey Pump 01 70 mtr 10.8 m3/h 10 

Electrical Pump 01 70 mtr 270m3/h 120 

Diesel Pump Nil Nil Nil Nil 

Total 02 Nil Nil Nil 

30. Hydrant System Details 

Area / Plant Nos. Of Hydrant 

with Hose Box 

PNCB Plant Hydrant – 07 nos 

Hose box- 01 nos 

Nos. Of 

Monitors 

01 no 



MCB Plant Hydrant – 01 nos 


Acid Division Hydrant – 11 nos 


Old VS plant Hydrant – 06 nos 


New VS Plant Hydrant – 011nos 


Acetanilide Plant Hydrant – 01no 

Hose box- 01 no 

PDCB Plant Hydrant – 02 nos 


Power Plant Hydrant – 05 nos 


Canteen Hydrant – 01 no 

Hose box- 01 no 

DMS Plant Hydrant – 02nos 


Total Hydrant – 47 nos 


31. License & Approval: 

A. 

B. 

C. 

D. 



Nil 

01 no 

Factory Inspectorate 

Licence No : 018712 

Validity : 31/12/2010 

GPCB Consent No: 5991/3/5/2005 

Validity : 31/1/2010 

Note – Application inward ID- 

12531/Dated- 18/12/2009 for 

renewal of consent 

Solid waste Disposal 

Member ship : TSDF, 

Explosive Particulars 

Nandesari Baroda 

Licence no Validity 

licence No : Chlorine G/WC/GJ/06/109(G15607) 30/09/2011 

Ethylene oxide 

old VS Plant 

S/HO/GJ/03/718(SS5280) 31/03/2013 

Ethylene oxide 

New VS Plant 

S/HG/GJ/03/1066(S32386) 31/03/2011 

Furnace oil P/WC/GJ/15/2380(PII9928) 31/12/2010 

Methanol P/HQ/GJ/15/4682(P120542) 31/12/2010 

Benzene& 

Toluene 

P/HQ/GJ/15/4568(P20641) 31/12.2012 

3.3 PROJECT SETTING: 

The company is located at 70 0 11’ 40.17”East longitude & 23 0 10’ 14.44” North latitude 

in Village: Padana, Tal: Gandhidham, Dist. Kutch in Gujarat State. 

The site location is shown as figure 1.1. and plant layout is provided as figure 1.2.

Figure 1.1 



Figure 1.2 





3.4 HSE ORGANISATIONAL SET UP 

Advise Company of safety 

legislation & updates, 

safety awareness, carry 

out safety audits, update 

safety policy, provide 

training when required, to 

provide investigations and 

reports for any accidents. 

Safety setup organisation chart 

3.5 LIST OF EXISTING AND PROPOSED PRODUCTS 

Sr. 

No. 

Name of the Product 

Directors 

Unit Head 

VP Operation Dy. Mgr ((Fire & Safety) 

(General Shift only) 

GM Operation 

Fire & Safety Supervisor 

(One in every shift) 

Fireman 

Two in each shift 

Table-3.1 

Existing 

Capacity, 

MT/Month 

Additional 

Capacity, 

MT/Month 

Total 

Capacity, 

MT/Month 

Product Required Environmental Clearance 

1. Vinyl Sulphone 500 4000 4500 

2. Acetanilide 1000 Nil Nil 

3. 

Sulphonation of PNT,ONT,VS, 

Tobies & Other 

0 1500 1500 

4. Benzene Sulphonyl Chloride 0 1500 1500 

5. DASDA 0 1000 1000 

6. V.S Condense 0 1000 1000 

7. Dimethyl Sulfate (DMS) 100 3000 3100 

8. Dimethyl Aniline (DMA) 0 1500 1500 

9. Diethyl Sulfate (DES) 0 1500 1500 

10. Sulfamic Acid 0 1000 1000 

11. Power Plant (Coal) 2.5 MW 10 MW 12.5 MW 

Product do not required Environmental Clearance 

12. Sulphuric Acid (98%) 250 15000 15250 

13. Oleum (23% & 65%) 0 3000 3000 



14. Liquid SO3 ( 70-90%) 0 7500 7500 

15. Chloro Sulphonic Acid 1200 5000 6200 

16. Thionyl Chloride 0 5000 5000 

17. Sodium Bisulphite (SBS) 0 3000 3000 

18. Calcium Chloride 0 4000 4000 

19. Dicalcium Phosphate (DCP) 0 1500 1500 

20. Sulphur Monochloride 0 200 200 

21. Sulphuryl Chloride 0 200 200 

22. Aluminium Sulphate (Alum) 0 1000 1000 

3.6 LIST OF PROPOSED RAW MATERIALS 

Sr 

No. 

Raw Materials Physical & chemical composition Rate of 

Consumption 

Chemical Formula 

State MT/Month 

1 Acetanilide C6H5NHCOCH3 Solid 2182 

2 Chloro Sulphonic Acid Cl.SO3H Liquid 10182 

3 Caustic Lye NaOH Liquid 2182 

4 Sodium bysulphite NaHSO3 Solid 3545 

5 Sulfuric Acid H2SO4 Liquid 3989 

6 Sluphur S Solid 1949 

7 Hydrochloric Acid HCl Liquid 6567 

8 o-Nitro Toluene C6H4CH3NO2 Liquid 215 

9 p-Nitro Toluene C6H4CH3NO2 Liquid 215 

10 Oluem H2S2O7 Liquid 19683 

11 Sodium Chloride NaCl Solid 117 

12 Benzene C6H6 Liquid 663 

13 Chlorine Cl2 Gas 2967 

14 Soda Ash Na2CO3 Solid 106 

15 Iron Fe Solid 29 

16 Sodium Hypochloride NaOCl Liquid 406 

17 Ammonium Chloride NH4Cl Liquid 88 

18 Sodium Carbonate Na2CO3 Solid 1986 

19 Methanol CH3OH Liquid 780 

20 Aniline C6H5NH2 Liquid 1134 

21 Ethanol C2H5OH Liquid 896 

22 Ammonia NH3 Liquid 166 



3.7 Details of Storage of Hazardous Materials in Bulk 

NAME OF 

HAZARDOUS 

SUBSTANCE 

Vinyl Sulphone Plant 

Ethylene 

Oxide 

Chloro 

Sulfonic Acid 

Chloro 

Sulfonic Acid 

(Proposed) 

MAX. STORAGE 

CAP.[Qty.] 

25 KL X 1 bullet 

15 KL X 1 bullet 

45 KL X 6 Nos 

Tank 

PLACE 

OF IT’S 

STORAGE 

Licenced 

Premises 

A/G SS 

Tank farm 

area 

A/G MS 

OPERATING 

PRESSURE 

AND TEMP. 

10 Kg/ cm2 

Ambient 

ATP 

Ambient 

200 MT X 3 Nos. Do ATP 

Ambient 

Caustic Lye 25 KL X 2Nos 

Tank 

Caustic Lye 40 KL X6 Nos 

Tank 

Sulfuric Acid 20 KL X 1Nos 

Tank 

Hydrochloric 30 KL X 3Nos 

Acid 

Tank 

Acetanilide Plant 

Tank farm 

area 

A/G MS 

ATP 

Ambient 

Do ATP 

Ambient 

Do ATP 

Ambient 

Tank farm ATP 

area Ambient 

A/G HDPE 

Acetanilide 600 MT Godown ATP, 

Ambient 

Aniline 100 KL X 1 No Tank farm ATP, 

Tank 

area 

A/G MS 

Ambient 

Aniline 200 KL X 1 No Do ATP, 

Tank 

Ambient 

Acetic Acid 100 KL X 2 No Do ATP, 

Tank 

Ambient 

Dil. Acetic 25 KL X 2 No Do ATP, 

Acid 

Tank 

Ambient 

TYPE OF 

HAZARD 

Fire 

/Explosion/ 

Toxic 

CONTROL 

MEASURE PROVIDED 

Double Safety Valve 

Nitrogen Blanketing 

Double Static earthing 

Dyke wall 

Scrubber provided 

Jumper clips on flanges 

Hydrant system 

Fire extinguishers 

Fencing and No Smoking 

and prohibited area. 

Tanker unloading 

procedure. 

Shed provided on bullets. 

Sprinkler provided on 

bullets. 

SCBA sets available. 

Safety shower. 

Corrosive Level gauge provided. 


Required PPEs provided to 

Corrosive all employees 

Double drain valve will be 

provided to sulfuric Acid 

Corrosive storage tank 

Full body protection will 

be provided to operator. 

Corrosive Caution note and 

emergency first aid will be 

Corrosive displayed and train for the 

same to all employees. 

Corrosive Safety shower and eye 

wash will be provided in 

storage tank area and plant 

area. 

Total close process will be 

adopted for Sulfuric acid 

handling. 

Dyke wall will be provided 

to storage tank 

Combustible Flame proof plant, 

pumping transfer, close 

Flammable process, etc. 


Dyke wall 

Flammable Tanker unloading 

procedure. 

Corrosive/ SCBA sets available . 

Flammable Flame proof plant, 

Corrosive 


process, etc. 



Ethyl Acetate 25 KL X 1 No 

Tank 

15 KL X 1No 

Tank 

MCB, ODCB, PDCB, DCB Plant 

Chlorine 209 Tonners Storage 

Chlorine 200 Tonners Storage 

Shed 

Benzene 40KLX4 Nos 

Tank 

Monochloro 

Benzene 

(MCB) 

Total : 160 KL 

200KLX2Nos 

Tank 

PNCB 90KLX 

Tank 

2 Nos 

ONCB 200KLX 

Tank 

1 No 

Dichloro 200KLX 1 No 

Benzene 

(DCB) 

Tank 

NB, PNT, ONT, Plant 

Toluene 40KLX4 Nos 

Tank 


Benzene 40KLX4 Nos 

Tank 


Nitric Acid 20KLX3 Nos 

Tank 

Do ATP, 

Ambient 

Flammable Jumper clips on flanges 





procedure. 

Flame arrestor provided on 

vent line of the tank 

10 Kg/cm2 Toxic Chlorine Kit, Caustic 

Shed Ambient 

Pit, SBA sets, Cl2 Shed, 

10 Kg/cm2 

Ambient 

Toxic Cl2 Hood, EOT, etc. 

Provided. 

U/G Tank ATP Fire Flame proof plant, 

MS 


process, etc. 

Tank farm ATP Fire Double Static earthing 

area 

Dyke wall 

A/G MS 


DO ATP Fire 

procedure. 

SCBA sets available . 

DO ATP Fire Flame proof plant, 


Tank farm ATP 

area 

A/G MS 

Fire 

process, etc. 






procedure. 




U/G Tank 

MS 

U/G Tank 

MS 

MS A/G 

Tank 

ATP Fire Flame proof plant, 


process, etc. 

ATP Fire Double Static earthing 

Dyke wall 


procedure. 


Flame proof plant, 


process, etc. 






procedure. 




ATP Corrosive Safety Showers provided 

Caution note provided 



Sulphuric 

Acid 

PNT 

(P- 

NitroToluene) 

ONT 

O- Nitro 

Toluene 

MNT 

(Meta Nitro 

Toluene) 

NB 

(Nitro 

Benzene) 

20KLX 1 No 

Tank 

200KLX1No 

Tank 

200 KLX 1 No 

Tank 

90KL X1 No 

Tank 

200KLX 1 No 

Tank 


150KLX 1 No 

Tank 

MS A/G 

Tank 

MS A/G 

Tank 

MS 

A/G(V) 

Tank 

MS A/G 

(H) Tank 

MS 

A/G(V) 

Tank 

Sulphuric Acid Plant 

Sulfur powder 5000 MT Storage 

yard 

Oleum 65 % 250 MT X2 Nos 

Tank 

Oleum 23% 250 MT X 1No 

Tank 

MS A/G 

Tank 

MS A/G 

Tank 

Oleum 65 % 100 MT X 2 Nos. MS A/G 

Tank 

Liq Sulphur 

Trioxide 

Sulphuric 

Acid 98 % 

CSA Plant 

Chloro 

sulphonic 

Acid 

Chloro 

sulphonic 

Acid 

1000 MT X 2 

Nos. tank 

50 KLX 3 Nos 

Tank 

140 KL X 01 

Tank 

2000 MT X 2 Nos 

Tanks 

MS A/G 

Tank 

MS A/G 

Tank 

MS A/G 

Tank 

MS A/G 

Tank 

ATP Corrosive Dyke wall provided 

Level gauge provided. 

Double drain valve 

provided 



all employees 

ATP Fire Flame proof plant, 


process, etc. 

ATP Fire Double Static earthing 

Dyke wall 


ATP Fire Hydrant system 





procedure. 

ATP Fire Flame arrestor Provided. 

ATP Fire Separate storage area. 

Monitors provided 

surrounding the storage 

area. 

Automatic conveyer 

system for charging in 

Atmospheric 

Ambient 

Atmospheric 

Ambient 

Atmospheric 

Ambient 

Atmospheric 

Ambient 

Atmospheric 

Ambient 

Atmospheric 

Ambient 

Atmospheric 

Ambient 

melter. 




Corrosive all employees 



Corrosive storage tank 



Corrosive Caution note and 


displayed and train for the 

Corrosive same to all employees. 

Safety shower and eye 



area. 



handling. 






all employees 

Corrosive 



storage tank 



Dimethyl 

Sulfate (DMS) 

Dimethyl 

Aniline 

(DMA) 

Diethyl 

Sulfate (DES) 

Benzene 

Sulphonyl 

Chloride 

DASDA 

200 MTX 3 Nos. 




MS A/G 

Tank 

MS A/G 

Tank 

MS A/G 

Tank 

MS A/G 

Tank 

100 MTX 2 Nos. MS A/G 

Tank 

Methanol 60KLX 4 Nos 

Tank 

Ethanol 200 KL X 1 No. 

tank 

Ammonia 

Anhydrous 

( Liquefied ) 

Hydrochloric 

Acid 

50 MT X 1 No. 

Bullet 

MS A/G 

Tank 

MS A/G 

Tank 

25 KL X 03 Nos A/G HDPE 

Tank 

Atmospheric 

Ambient 

Atmospheric 

Ambient 

Atmospheric 

Ambient 

Atmospheric 

Ambient 

Atmospheric 

Ambient 

Atmospheric 

Ambient 

Atmospheric 

Ambient 

MS bullet 35 0 C 

4 to 10 

kg/cm 2 

Atmospheric 

Ambient 

Fire Full body protection will 


Caution note and 

Fire 





Fire 



area. 

Fire Total close process will be 


handling. 

Fire Dyke wall will be provided 


Fire Flame proof plant, 


process, etc. 

Fire Double Static earthing 







procedure. 

Flame arrestor Provided. 

Toxic Flame proof equipment, 


process, etc. 


Dyke wall 








procedure. 


Safety Showers provided 


Dyke wall provided 



provided 



all employees 

Corrosive Safety Showers provided 





provided 



all employees 



TC plant (PROPOSED) 

Thyonile 

chloride 

150KL X 03 Tank SS 

A/G Bullet 

Chlorine 140 Toner Storage 

Shed 

Sulpher 

trioxide 

100 MT X 02 

Tank 

Atmospheric 

Ambient 

10 Kg/cm2 

Ambient 

MS Tank Atmospheric 

Ambient 

Chlorinated Paraffin Wax CPW (PROPOSED) 

HNP 65KLX 04 TANK MS Tank Atmospheric 

Ambient 

HCL 75KLX 6 TANK HDPE 

TANK 

Atmospheric 

Ambient 




all employees 



storage tank 



Caution note and 







area. 



handling. 



Toxic Chlorine Kit, Caustic 

Pit, SBA sets, Cl2 Shed, 

Cl2 Hood, EOT, etc. 

Provided. 

Scrubber provided . 






provided 



all employees 

Flammable Safety Showers provided 





provided 



all employees 






provided 



all employees 



Chlorinated 

Paraffin oil 

20 KLX 03 FRP Atmospheric 

Ambient 

Furnace Oil/ 27 KLX 2 Nos MS Tank Atmospheric 

LDO 

U/G tanks 

Ambient 

HSD 21 KL Tank MS Tank Atmospheric 

Ambient 






provided 



all employees 

Fire Flame proof plant, 


Fire 

process, etc. 








procedure. 

Flame arrestor Provided. 



3.8 HAZARDOUS PROPERTIES OF THE CHEMICALS, COMPATIBILITIES, SPECIAL HAZARD AND ANTIDOTES 

Table-3.3 

SR. NAME OF 

CHEMICAL 

1. Ethylene oxide 

CAS # 75-21-8 

2. Chlorine 

CAS #7782-50-5 

3. Benzene 

CAS # 71-43-2 

HAZARD FLASH 

POINT 

0 C 

BP 

0 C 



LEL 

% 

UEL 

% 

SP.GR. 

20 0 C 

VD SOLUBILI 

TY WITH 

WATER 

at 20 0 C 

T/F/E - 17.8 10.6 3.0 100 0.869 1.5 2.0 % 

SOLUBL 

E 

NFPA 

H F R 

HAZARDOUS 

COMBUSTIO 

N PRODUCT 

2 4 3 Irritating 

vapour 

T - -34.1 - - 1.424 - Boils 3 0 0 Toxic and 

irritating 

gases 

TLV 

PPM 

TWA 

IDLH 

PPM 

LC50 

mg/m3 

1.0 3.0 5748 ppm 

for 1 Hr. 

1 ppm 25 

ppm 

-11 81.1 1.3 7.9 0.879 2.8 Insoluble 2 3 0 - 0.5 ppm 500 

ppm 

4. Methanol F/T 10 54 5.4 44 0.792 1.1 Soluble 1 3 0 Irritating 

vapour 

5. Toluene 

CAS # 108-88-3 

6. Ethanol 

CAS # 64-17-5 

7. Acetanilide 

CAS # 103-84-4 

8. Ethyl Acetate 

CAS # 141-78-6 

9. Acetic Acid 

CAS # 64-19-7 

F 4.0 111 1.1 7.1 0.87 3.2 Insoluble 2 3 0 Irritating 

Vapour 

generated 

F 17.7 78.2 3.3 19 0.790 1.6 Soluble 0 3 0 - 1000 

ppm 

T 173.8 303.8 - - 1.219 4.65 Insoluble 1 1 0 NOX Not 

listed 

F -4.0 77.0 2.0 11.5 0.902 3.0 1 ml/10ml 

water 

T / F 44.4 117.9 5.4 16.0 1.015 -- SOLUBL 

E 


Vapour 

generated 


Vapour 

generated 

200 6000 

LEL 

Rat 

1017 

For human 

24 ml/kg 

for rat for 

2H 

64000 

ppm for 

4H rat 

50 2000 400 ppm 

for 24Hr 

Rat 

3300 

ppm 

Not 

listed 

39 gm/m3 

for 4H 

Rat 

100 mg/L; 

96 Hr Fish 

- 400 200 

gm/m3 

rat 

10 40 5620 ppm 

for 1 Hr 

Rat 

CARCIN ANTIDOT 

OGENIC 

CHARAC 

TERISTI 

C 

Yes Not available 

No milk, milk 

butter and 

milk of 

magnesia. 

Yes Not available 

No 10 mg 

diazepam 

through 

injection 

No Diazem – 1 

mg/Kg.(Intrav 

enous), 

Epinephina, 

Efidrine 

No Diazepam 10 

mg through 

injection 

No Milk, 

Activated 

Charcoal or 

water 

No Not available 

No Sodium 

Hydro- 

Carbonate 

(4% Conc.), 

Milk, Lime

10. Chloro Sulphonic 

Acid 

CAS # 7790-94-5 

11. Caustic Lye 

CAS # 1310-73-2 

12. Sulfuric Acid 

CAS # 7664-93-9 

13. Sulfur powder 

CAS # 7704-34-9 

14. Sulfur Trioxide 

CAS # 7446-11-9 

15. Aniline 

CAS # 62 – 53 - 3 

16. Hydrochloric Acid 

HCL 

17. Ammonia (Anhydrous) 

CAS # 7664-41-7 

T/C - 155 - - 1.375 - Water 

reactive 



3 0 2 Non 

combustible 

T - - - - 2.13 - Soluble 3 0 1 Non 

combustible 

C -- 340 -- -- 1.84 -- Water 3 0 2 Non 

reactive 

combustible 

T/F 207 115 MP 35 

g/m 

3 

140 

0 

g/m 

3 

- 8.9 None 2 1 0 Irritating 

fumes 

generated 

C - 45 - - 1.92 2.76 Water 

reactive 

- SO2 100 

ppm 

C 75.5 184.1 1.3 11 1.022 - Insoluble 3 2 0 Toxic Vapour 2 ppm 100 

ppm 

C/T NF 108 NF NF 1.12 - 

1.19 

0.2 - - No 

Juice, Milk of 

Megnesia 

Sodium 

mg/m3 

Hydro- 

Carbonate 

(4% Conc.), 

Milk, Lime 


Megnesia 

- 10 

mg/m3 

No Apply Water 

1 

mg/m3 

15 

mg/m 3 

510 

mg/m3 for 

2H Rat 

No Sodium Hydro- 

Carbonate (4% 

Conc.), Milk, 

Lime Juice, 

Milk of 

Megnesia 

- - 9200 mg 

m-3 4h 

No Not Available 

510 

mg/m3 

for 2H 

Rat 

175 ppm 

for 7H 

mouse 

1.267 Soluble 3 0 1 N A 5 ppm 50 ppm 3124 ppm 

for 1h rat 

C - - 33.3 15.50 27 0.682 0.6 Insoluble 3 1 0 N A 25 ppm 300 

ppm 

7040 

mg/m3 

for3 0 Mnt 

Rat- 

Yes 

Classifie 

d : 1 

Sodium Hydro- 

Carbonate (4% 

Conc.), Milk, 

Lime Juice, 

Milk of 

Magnesia 

Yes Mitholene Blu 

– 1% 

Excartric Acid 

– 5% 

No Sodium 

Hydro- 

Carbonate 

(4% Conc.), 

Milk, Lime 


Megnesia 

No Smelling 

Ethanol or 

Ether

18. O- Nitro Toluene 

CAS # 64-17-5 

19. P- Nitro Toluene 

CAS # 99-99-0 

20. Oleum 

CAS # 8014-95-7 

21. Nitric Acid 

CAS # 7697-37-2 

22. Chloro Benzene 

CAS # 108-90-7 

23. Ortho Dichloro 

Benzene (ODCB) 

CAS # 95-50-1 

24. Para Dichloro 

Benzene (PDCB) 

CAS # 106-46-7 

25. Nitro Benzene 

( NB) 

CAS # 98-95-3 

T/F 106 222 2.0 - 1.16 4.73 Insoluble 2 1 4 Irritating 

Vapour 

generated 

C 106.1 238.3 - - 1.286 4.72 Insoluble 3 1 0 Toxic Oxides 

of Nitrogen 

T/C - - - - 1.91-1.97 - Insoluble 3 0 2 Toxic and 

irritating 

vapors 



2 ppm 200 

ppm 

2 ppm 200 

ppm 

1 mg/m3 15 

mg/m3 

C -- 121 -- -- 1.408 2.5 Soluble 3 0 0 - 4 67 

ppm 

(NO2) 

/4H. 

T/F 28 132 1.3 9.6 1.11 3.9 Insoluble 2 3 0 Phosgene & 

Hydrochloric 

gases 

generated 

T/F 66 180-183 2.2 9.2 1.3 5.1 Insoluble 2 2 0 CO, CO2, 

HCL 

T/F 66 180 - - 1.25 5.1 Insoluble 2 2 0 CO, CO2, 

HCL 

T/F 88 211 1.8 40.0 1.2 4.3 0.2 3 2 1 Irritating 

Vapour 

generated 

10 ppm 10 

ppm 

- 25 

ppm 

10 ppm 10 

ppm 

790 

mg/m3 

Rat 

975 

mg/m3 

Rat 

510 

mg/m 3 

for 

2 hrs 

RAT 

260 

mg/m3/30 

M Rat 

22,000 

ppm 

Rat 

8150 

mg/m3 

for 4H 

Rat 

> 6.0 mg/ 

m3 for 4hr 

Rat 

- 1 ppm 556 ppm 

for 4H 

Rat 

No Mitholene Blu 

– 1%, 


– 5% 

No Mitholene Blu 

– 1%, 


– 5% 

No Sodium 

Hydro- 

Carbonate 

(4% Conc.), 

Milk, Lime 


Magnesia 

Yes Sodium 

Hydro- 

Carbonate 

(4% Conc.), 

Milk, Lime 


Megnesia 


mg/Kg.(Intrav 

enous) 

Epinephina, 

Efidrine 


mg/Kg.(Intrav 

enous) 

Epinephina, 

Efidrine 


mg/Kg.(Intrav 

enous) 

Epinephina, 

Efidrine 


mg/Kg.(Intrav 

enous) 

Epinephina, 

Efidrine 

26. Thionyl Chloride T - 76 1.64 4.6 - - Water 4 0 2 sulfur dioxide, 1 ppm Not 500 ppm No natural oil and

CAS # 771909-7 reactive sulfur chloride determi 

ned 

27. Di methyl sulphate 

CAS #77-78-1 

28. Aluminum Chloride 

CAS #7446-70-0 

29. Sodium Hydroxide 

CAS #1310-73-2 

T/C 83 188.8 3.6 23.2 1.33 4.35 Soluble 3 2 0 CO , Toxic 0.1 ppm 10 

vapour 

ppm 

C/T - - - - 2.44 4.5 - 3 0 2 Toxic fumes 5 ppm 100 

ppm 

C - very 

high 

- - - - Miscible 3 0 1 Toxic fumes 

of sodium 

oxide. 



2 mg/m 3 200 

mg/m 3 

F = FIRE T = TOXIC 

E = Explosive R = REACTIVE 

BP = BOILING POINT LEL = LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT 

UEL = UPPER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT SP.GR = SPECIFIC GRAVITY 

VD = VAPOUR DENSITY ER = EVAPORATION RATE 

H = HEALTH HAZARD CLASS F = FIRE HAZARD CLASS 

R = REACTIVE HAZARD BR = BURNING RATE 

TLV = THRESHOLD LIMIT VALUE PPM = PARTS PER MILLION 

STEL = SHORT TERM EXPOSURE LIMIT NFPA = NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION-usa 

for 1 Hr Rat one table 

spoon sodium 

or magnesium 

sulphate with 

one glass of 

water. one cup 

strong tea or 

coffee. 

45 mg/m3 No Cotirco steroid 

for 4H Rat 

injection. 

- No 2 to 5 gm 

sodium 

thiosulphate in 

5% sodium bi 

carbonate 

solution in 200 

2300 

mg/m3 for 

2H Rat 

ml 

No Sodium Hydro- 

Carbonate (4% 

Conc.), Milk, 

Lime Juice, 

Milk of 

Magnesia

3.9 Facilities / System for process safety, transportation, fire fighting system and 

emergency capabilities to be adopted 

Following facilities and system will be installed / implemented. 

1. Total enclosed process system. 

2. DCS operation plant. 

3. Instrument & Plant Air System for control all parameters. 

4. High level, low level, High pressure, low pressure, high temp, high 

flow, low flow indication and cut off interlocking provided on storage 

as well as process reactors. 

5. Safety valve, rupture disk provided on reactor and pressure storage 

tanks. 

6. Static earthing and electric earthing (Double) will be provided. 

7. Jumpers for static earthing on pipeline flanges of flammable chemical 

provided. 

8. Flame proof light fitting installed where ever it is required. 

9. Emergency handling equipments like SCBA sets, Fire extinguishers, 

Gas mask, PPEs, Chlorine emergency Kit, chlorine hood, caustic pit, 

Air line respirator, provided. 

10. Full fledge ETP plant made and it will take care of liquid effluent of 

the plant and final discharge parameter will be maintained as per 

GPCB norms. 

11. Scrubbers provided on all process vent and air monitoring carried out 

and parameters will be maintained as per GPCB norms. Fire Water 

reservoir for fire hydrant and sprinkler system. 

12. Storage tank area are away from the process plant and Separation 

Distance has been maintained. 

13. Dyke wall provided to all above ground storage tanks, collection pit 

with valve provided. 

14. Flame arrestor with breather valve is installed on flammable material 

storage tank vent. 

15. Lightening arrestor on all chimneys and building provided. 

16. Fencing and caution notes and hazard identification boards displayed. 

17. Only authorized person are permitted in storage tank farm area. 

18. Safety permit for hazardous material loading unloading is prepared 

and implemented. 

19. Static earthing provision is made at all loading unloading points of 

flammable chemical storage tank farm area. 

20. TREM CARD provided to all transporters and trained for 

transportation Emergency of Hazardous chemicals. 

21. Fire hydrant system and water sprinkler system installed at tank farm 

area. 

22. Caution note, safety posters, stickers and emergency preparedness 

plan will be displayed. 



23. Emergency facilities and medical emergency facilities are available at 

site. Occupational Health centre facility generated at factory premises 

and paramedical staff is available round the clock. 

24. Wind direction indicators are provided. 

25. Safety Shower and eye wash are installed at acid/ alkali handling area. 

26. Tele Communication system and mobile phone will be used in case of 

emergency situations for communication. 

27. Emergency siren installed at main gate as well as in all plant. 

28. Training programme are being conducted regularly and induction 

training are being provided to all employees on chemical safety and 

process safety. 

3.10 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF PROCESS AND FLOW CHART 

3.10.1 Vinyl Sulphone & Vinyl Sulphone Condense: 

Chloro Sulphonation: 

Chloro Sulphonic Acid is charged into the sulphonation reactor. Acetanilide is then slowly 

added to maintain the temperature below 80° C. The temperature is then maintained 

between 50-60 °C. The batch thus prepared is transferred to the storage tank. 

Dumping: 

Sulphonated mass is charged into the Reactor cooled with brine. Ice water is then added 

slowly to remove all the HCl formed due to decomposition of excess Chloro Sulphonic 

Acid. The HCl is scrubbed and absorbed in water to make HCl. Further Ice water is added 

to dilute the concentrated Sulfuric Acid formed due to the decomposition of Chloro 

Sulphonic Acid. Here we get of Sulfuric Acid of strength 30-40%. 

The mass is then filtered out (ASC Cake). 

Reduction: 

Sodium Bi Sulphite slurry is added to the reactor. The pH is maintained neutral by adding 

Caustic Lye. The ASC wet cake is then charged under controlled temperature and pH. 

After addition is over the temperature is raised up to 50 °C. The mass is then filtered and 

transferred to condensation vessel. 

Condensation: 

The reduction mass in condensation vessel is maintained at 50°C. Ethylene Oxide is slowly 

added. The pH is maintained to 5-7 by adding dilute sulphuric acid. The material after 

condensation is transferred to the Nutsch Filter. The Mother liquor is stored in storage 

tank. The condensed product is then washed and dried. 



Esterification: 

The condensed product is charged in esterification reactor. Concentrated Sulphuric Acid is 

added. The temperature is then raised and maintained at 160°C for 4 hours. Vacumm is 

applied to take out acetic acid vapors and being condensed. The product is then collected a 

tank. The dried Vinyl Sulphone is pulverized and packed in PVC bags. 

Chlorosulphonation: 

NHCOCH 3 

ACETANILIDE 

Reduction: 

NHCOCH 3 

SO 2 Cl 

Ethoxylation: 

NHCOCH 3 

SO 2 Na 

+ 

Esterification: 

+ 

+ 2Cl.SO 3 H 

CHLORO SULPHONIC ACID 

NaOH + NaHSO 3 

H2C CH2 

H2SO4 + H2O + 

NHCOCH 3 

+ H 2 SO 4 

SO 2 CH 2 CH 2 OH 

O 

ETHYLENE OXIDE 

NHCOCH 3 

SO 2 Cl 

NHCOCH 3 

SO 2 Na 



NH 2 

+ 

+ 

HCl + H 2 SO 4 

Na 2 SO 4 + NaCl 

NHCOCH 3 

+ Na 2 SO 4 

SO 2 CH 2 CH 2 OH 

+ CH 3 COOH 

SO 2 CH 2 CH 2 OSO 3 H 

VINYL SULPHONE

Process Flow Chart: 

Acetanilide 2182 

CHLOROSULPHONIC 

10182 

ACID 

12364 

Ice 14545 DUMPING(ICE) 

SOD. BISULPHITE 

SLURRY(30%) 

6545 

CAUSTIC LYE 2182 

PRODUCT FROM FILT 

ETHYLENE OXIDE 1018 

H2SO4 2269.00 

PRODUCT FROM 

Dryer 

CHLOROSULPHONATION 

26909 

FILTERATION(Nutch) H2SO4 (35-40%) 

12364 14545 

21091 

24378.00 

6625.00 

FILTER 17753 

SODIUM SULPHITE 

SALT 

(BYPRODUCT) 



Salt 

8299 

CONDENSED PRODUCT 9454 

6625.00 

4363.00 

DRYER 

H2SO4 1455 ESTERIFICATION 

5818.00 

4000.0 

REDUCTION 

ETHOXYLATION 

VINYL SULPHONE 

2262 MOISTURE LOSS 

ACETIC ACID 

1818 

MASS BALANCE/FLOW CHART OF THE VINYL SULPHONE 

ETP

3.10.2 Sulphuric Acid 

The process for the manufacture of sulphuric acid comprise the following steps: 

1. Solid Sulphur after weighment is fed to sulphur melter which is provided with steam coils. 

The ash content of the molten sulphur settles in the melter cum settler and molten sulphur 

free of impurities is pumped to the sulphur burner where it is burnt with air. Sulphur is 

converted in to SO2 in the sulphur burner as per the following reaction 

S + O2 SO2 

2. SO2 is further converted to SO3 in presence of Vanadium Pentoxide catalyst in the 

converter as per the following reaction: 

3. 

SO2 + ½ O2 SO3 

The conversion of SO2 to SO3 is carried out in stages in all the five pass of the convertor. 

The conversion is optimized by intermediate cooling of gases between the different stages 

and also by interpass absorption of SO3 after 3 rd pass of the convertor. 

4. The gas from the 3 rd & 5 th pass of the convertor containing SO3 is cooled & then fed to the 

interpass & final absorption tower where SO3 is removed by circulating Sulphuric Acid in 

the absorption towers. The concentration of sulphuric acid is controlled by addition of 

water in the pump tank. 

5. Air for sulphur burner is routed through Air Filter to drying tower and further to suction 

side of Centrifugal Air Blower. 98.5% acid is circulated through drying tower at 70°C, 

thus heating to 125°C before entering sulfur burner. This system helps to increase 

generation of steam and hence power generation. 

6. SO2 emission during start up of the plant is controlled by a Venturi Scrubber using alkali 

as scrubbing medium. The plant therefore does not cause any pollution either during start 

up or during normal operation. 

The process as described above has been divided into five main sections described as 

follows: 

• Sulphur Circuit 

The weighed quantity of sulphur of about 99.5% purity is fed to the first compartment 

of sulphur melter. The heat for melting sulphur is provided through steam coils. The 

optimum pressure to be maintained for melting sulphur in the first compartment is upto 

7 kg/cm2 G. 

The molten sulphur flows from compartment no. 1 to pumping compartment through 

underflows/overflows. The sulphur pumps for feeding sulphur are fitted in pumping 

compartment. The total time of retention in the compartments corresponds to more 

than 72 hrs at normal rated production capacity of the plant. In order to achieve 



optimum results, it is necessary that the feeding of sulphur to the melter should be 

maintained at specified temperature of 135 °C. All compartments are fitted with steam 

coil to provide the necessary heat for maintaining the temperature of molten sulphur at 

the desired level. Molten sulphur from the pumping compartment is pumped to the 

sulphur burner through one of the submersible type sulphur pumps through specially 

designed sulphur feeding gun. The rate of feed of sulphur to the sulphur burner is 

controlled by operation of sulphur feed control valve. Drain lines have been provided 

in the molten sulphur discharge line at two different points. 

The optimum steam pressure for coils located in 2 nd , 3 rd , 4 th through pumping 

compartments of the sulphur melter is around 4 kg/cm2 G. This regulated steam 

pressure is achieved through pressure reducing valve. Molten sulphur line starting from 

the discharge flange of the sulphur pump to the inlet of the sulphur burner is suitably 

steam jacketed to maintain correct temperature of molten sulphur fed to the sulphur 

burner. 

• SO2 Scrubber 

It is very important that SO2 emission during plant startup is controlled within 

persmissible limits. This is achieved by use of a alkali scrubber located after the final 

absorption tower where gas is scrubbed with circulating alkali solution. 

• DM and Water Softening Plants 

For generation of steam of high quality DM water is required for this purpose RO 

plant and DM plant will be installed. 

• The plant is provided with data logging system through DCS control circuits for 

control of parameters like Acid concentration control, pump tank level control, Boiler 

feed water level control, boiler feed water from deaerator temperature control. All the 

output signals are fed to a computer and output data is collected based on reports to be 

prepared including log sheets. 

Chemical Reaction: 

Overall 

S + O2 SO2 

SO2 + 1/2O2 SO3 

SO3 + H2O H2SO4 

S 3/2O2 + H2O H2SO4 

M.W 32 48 18 98 



3.10.3 Oleum & SO3 

Oleum (23%) 

Oleum 23% is manufactured by absorbing SO3 gas with Sulphuric Acid. 

H2SO4 + SO3 H2S2O7 

Oleum 23% means free SO3 in the product is 23%, which is equivivalent to 105.17% 

Sulphuric Acid. This way 23% Oleum is equivalent to 1.07 of 98% Sulphuric Acid. 

The sulphur required for 1 ton of 23% oleum is 0.326 x 1.07 = 0.349 ton. 

Oleum (65%) 

Oleum 65% means, the free SO3 in this product is 65% which is equivalent to 114.626% 

sulphuric acid. This way the oleum 65% is equivalent to 1.17 times of 98% sulphuric acid. 

The sulphur required for 1 ton of 65% Oleum 0.326 x 1.17 = 0.381 ton 

Liquid SO3 

Liquid SO3 is = 1.25 times of 98% Sulphuric Acid. The Sulfur required for 1 ton of liquid 

SO3 = 0.326 x 1.25 = 0.41 ton. 



100 MT 

DM Water 

Sulphur 

163.25 MT 

904341 M 3 Air Drying Tower 

(Oxygen: 245 MT) 

Acid Pump Tank P 

Water 

Metler 

(135°C) 

Furnace 

(1100°) 

WHB Steam Steam Turbine to Generate 

Convertor 

(upto 3rd pass) 

IPAB(Inter Pass 

Absorption 

Tower 

Convertor 

(4th pass) 

99% 

H2SO4 



4 MW Power 

Oleum 

Tower 

Oleum 

Pump Tank 

(Oleum 23% 

or 65%) 

Oleum 

Storage 

(23% or 65%) 

99% H2SO4 

H2SO4 

(98.5%) Storage 

Final Absorption 

Tower 

Alkali 

Scrubbe 

r 

Vent to 

Atmosphere 

Wastewater 

500 MT/Day 0.8 KLD 

PROCESS FLOW CHART OF H2SO4(98.7%), Oleum (23% & 65%) 

H2SO4 (98.5%)

Oluem Pump 

Tank (23%) 

8070 

3.10.4 Chloro Sulphonic Acid 

SO3 + HCl ClSO3H 

(l) (g) (l) 

80 36.5 116.5 

1567 HCl Chilling 

H2SO4 

SO3 

Convertor 

(132 °C) 

Oleum 

Tower 

(23%) 

PROCESS FLOW CHART OF SO3 LIQUID 

1567 

Chilled HCl 

Gas 

Cleaning Bleed 

1567 

Dry HCl 99.90% 

3433 Liq SO3 

Reactor 

100.00% Gas to Stack 

Caustic 

Scrubber 

0.8 Castic Solution Wastewate To ETP 

10% 0.8 KL/Month 

5000 

Chlorosulphonic Acid 

MASS BALANCE OF CHLOROSULPHONIC ACID 

Condenser SO3 Liquid 

The HCl gas is refrigerated and cleaned in gas cleaning tower. The dry HCl is reacted with 

liq SO3 to get Chloro Sulphonic Acid. The unconverted gas is scrubbed in caustic 

scrubber. 


Mass Balance: 



7500

3.10.5 Sulfonation (of ONT/PNT, Tobias, VS) 

Take ONT/PNT in as sulfonator and charge 98% Sulphuric Acid and 65% Oluem in it 

slowly. After completion of reaction blow sulfomass in another vessel containing water, 

charge common salt, mix it, cool it and filter in neutsch. Material is then centrifuge. 

Collect filterate as Spent Sulphuric Acid for sale. Sulphonated ONT/PNT from centrifuge 

is then packed in HDPE bags and sent for sale. 

For Tobias, Take Oleum (65%) in sulfonator, charge Tobias Acid slowly and after 

completion of charging raise temperature and maintain it. Now cool the sulphonated mass 

and blow it in Brine water. Allow for mixing, filter and give wash of brine water. 

Centrifuge the mass and collect the wet cake as product and packed in HDPE bags. 

Chemical Reaction (o-NT/p-NT): 

CH3 NO2 

98 

H2SO4 

H2S2O7 

178 

CH3 NO2 

o-Nitro Toluene Sulphonated Sulfuric Acid 

o-NT 

137 217 98 

Chemical Reaction: (Tobias) 

SO3H 



SO3H 

+ H2SO4 

NH2 

SO3H 

SO3H 

NH2 

+ H2S2O7 + H2SO4 

Tobias Acid (TA) STA (Sulfo Tobias Acid) 

223 178 303 98 

MASS BALANCE: 

ONT 137 

H2SO4 98 

H2S2O7 178 

Sulfonator 

Water 18 

Drawning 

Common Salt 117 

Vessel 

(NaCl) 548 

Filteration 

Spent Acid (25%) 

(Water+Salt+Sulfuric Acid) 

217 331 

413 

Centrifuge 2 

(Recycle to Drawning Vessel) 

Wet Cake 

215 

MASS BALANCE OF SULPHONATION ONT/PNT

3.10.6 BENZENE SULPHONYL CHLORIDE 

Benzene is reacted with Chloro Sulphonic Acid in a agitated vessel at low temperature at 

about 20 -25 °C. Chloro Sulphonic Acid is used in excess for the reaction. The reacted 

mass is then kept under agitation for some time. It is then transferred to another vessel 

containing chilled water. During the addition, the vessel is cooled up to desire temperature 

till the addition complete. The contents are kept under agitation for some time. The mass is 

then separated. The acid layer is transferred to the storage tank for sale. The organic layer 

is washed, dried & distilled under vacuum to get the product. The HCl gas evolved during 

the reaction & isolation is send to CAS plant for making Chloro Sulphonic Acid. 


C6H6 + HOSO2Cl C6H5SO2Cl + HCl 

Benzene CSA BSC Hydrochloric Acid Gas 

(l) (l) (l) (g) 

M.W 78 116.5 176.5 36.5 

Mass Balance/Flow Chart: 

3.10.7 Thionyl Chloride 

663 Benzene HCl gas 

Reactor 

1980 CSA 310 

Isolation 

Distillation 



2333 

1500 

Benzyl Sulphonyl Chloride 

Dilute H2SO4 

833 

Crude 

Dimethyl 

Sulphone 

1485 15 

MASS BALANCE OF BENZYL SULPHONYL CHLORIDE 

Sulphur is charged in sulfur monochloride reactor along with chlorine in measured 

quantity and reacted over a period of 12 hours to Sulphur Monochloride (SMC), which is 

stored for further reaction. Thionyl Chloride reacted is fed with SMC, SO3 and Chlorine. 

Reactor is fitted with fractionating column. TC gas thus produced is passed through 3 

condenser, out of which first condenser used cooling water and other two condenser use 

chilled water. Crude TC is then sent to Distillation column as reflux. A part of crude TC is 

reacted with sulfur to get pure Thionyl Chloride.

Alkali Scrubber is provided to absorb SO2 when required; similarly chlorine scrubber 

removes traces of chlorine. Byproduct is recycled back to sulfuric acid plant, where it is 

converted to Sulphur Trioxide for reuse in TC Plant. 


Mass Balance: 

3.10.8 DASDA 

818 Sulphur 

890 Chlorine 

2S + Cl 2 S 2Cl 2 

Sulphur Chlorine Sulphur Monochloride (SMC) 

64 70 134 

S 2Cl 2 + 2SO 3 + Cl 2 2SOCl 2 + 2SO 2 

134 160 70 236 128 

SMC Sulphur Trioxide Chlorine TC 

Overall Chemical Reaction: 

2S + 2Cl 2 + 2SO 3 2SOCl 2 + 2SO 2 

64 140 160 236 128 

SMC Reactor 

2044 SO3 

890 Chlorine 

1708 

TC Reactor 

3015 

To Sulfuric Acid & SBS plant (Recycle) 

1627 

Condenser 

Product 



2400 

Distillation 

600 

Column Product 

15 

Total Product 3000 

MASS BALANCE OF THIONYL CHLORIDE 

Sulfuric Acid & Oluem (65%) are taken in Sulfonator, Para Nitro Toluene (PNT) is then 

charged. The mass in then dumped in to the water, cooled and filtered in Neutsch filter. 

The acid is then separated, The mass (PNTOSA) is then oxidized with sodium 

hypochloride. After completion of the reaction common salt is charged at the room 

temperature the mass is then filtered in Neutsch Filter . 

Then reduction of PNTOSA is carried out with Fe, HCl and NH4Cl. Filter the reduction 

mass & isolate the filterate using dilute H2SO4 & filter it in Neutsch filter. Material thus 

prepared is DASDA. Which is then centrifuged and packed in the HDPE bags.


PNT(137) 98 178 PNTSA (217) 

SO3H 

2 + 2NaOCl +H2O 

O2N 

O2N 

CH3 

NO 2 

+ 

SO3H 

H2SO 4 + H2S2O7 + 2H2SO4 

PNT 63 

H2SO4 45 

Oleum 82 

Water 20 

Salt 15 

Common Salt 15 

Soda Ash 18 

NaOCl 69 

Water 25 

Fe 5 

HCl 8 

NH4Cl 15 

Sulfonator 

Drawning 

Vessel 



190 

225 

Neutsch Filter 58 To ETP 

167 

Centrifuge 30 ML(Recycle) 

137 Drawning 

Oxidation 

264 


206 


201 Drawning 

Reduction 

Vessel 

229 

Filter Press 27 To ETP 

202 

Isolation Vessel 

202 


176 


170 Isolation Vessel 

Product 

DASDA 

MASS BALANCE OF DASDA 

+ 2HCl + 3H2O 

NO2 

NO2 H H 

217 149 18 474 73 54 

SO3Na 

- C = C 

H H 

SO3N 

NO2 

Fe/HCl 

NH4Cl 

(DNSDA) Di-Sodium Salt (Nitro form) Di-Sodium Salt (Amino form) 

414 

H2N 

CH3 

SO3Na 

Mass Balance: 

- C = C 

H H 

SO3N 

NH2 + H2SO4 

H2N 

414 DASDA 370 

H2N 

CH3 

NO 2 

SO3Na 

- C = C 

SO3Na 

- C = C 

H H 

SO3H 

- C = C 

H H 

SO3N 

SO3N 

SO3H 

NH2 

NH

3.10.9 Power Generation of 10 MW (Coal) 

For power generation steam will be generated from the boiler, which is then sent to steam 

turbine to generated the power. At the outlet of the turbine steam goes to condenser to 

recover the water utilized and further sent back to the boiler. The fuel utilized for the boiler 

will be Coal. 

To generated 10 MW, a steam of 40 MTD required, which is generated from the coal 

based boiler. The coal consumption for the required steam would be approximately 10 

MTD. 

For Power plant, separate coal yard will be made in which coal will be stored, from coal 

yard the coal will be sent to crusher. The crushed coal is then sent to silo for ultimate feed 

in to the combustion chamber. 

Process Flow Chart: 

High Pressure Steam 

45 kg/cm 2 

410°C 

3.10.10 Sodium Bi Sulphite 

Turbine 

Generator 

Set 

Exhaust 

0.1 kg/cm 2 

100 °C 

Condenser Condensate back to 

Boiler feed water 

Sodium Carbonate and Water is charged in the reactor. Sulphur Dioxide is then passed 

slowly to the reactor. The mass is then allowed for continuous mixing. The material thus 

prepared is Sodium Bi Sulphite. 


Na2CO3 + 2SO2 + H2O 2NaHCO3 + CO2 

106 64 18 208 28 

Sodium SBS 

Carbonate 

Mass Balance: 

Sodium Carbonate 106 

CO2 

28 

SO2 64 

Reactor 

Water 18 



160 

MASS BALANCE OF SODIUM BI SULPHITE

3.10.11 Dimethyl Sulphate 

Methanol from day tank in the plant is taken through metering pump passed through heat 

exchanger and condenser in gas cycle. The methanol gas is passed through the aluminum 

catalyst, further it is reacted with liquid SO3. The ration of consumption of methanol + 

SO3 for DMS produced is as follows: 

1524 Methanol Day Tank 

SO3 = 0.70 MT 

Methanol = 0.55 MT. 

The moisture shall be collected out of Methanol and sent to ETP. After reaction of SO3 + 

Methanol gas in a closed reaction , Which will have chilled water circulation in jacket. The 

crude DMS formed is having a high acidity. The distilled and acid thus produced is 98% 

Sulphuric Acid. This is a by product and will be sold. 


Mass Balance : 

260°C 

2 CH3OH CH3-O-CH3 + H2O 

Catalyst(Al2O3) 

Methanol Dimethyl Ether 

2 x 32 46 18 

CH3-O-CH3 + SO3 (CH3)2SO4 

Dimethyl Sulphate 

46 126 

SO3 + H2O H2SO4 

80 18 98 

Heat 

Exchanger 

386 Water To ETP 

Reactor 

Containing 

Al2O3 

Catalyst(260°C) 

Condensation 

Tank 

DME Gas 

1138 

1979 Liq SO3 

Reactor 

Pure Dimethyl Sulphate 3000 Distillation 

MASS BALANCE OF DIMETHYL SULPHATE 

117 

98% Spent Sulfuric Acid 



3.10.12 Dimethyl Aniline 

Methanol from day tank in the plant is taken through metering pump passed through heat 

exchanger and condenser in gas cycle. The methanol gas is passed through the aluminum 

catalyst, further it is reacted with Aniline. The product is then distilled to get Dimethyl 

Aniline 

The moisture shall be collected out of Methanol and sent to ETP. 


Mass Balance: 

260°C 

2 CH3OH CH3-O-CH3 + H2O 

Catalyst(Al2O3) 

Methanol Dimethyl Ether 

2 x 32 46 18 

CH3-O-CH3 + C6H5NH2 (CH3)2C6H5NH2 

780 Methanol Day Tank 

3.10.13 Diethyl Sulfate 

Dimethly Aniline 

46 93 123 

Heat 

Exchanger 

220 Water To ETP 

560 

Reactor 

Containing 

Aluminium 

Catalyst 

Condensation 

Tank 

MASS BALANCE OF DIMETHYL ANILINE 

DME Gas 

Reactor 

1500 Pure Dimethyl Aniline Distillation 

Aniline 

1134 

194 

Wastewate to ETP 

Ethyl Alcohol and SO3 reacts in presence of catalyst Sodium Sulphate and Urea and 

formed Ethyl Hydrogen Sulfate (EHS). This EHS mass is ammoniated by ammonia and 

EHS gets converted into Diethyl Sulfate. Ammonia is passed in Ethyl Hydrogen Sulfate 

mass. The product thus formed is crude Diethyl Sulphate. 

Moisture content present in the Ethyl Alcohol reacts with SO3 and forms Sulphuric Acid. 

Distillation of crude EHS takes place under vacuum. The pure DES is produced and 

transported to the storage tanks. 




1694

2C2H5OH + 2SO3 2C2H5OSO3H 

Catalyst 

Ethyl Alcohol Ethyl Hydrogen Sulfate 

92 160 228 

2C2H5OSO3H + NH3 (C2H5)2SO4 + NH4SO4 

EHS Ammonia Diethyl Sulfate Ammonium Sulfate 

228 17 154 114 

Mass Balance: 

896 Ethyl Alcohol 

1558 SO3 

NH3 

Cooler 

3.10.14 Calcium Chloride 

166 

354 

Reactor (Catalyst: 

Urea+Sod. Sulfate) 



2100 

Ammoniation Reactor 

Distillation 

2266 

1500 

Pure Diethyl Sulfate 

MASS BALANCE OF DIETHYL SULFATE 

Spent ST Tank 

766 

Calcium Carbonate is reacted with Hydrochloric Acid to get Calcium Chloride. 


2CaCO3 +4 HCl 2CaCl2 + 2 HCO3

Mass Balance: 

0.2 

Water 

5 Lime Stone Ventury Scrubber (Alkali) 

Reactor 

ETP 

4 HCl 0.2 

9 

3.10.15 Di Calcium Phosphate 

Filter Press 

8 CaCl2 

Clear Liquid 

Evaporator 

5 

Dry CaCl2 

Product 

Sludge to ETP 

1 

Mosture Loss 

MASS BALANCE OF CALCIUM CHLROIDE 

Rock Phosphate is reacted with Hydrochloric Acid to generated Phosphoric Acid, which is 

further reacted with Lime stone to get DCP which separated and crystallized. 


Ca F2 3 ( Ca3(PO4)2) + 14 HCl 7 CaCl2 + 3Ca H(PO4)2 + 2HF 

Mass Balance: 

Rock Phosphate 1800 

HCl (30%) 3600 

Lime 200 

Hydrated Lime 200 

Sodium Silicate 10 

Reactor 

3Ca (OH)2 6CaHPO4 

DCP 



5400 

Neutralisation 

5600 

Separation 

5810 

Filteration Process Sludge 

5310 500 

Recycle to Reactor 

to recover DCP 1500 Centriguge 

3810 

Dryer Mositure Loss 

3000 810 

Finished Product 

MASS BALANCE OF DI CALCIUM PHOSPHATE

3.10.16 Sulphur Mono Chloride 

Sulphur Monochloride is generated by reacting sulphur & Hydrochloric Acid in a reactor. 


Mass Balance: 

3.10.17 Sulphuryl Chloride 

2S + Cl 2 S 2Cl 2 

Sulphur Chlorine Sulphur Monochloride (SMC) 

64 70 134 

95.5 Sulphur 

104.5 Chlorine 

SMC Reactor 



200 

MASS BALANCE OF SULPHUR MONOCHLORIDE 

Sulphur, Chlorine & Sulphur Trioxide is reacted to gether to get Sulphuryl Chloride. 


S + 3Cl2 + 2SO3 

3SO2Cl2 

32 210 160 402 

Sulphuryl 

Chloride 

Mass Balance: 

16 Sulphur 

17.5 Chlorine 

80 SO3 

89.5 Chlorine 

Reactor 

Reactor 

Condenser 

33.5 

203 

Product 

190 

13 

Residue 

Distillation 

Column Product 10 

3 

MASS BALANCE OF SULPHURYL CHLORIDE

3.10.18 Aluminium Sulphate (Alum) 

Aluminium Sulphate is manufactured by the reaction of Aluminia Hydrate and Bauxite 

with Sulphuric Acid. 

Bauxite is ground in the pulveriser to 90% passing through 200 mesh and elevated to batch 

hopper through bucket elevator. Measure quantity of water is added in the lead bonded 

reactor and slowly sulphuric acid is to be added in the reactor.. After getting the required 

temperature in the reactor, slowly ground bauxite i.e added. After the addition of measure 

quantity of bauxite/alumina hydrate, the agitator is kept on for about 45 minutes, solution 

is then dumped in to the settling tank. 

The decanted solution of Aluminium Sulphate is then taken to the reactor and the required 

quantity of sulphuric acid is added after getting the required temperature Hydrated 

Alumina is added slowly. After addition, Aluminum Sulphate is moulded in the trays with 

the help of tray filling arrangements. The slabs after cooling are to be taken out from the 

trays and stacked in the store. 


2Al(OH)3 + 3H2SO4 Al2(SO4)3 + 6H2O 

156 294 342 108 

Mass Balance: 

Water 

860 Alumina Hydrate/Bauxite 

456 Sulphuric Acid 

456 Sulphuric Acid 



1316 

1316 

Reactor 

Settling Tank 

Reactor 

Moulding 

in to Slab 

MASS BALANCE OF ALUM

3.10.19 Sulfamic Acid 

Urea & 23-25% Oleum are fed at controlled rates to reactor, which is cooled by chilled 

water/brine and cooling water. The reaction products are diluted by mixing with recycled 

mother liquor (available after separation of crystals of sulfamic acid). Temperature is 

controlled during mixing by chilled water/brine. Dilute acid streams (70% sulfuric acid) is 

separated after the mixing operation and is sold to SSP/Alum manufacturer. 


NH2CONH2 + SO3 NH2CONHSO3H + CO2 

NH2CONHSO3H + H2SO4 2NH2SO3H + CO2 

Overall Reaction 

NH2CONH2 + SO3 + H2SO4 2NH2SO3H + CO2 

60 80 98 2 x 97 44 

Mass Balance: 

350 Urea Reactor 

3300 SO3/Oleum 

(23-25%) 3650 

5150 

Mixing 

100 Water Make -Up 

Figure are in Ton/Month 

R/C Mother Liquor 

Separation Spent Acid 

2400 2750 

2500 

Cyrstallisation 

1000 

Packing/Bagging 



1500 

MASS BALANCE OF SULFAMIC ACID

4.1 INTRODUCTION 

SECTION IV 

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 

Risk assessment process rests on identification of specific hazards, hazardous areas and 

areas vulnerable to effects of hazardous situations in facilities involved in processing and 

storage of chemicals. 

In fact the very starting point of any such assessment is a detailed study of materials 

handled & their physical / chemical / thermodynamic properties within the complex at 

various stages of manufacturing activity. Such a detailed account of hazardous materials 

provides valuable database for identifying most hazardous materials, their behaviour 

under process conditions, their inventory in process as well as storage and hence helps in 

identifying vulnerable areas within the complex. 

Hazardous posed by particular installation or a particular activity can be broadly 

classified as fire and explosive hazards and toxicity hazards. Whether a particular 

activity is fire and explosive hazardous or toxicity hazardous primarily depends on the 

materials handled and their properties. 

It will be from the above discussion that study of various materials handled is a 

prerequisite from any hazard identification process to be accurate. Based on this study 

the hazard indices are calculated for subsequent categorization of units depending upon 

the degree of hazard they pose. 

In a Dyes Intermediates manufacturing plant main hazard handling of hazardous 

chemicals like Chlorine, Ethylene Oxie, Flammable solvents, corrosive and toxic 

chemicals, Natural Gas and HSD as a fuel in CPP, the primary concern has always been 

toxic release, fire and explosion prevention and control as these are the main hazard 

posed by such unit. This concern has grown through the lose of life, property and 

materials experienced after experienced after major disasters, which have occurred over 

the years. 

Identification of hazards is the most important step to improve the safety of any plant. 

The hazard study is designed to identify the hazards in terms of chemicals, inventories 

and vulnerable practices /operations. 

The hazard evaluation procedures use as a first step by chemical process industries and 

petroleum refineries are checklists and safety reviews. Dow and Mond fire and explosion 

indices, which make use of past experience to develop relative ranking of hazards, is also 

extensively used. For predictive hazard analysis, Hazard and Operability studies 

(HAZOP), Fault tree analysis, Event tree analysis, Maximum credible accident and 

consequence analysis etc are employed. 



Sr. 

No 

Material 

Stored 

4.2 Dow’s fire and Explosion Index (F & EI) 

4.2.1 Steps in fire and explosion index calculation are given below : 

4.2.2 Results of fire explosion and toxicity indices. 

Storage 

Qty. 

1. Chlorine 900 Kg. X 

209 Nos. 

2. Ethylene Oxide 15 MT 

Bullet 

Calculate GHP(F1), 

General Process Hazards 

Nh Nf Nr M 

F 

Select Pertinent Process 

Determine Material Factor 

Determine Hazard Factor 

F1 X F2 =F3 

F3XMaterial Factor 

=F & E Index 

Determine Exposure area 

TABLE- 4.1 

GPH SPH FEI Degree of 

hazard 

Radius 

of expo. 

(ft.) 

Th Ts TI Degree of 

Hazard 

4 0 0 1 2.05 2.82 5.8 Light 4.9 325 125 26.41 Severe 

2 4 3 29 3.0 3.2 278 Severe 

Calculate SPH(F2), special 

process Hazards 

200 125 125 18.0 Severe 

3. Sulfur Trioxide/ 100MTl x2 3 0 2 1 2.9 3.3 9.57 Low hazard 8 250 125 27.00 Severe 

Sulfuric 

Tanks 

for fire 

4. Benzene 40 KLx6 

U/G Tanks 

2 3 0 16 2.55 3 122.4 Intermediate 106 125 125 16.38 Heavy 

5. Toluene 40 KL X2 

U/G Tanks 

2 3 0 16 2.55 3 122.4 Intermediate 106 125 125 16.38 Heavy 

6. Methanol 60 KLX4 

Tanks 

1 3 0 16 2.55 2.35 95.88 Moderate 78 50 50 5.3 Light 

7. Oleum 150 MTx 2 

Tanks 

3 0 2 24 2.85 1.5 102.6 Intermediate 87 250 125 20.06 Severe 

8. Sulfuric acid 1000MTX2 3 0 2 1 2.9 3.3 9.57 Low hazard 8 250 125 27.00 Severe 

Tanks 

for fire 

9. Nitric Acid 20 KLX 3 

Tanks 

2 1 0 4 2.90 3.0 34.8 Intermediate 28 125 75 7.9 Moderate 

10. Thionyl Chloride 

11. Ammonia 50 MT 3 1 0 4 3.75 2.91 10.9 Light 8 250 75 24.89 Heavy 

12. FO 60 MT 0 0 0 10 2.2 2.4 52.8 Light 44 0 50 2.7 Light 

13. HSD 20 0 2 0 10 2.55 1.93 49.21 Light 41 0 50 2.4 Light 



FEI= MF x GPH x SPH 

TI = Th + Ts x ( 1+ GPH tot + SPH tot ) 

------------- 

100 

Nh = NFPA Health rating GPH = General Process Hazard 

Nf = NFPA Fire rating SPH = Special Process Hazard 

Nr = NFPA Reactive rating FEI = Fire Explosion Index 

MF = Material Factor Th = Penalty Factor 

Ts = Penalty for Toxicity TI = Toxicity Index 

4.3 Failure Frequencies 

4.3.1 Hazardous material release scenarios can be broadly divided into 2 categories 

I) catastrophic failures which are of low frequency and 

II) ruptures and leaks which are of relatively high frequency. 

Releases from failure of gaskets, seal, rupture in pipelines and vessels fall in the second 

category whereas catastrophic failure of vessels and full bore rupture of pipelines etc fall 

into the first category. 

4.3.2 Typical failure frequencies are given below:- 

TABLE-4.2 

Item Mode of failure Failure frequencies 

Atmospheric 

Catastrophic failure 

10-9 /yr 

storage 

Process Pipelines 

Significant leak 

10-5 /yr 

< = 50 mm dia Full bore rupture 

8.8 x 10-7 /m.yr 

Significant leak 

8.8 x 10-6 /m.yr 

> 50 mm

TABLE-4.3 

TABLE-4.4 



4.4 Identification of Hazardous Areas: 

A study of process for manufacturing as given in chapter 2 of the report indicates the 

following: 

Various raw materials used in the manufacturing processes are listed in Table-3.2 in 

Section-3 along with mode / type of storage & storage conditions. It can be readily seen 

that raw materials even though hazardous in nature, are used in continuous process & 

inventory are low at process plant. However some chemicals such as Methanol, Chlorine 

are used / common in more than one process & therefore their inventory requirement is 

higher. Most of hazardous chemicals are stored in dedicated Explosive licence premises. 

List of chemicals stored in larger quantities is provided in Table-4.5 

Following areas considered as a Hazardous area of the plant. 

(a) CCOE approved Chlorine tonner Shed 

(b) Class A petroleum storage tank farm 

(c) Ethylene Oxide Storage bullet tank farm ( CCOE approved licenced premises). 

(d) Oleum, Sulfuric Acid, SO3, CSA, TC & DMS storage area. 

(e) Anhydrous Ammonia storage tank (CCOE approved licenced premises) 

4.4.1 Evaluation Of Hazards : 

4.4.1.1 Major inventory of Hazardous chemicals within the factory premises are- 

The materials were studied with respect to their flammability, reactivity and toxicity based 

on the criteria given by the NFPA (NFPA ratings). Material factor values were determined 

using these ratings. General process hazards and Special process hazards for all the 

materials stored were determined as per the guidelines given by DOW Chemicals 

Company in DOW Index. FEI values for all these materials were calculated form the 

above data. 

Value of material factor, General Process Hazard & Special Process Hazard as also FEI / 

TI values & degree of hazard are given in Table 4.1 It can be seen storage in tank farms is 

mostly in the Severe category due to pressure storage and highly flammable and toxic 

nature of chemicals. The radius of exposure for various tanks considering FEI Values is 

also calculated and presented in the Table. 

4.4.1.2 Evaluation of Process Areas : 

Existing and proposed Sulfuric Acid and Thyonil Chloride, VS, CSA & DMS plant are 

a state of the art Technology process fully automatic DCS operation and continuous 

process plant. Thus the inventory of hazardous chemicals is in the plant is very small. 

Existing and proposed plants are generally controlled by Distributed Control System 

(DCS) to provide an integrated plant control built in safety devices provided. Process 

parameters control and interlocking are provided and foolproof safety interlocking and 

logics applied at design level and maintained. 

Existing Captive Power Plant and proposed CPP plant gas base engine and NG will be 

used through pipe line. 

From heat recovery of sulfuric acid plant, steam will be utilized in steam turbine for 

power generation. 



Thus Produce units will do not warrant any detailed calculations as consequences due 

to any worst case scenario due to very quantity of material & damage is such a case is 

expected to be limited to within the factory premises. 

Considering this, the risk analysis and consequences studies are concentrated on 

storage in bulk as per Table -3.2. 



5.1 Effects Of Releases Of Hazardous Substances 

SECTION V 

RISK ASSESSMENT 

Hazardous substances may be released as a result of failures / catastrophes, 

causing possible damage to the surrounding area. In the following 

discussion, an account is taken of various effects of release of hazardous 

substances and the parameters to be determined for quantification of such 

damages. 

In case of release of hazardous substances the damages will depend largely 

on source strength. The strength of the source means the volume of the 

substance released. The release may be instantaneous or semi-continuous. 

In the case of instantaneous release, the strength of the source is given in 

kg and in semi-continuous release the strength of the source depends on the 

outflow time (kg/s.). 

In order to fire the source strength, it is first necessary to determine the 

state of a substance in a vessel. The physical properties, viz. Pressure and 

temperature of the substance determine the phase of release. This may be 

gas, gas condensed to liquid, liquid in equilibrium with its vapour or 

solids. 

Instantaneous release will occur, for example, if a storage tank fails. 

Depending on the storage conditions the following situations may occur. 

The source strength is equal to the contents of the capacity of the storage 

system. 

In the event of the instantaneous release of a liquid a pool of liquid will 

form. The evaporation can be calculated on the basis of this pool. 

Pool Fire 

In the event of the instantaneous release of a liquid a pool of liquid will 

form. The evaporation can be calculated on the basis of this pool. 

The heat load on object outside a burning pool of liquid can be calculated 

with the heat radiation model. This model uses average radiation intensity, 

which is dependent on the liquid. Account is also taken of the diameter-toheight 

ratio of the fire, which depends on the burning liquid. In addition, 

the heat load is also influenced by the following factors : 

Distance from the fire 

The relative humidity of the air (water vapour has a relatively high 

heat-absorbing capacity) 

the orientation i.e. horizontal/vertical of the objective irradiated with 

respect to the fire. 



Jet Fire 

The escaping jet of Hydrogen gas from a pipe line or a pipeline if ignited causes a jet 

flame. The direction and tilt of this jet flame will depend on the prevailing wind direction 

and velocity. The damage in case of such type of jet fire is restricted within the plant 

boundary limit. However, the ignited jet may impinge on other nearby vessel / equipment / 

pipeline causing a domino effect. 

Fire Ball 

This happens during the burning of Methanol vapour cloud, the bulk of which is initially 

over rich (i.e. above the upper flammable limit.). The whole cloud appears to be on fire as 

combustion is taking place at eddy boundaries where air is entrained (i.e. a propagating 

diffusion flame). The buoyancy of the hot combustion products may lift the cloud form the 

ground, subsequently forming a mushroom shaped cloud. Combustion rates are high and 

the hazard is primarily thermal. 

“UVCE” 

UVCE stands for unconfined vapor cloud explosion. The clouds of Hydrogen Gas mix 

with air (within flammability limit 3.0 % to 74 %) may cause propagating flames when 

ignited. In certain cases flame may take place within seconds. The thermal radiation 

intensity is severe depending on the total mass of Gas in cloud and may cause secondary 

fire. When the flame travels very fast, it explodes causing high over pressure or blast 

effect, resulting in heavy damage at considerable distance from the release point. Such 

explosion is called UVCE (Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion) and is most common 

cause of such industrial accident. 

BLEVE( Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Cloud Explosion ) 

Is a physical explosion, which occurs when the vapour side of a storage tank is heated by 

fire e.g. a torch. As a result of the heat the vapour pressure will rise and the tank wall will 

weaken. At a given moment the weakened tank wall will no longer be able to withstand 

the increased internal pressure and will burst open. As a result of the expansion and flashoff, 

a pressure wave occurs. With flammable gases, a fireball will occur. 

DISPERSION CASES : 

PLUMES : 

Plumes are continuous release of hazardous gases and vapours. Smoke from 

a chimney is an example. Plumes can cause FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS as 

secondary scenarios. 

PUFFS : 

Puffs are instantaneous release of hazardous gases and vapours. Puffs can 

give rise to FIRE BALLS and vapour cloud explosions(VCE). A special 

case of vapour cloud explosion is the Boiling Liquid Evaporating Vapour 

Explosion (BLEVE). 



SPILLS POOL: 

Spills are liquid pools created by leaking liquid chemicals. Spills cause 

evaporation and dispersal of toxic gases and if the spilled liquid is 

flammable, then it can catch fire creating a pool fire also the vapours can 

cause explosion. 

5.2 Identification of High Risk Areas : 

Following areas considered as a High Risk area of the plant. 

(a) Chlorine tonner Shed ( CCOE licenced premises ) 

(b) Class A petroleum storage area ( CCOE licenced premises ) 

(c) Ethylene Oxide Storage bullet tank farm ( CCOE approved licenced premises). 

(d) Oleum, Sulfuric Acid, SO3, CSA, TC storage area. 

(e) Anhydrous Ammonia storage tank (CCOE approved licenced premises) 

5.3 Modes of Failure: 

5.3.1 Following failure are considered for detailed analysis and safe distances computed: 

Liquid release due to catastrophic failure of storage vessel or road tanker. 

Liquid release through a hole/crack developed at welded joints/flanges / nozzles / 

valves etc. 

Vapour release due to exposure of liquid to atmosphere in the above scenarios. 

Gas release due to catastrophic failure of gas/ liquid outlet valve failure. 

Based on the above the following accident scenarios were conceived as most probable 

failure cases: 

TABLE-5.1 

Event Causes 

Tank on Fire/ - Catastrophic failure of tank + Ignition availability 

Pool fire - Failure of liquid outlet line + Ignition availability 

Fire Ball/ - Catastrophic failure of road tanker/ storage tank 

Flash Fire Vapour generation due to substrate and wind 

UVCE Vapour cloud generation and about 15 % of 

total vapour mass Above the UEL-LEL % Ignition availability 

Toxic gas dispersion - Toxic Gas release due to catastrophic failure of tonner/bullet/ 

Tanks and ignition not available within LEL- UEL range. 

Considering the quantity of storages & nature of Toxic nature and Flammable storage, 

following scenarios were taken up for detailed analysis & safe distances computed : 

Catastrophic failure of road tanker of Methanol, Toluene, Benzene and presence of 

ignition source poses heat radiation hazards to nearby areas. 

Dispersion of vapour up to LC-50 ( Fatal ), Immediate Danger to Life and Health 

(IDLH ) and TLV ( Threshold Limit Value ) concentration Dispersion of vapour to 

toxic end points 



Failure cases considered for consequence analysis are representative of worst-case 

scenarios. Probability of occurrence of such cases is negligible (less than 1 x 10 -6 per 

year) because of strict adherence to preventive maintenance procedures within the 

complex. General probabilities for various failure is provided in Table-4.2, 4.3 and 

4.4, but consequences of such cases can be grave & far reaching in case such systems 

fail during life history of the company. Hence such scenarios are considered for 

detailed analysis. It is to be noted however that such situations are not foreseeable or 

credible as long as sufficient measures are taken. Also, consequence analysis studies 

help us evaluate emergency planning measures of the Company. 

Scenario 

No. 

Failure Type 

Table-5.2 

Failure Mode Consequence 

1,2,3,4 Methanol, Benzene, Un loading Un confined Pool fire Ball 

Toluene, Ethanol road arm 100 % Fire, Flash Fire, UVCE 

tanker catastrophic 

failure. 

failure 

Random 

failure 

5,6,7,8,9, 

10 

Ethylene Oxide storage 

bullet catastrophic failure 

11 Puff Isopleth Simulation 

For Chlorine Tonner 

Catastrophic Failure 

12 Point source plume 

release for Chlorine 

14 

liquid/ gas phase valve 

failure. 

Oleum storage Tank 

catastrophic failure 

15 SO3 storage Tank 


16 CSA storage Tank 


17 TC storage Tank 


18 HCL storage Tank 


19 Sulfuric Acid storage 

tank catastrophic failure 

20 Sulpher powder storage 

area fire 

21 Anhydrous Ammonia 

storage bullet 


Catastrophic 

failure 

Catastrophic 

failure 

Random 

failure 

Catastrophic 

failure 

Catastrophic 

failure 

Catastrophic 

failure 

Catastrophic 

failure 

Catastrophic 

failure 

Catastrophic 

failure 

Due to source 

of ignition and 

heat 

Catastrophic 

failure 

Pool fire, Ball Fire/ BLEVE, 

Flash Fire, UVCE, Puff 

dispersion, Spill pool 

Evaporation up to LC 50, 

IDLH and TLV level. 

Puff dispersion up to LC 50 

Human, IDLH and TLV level. 



Spill pool Evaporation up to 

LC 50, IDLH and TLV level. 











Fire in storage area, Toxic 

release due to SO3 gas 

generated during fire 





5.4 Damage Criteria For Heat Radiation: 

Damage effects vary with different scenarios. Calculations for various 

scenarios are made for the above failure cases to quantify the resulting 

damages. 

The results are translated in term of injuries and damages to exposed 

personnel, equipment, building etc. 

Tank on fire /Pool fire due to direct ignition source on tank or road tanker 

or catastrophic failure or leakage or damage from pipeline of storage 

facilities or road tanker unloading arm, can result in heat radiation causing 

burns to people depending on thermal load and period of exposure. 

All such damages have to be specified criteria for each such resultant 

effect, to relate the quantifier damages in this manner, damage criteria are 

used for Heat Radiation. 

TABLE 5.3 

DAMAGE CRITERIA – HEAT RADIATION 

Heat Radiation 

Incident Flux KW/m2 Damage 

38 100% lethality, heavy damage to tanks 

37.5 100% lethality, heavy damage to equipment. 

25 50% lethality, nonpiloted ignition 

14 Damage to normal buildings 

12.5 1% lethality, piloted ignition 

12 Damage to vegetation 

6 Burns (escape routes) 

4.5 Not lethal, 1st degree burns 

3 1st degree burns possible 

(personnel only in emergency allowed) 

2 Feeling of discomfort 

1.5 No discomfort even after long exposure 



6.1 Consequence analysis. 

CHAPTER VI 

CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 

In the risk analysis study, probable damages due to worst case scenarios 

were quantified and consequences were analyzed with object of emergency 

planning. Various measures taken by the company and findings of the study 

were considered for deciding acceptability of risks. 

6.1.1 Weather Data : 

Average wind speed : 5 m / sec. 

Average Ambient Temperature : 35 deg. c. 

Average Humidity : 70 % 

Atmospheric Stability : A 

6.1.2 Assumption : 

6.1.2.1 For Class A Petroleum Road tanker catastrophic failure( Unloading arm 100 % 

failure 

Catastrophic failure is considered for 20 MT Methanol, Toluene, & 

Benzene road tanker while unloading and due to vapour cloud of 

evaporated solvent vapour mass comes in the contact with ignition source 

pool fire, UVCE, Ball Fire and Flash Fire scenarios were considered for 

various situation. 

6.1.2.2 For Ethylene Oxide as follows. 

♦ Pool Fire in 15 MT, 18.8 MT and 11.3MT E.O. storage Bullet 

♦ Catastrophic failure is considered for E.O. Storage tanks and road 

tanker while unloading and due to vapour cloud of E.O. If release 

vapour mass come in the contact with ignition source it may give 

various scenarios like UVCE, Ball Fire, Flash fire and BLEVE were 

considered for various situation. 

♦ We have calculated following hazardous distance for the above 

mentioned scenarios. 

♦ Fatality ( LC-50 ) 

♦ Immediate danger to life and health (IDLH) concentration area 

♦ TWA/TLV concentration distance( Meters) 



6.1.2.3 For Chlorine supply system as follows. 

♦ Chlorine tonner catastrophic failure i.e. 900 kg gas puff dispersion 

♦ For Chlorine liquid/ gas phase valve failure release scenario, we have 

considered release rate 1000 grms/sec. Maximum contents of the 

tonners will be release within 900 seconds or 15 minutes. 




♦ Reverse Injury Concentration (RIC-50 )for human 



6.1.2.4 For Oleum/ CSA/ DMS/ Sulfuric Acid / Thyonil Chloride storage tanks/ road 

tanker as follows. 

♦ Oleum Storage tank catastrophic failure i.e. So2 gas puff dispersion 

♦ For Oleum outlet line valve failure release scenario, we have 

considered release rate 1000 grms/sec. 900 kgs oleum release within 

15 minutes. 






6.1.2.5 For Ammonia release scenarios 

♦ Ammonia tank catastrophic failure i.e. 50 MT gas puff dispersion 

♦ Due to pool evaporation maximum evaporation rate will be 1442 

g/sec. 








Scenario –1 Unconfined Pool Fire for Solvent road tanker catastrophic failure 

TABLE –1 

Unconfined Pool Fire for Solvent road tanker catastrophic failure 

Scenario : UNCONFINED POOL FIRE 

Input Data Results of Computations 

Stored quantity 20 KL Max. IHR at flame centre height 180 Kw/m 2 

Pool diameter 25(m) Flame centre height 9.6 meter 

Pool liquid depth 0.1 (m) Maximum Flame width 9.59 meter 

Wind speed 6 m/s Mass burning rate liquid 1.34 kg/ m 2 /min. 

Liquid Density 791 kg/m 3 Flame burnout time 58.82 Mims. 

Incident Intensity of 


(IHR) at ground 

level KW /m 2 

Results 

IHR- 

Isopleth 

Distance 

( Meters ) 

Effect if IHR at Height of Simulation 

37.5 13.5 Damage to process equipment. 100 % Fatal in 1 Min. 1 % 

fatal in 10 sec. 

25.0 15.6 Min. to ignite wood ( without flame contact ). 100 % fatal 

in 1 Min. Significant injury in 10 sec. 

12.5 22.1 Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 % fatal in 1 

min. 1 st deg. burn in 10 sec. 

4.0 39.0 Pain after 20 secs. Blistering unlikely. 

1.6 61.6 No discomfort even on long exposure. 

♦ In the 13.5 meter radius area is considered as 100% fatality in 1 min. 

♦ In the 22.1 meter radius first degree burn in 10 sec. 

♦ In the 39 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely. 

♦ In the 61.6 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfort even on long 

exposure. 





Scenario –2 Fire Ball simulation for Solvent road tanker unloading catastrophic failure 

TABLE –2 

Fire Ball simulation Solvent road tanker catastrophic failure 

In put Data 

Scenario : FIRE BALL 

Results of Computations 

Stored quantity 20 KL Fire Ball radius 14.66 meter 

Mass of vapour 184 Kgs. Fire ball Intensity of Heat 243 Kw /m 

Between LEL-UEL% 

radiation 

2 

Heat of combustion 28500 Kj/Kg Fire Ball rate of energy 

release 

658492 Kj/ sec. 

Wind speed 6 m/s Fire- Ball total energy 

release 

3.9e +006 Kj 

Liquid Density 791 kg/m 3 Fire ball duration 5.98 sec. 




level KW /m 2 

IHR- 

Isopleth 

Distance 

( Meters ) 

Damage effects 

37.5 30 100 % Fatal . Min. to ignite wood (without flame 

contact) 

25.0 38 Min. to ignite wood ( without flame contact ). 

Significant injury. 

12.5 54 Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 st deg. burn 

. 

4.0 94 Pain after 20 secs. Blistering unlikely. 

1.6 180 No discomfort even on long exposure. 

Results 

♦ In the 30 meter radius area is considered as 100 % fatality in 1 min. and first degree burn in 10 

sec. 

♦ In the 54 meter radius first degree burn in 10 sec. 


♦ In the 180 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfort even on long 

exposure. 





Scenario –3 Flash Fire simulation Solvent road tanker catastrophic failure 

TABLE –AB 

Flash Fire simulation Solvent road tanker catastrophic failure 

In put Data 

Scenario : FLASH FIRE 


Stored quantity 20 KL Visible Flash Fire Height 34.38 meter 

Mass of Gas 184 Kgs. Visible Flash Fire Width 17.19meter 

Heat of combustion 42267 Kj/kg Duration of Flash-Fire in Sec. 5.99 sec. 

Fuel-Air volume ratio 

in Flash fire cloud 

0.600 Radius of fuel-air cloud mixture 14.67 meter 

Stochiometric 

Air Mixture 

Fuel- 0.133 Total energy release 2622000 Kj 

Wind speed 6.0 m/s Max. Heat Radiation from 1 m 162 Kw/ m 

from Flash Fire 

2 

Gas Density 1.29 kg/m 3 Combustion efficiency 0.5 




level KW /m 2 

Results 

IHR- Isopleth 

Distance 

( Meters ) 



contact) 

25.0 38 Significant injury. Min. to ignite wood ( without flame 

contact ). 

12.5 54 Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 st deg. 

burn . 



♦ In the 30 meter radius area is considered as 100 % fatality in 1 min. and first degree burn in 10 

sec. 




exposure. 





Scenario –4 Unconfined Vapour cloud Explosion ( UVCE ) for Solvent road tanker 

TABLE – 4 

Unconfined Vapour cloud Explosion ( UVCE ) for Solvent road tanker 

Scenario : UVCE 

In put Data 

Stored quantity 20 KL 

Mass of vapour between LEL – UEL % 405 lbm. 

TNT equivalent 7.8 

Explosion efficiency 0.04 

Wind speed 6.0 m/s 

Radial 

Distance 

in feet 

Results 

Over 

pressure 

( psi ) 

% Fatality 

lung Rupture 

% Eardrum 

rupture 

%Structural 

damage 

% Glass 

rupture 

20 47.7 100 100 100 100 

25 28.0 98.8 100 100 100 

40 9.1 0.0 78.7 100 100 

105 2.3 0.0 2.6 10.9 100 

2005 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.3 

♦ In case of UVCE up to 20 feet distance is considered as 100 % fatality and 100 % ear drum 

rupture radius. 

♦ Up to 40 feet distance is considered as 100 % structural Damage and up to 105 feet distance 

for 100 % glass damage area. 





Scenario –5 Unconfined Pool Fire for Ethylene Oxide Road Tanker catastrophic failure 

TABLE – 5 

Unconfined Pool Fire for Ethylene Oxide Road Tanker catastrophic failure 


In put Data Results of Computations 

Stored quantity 14 MT Max. IHR at flame centre 

height 

108.40 Kw/m 2 

Pool diameter 45 (m) Flame centre height 39.13 meter 

Pool liquid depth 0.3 (m) Maximum Flame width 38.83 meter 



Incident Intensity 

of Heat Radiation 


level KW /m 2 

IHR- Isopleth 

Distance 

( Meters ) 


37.5 34.8 Damage to process equipment. 100 % Fatal in 1 Min. 

1 % fatal in 10 sec. 

25.0 42.6 Min. to ignite wood ( without flame contact ). 100 % 

fatal in 1 Min. Significant injury in 10 sec. 

12.5 60.2 Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 % fatal in 

1 min. 1 st deg. burn in 10 sec. 



Results 



♦ In the 106.3 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely. 


exposure. 





Scenario –6 Ball Fire for Ethylene Oxide Road Tanker catastrophic failure 

TABLE – 6 

Ball Fire for Ethylene Oxide Road Tanker catastrophic failure 

In put Data 



Stored quantity 14 MT Fire Ball radius 26.58 meter 

Mass of vapour 1135 Kgs. Fire ball Intensity of Heat 314.43 Kw /m 


radiation 

2 

Heat of combustion 26710 Kj/Kg Fire Ball rate of energy 2.79317e+006 Kj/ 

release 

sec. 

Wind speed 5 m/s Fire- Ball total energy release 3.03159e+007 Kj 




( IHR) at ground 

level KW /m 2 

IHR- 

Isopleth 

Distance 

( Meters ) 


37.5 78 100 % Fatal . Min. to ignite wood (without flame contact) 

25.0 96 Min. to ignite wood ( without flame contact ). Significant 

injury. 

12.5 136 Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 st deg. burn . 



Results 

♦ In the 78 meter radius area is considered as 1% fatality in 1 min. 

♦ In the 136 meter radius area is considered as first degree burn in 10 sec. 



exposure. 





Scenario –7 Flash Fire simulation for Ethylene Oxide road tanker catastrophic failure 

TABLE – 7 

Flash Fire simulation for Ethylene Oxide road tanker catastrophic failure 

In put Data 



Stored quantity 14 MT Visible Flash Fire Height 64.07 meter 

Mass of Gas 1135 Kgs. Visible Flash Fire Width 32.04 meter 

Heat of combustion 42267.5 Kj/kg Duration of Flash-Fire in Sec. 10.85 Sec. 




Stochiometric 

Air Mixture 

Fuel- 0.128 Total energy release 1396584.22 Kj 

Wind speed 6.0 m/s Max. Heat Radiation from 1 m 157.22 Kw/ m 


2 

Gas Density 869 kg/m 3 Combustion efficiency 0.5 




level KW /m 2 

Results 

IHR- 

Isopleth 

Distance 

( Meters ) 



contact) 


contact ). 


burn . 



♦ In the 58 meter radius area is considered as 100 % fatality in 1 min 




exposure. 





Scenario –8 Unconfined Vapour cloud Explosion ( UVCE ) for Ethylene Oxide road tanker 


TABLE – 8 

Unconfined Vapour cloud Explosion ( UVCE ) for Ethylene Oxide road tanker 



In put Data 

Stored quantity 14 MT 





Radial 

Distance 

in meter 

Results 

Over 

pressure 

( psi ) 

% Fatality 

lung Rupture 

% Eardrum 

rupture 

%Structural 

damage 

% Glass 

rupture 

50 38.00 100 100 100 100 

51 32.6 98.8 100 100 100 

53 11.2 0.0 78.7 100 100 

73 1.9 0.0 2.6 10.9 100 

♦ In case of UVCE up to 50 meter distance is considered as 100 % fatality and 100 % ear drum 


♦ Up to 53 meter distance is considered as 100 % structural Damage and up to 73meter feet 

distance for 100 % glass damage area. 





Scenario –9 Puff release simulation for Ethylene Oxide road tanker catastrophic failure 

TABLE – 9 

Puff release simulation module for Ethylene Oxide road tanker catastrophic failure 

Scenario : PUFF RELEASE 


Stored quantity 14 MT End point 

Release Rate 1.4e + 007 gms/ Sec. 

(meter) 

LC50 Human 4443 ppm 397.34 

IDLH value 800 ppm 663.95 

TLV value 1 ppm 4186.56 

Results 

• LC50 Human (4443 ppm) area up to 397.34 meter, IDLH (Immediate danger to life and 

health-800 ppm) concentration area up to 663.95 meter and TLV (1 PPM ) area up to 4186.56 

meter. Therefore 663.95 meter area in wind direction is considered as evacuation zone. 



Scenario – 10 Spill Pool simulation for Ethylene Oxide road tanker catastrophic failure 

TABLE – 10 

Spill Pool simulation module for Ethylene Oxide road tanker catastrophic failure 

Scenario : SPILL POOL 



Release Rate 8041 Gms/ Sec. 

(meter) 

LC50 Human 4443 ppm 79.78 



Results 

• LC50 HUMAN (4443 ppm) area up to 79.78 meter, IDLH (Immediate danger to life and 

health-800 ppm) concentration area up to 201.16 meter and TWA (1 PPM ) area up to 2841.01 

meter. Therefore 201.16 meter area in wind direction is considered as evacuation area. 





Scenario –11 Pool Fire for Ethylene Oxide 15MT Bullet catastrophic failure 

TABLE – 11 

Pool Fire for Ethylene Oxide 15MT Bullet catastrophic failure 



Stored quantity 15 MT Max. IHR at flame centre height 46.55 Kw/m 2 

Pool diameter 10 (m) Flame centre height 14.43 meter 

Pool liquid depth 1 (m) Maximum Flame width 13.43 meter 






level KW /m 2 

IHR- Isopleth 

Distance 

( Meters ) 


37.5 8.6 Damage to process equipment. 100 % Fatal in 1 Min. 

1 % fatal in 10 sec. 

25.0 10.6 Min. to ignite wood ( without flame contact ). 100 % 

fatal in 1 Min. Significant injury in 10 sec. 

12.5 14.9 Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 % fatal in 

1 min. 1 st deg. burn in 10 sec. 



Results 



♦ In the 26.4 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely. 


exposure. 





Scenario –12 Ball Fire for Ethylene Oxide 15MT Bullet catastrophic failure 

TABLE – 12 

Ball Fire for Ethylene Oxide 15MT Bullet catastrophic failure 

Input Data 



Stored quantity 15 MT Fire Ball radius 16.06 meter 

Mass of vapour 243 Kgs. Fire ball Intensity of Heat 305.35 Kw /m 


radiation 

2 

Heat of combustion 26710 Kj/Kg Fire Ball rate of energy 989915 Kj/ sec. 

release 

Wind speed 6 m/s Fire- Ball total energy release 6.49053e+006 Kj 




( IHR) at ground 

level KW /m 2 

IHR- 

Isopleth 

Distance 

( Meters ) 


37.5 49.0 100 % Fatal . Min. to ignite wood (without flame contact) 

25.0 54.0 Min. to ignite wood ( without flame contact ). Significant 

injury. 

12.5 84.0 Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 st deg. burn . 



Results 

♦ In the 49 meter radius area is considered as 1% fatality in 1 min. 

♦ In the 54 meter radius area is considered as first degree burn in 10 sec. 



exposure. 





Scenario –13 Flash Fire simulation for Ethylene Oxide 15MT Bullet catastrophic failure 

TABLE – 13 

Flash Fire simulation for Ethylene Oxide 15MT Bullet catastrophic failure 

In put Data 



Stored quantity 15 MT Visible Flash Fire Height 40.53 meter 

Mass of Gas 243 Kgs. Visible Flash Fire Width 20.26 meter 

Heat of combustion 42267.5 Kj/kg Duration of Flash-Fire in Sec. 6.56 Sec. 




Stochiometric 

Air Mixture 

Fuel- 0.128 Total energy release 3245265 Kj 

Wind speed 6.0 m/s Max. Heat Radiation from 1 m 152.68 Kw/ m 


2 

Gas Density 869 kg/m 3 Combustion efficiency 0.5 




level KW /m 2 

Results 

IHR- 

Isopleth 

Distance 

( Meters ) 



contact) 


contact ). 


burn . 



♦ In the 32 meter radius area is considered as 100 % fatality in 1 min 




exposure. 





Scenario –14 Vapour cloud Explosion ( UVCE ) for Ethylene Oxide 15MT Bullet 


TABLE – 14 

Vapour cloud Explosion ( UVCE ) for Ethylene Oxide 15MT Bullet catastrophic failure 


In put Data 

Stored quantity 15 MT 





Radial 

Distance 

in Meter 

Results 

Over 

pressure 

( psi ) 

% Fatality 

lung Rupture 

% Eardrum 

rupture 

%Structural 

damage 

% Glass 

rupture 

13 49.9 100 100 100 100 

14 37.7 98.8 100 100 100 

27 8.2 0.0 78.7 100 100 

32 1.8 0.0 2.6 10.9 100 

♦ In case of UVCE up to 13 meter distance is considered as 100 % fatality and 100 % ear drum 


♦ Up to 27 meter distance is considered as 100 % structural Damage and up to 32 meter distance 

for 100 % glass damage area. 





Scenario – 15 Puff release simulation module for Ethylene Oxide Bullet catastrophic failure 

TABLE –15 

Puff release simulation module for Ethylene Oxide Bullet catastrophic failure 




Release Rate 1.5e + 007 Gms/ 

Sec. 

(meter) 

LC50 Human 4443 ppm 405.79 



Results 


health) concentration area up to 677.54 meter and TWA (1 PPM ) area up to 4262.31 meter. 

Therefore 677.54 meter area in wind direction is considered as evacuation area. 





Scenario – 16 Spill Pool evaporation module for Ethylene Oxide Bullet catastrophic failure 

TABLE – 16 

Spill Pool evaporation module for Ethylene Oxide Bullet catastrophic failure 

In put Data 





(meter) 

LC50 Human 4443 ppm 41.24 



Results 








Scenario – 17 Spill Pool evaporation module for Oleum 250 MT Tank catastrophic failure 

TABLE – 17 

Spill Pool evaporation module for Oleum 250 MT Tank catastrophic failure 




Release Rate 2405 Gms/ Sec.( As SO3) 

(meter) 

LC50 Human 460 ppm ( 1460 mg.m3) 96.26 

IDLH value 3.0 ppm ( 15 mg/m3) 872.05 

TLV value 0.30 ppm (1 mg/m3) 1967.21 

Results 

• LC50 HUMAN (460 ppm) area up to 96.26 meter, Immediate danger to life and health (3 ppm 

) concentration area up to 872.05 meter and TWA (0.30 PPM ) area up to 1967.21 meter. 






Scenario – 18 Spill Pool evaporation module for Chloro Sulphonic Acid Tank catastrophic 

failure 

TABLE – 18 

Spill Pool evaporation module for Chloro Sulphonic Acid Tank catastrophic failure 





( As HCL gas) 

(meter) 

LC50 Human for 30 3940 ppm 29.73 

mints 



Results 








Scenario – 19 Spill Pool evaporation module for Sulphuric Acid Storage Tank catastrophic 

failure 

TABLE – 19 

Spill Pool evaporation module for Sulphuric Acid Storage Tank catastrophic failure 




Release Rate 1000 Gms/ Sec. ( As SO3) 

(meter) 

LC50 Human 460 ppm (1460 mg/m3) 59.85 

IDLH value 3.0ppm (15mg/m3) 587.63 

TLV value 0.2 ppm (1mg/m3) 1349.6 

Results 

• LC50 HUMAN (460 ppm) area up to 59 meter, IDLH (Immediate danger to life and health) 

concentration area up to 587.63 meter and TWA (0.2 PPM ) area up to 1349.6 meter. 






Scenario – 20 Puff release simulation module for Sulfur Trioxide 100 MT Tank catastrophic 

failure 

TABLE –20 

Puff release simulation module for Sulfur Trioxide 100 MT Tank catastrophic failure 




Release Rate 1e + 008 Gms/ Sec. 

(meter) 


IDLH value 3.0 ppm (15mg/m3) 4121.82 


Results 


health) concentration area up to 4121 meter and TWA (0.30 PPM ) area up to 7486.05 meter. 

Therefore 7486 meter area in wind direction is considered as evacuation area. 





Scenario – 21 Spill Pool evaporation module for Sulfur Trioxide 100 MT Tank catastrophic 

failure 

TABLE – 21 

Spill Pool evaporation module for Sulfur Trioxide 100 MT Tank catastrophic failure 





(meter) 


IDLH value 3.0 ppm (15mg/m3) 970.84 


Results 

• LC50 HUMAN (460 ppm) area up to 66.22 meter, IDLH (Immediate danger to life and health) 

concentration area up to 970 meter and TWA (0.20 PPM ) area up to 3958 meter. Therefore 

970 meter area in wind direction is considered as evacuation area. 





Scenario – 22 Puff release simulation module for Ammonia 50 MT Bullet catastrophic 

failure 

TABLE –22 

Puff release simulation module for Ammonia 50 MT Bullet catastrophic failure 




Release Rate 5e + 007 Gms/ Sec. 

(meter) 

LC50 Human 6164 ppm 649.68 



Results 








Scenario – 23 Spill Pool evaporation module for Ammonia 50 MT Bullet catastrophic failure 

TABLE – 23 

Spill Pool evaporation module for Ammonia 50 MT Bullet catastrophic failure 

In put Data 





(meter) 

LC50 Human 4443ppm 102.31 



Results 








Scenario – 24 Spill Pool evaporation module for Ammonia Road Tanker Unloading Arm 

failure 

TABLE – 24 

Spill Pool evaporation module for Ammonia Road Tanker Unloading Arm failure 

In put Data 





(meter) 

LC50 Human 4443ppm 38.39 



Results 








Scenario-25 Puff Isopleth Simulation For Chlorine Tonner Catastrophic Failure 

In put Data 

TABLE –O FOR CHLORINE 

Scenario : PUFF DISPERSION 


Stored quantity 1 MT Tonner Max. ground level conc. 456393 ppm 

Instantaneous Puff 900 kgs Dist. of maxi. ground level 17 meter 

Release quantity 

Molecular weight 70.9 


Density ( Air) 2.49kg/m 3 

conc. 

Hazard Level Concentration 

End point 

(PPM) 

(Meter) 

LC50 1017 210.30 

IDLH 10 856.39 

TWA/ TLV 1 1619.16 


concentration area up to 856 meter and TWA (1 PPM ) area up to 1619 meter. Therefore 856 

meter area in wind direction is considered as evacuation area. 





Scenario-26 Point source plume release for Chlorine tonner liquid/ gas phase valve failure 

TABLE –P FOR CHLORINE 

Scenario : POINT SOURCE PLUME RELEASE 


Stored quantity 1 MT Max. ground level conc. 501046ppm 

Rate of release 1000 g/s Dist. of maxi. ground level 5 meter 

Molecular weight 70.9 

conc. 


Density ( Air) 2.49kg/m 3 

Hazard Level Concentration 

End point 

(PPM) 

(Meter) 

LC50 HUMAN 1017 51.91 

IDLH 10 445.25 

TWA/ TLV 1 1035.91 


concentration area up to 445 meter and TWA (1 PPM ) area up to 1038 meter. Therefore 445 

meter area in wind direction is considered as evacuation area. 





6.2 Assessment Of Consequence Modeling Results : 

Results of consequence analysis for the release of various flammable and toxic materials at 

the KCIL are depicted in Table 6.3. 



Scenario Type of failure 

considered 

1,2,3,4 Unconfined Pool 

Fire, Fire Ball, 

Flash fire & 

Unconfined 

Vapour Fire for 

Solvent road tanker 


5,6,7,8 Unconfined Pool 


Flash fire & 

Unconfined 


Ethylene Oxide 

road tanker 

11,12,13, 

14 


Unconfined Pool 


Flash fire & 

Unconfined 


Ethylene Oxide 15 

MT Bullet 


Spill 

quantity 

considerat 

ion Max. 

Credible 

loss 

scenario 

in KL. 

TABLE - 6.3 

Details regarding Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment table :- 

Evaporati 

on vapor 

cloud 

mass Btn. 

LEL-UEL 

% for 15 

mints 

release 

from the 

source. 

Tank fire / pool fire 

damage radius at various 

KW/ M 2 in meter 

Fire Ball damage radius 

at various KW/ M 2 in 

meter 



Flash fire simulation 

radius at various KW/ 

M 2 in meter 

Heat Intensity KW/ M 2 

37.5 12.5 1.6 37.5 12.5 1.6 37.5 12.5 1.6 100% 

Fatality 

Vapor cloud Explosion 

( Unconfined vapor cloud 

explosion) UVCE peak over 

pressure in feet. 

100% 

Eardrum 

rupture 

100% 

Structur 

al 

Damage 

20 184 13.5 22.1 61.6 30 54 148 30 54 148 20 25 40 105 

14 1135 34.8 60.2 168.1 78 136 368 58 96 264 15 16 25 85 

15 243 8.6 14.9 41.7 49 84 217 32 56 157 8 9 17 55 

100% 

Glass 

brk.

TABLE - 6.4 

Type of failure considered Spill quantity 

consideration 

Max. Credible 

loss scenario in 

Scenario –9 Puff release simulation 

module for Ethylene Oxide road 

tanker catastrophic failure 

Scenario – 10 Spill Pool simulation 

module for Ethylene Oxide road 

tanker catastrophic failure 

Scenario – 15 Puff release 

simulation module for Ethylene 

Oxide Bullet catastrophic failure 

Scenario – 16 Spill Pool simulation 

module for Ethylene Oxide Bullet 


Scenario – 17 Spill Pool 

evaporation module for Oleum 250 

MT Tank catastrophic failure 


evaporation module for Chloro 

Sulphonic Acid Tank catastrophic 

failure 


evaporation module for Sulphuric 

Acid Storage Tank catastrophic 

failure 


simulation module for Sulfur 

Trioxide 100 MT Tank catastrophic 

failure 


evaporation module for Sulfur 

Trioxide 100 MT Tank catastrophic 

failure 


simulation module for Ammonia 50 

MT Bullet catastrophic failure 


evaporation module for Ammonia 

50 MT Bullet catastrophic failure 


evaporation module for Ammonia 

Road Tanker Unloading Arm 

failure 

Scenario-25 Puff Isopleth 

Simulation For Chlorine Tonner 

Catastrophic Failure 

Scenario-26 Point source plume 

release for Chlorine tonner liquid/ 

gas phase valve failure 

MT. 

Evaporati 

on Rate 

Grm/ Sec. 

LC50 

Distance 

in meter 

IDLH 

Distance 

in meter 

TLV 

Distance in 

meter 

14 - 397.34 663.95 4186.56 

14 8041 79.78 201.16 2841.01 

15 - 405.79 677.54 4262.31 

15 1800 41.24 89.79 1681.42 

250 2405 79.18 267.76 1489.53 

2000 1000 29.73 292.07 1238.93 

1000 1000 71.03 230.91 1349.46 

100 - 1192.32 2234.82 7486.05 

100 999 178.26 748.04 15709.48 

50 - 649.68 1509.17 2951.09 

50 1442 102.31 553.38 2709.05 

50 856 38.39 58.27 399.82 

1 - 210 856 1619 

1 1000 51 445 1035 



6.3 Comments 

The appended table 6.3 and 6.4 summarizes the consequences of the various hazards 

analyzed under this study. 

As can be seen from the results of the summary of the Risk Analysis study, the Fatality 

zone due to burn up to 78 meters in worst case scenario. First degree burn zone up to 136 

meter. Due to explosion fatal distance is maximum 20 feet, structural damage zone is up to 

40 feet for fire and explosion scenarios. 

In case of toxic gas release Fatal distance upto 1192 meters and evacuation zone maximum 

up to 2234 meter and company has to plan for evacuation accordingly. Company has to 

increase awareness programme in the surrounding vicinity and educate people for safe 

evacuation at the time of toxic release. 

On site emergency preparedness plan 

On site emergency preparedness plan is prepared but risk assessment study data needs to 

be studied and further prepared as per risk assessment findings. Emergency control 

facilities and resources to be plan and rehearsal / Mock- Drill needs to be conducted 

regularly to combat emergency in minimum time. 

Emergency handling facilities and training: 

All employees should be well aware about possible emergencies and its consequences, 

emergency control equipments and practices to control such hazardous condition within 

premises. 



SECTION VII 

RISK REDUCTION MEASURES 

Some of the safeties and risk reduction measures adopted and recommended for the safety of the 

plant are as follows:- 

7.1 Design 

7.1.1 During the design stage itself adequate care has been taken for design, selection, 

fabrication, erection and commissioning of Flammable and toxic liquid / gas handling 

facilities and other equipment, piping, pipe fittings, electrical equipment etc. relevant and 

prevalent international and Indian standards has been followed for design, fabrication, 

inspection of the storage tanks and other equipment. 

7.1.2 Civil foundations is suitably designed to take care of earthquakes, cyclones, landslides, 

flooding, collapse of structures etc. 

7.1.3 Plant operator and staffs are selected well experience and qualified for chemical plant 

operation. 

7.1.4 All key personals are trained for emergency handling procedures and regular Mock- Drills 

has been conducted on various scenarios. 

7.2 Safety Devices 

Following safety devices are provided to protect from any malfunctioning of plant 

equipments: 

7.2.1 Storage tanks. 

a) Nitrogen blanketing for flammable liquid/ gas storage tanks. 

b) Pressure ( Maximum and Minimum ) cutoff and gauge provided. 

c) DCS operational process plan with 100 % foolproof safety logics are provided for 

process as well as storage safety. 

d) Level gauges on storage tanks. 

e) Static bonding of pipeline flanges. 

f) Dyke wall provided surround above ground storage tanks. 

g) Safety valve and other venting system provided on pressure storage vessels. 

h) All pumps flameproof type and double mechanical seal type. 

i) All pipeline and tanks painted as per IS colour code. 

j) Jumpers and static earthing provision made on all flanges and tanks. 

k) Caution note and Material identification, capacity displayed on all storage tanks. 

l) Water sprinklers surrounding Ammonia storage tank and EO storage tank. 

m) Matur curtain sprinkler will be provided for Acid storage tanks leakage spillage. 

n) Mosture absorbent (Silica gel provision will be made on sulfuric, Oleum , SO3 storage 

tanks. 

7.2.2 Pumps 

a) Required out let valve and NRV provided on pump outlet. 

b) Modular fire extinguishers provided near of most of the pumps. 



c) FLP type and mechanical seal type pump installed for flammable chemicals. 

7.2.3 Pipelines 

a) Jumper connections on flanges to prevent build up of static electricity charge. 

b) Proper supports and clamping are provided 

c) Double earthing provided to all electrical motors. 

d) Colour code as Per IS maintained. 

7.3 Operation and Maintenance 

Operations and maintenance of the plant is being in accordance with the well-established 

safe practices. Some of the guidelines are as follows:- 

a) Periodic testing of hoses for leakages and continuity. 

b) Earthing of all plant equipment and earthing of vehicles under unloading operations. 

c) Annual testing of all safety relief valves. 

d) Planned preventive maintenance of different equipment for their safety and reliable 

operations. 

e) Inspection of the storage tanks as per prefixed inspection schedule for thickness 

measurement, joint and weld efficiency etc. 

f) Comprehensive color code scheme to identify different medium pipes. 

g) Strict compliance of safety work permit system. 

h) Proper maintenance of earth pits. 

i) Strict compliance of security procedures like issue of identify badges for outsides, gate 

pass system for vehicles, checking of spark arrestors fitted to the tank lorries etc. 

j) Strict enforcement of no smoking regime. 

k) Periodic training and refresher courses to train the staff in safety, fire fighting and first 

aid. 

7.4 Recommendations 

7.4.1 From the Risk Analysis studies conducted, it would be observed that by and large, the risks 

are confined within the factory boundary walls in case of fire & explosion, except in the 

event of a catastrophic failure of storage tanks of gas it will create OFF site emergency 

situations and required more attention and emergency preparedness for combat such 

situations.. To minimize the consequential effects of the risk scenarios, following steps are 

recommended. 

Plant should meet provisions of the Manufacture, storage & Import of Hazardous 

Chemicals Rules, 1986 & the factories Act, 1948. 

Sprinkler system to be installed in Ammonia storage area and EO storage area to be 

made more effective and pressure needs to be maintained. 

Sprinkler opening valve location needs to be relocate away from the EO storage tanks. 

Air line respirator provision to be made in Chlorine, EO, Oleum, Sulfur trioxide, DMS 

and CSA, Thionyl chloride storage tank farm area. 

Chlorine hood with blower and neutralizing pit arrangement needs to be made at 

Chlorine tonners storage area. 

React with water and generate toxic fumes while contact with water caution note to be 

displayed in Acid tank farm area. 



Fire hydrant system for proposed plant to be installed as per TAC/NFPA Norms in 

each plant and buildings. 

Dyke wall and collection pit with drain valve needs to be provided in acid storage area 

Tanker unloading procedure needs to be displayed at tanker unloading area. 

Periodic On Site Emergency Mock Drills and occasional Off Site Emergency Mock 

Drills to be conducted, so those staffs are trained and are in a state of preparedness to 

tackle any emergency. 

Emergency handling facilities to be maintained in tip top condition at all time. 

Safe operating procedure to be prepared for hazardous process and material handling 

process. 

Safety devices and control instruments to be calibrated once in a year. 

Proper colour work as per IS 2379 to plant pipeline and tank, equipments to be done 

once in a six month to protect from corrosion. 

Permit to work system to be implemented 100 % for hazardous work in the plant. 

Safety manual as per Rule-68 K & P and Public awareness manual as per 41 B & C be 

prepared and distributed to all employees and nearby public. 

As per puff release Scenario for Catastrophic Failure of storage tanks, it has been 

observed that IDLH distance cover surrounding 2234 meters distance. Hence, 

population evacuation plan up to 3.0 kms. needs to be prepared for near by factories in 

wind direction in case of extreme accident scenario. 

The details of emergency equipments are given in on site emergency Plan along with 

its quantity. As per our site visit, these was found in order & working condition and 

sufficient for existing production Activates. 

Manual call points for fire location identification to be installed in plant premises. 

Fog type Pressure sprinkler to be installed at EO storage tank farm. 

For proposed plant Fire & Safety organization setup to be replanted for batter plant 

process safety. 

On line gas detection system needs to be provided in Chlorine shed area and EO 

storage tank farm area. 

All Acid vents to be connected with scrubber system. 

A HAZOP study to be carried out for all product plant and storage facilities. 

Induction safety course to be prepared and trained all new employees before starting 

duties in plant. 



SECTION VIII 

DESASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN 

An onsite emergency in the industries involving hazardous processes or in hazardous installations 

is one situation that has potential to cause serious injury or loss of life. It may cause extensive 

damage to property and serious disruption in the work area and usually, the effects are confined to 

factory or in several departments of factory, premise. An emergency begins when operator at the 

plant or in charge of storage cannot cope up with a potentially hazardous incident, which may tum 

into an emergency. 

8.1 ONSITE EMERGENCY PLAN 

8.1.1 OBJECTIVES OF ONSITE EMERGENCY PLAN 

A quick and effective response at during an emergency can have tremendous significance 

on whether the situation is controlled with little loss or it turns into a major emergency. 

Therefore, purpose an emergency plan is to provide basic guidance to the personnel for 

effectively combating such situations to minimize loss of life, damage to property and loss 

of property. 

An objective of Emergency Planning is to maximize the resource utilisation and combined 

efforts towards emergency operations are as follows. : 

8.1.2 DURING AN EMERGENCY. 

To increase thinking accuracy and to reduce thinking time. 

To localize the emergency and if possible eliminates it. 

To minimize the effects of accident on people and property. 

To take correct remedial measures in the quickest time possible to contain the incident 

and control it with minimum damage. 

To prevent spreading of the damage in the other sections. 

To mobilize the internal resources and utilize them in the most effective way 

To arrange rescue and treatment of causalities. 

8.1.3 DURING NORMAL TIME. 

• To keep the required emergency equipment in stock at right places and ensure the 

working condition. 

• To keep the concerned personnel fully trained in the use of emergency equipment. 

• To give immediate warning tooth surrounding localities in case of an emergency 

situation arising. 

• To mobilize transport and medical treatment of the injured. 

• To get help from the local community and government officials to supplement 

manpower and resources. 

• To provide information to media & Government agencies, Preserving records, evidence 

of situation for subsequent emergency etc. 



8.2 SCOPE OF OSEP 

This OSEP is prepared for industrial emergencies like fires, explosions, toxic releases, and 

asphyxia and does not cover natural calamities and societal disturbances related 

emergencies (like strikes, bomb threats, civil commission’s etc.) 

8.3 ELEMENTS OF ONSITE EMERGENCY PLAN 

The important elements to be considered in plan are 

Emergency organization 

Emergency Facilities. 

Roles and Responsibilities of Key Personnel and Essential Employee. 

Communications during Emergency 

Emergency Shutdown of Plant & Control of situation. 

Rescue Transport & Rehabilitation. 

Developing Important Information. 

8.4 METHODOLOGY. 

The consideration in preparing Emergency Plan will be included the following steps: 

• Identification and assessment of hazards and risks. 

• Identifying, appointment of personnel & Assignment of Responsibilities. 

• Identification and equipping Emergency Control Centre. 

• Identifying Assembly, Rescue points Medical Facilities. 

• Formulation of plan and of emergency sources. 

• Training, Rehearsal & Evaluation. 

• Action on Site. 

Earlier, a detailed Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment was carried out on hazards and 

their likely locations and consequences are estimated following the standard procedure. 

However the causing factors for above discussed end results may be different and causing 

factors are not discussed in this plan. 

8.5 EMERGENCIES IDENTIFIED 

Emergencies that may be likely at bulk fuel storage area, process plant, cylinder storage 

area, and drum storage shed, and autoclave reactor area. There are chances of fire and 

explosive only. 

8.6 OTHERS 

Other risks are earthquake, lightning, sabotage, bombing etc., which are usually, not in the 

purview of management control. 



8.7 EMERGENCY ORGANISATION. 

Plant organization is enclosed. Based on the plant organization, which includes shift 

organization, an Emergency Organization is constituted towards achieving objectives of 

this emergency plan. 

Plant Manager is designated as Overall in Charge and is the Site Controller. 

The following are designated as Incident Controllers for respective areas under their 

control. Shift in charge Engineer (Plant Operations) is designated at Incident Controller for 

all areas of plant. 

8.8 EMERGENCY FACILITIES 

8.8.1 EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTRE (ECC) 

It is a location, where all key personnel like Site Controller, Incident Controller etc. can 

assemble in the event of onset of emergency and carry on various duties assigned to them. 

Plant Manager’s Office is designated as Emergency Control Centre. It has P&T telephone 

as well as internal telephones, ECC is accessible from plant located considerably away 

from process plant, Storage’s and on evaluation of other locations, Plant Manager’s Room 

find merit from the distance point of view, communication etc. 

8.8.2 FACILITIES PROPOSED TO BE MAINTAINED AT EMERGENCY CONTROL 

CENTRE (ECC) 

The following facilities and information would be made available at the ECC 

• Latest copy of Onsite Emergency Plan and off sites Emergency Plan (as provided by 

District Emergency Authority). 

• Intercom Telephone. 

• P&T Telephone. 

• Telephone directories (Internal, P&T) 

• Factory Layout, Site Plan 

• Plans indicating locations of hazardous inventories, sources of safety equipment, 

hydrant layout, location of pump house, road plan, assembly points, vulnerable zones, 

escape routes. 

• Hazard chart. 

• Emergency shut-down procedures. 

• Nominal roll of employees. 

• List and address of key personnel 

• List and address of Emergency coordinators. 

• List and address of first aides, 

• List and address of first aid fire fighting employees, 

• List and address of qualified Trained persons. 



8.8.3 FIRE FIGHTING FACILITIES. 

• Internal hydrant system 

• Portable extinguishers 

8.8.4 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS 

These systems are proposed to protect the plant by means of different fire protection 

facilities and consist of 

• Hydrant system for exterior as well as internal protection of various buildings/areas of 

the plant. 

• Portable extinguishers and hand appliances for extinguishing small fires in different 

areas of the plant. 

• Water cum foam monitor to be provided in bulk fuel storage area. 

• Fire water pumps. 

• Two (2) independent motor driven pumps each of sufficient capacity and head are 

proposed for the hydrant systems which is capable to extinguish Fire or cooling 

purpose. 

8.8.5 HYDRANT SYSTEM. 

Adequate number of fire hydrants and monitors will be provided at various locations in and 

around the buildings and other plant areas. The hydrants will be provided on a network of 

hydrant mains drawing water from the hydrant pump, which starts automatically due to 

drop of pressure in the event of operating the hydrant valves. We are suggesting you to go 

for TAC approved hydrant system for foolproof safety and benefit from fire policy 

premium. 

8.9 EMERGENCY ESCAPES 

The objective of the emergency escape is to escape from the hazardous locations, to the 

nearest assembly point or the other safe zone, for rescue and evacuation. 

8.10 ASSEMBLY POINT. 

Assembly point is location, where, persons unconnected with emergency operations would 

proceed and await for rescue operation. 

8.11 WIND SOCK. 

Wind socks for knowing wind direction indication would be provided at a suitable location 

to visible from many locations. It is proposed to install windsocks at E.O storage area and 

Administration Building so as to be visible from different locations in the plant. 

8.12 EMERGENCY TRANSPORT. 

Emergency Ambulance would be stationed at the Administration Office and round the 

clock-driver would be made available for emergency transportation of injured etc. 



However, the other vehicles of the company also would be available for emergency 

services. 

8.13 EMERGENCY COMMUNICATION. 

There are two kinds of communication system provided. 

(a) Regular P&T phones with intercom facility. 

(b) Mobile phone 

8.14 WARNING/ALARM/COMMUNICATION OF EMERGENCY 

The emergency would be communicated by operating electrical siren for continuously for 

five minutes with high and low pitch mode. 

8.15 EMERGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES: 

Priority of Emergency Protection. 

• Life safety 

• Preservation of property 

Restoration of the normalcy 

8.16 MUTUAL AID 

While necessary facilities are available and are updated from time to time, sometimes, it 

may be necessary to seek external assistance; it may be from the neighboring factories or 

from the State Government as the case may be. 

8.17 MOCK DRILL 

Inspite of detailed training, it may be necessary to try out whether, the OSEP works out 

and will there be any difficulties in execution of such plan. In order to evaluate the plan 

and see whether the plan meets the objectives of the OSEP, occasional mock drills are 

contemplated. Before undertaking the drill, it would be very much necessary to give 

adequate training to all staff members and also information about possible mock drill. 

After few pre-informed mock drills, few UN-informed mock drills would be taken. All 

this is to familiarize the employees with the concept and procedures and to see their 

response. These scheduled and unscheduled mock drills would be conducted during shift 

change, public holidays, in night shift etc. To improve preparedness once in 6 months and 

performance is evaluated and Site Controller maintains the record. Incident Controller (IC) 

coordinates this activity.

M/s. Kutch Chemical Industries Limited. - Gujarat Pollution Control ...

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