View CV - European University Institute

Clodomiro F. Ferreira
Economics Department
European University Institute (EUI)
Villa San Paolo
Via della Piazzuola 43
50133 Florence, Italy
Email: clodomiro.ferreira@eui.eu
Homepage: https://sites.google.com/site/clodoferreira/
EDUCATION (most recent first)
Available from: March 2013
This version: October 2012
2008-2013 (expected) EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, Florence, Italy
PhD Candidate in Economics. MRes. GPA: A-
Thesis Title: Reputation, Limited Commitment and Beliefs in
Microeconomics and Macroeconomics
2006-2008 CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS MONETARIOS Y FINANCIEROS
(CEMFI), Madrid, Spain.
Master Sc. in Economics and Finance. Final grade:
distinction.
2000-2004 UNIVERSIDAD DE SAN ANDRES, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
BS in Economics (minor in Statistics)
RESEARCH INTERESTS
Primary: Macroeconomics, Computational Economics, Industrial Organization, Monetary
economics
Secondary: Banking and Finance, Development economics and Inequality.
RESEARCH PAPERS
- Strategic Competition and the Dynamics of Reputation: The Case of an Online
Market, joint with Ema Iancu (EUI) (JOB MARKET PAPER)
Industrial organization, learning, dynamic games, computational economics, on-line
markets
- Expectations and Pricing in Sovereign (primary) Bond Markets, joint with P.
Benczur (National Bank of Hungary) and C. Ilut (Duke University)
Default and expectations, sovereign debt,
TEACHING INTERESTS
Introductory Econometrics and Statistics, Macroeconomics and Information, Financial
Economics
TEACHING EXPERIENCE (most recent first)

May 2012 Invited Lecturer.
Topics In Dynamic Programming: Dynamic Games Solution
and Data (PhD level). Prof. Russell Cooper and Jerome Adda.
EUI.
February-May 2012 Teaching Assistant.
Money and Banking (undergraduate). New York University.
Florence Campus. Prof. for Giampiero Gallo.
2011 and 2012
August-September 2009
WORK EXPERIENCE (most recent first)
Tutor Programming for MATLAB.
PhD program at EUI.
Lecturer. Probability Theory (PhD level). EUI.
2010-2011 Visiting Researcher. Central Bank of Hungary (MNB).
Project: Expectations and Pricing in Sovereign Bond markets.
Joint with Peter Benczur (Head of Research, MNB) and
Cosmin Ilut (Duke University)
Summer 2007 Research Assistant. CEMFI and Bank of Spain.
Prof. Claudio Michelacci.
2004-2006 Junior Analyst. Advanced Logistics Group – Indra.
Transport Engineering and Logistics consulting. Projects:
- Shadow Prices for a Toll System Implementation in
Bangkok, Thailand
- Investment Valuation for the New Terminal at Port of
Callao. Lima, Peru
AWARDS (most recent first)
2011-2012 European University Institute Ph.D. final year dissertation grant.
2008-2011 Doctoral Grant, Agencia Española de Cooperación
Internacional y Desarrollo, Spain,
2006-2008 BBVA-Bank of Spain scholarship.
2000-2002 Open contest scholarship, Universidad de San Andrés,
CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS and DISCUSSIONS (most recent first)
November 2012 Workshop on Fiscal Policy and Sovereign Debt. Discussant.
Florence, Italy.
August 2012 Econometric Society European Meetings (ESEM). Presenter.
Málaga, Spain
July 2012. World Congress of Game Theory (Games 2012). Copresenter.
Istambul, Turkey
November 2011 Financial Fragility: Sources and Consequences. Discussant.
Florence, Italy.
August 2011 European Economic Association Meetings (EEA) Presenter.
Oslo, Norway.
September 2010 National Bank of Hungary. Research conference. Presenter.
Budapest, Hungary.

OTHER ACTIVITIES
2011 - present Project Insight Europe
Founding member. Think tank that focuses current socioeconomic
issues, drawing on an interdisciplinary network of
economists, historians, political scientists and lawyers from
different countries and continents.
2009 - 2010 Researcher Representative – Economics Department
Designed an algorithm in the lines of the Gale-Roth-Shapley
algorithms for the allocation of researchers to available
workspaces given a set of revealed preferences.
SKILLS
Languages: Spanish (mother tongue), English (proficiency level), French (basic) and
Italian (intermediate)
Programming and statistical packages: MATLAB, Fortran 90, Gauss, Stata, Eviews,
LaTEX, Microsoft Office
PERSONAL INFORMATION
Nationality: Argentinean
Date of birth: 30 April 1982
JOB PREFERENCES
Institutions, Private sector, Academia.
REFERENCES
Professor Russell Cooper
Department of Economics
Penn State University
611 Kenn Graduate Building
Philadelphia
Tel:+1-814-863-4775
Email: russellcoop@gmail.com
Homepage: R. Cooper's homepage
Professor Arpad Abraham
Department of Economics
European University Institute
Via della Piazzuola 43
50133 Florence, Italy
Tel: +39-055-4685.909
E-mail: arpad.abraham@eui.eu
Homepage: A. Abraham's homepage
Professor Piero Gottardi
Department of Economics
European University Institute
Via della Piazzuola 43
50133 Florence, Italy
Tel: +39-055-4685.919
Email: piero.gottardi@eui.eu
Homepage: P. Gottardi's homepage

PAPER ABSTRACTS
JOB MARKET PAPER
Strategic Competition and the Dynamics of Reputation: The Case of An Online Market
joint with Ema Iancu (EUI)
This paper analyzes how reputation building and strategic competition among sellers shape
their equilibrium behavior when there are different sources of asymmetric information, and
how these determine the dynamics of market outcomes. In the empirical context of on-line
markets, we use this analysis to show the bias that might arise in the reduced form
estimation of the impact of reputation / feedback on sales due to the unobserved nature of
effort, even when panel or randomized data is used. Such bias, however, decreases with the
number of buyers. We examine a market in which long-lived firms repeatedly auction off a
homogeneous object to a pool of short-lived buyers, and in which their competence and
effort is private information. We first investigate the incentives of a single seller (a
"monopolist") to build a reputation that generates higher future profits. We show that there is
a unique equilibrium in Markov strategies in which effort evolves non-monotonically with
reputation. Second, we characterize the impact of strategic competition for heterogeneous
buyers on sellers’ behaviour and observed outcomes: as the "intensity" of competition
increases in the unique equilibrium, sellers have less incentives to exert effort. By contrasting
the two scenarios, we theoretically disentangle the effects of reputation and strategic
competition as incentives mechanisms.
SECOND PAPER
Understanding Sovereign Bond Prices: Expectations, Information, and Self Fulfilling
Crises
joint with P. Benczur (National Bank of Hungary) and C. Ilut (Duke University)
Do market participants perceive the expected values of sovereign risks correctly? When
attempting to separate various determinants of sovereign bond prices, a major obstacle is
that the conditional expectations of various losses are not directly observable. We use data
on the realizations of the risk events (losses), and address the following four issues related to
the above question. First, whether foreign currency denominated sovereign bond price
differentials can be attributed entirely to differences in expected returns, consistent with
expected values (probabilities) predicted from default realizations. Second, what risks
(default risk alone, or default and illiquidity risks) are involved in the calculation of expected
returns, and what are their relative importance. Third, do global factors have an extra impact?
Finally, we test whether there are systematic expectational errors, leading to a strong
feedback from investor sentiment (manifesting in low or high refinancing costs) to future
default, raising the possibility of self-fulfilling debt crises, as in Cole and Kehoe (2000). In
order to do answer the questions, we estimate a structural form pricing equation for bonds,
and test for a role of additional factors and systematic expectational errors.