Louisiana Purchase Primary Source Packet

11
The Triumph of
Jeffersonian Democracy
We have a perfect horror at everything like conriecting ourselves w/'th
the politics of Europe.
Thomas Jefferson, 1801
Prologue: Thomas Jefferson, branded a radical by his foes, defeated John Adams
for the presidency in 1800—the so-called Revolution of 1800. But the lanky Virginian,
sobered by realities, proved to be no bull in a china shop. Except for a repeal of the
odious excise tax and an unsuccessful assault on the Supreme Court, he left the
elaborate Federalist structure virtually unshaken. The real revolution occurred in
Jefferson's thinking. Antiwar and antinavy, he was forced to use the navy to fight the
Barbary pirates. Anti-British, pro-French, antialliance, and pacifistic, he seriously considered
an alliance with Britain and war against France to keep Napoleon out of New
Orleans. The two most memorable acts of his presidency—the Louisiana Purchase
and the self-crucifying embargo—were both of dubious constitutionality, and could
hardly be reconciled with his pre-1801 insistence on a strict or literal interpretation of
the Constitution.
A. The Negotiations for Louisiana
/. Jeffersor) Alerts LiYir)gston (1802)
Rumors of the secret treaty of 1800, under which Spain agreed to cede Louisiana
to France, filled [Resident Jefferson with apprehension. The extent of his concern is
betrayed in this remarkable letter, addressed to the American minister in Paris, Robert
R. Livingston, a distinguished lawyer and diplomat also famous as the financial
backer of Robert Fulton's successful steamboat in 1807. Why did Jefferson feel that
French occupancy of Louisiana would force the United States to reverse its 'political
relations"?
The cession of Louisiana ... by Spain to France works most sorely on the United
States. On the subject the Secretary of State has written to you fully. Yet I cannot
forbear recurring to it personally, so deep is the impression it makes in my mind. It
'p. L. Ford, Writing of Thomas Jefferson (1897), vol. 8, pp. 144-146 (April 18, 1802).
176

A The Negotiations for Louisiana 177
completely reverses all the political relations of the United States and will form a new
epoch in our political course.
Of all nations of any consideration, France is the one which hitherto has offered
the fewest points on which we could have any conflict of right, and the most points of
a communion of interests. From these causes we have ever looked to her as our
natural friend, as one with which we never could have an occasion of difference.* Her
growth therefore we viewed as our own, her misfortunes ours.
There is on the globe one single spot, the possessor of which is our natural and
habitual enemy. It is New Orleans, through which the produce of three-eighths of our
territory' must pass to market, and from its fertility' it will ere long yield more than half
of our whole produce and contain more than half our inhabitants. France, placing
herself in that door, assumes to us the attitude of defiance.
Spain might have retained it quietly for years. Her pacific dispositions, her feeble
state, would induce her to increase our facilities there, so that her possession of the
place would be hardly felt by us. And it would not perhaps be ver^^ long before some
circumstances might arise which might make the cession of it to us the price of
something of more worth to her.
Not so can it ever be in the hands of France. The impetuosit)' of her temper, the
energ\ and restlessness of her character. . . render it impossible that France and the
United States can continue long friends when they meet in so irritable a position.
They, as well as we, must be blind if they do not see this; and we must be very
improvident if we do not begin to make arrangements on that hypothesis.
The day that France takes possession of New Orleans fixes the sentence which is
to restrain her forever within her low-water mark. It seals the union of two nations
who in conjunction can maintain exclusive possession of the ocean. From that moment
we must marr\ ourselves to the British fleet and nation. We must turn all our
attentions to a maritime force, for which our resources place us on veq' high grounds;
and having formed and cemented together a power which may render reinforcement
of her settlements here impossible to France, make the first cannon which shall be
fired in Europe the signal for tearing up any settlement she may have made, and for
holding the two continents of America in sequestration for the common purposes of
the united British and American nations.
This is not a state of things we seek or desire. It is one which this measure, if
adopted by France, forces on us, as necessarily as any other cause, by the laws of
nature, brings on its necessar>' effect. It is not from a fear of France that we deprecate
this measure proposed by her. For however greater her force is than ours compared
in the abstract, it is nothing in comparison of ours when to be exerted on our soil. But
it is from a sincere love of peace, and a firm persuasion that, bound to France by the
interests and the strong sympathies still existing in the minds of our citizens, and
holding relative positions which ensure their continuance, we are secure of a long
course of peace. Whereas the change of friends, which will be rendered necessan' if
France changes that position, embarks us necessarily as a belligerent power in the first
war of Europe. In that case, France will have held possession of New Orleans during
the interval of a peace, long or short, at the end of which it will be wrested from
her. ...
'Jefferson conveniently overlooked the undeclared naval war of 1798-1800.

178 Chapter 11 The Triumph of Jeffersonian Democracy'
She may say she needs Louisiana for the supply of her West Indies. She does not
need it in time of peace. And in war she could not depend on them because they
would be so easily intercepted [by the British navy], . . .
If France considers Louisiana, however, as indispensable for her views, she might
perhaps be willing to look about for arrangements which might reconcile it to our
interests. If anything could do this, it would be the ceding to us the Island of New
Orleans and the Floridas. This would certainly in a great degree remove the causes of
jarring and irritation between us, and perhaps for such a length of time as might
produce other means of making the measure permanently conciliator)' to our interests
and friendships.
2. Napoleon Conceals His Motives (1803)
In 1802 the Spanish officials in New Orleans suddenly withdrew the right of
deposit or storage, so essential to Ainerican down-river commerce, without naming
another place, as required by the Treat)' of 1795. Seeking to calm the hair-trigger
westerners by eliminating such restrictions, fefferson dispatched fames Monroe to
Paris to assist Minister Livingston. The two envoys were instructed to pay up to $10
million for New Orleans and as much land to the east in the Floridas as the)' could
obtain. If Prance then proposed to close the Mississippi or seemed to "meditate hostilities,
" Monroe and Livingston were to seek an alliance with Britain. Napoleon, for
purely realistic reasons, had meanwhile decided to sell all of Louisiana. He had failed
disastrously in his efforts to reconquer the sugar-rich colony of Santo Domingo from
the rebellious blacks, and he valued Louisiaria primarily as a feeder for this colony. He
was about to reopen war with the British, who could speedily capture Louisiana with
their might)' fleet. If he sold the territor)' to the A?nericans for $15 million, he would
strengthen his short-run position and build up a long-run rival of Britain in North
America. His motives, as expressed to Monroe, do not square with all the facts. What is
?nost improbable about Napoleon's version as reported b)' Monroe?
... I [Monroe] added that it was the wish of the President that I should assure him
[Napoleon] before my departure of his high respect and esteem for him personally
and for the French nation, and of his earnest desire to presence peace and friendship
with it.
The First Consul [Napoleon] reciprocated the sentiment toward the President and
the United States in strong terms. He said that he considered the President as a
virtuous and enlightened man, who understood and pursued the interest of his country',
as a friend of liberty and equality; that no one wished more than himself the
preservation of a good understanding between tlie two republics; that he had been
prompted to make the late cession to the United States not so much on account of the
sum given for the territory as from views of policy; that France had been their first
friend and he wished to preserve that relation bet^\'een the two countries for ever. He
had perceived that we entertained a jealousy of their possession of Louisiana which
was likely to drive us into measures and connections [with Britain] that would prove
^S. M. Hamilton, ed., Writings of Jam.esMonroe (New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, ]900), vol, 4,
pp. 48-49.

A The Negotiations for Louisiana 179
not only hurtful to France but, as he presumed, to ourselves also. He therefore wished
to remove the cause by an act which would free us from all apprehension on that
head, and leave us at libert\ to pursue our course according to our interest and
inclination.
I told him in reply that I had considered the cession of Louisiana as having been
prompted by the motives which he stated, as being an act of great and enlightened
policy rather than an affair of commerce, and was persuaded that our government
would view it in the same light; that the cession would place us on the ground he
mentioned of real independence; that we had, however, been willing to give what was
deemed an equivalent for it.
He obser\'ed that there was no rivalship betv.'een us, our relation to France being
chiefly commercial; but that we must be on our guard not to give the protection of our
flag to the British.
3. Hamilton Lukewarmly Backs Jefferson (1803)
The loose constructionist Alexander Hamilton, destined to die in a duel a year
later, could not have been altogether displeased by fefferson's sudden conversion from
supporting a strict construction of the Constitution to advocating a loose construction.
Then a prominent New York attorney, Hamilton prepared the following newspaper
editorial in which be deplored the acquistion of the vast trans-Mississippi wilderness
as unnecessaty and as likely to cause the eventual dismemberment of the Union b)>
diffusing the population too widely. In what ways did subsequent events confinn or
disprove bis views?
At length the business of New Orleans has terminated favorably to this country',
histead of being obliged to rely any longer on the force of treaties for a place of
deposit, the jurisdiction of the territory is now transferred to our hands, and in future
the navigation of the Mississippi will be ours unmolested. This, it will be allowed, is an
important acquisition; not, indeed, as territory, but as being essential to the peace and
prosperit\ of our Western countr)', and as opening a free and valuable market to our
commercial states.
This purchase has been made during the period of Mr. Jefferson's president', and
will, doubtless, give eclat to his administration. Ever)' man, however, possessed of the
least candor and reflection will readily acknowledge that the acquisition has been
solely owing to a fortuitous concurrence of unforeseen and unexpected circumstances,
and not to any wise or vigorous measures on the part of the American
government. . . .
As soon as we experienced from Spain a direct infraction of an important article
of our treat)' [of 1795], in withholding the deposit of New Orleans, it afforded us
justifiable cause of war, and authorized immediate hostilities. Sound poliq' unquestionably
demanded of us to begin with a prompt, bold, and vigorous resistance against
the injustice; to seize the object at once. And having this vantage ground, should we
'"Hamilton on the LouLsiana Purchase: A Newly Identified Editorial from the Neiv York Evening Post,"
William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, vol. 12 (1955), pp. 273-276, passim.

Chester 11 The Triumph of Jeffersonian Democracy
have thought it advisable to terminate hostilities by a purchase, we might then have
done it on almost our own terms. This course, however, was not adopted. . . .
On the part of France, the short interval of peace had been wasted in repeated and
fruitless efforts to subjugate Santo Domingo; and those means which were originally
destined to the colonization of Louisiana had been gradually exhausted by the unexpected
difficulties of this ill-starred enterprise. To the deadly climate of Santo
Domingo, and to the courage and obstinate resistance made by its black inhabitants,
are we indebted for the obstacles which delayed the colonization of Louisiana till the
auspicious moment when a [prospective] rupture between England and France gave a
new turn to the projects of the latter, and destroyed at once all her schemes as to this
favorite object of her ambition.
It was made known to Bonaparte that among the first objects of England would be
the seizure of New Orleans, and that preparations were even then in a state of
forwardness for that purpose. The First Consul could not doubt that, if an English fleet
was sent thither, the place must fall without resistance. It was obvious, therefore, that it
would be in ever^' shape preferable that it should be placed in the possession of a
neutral power. And when, besides, some millions of money, of which he was extremely
in want, were offered him to part with what he could no longer hold, it affords
a moral certainty that it was to an accidental state of circumstances, and not to wise
plans, that this cession, at this time, has been owing. We shall venture to add that
neither of the ministers through whose instrumentality it was effected will ever deny
this, or even pretend that, previous to the time when a rupture was believed to be
inevitable, there was the smallest chance of inducing the First Consul, with his ambitious
and aggrandizing views, to commute the territory' for any sum of money in their
power to offer.
The real truth is, Bonaparte found himself absolutely compelled, by situation, to
relinquish his darling plan of colonizing the banks of the Mississippi. And thus have
the government of the United States, by the unforseen operation of events, gained
what the feebleness and pusillanimity' of its miserable system of measures could never
have acquired. . . .
Those disposed to magnify its [Louisiana's] value will say that this Western region
is important as keeping off a troublesome neighbor, and leaving us in the quiet
possession of the Mississippi. Undoubtedly this has some force, but, on the other
hand, it may be said that the acquisition of New Orleans is perfectly adequate to every
purpose. For whoever is in possession of that, has the uncontrolled command of the
river.
Again, it may be said, and this probably is the most favorable point of view in
which it can be placed, that although not valuable to the United States for settlement, it
is so to Spain, and will become more so, and therefore at some distant period will
form an object which we may barter with her for the Floridas, obviously of far greater
value to us than all the immense, undefined region west of the river. . . .
. . . When we consider the present extent of the United States, and that not one
sixteenth part of its territory is yet under occupation, the advantage of the acquisition,
as it relates to actual settlement, appears too distant and remote to strike the mind of a
sober politician with much force. This, therefore, can only rest in speculation for many
years, if not centuries to come, and consequently will not perhaps be allowed very
great weight in the account by the majority of readers.
)
/

B. The Approval of the Purchase
181
But it may be added that, should our own citizens, more enterprising than wise,
become desirous of setding this country, and emigrate thither, it must not only be
attended with all the injuries of a too widely dispersed population, but by adding to
the great weight of the western part of our territor>', must hasten the dismemberment
of a large portion of our country', or a dissolution of the government. On the whole,
we think it may with candor be said that whether the possession at this time of any
territory west of the river Mississippi will be advantageous, is at best extremely problematical.
6. The Approval of the Purchase
/. Jefferson Favors an Unconstitutional Act (1803)
Jefferson, in opposing Hamilton's Bank, had argued (see p. 154) that powers not
conferred on the central government were reserved to the states. The Constitution did
not specifically empower the president and Congress to annex foreign territory, especially
territory as large as the nation itself, and incorporate its fift}' thousand or so
multicolored inhabitants into the Union as citizens. Jefferson hastily drafted proposals
for a constitutional amendment, but since time pressed and the bargain was breathtaking,
he finally pigeonholed them. (In 1828 Supreme Court upheld the acquisition
of territory under the war- and treaty-m^ing clauses of the Constitution.) In
Jefferson's letter to Senate leader John Breckinridge, is the guardian analogy sound?
This treaty must, of course, be laid before both Houses, because both have
important functions to exercise respecting it. They, 1 presume, will see their duty to
their country in ratifying and paying for it, so as to secure a good which would
otherwise probably be never again in their power. But I suppose they must then
appeal to the nation for an additional article [amendment] to the Constitution, approving
and confirming an act which the nation had not previously authorized.
The Constitution has made no provision for our holding foreign territory', still less
for incorporating foreign nations into our Union. The Executive, in seizing the fugitive
occurrence which so much advances the good of their country', have done an act
beyond the Constitution. The Legislature, in casting behind tliem metaphysical subdeties,
and risking themselves like faithful servants, must ratify and pay for it, and
throw themselves on their country for doing for them, unauthorized, what we know
they would have done for themselves had they been in a situadon to do it.
It is the case of a guardian, invesung the money of his ward in purchasing an
important adjacent territory'; and saying to him when of age, "I did this for your good. I
pretend to no right to bind you: you may disavow me, and I must get out of the scrape
as I can. I thought it my duty to risk myself for you."
But we shall not be disavowed by the nation, and their act of indemnity will
confirm and not weaken the Constitution, by more strongly marking out its lines.
'A. A. Lipscomb, ed., Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Washington, D.C.: Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association,
1904), vol. 10, pp. 410-411 (August 12, 1803).

182 Chapter 11 The Triumph of Jeffersonian Democracy
2. Representative Griswold Is Unhappy (1803)
fefferson summoned Congress into special session because the Senate had to
approve the Louisiana Purchase t)-eaties, and the House and Senate had to vote the
money. The New England Federalists fought the acquisition, largely because "the
mixed race of Anglo Hispano-Gallo-Americans" would ultimately outvote the charter-member
states of the Union and, the^'feared, cause its dismemberment. Representative
Griswold of Connecticut, perhaps the ablest Federalist spokesman in the House,
had already attained notoriety in 1798 by> caning Representative Lyon after the latter
had spat in his face. On tvhat terms would Griswold, in the folloiving speech, have
accepted Louisiana?
It is, in my opinion, scarcely possible for any gentleman on this floor to advance
an opinion that the President and Senate may add to the members of the Union by
treat}' whenever they please, or, in the words of this treat)', may "incorporate in the
union of the United States" a foreign nation who, from interest or ambition, may wish
to become a member of our government. Such a power would be directly repugnant
to the original compact betvi'een the states, and a violation of the principles on which
that compact was formed.
It has been already well obsen'ed that the union of the states was formed on the
principle of a co-partnership, and it would be absurd to suppose that the agents of the
parties who have been appointed to execute the business of the compact, in behalf of
the principals, could admit of a new partner without the consent of the parties themselves.
. . .
The incorporation of a foreign nation into the Union, so far from tending to
preserve the Union, is a direct inroad upon it. It destroys the perfect union contemplated
between the original parties, by interposing an alien and a stranger to share the
powers of government with them. ...
A gentleman from Pennsylvania, however (Mr. Smilie), has said that it is competent
for this government to obtain a new territory' by conquest, and if a new territory
can be obtained by conquest, he infers that it can be procured in the manner provided
for by the treat)'.
While I admit the premises of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, I deny his
conclusion. A new territor>' and new subjects may undoubtedly be obtained by conquest
and by purchase; but neither the conquest nor the purchase can incorporate
them into the Union. They must remain in the condition of colonies, and be governed
accordingly. The objection to the third article is not that the province of Louisiana
could not have been purchased, but that neither this nor any other foreign nation can
be incorporated into the Union by treaty or by a law. And as this country' has been
ceded to the United States only under the condition of an incorporation, it results
that, if the condition is unconstitutional or impossible, the cession itself falls to the
ground. . . .
This subject was much considered during the last session of Congress, but it will
not be found ... that any individual entenained the least wish to obtain the province of
Louisiana. Our views were then confined to New Orleans and the Floridas, and, in my
^Annals of Congress, 8th Congress, 1st session, vol. 1, cols. 461-462, 463, 465.

B. Tlx Approval of the Purchase 183
judgment, it would have been happy for the countiy if they were still confined within
those limits. The vast and unmanageable extent which the accession of Louisiana will
give to the United States; the consequent dispersion of our population; and the
destruction of that balance which it is so important to maintain between the Eastern
and the Western states, threatens, at no ver^' distant day, the subversion of our Union.
3. Senator Breckinridge Supports the Purchase (1803)
Virginia-bom Senator John Breckinridge of Ke^ttuck}', then the ablest spokesman
for the West, had spomored Jefferson's secretly prepared Kentucky! resolutions of
1798-1799 in his state legislature. Alert both to tvestern interests aitd to partisan
politics, he urged the Louisiana Purchase in this notewonhy speech. He took shaip
issue with the Federalist senators, including Seitator White of Delaware, ivho held that
Louisiana would "be the greatest curse that could at presei%t befall us. ..." Breckinridge
noted particularly the disagreement of the Fedei'alists among themselves conce}~ni7ig
the extravagance of the price, the validity of the title, and the unconstitutionalit)!
of acquiring foreign ten'itoiy. He then launched into his argument, as follows. How
effectively did he meet the Fedei'alist objections, especially with I'eference to the problem
of the westerne)-s?
As to the enormit\ of price, I would ask that gendeman [Senator White], would his
mode of acquiring it [by war] through 50,000 men have cost nothing? Is he so
confident of this as to be able to pronounce positively tliat the price is enormous?
Does he make no calculation on the hazard attending this conflict? Is he sure the God
of battles was enlisted on his side? Were France and Spain, under the auspices of
Bonaparte, contemptible adversaries? Good as the cause was, and great as my
confidence is in the courage of my countr^'men, sure 1 am that I shall never regret, as
the gentleman seems to do, that the experiment was not made. . . .
To acquire an empire of perhaps half [once again] the extent of the one we
possessed, from the most powerful and v>'arlike nation on earth, without bloodshed,
without tlie oppression of a single individual, without in the least embarrassing the
ordinan' operations of your finances, and all this through the peaceful forms of
negotiation, and in despite too of the opposition of a considerable portion of the
communit)', is an achievement of which the archives of the predecessors, at least, of
those now in office cannot furnish a parallel.
The same gentleman has told us, that this acquisition will, from its extent, soon
prove destructive to the confederal' [Union]. . . .
So far from believing in the doctrine that a republic ought to be confined within
narrow limits, I believe, on the contrar)-, that the more extensive its dominion the
more safe and more durable it will be. hi proportion to the number of hands you
entrust the precious blessings of a free government to, in the same proportion do you
multiply the chances for their preservation. I entertain, therefore, no fears for the
confederaq' on account of its extent. . . .
The gentlemen from Delaware [White] and Massachusetts [Pickering] both contend
that the third article of the treat)' is unconstitutional, and our consent to its
'Ammls of Congress, 8th Congress, 1st session, vol. 1, cols. 60-62, 65.

184 Chapter 11 The Triumph of Jeffersonian Democracy
ratification a nullity, because the United States cannot acquire foreign territory. . . .
Cannot the Constitution be so amended (if it should be necessary) as to embrace this
territory? If the authority to acquire foreign territory be not included in the treatymaking
power, it remains with the people; and in that way all the doubts and
difficulties of gentlemen may be completely removed; and that, too, without affording
France the smallest ground of exception to the literal execution on our part of that
article of the treaty. . . .
What palliation can we offer to our Western citizens for a conduct like this? Will
they be content with the redefined and metaphysical reasonings and constructions
upon which gentlemen have bottomed their opposition today? Will it be satisfactory' to
them to be told that the title is good, the price low, the finances competent, and the
authority, at least to purchase, constitutional; but that the country is too extensive, and
that the admission of these people to all the privileges we ourselves enjoy is not
permitted by the Constitution? It will not, sir.
4. Lew/s and Clark Meet a Grizzly (1805)
Diplomacy done, the vast and uncharted wilderness that was the Louisiana territory
remained to be explored. President Jefferson commissioned Meriwether Lewis and
William Clark for the Job, which took two years. The Lewis and Clark party of thirtyfour
soldiers and ten civilians moved up the Missouri River from St Louis in the
autumn of 1804, wintered with the Mandan Indians in present-day North Dakota,
and struck out for the Pacific Ocean again in the spring of 1805- They sighted the
Pacific in November 1805 and eventually returned to St. Louis nearly a year later.
Along the way they collected botanical and geological specimens and made preliminary
maps of the country. They also had numerous adventures, such as this one,
recounted in Lewis's diary, which took place in present-day eastern Montana. What
does it suggest about the task of taming the nearly trackless territory Jefferson had
acquired?
Tuesday May I4th 1805.
Some fog on the river this morning, which is a very rare occurrence; the country much
as it was yesterday with this difference that the bottoms are somewhat wider; passed
some high black bluffs. Saw immence herds of buffaloe today also Elk deer wolves and
Antelopes. Passed three large creeks one on the Starboard and two others on the
Larboard side, neither of which had any runing water. Capt Clark walked on shore and
killed a very fine buffaloe cow. I felt an inclination to eat some veal and walked on
shore and killed a very fine buffaloe calf and a large woolf, much the whitest I had
seen, it was quite as white as the wool of the common sheep. One of the party
wounded a brown bear very badly, but being alone did not think proper to pursue
him. In the evening the men in two of the rear canoes discovered a large brown bear
•'Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., Original Journals of the Lewis and Clark Expedition, 1804-1806 (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904), vol. 2, pp. 33-34.