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View CV - European University Institute

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PAPER ABSTRACTS<br />

JOB MARKET PAPER<br />

Strategic Competition and the Dynamics of Reputation: The Case of An Online Market<br />

joint with Ema Iancu (EUI)<br />

This paper analyzes how reputation building and strategic competition among sellers shape<br />

their equilibrium behavior when there are different sources of asymmetric information, and<br />

how these determine the dynamics of market outcomes. In the empirical context of on-line<br />

markets, we use this analysis to show the bias that might arise in the reduced form<br />

estimation of the impact of reputation / feedback on sales due to the unobserved nature of<br />

effort, even when panel or randomized data is used. Such bias, however, decreases with the<br />

number of buyers. We examine a market in which long-lived firms repeatedly auction off a<br />

homogeneous object to a pool of short-lived buyers, and in which their competence and<br />

effort is private information. We first investigate the incentives of a single seller (a<br />

"monopolist") to build a reputation that generates higher future profits. We show that there is<br />

a unique equilibrium in Markov strategies in which effort evolves non-monotonically with<br />

reputation. Second, we characterize the impact of strategic competition for heterogeneous<br />

buyers on sellers’ behaviour and observed outcomes: as the "intensity" of competition<br />

increases in the unique equilibrium, sellers have less incentives to exert effort. By contrasting<br />

the two scenarios, we theoretically disentangle the effects of reputation and strategic<br />

competition as incentives mechanisms.<br />

SECOND PAPER<br />

Understanding Sovereign Bond Prices: Expectations, Information, and Self Fulfilling<br />

Crises<br />

joint with P. Benczur (National Bank of Hungary) and C. Ilut (Duke <strong>University</strong>)<br />

Do market participants perceive the expected values of sovereign risks correctly? When<br />

attempting to separate various determinants of sovereign bond prices, a major obstacle is<br />

that the conditional expectations of various losses are not directly observable. We use data<br />

on the realizations of the risk events (losses), and address the following four issues related to<br />

the above question. First, whether foreign currency denominated sovereign bond price<br />

differentials can be attributed entirely to differences in expected returns, consistent with<br />

expected values (probabilities) predicted from default realizations. Second, what risks<br />

(default risk alone, or default and illiquidity risks) are involved in the calculation of expected<br />

returns, and what are their relative importance. Third, do global factors have an extra impact?<br />

Finally, we test whether there are systematic expectational errors, leading to a strong<br />

feedback from investor sentiment (manifesting in low or high refinancing costs) to future<br />

default, raising the possibility of self-fulfilling debt crises, as in Cole and Kehoe (2000). In<br />

order to do answer the questions, we estimate a structural form pricing equation for bonds,<br />

and test for a role of additional factors and systematic expectational errors.

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