Ethiopia SOCODEP CE - main report - IFAD
Ethiopia SOCODEP CE - main report - IFAD
Ethiopia SOCODEP CE - main report - IFAD
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PROJECT EVALUATION<br />
Federal Democratic Republic of <strong>Ethiopia</strong><br />
Southern Region Cooperatives Development<br />
and Credit Programme<br />
Completion Evaluation<br />
November 2008
Document of the<br />
International Fund for Agricultural Development<br />
Federal Democratic Republic of <strong>Ethiopia</strong><br />
Southern Region Cooperatives Development and Credit Project<br />
(<strong>SOCODEP</strong>)<br />
Completion Evaluation<br />
November 2008<br />
Report No. 1909-ET
Overall Responsibility<br />
Lead Evaluator<br />
Associate Evaluator<br />
Consultants:<br />
Team Leader<br />
Team Members<br />
Evaluation Team<br />
Mr Luciano Lavizzari, Director, Office of Evaluation<br />
Mr Andrew Brubaker, Evaluation Officer<br />
Mr Michael Carbon, Associate Evaluation Officer<br />
Mr Richard C Carter<br />
Mr Michael Assefa, Cooperatives and Capacity Building Specialist<br />
Mr Tsegaye Asafaw, Credit and Microfinance Specialist<br />
Mr Ayele Gebremariam, Socio Economist<br />
Photo on cover page:<br />
Ox ploughing in Wolayta Zone<br />
Source: Evaluation Mission 2007
Federal Democratic Republic of <strong>Ethiopia</strong><br />
Southern Region Cooperatives Development and Credit Project<br />
<strong>IFAD</strong> Loan Nos. 342-ET, SRS 37-ET, BSF Grant BG-29-ET<br />
Completion Evaluation<br />
Table of Contents<br />
Abbreviations and Acronyms iii<br />
Exchange Rate iv<br />
Map of Project Area v<br />
Executive Summary vii<br />
Agreement at Completion Point xvii<br />
I. INTRODUCTION 1<br />
II. COUNTRY BACKGROUND 2<br />
A. Project Background 2<br />
B. Objectives and Methodology of the Evaluation 7<br />
III. PROJECT PERFORMAN<strong>CE</strong> 8<br />
A. Design Features 8<br />
B. Implementation and Outputs 10<br />
C. Restructuring of Service Cooperatives 12<br />
D. Provision of Loans to Cooperatives and their Members 13<br />
E. Attaining Project Objectives 20<br />
F. Assessment: Relevance, Effectiveness and Efficiency 27<br />
G. Performance of <strong>IFAD</strong> and its Partners 29<br />
IV. PROJECT IMPACTS 30<br />
A. Rural Poverty Reduction Impacts 30<br />
B. Sustainability and Ownership 32<br />
C. Innovation, Replicability and Scaling-Up 33<br />
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 34<br />
A. Overall Assessment 34<br />
B. Conclusions 35<br />
C. Recommendations 37<br />
D. Questions for the Forthcoming Country Programme Evaluation (CPE) 37<br />
APPENDI<strong>CE</strong>S<br />
1. Summary of Project Objectives 39<br />
2. Project Costs and Financing 41<br />
3. <strong>SOCODEP</strong> Timeline 43<br />
4. Reconstructed Logframe for <strong>SOCODEP</strong> 45<br />
5. Trainings carried out by <strong>SOCODEP</strong> 63<br />
6. Evaluation Mission Itinerary 67<br />
7. Organisations and Individuals Interviewed 69<br />
8. Bibliography 73
TABLES<br />
1. Statistical Data 3<br />
2. <strong>SOCODEP</strong> Objectives 4<br />
3. <strong>SOCODEP</strong> Numerical Targets and Achievements 12<br />
4. Loans Made Through <strong>SOCODEP</strong> for Individual Activities 14<br />
5. Rural Roads Constructed by <strong>SOCODEP</strong> (in km) 17<br />
6. Changes in Service Cooperative Performance between 1993 and 2006 22<br />
7. <strong>SOCODEP</strong>: Achievement of Specific Objectives 28<br />
8. Project Ratings Summary 35<br />
FIGURES<br />
1. Budget Costs by Component (million US$, total 22.72m) 5<br />
2. Main Project Stakeholders 6<br />
3. <strong>SOCODEP</strong>: Quantitative Achievements against Targets at Appraisal 20<br />
4. Cooperatives: Findings from the Evaluation 21<br />
BOXES<br />
1. Two Examples from Individual Beneficiaries of OMFI Loans 14<br />
2. Three Case Studies of Women Loan Beneficiaries 23<br />
3. Four Examples of Ox-loan Beneficiaries 25<br />
ANNEXES*<br />
1. Development of Cooperatives and Institutional Capacity Building<br />
2. Evaluation of Credit and Input Supply Component of <strong>SOCODEP</strong><br />
3. Socio-Economic Impact<br />
* All annexes are available from <strong>IFAD</strong>’s Office of Evaluation (evaluation@ifad.org).<br />
ii
Abbreviations and Acronyms<br />
A<strong>CE</strong> Agricultural Cooperatives in <strong>Ethiopia</strong> Project<br />
AfDB African Development Bank<br />
AIDB Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank (now DBE)<br />
AISCO Agricultural Inputs Supply Corporation<br />
BOARD Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development<br />
BOFED Bureau of Finance and Economic Development<br />
BOH Bureau of Health<br />
BSF Belgian Survival Fund<br />
BWMED Bureau of Water, Mines and Energy Development<br />
BPWUD Bureau of Public Works and Urban Development<br />
CBE Commercial Bank of <strong>Ethiopia</strong><br />
CBO Community Based Organizations<br />
CLP Core Learning Partnership<br />
CPD Cooperatives Promotion Department<br />
CPE Country Programme Evaluation<br />
CPM Country Programme Manager<br />
DBE Development Bank of <strong>Ethiopia</strong><br />
EB <strong>Ethiopia</strong>n Birr<br />
GoE Government of <strong>Ethiopia</strong><br />
HIV/AIDS Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus/Acquired Immuno-Deficiency Syndrome<br />
HSC Health and Sanitation Committees<br />
<strong>IFAD</strong> International Fund for Agricultural Development<br />
IFI International Financing Institution<br />
(W)IGA (Women’s) Income Generating Activity<br />
ILO International Labour Organisation<br />
KDP Kafa Development Programme (formerly SUPAK-S)<br />
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation<br />
MOFED Ministry of Finance and Economic Development<br />
MTR Mid-term Review<br />
NBE National Bank of <strong>Ethiopia</strong><br />
OE Office of Evaluation<br />
OMFI Omo Micro Finance Institution<br />
PC/PCU Programme Coordination Unit<br />
PCR Project Completion Report<br />
PSC Project Steering Committee<br />
RA Roads Authority<br />
RR30/RR50 Rural Roads 30/50 Vehicles per Day Design Standards<br />
RUFIP Rural Financial Intermediation Project<br />
RWAT Rural Women’s Affairs Team<br />
SACCO Savings and Credit Cooperative<br />
SC(s) Service Cooperative(s)<br />
SNNPRS Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State<br />
SO Special Objective<br />
<strong>SOCODEP</strong> Southern Region Cooperatives Development and Credit Project<br />
SRAB Southern Region Agricultural Bureau<br />
SSE Small Scale Enterprise<br />
SUPAK-S Sustainable Poverty Alleviation Kaficho-Shakicho (renamed KDP)<br />
TA Technical Assistance<br />
UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services<br />
USAID United States Agency for International Development<br />
US$ United States Dollar<br />
VOCA Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance<br />
VRDF Veterinary Revolving Drugs Fund<br />
WIGA Women Income Generating Activities<br />
WSHBS Water Supply, Health and Basic Sanitation<br />
iii
<strong>Ethiopia</strong>n Birr to one USD<br />
9.50<br />
9.00<br />
8.50<br />
8.00<br />
7.50<br />
7.00<br />
6.50<br />
6.00<br />
5.50<br />
5.00<br />
Exchange Rate (US$ to <strong>Ethiopia</strong>n Birr)<br />
Oct-93<br />
Oct-94<br />
Oct-95<br />
Oct-96<br />
Oct-97<br />
Oct-98<br />
Oct-99<br />
Oct-00<br />
Oct-01<br />
Oct-02<br />
Oct-03<br />
Oct-04<br />
Oct-05<br />
Oct-06<br />
iv
Federal Democratic Republic of <strong>Ethiopia</strong><br />
Southern Region Cooperatives Development and Credit Project<br />
(<strong>SOCODEP</strong>)<br />
Completion Evaluation<br />
Executive Summary<br />
I. INTRODUCTION<br />
1. Introduction. The Southern Region Cooperatives Development and Credit Project<br />
(<strong>SOCODEP</strong>) was undertaken in the Southern Region of <strong>Ethiopia</strong> between 1994 and 2005. This<br />
document is the completion evaluation <strong>report</strong> for the project. The evaluation mission took place<br />
between 17 th September and 11 th October 2006. It was conducted by a four-man team and the conduct,<br />
analysis and <strong>report</strong>ing of the evaluation has been carried out according to the Office of Evaluation<br />
(OE) guidelines for project evaluations.<br />
A. Country Background<br />
2. <strong>Ethiopia</strong>. <strong>Ethiopia</strong> is a very large (1.1m km 2 ), very diverse (geographically and ethnically), and<br />
extremely poor country. It ranks 170 th out of 177 countries in the current (2006) Human Development<br />
Rankings. The predominantly rural population depends heavily on subsistence agricultural production,<br />
the vast majority of which exists under rainfed conditions. Cash incomes are very low except in<br />
coffee-producing areas, and access to rural financial services is very limited. Physical infrastructure<br />
(roads, power supplies, water and sanitation, and telecommunications) is very poorly developed.<br />
Population growth, increasing prevalence of the Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus/Acquired Immuno-<br />
Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS), environmental degradation, and increasing climate instability are<br />
among the trends which add to the challenges of poverty alleviation in <strong>Ethiopia</strong>. Politically, <strong>Ethiopia</strong><br />
has undergone a virtually continuous process of change since the 1974 revolution in which Emperor<br />
Haile Selassie was overthrown. The Marxist rule of the Derg from 1974 to 1991 led to many reforms,<br />
but the authoritarian use of power over the peasantry did not change, or if anything, it became more<br />
restrictive. After the fall of the Derg in May 1991, a slow process of liberalisation of economy and<br />
political systems has taken place, but there is still a long way to go before the rural population will be<br />
fully able to participate in a free market and transparent democratic processes of government. There is<br />
no doubt that <strong>Ethiopia</strong> is a very difficult country in which to make progress in terms of development<br />
and poverty alleviation.<br />
3. The Southern Region. At 232,000km 2 , the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples<br />
Regional State (SNNPRS) is one of the four largest Regions in <strong>Ethiopia</strong> (out of the 9 Regions and 2<br />
City Authorities into which the country is presently divided). It is probably the most diverse Region in<br />
ethnic terms, and it contains some of the most remote and wettest parts of <strong>Ethiopia</strong>. At the time of<br />
project commencement in 1994, the Region consisted of 53 Woredas (districts), and had a total<br />
population of about 11m. Twelve years later, at the time of the completion evaluation the number of<br />
Woredas had grown to 133 and the total population to about 14.5m. Mean population density in the<br />
Region has consequently increased from about 47 to 63 per km 2 , but these averages hide a great deal<br />
of variation; at Appraisal in 1994, population densities were thought to range from less than 10 to over<br />
500 per km 2 . Rainfall, temperatures, altitudes, cropping patterns, infrastructure, and cultures vary<br />
widely within the Region.<br />
B. The Project<br />
4. The project. <strong>SOCODEP</strong> was one of the first significant internationally funded interventions in<br />
<strong>Ethiopia</strong> following the fall of the Derg in May 1991. The Project aimed to respond to the then new<br />
legislation (Proclamation 85/1994) concerning Cooperatives, which ostensibly set out a means of<br />
turning the former Government-imposed and politically-dominated Producer Cooperatives of the Derg<br />
vii
into farmer-owned viable business entities serving their members’ interests. In particular, it aimed to<br />
make rural finance (specifically micro-credit) available to so-called Service Cooperatives and their<br />
members. The Principal Objective of the Project was to “increase agricultural productivity and raise<br />
income levels of the rural poor through support to Service Cooperatives’ development in order to<br />
facilitate efficient provision of sustainable services to members”. The Project had 7 specific objectives<br />
which are set out in Table ES1 and further elaborated in the reconstructed logframe in Appendix 4.<br />
Together these objectives were designed not only to turn Service Cooperatives (SCs) into effective<br />
vehicles for the service of their members, but also to deliver some specific services (road construction,<br />
veterinary drug supply, health facility up-grading, and provision of water supply and sanitation<br />
services) directly through the relevant Government organs. The Water Supply, Health and Basic<br />
Sanitation Component (WSHBS) was separately financed by the Belgian Survival Fund as a later<br />
addition to the Project.<br />
Table ES1. <strong>SOCODEP</strong> Specific Objectives<br />
SO1 Provide a model for developing <strong>Ethiopia</strong>n cooperatives under the new legislation,<br />
particularly with respect to improvement of financial intermediation services in rural areas,<br />
which could be replicated in other areas of the country.<br />
SO2 Increased capital and income among the rural poor in the project area through off-farm<br />
income-generating activities particularly for women and families in densely populated areas<br />
with limited land for farm expansion.<br />
SO3 Strengthen the SRAB to carry out its mandate with respect to cooperative development.<br />
SO4 Provide credit to meet financial requirements for agricultural inputs and draught oxen and<br />
facilitate the supply of inputs through support to local traders and cooperatives.<br />
SO5 Relief of livestock health constraints, particularly with respect to draught animals, through<br />
provision of veterinary drugs.<br />
SO6 Improve access of rural families to services and markets by rehabilitating and <strong>main</strong>taining<br />
rural roads.<br />
SO7 (BSF Component) Reduce the burden of disease in 8 woredas of the <strong>SOCODEP</strong> area<br />
C. Objectives and Methodology of the Evaluation<br />
5. Overall objectives. The <strong>main</strong> objectives of the evaluation were to: (i) assess the performance<br />
and impact of the <strong>SOCODEP</strong> project; and (ii) generate a series of findings and recommendations that<br />
would serve the International Fund for Agricultural Development (<strong>IFAD</strong>), the Government of the<br />
<strong>Ethiopia</strong>, and other donors in designing and implementing similar projects and programmes in the<br />
future.. The special focus of the evaluation, as highlighted in the Approach Paper, was to be on<br />
Cooperatives Development, Rural Microfinance, Socio-economic impact, and Institutional Capacity-<br />
Building.<br />
6. Evaluation methodology. The evaluation followed OE’s guidelines for project evaluations. 1<br />
The evaluation team conducted a field visit to the project area and interviews with key stakeholders.<br />
The evaluation notes the limited range of <strong>report</strong>s and other documents available through the project<br />
and partners due to the frequent moving of the project office which made it challenging to find many<br />
documents.<br />
1 This included assessing the project against internationally recognized evaluation criteria, namely: (i) project<br />
performance, including relevance, effectiveness and efficiency; (ii) impact on rural poverty; and<br />
(iii) performance of partners involved in the project, including <strong>IFAD</strong>, government institutions, and others.<br />
viii
7. However, the core documents were available and provided a sufficient source of secondary data<br />
for the evaluation. As per standard OE practice, a Core Learning Partnership (CLP) 2 was constituted<br />
for the evaluation, which provided critical inputs and views at key stages of the evaluation process.<br />
II. PROJECT PERFORMAN<strong>CE</strong><br />
A. Implementation and Outputs<br />
8. Cooperatives restructuring (US$0.95m, four per cent of total budget at Appraisal).<br />
Cooperatives under the former Government (the Derg) were an instrument of Marxist ideology and<br />
coercion. A great deal of work would have to be done to turn these into autonomous businesses owned<br />
and democratically controlled by their members. The number of cooperatives restructured through<br />
<strong>SOCODEP</strong> under the new legislation exceeded the Appraisal target, 200, by about 30 per cent. Credit<br />
delivery (US$7.68m, 34 per cent of total budget at Appraisal).<br />
9. Credit was to be delivered to cooperatives for their own businesses (flour mills, shops, produce<br />
marketing) and through the cooperatives to the individual members (for farm inputs, incomegenerating<br />
activities, small-scale enterprises, and work oxen). The Commercial Bank of <strong>Ethiopia</strong><br />
(CBE) was to be the channel for disbursement of loans to the restructured cooperatives. Overall, the<br />
disbursement of loans fell below target, at EB 18.76m by the time of closure of this project<br />
component. This is a little over US$2.0m or approximately 30 per cent of target. This low number of<br />
loans disbursed was attributable partly to project design shortcomings and partly to problems<br />
encountered during project implementation. Specific factors included: CBE’s lack of experience in<br />
rural credit implementation; delays in loan processing; lack of capacity in the restructured Service<br />
Cooperatives (SC) to borrow and on lend; and defaults in loan repayment.<br />
Promotion of Off-farm Income Generating Activities (US$0.29m, 1 per cent)<br />
10. Small enterprise promotion was undertaken through a pilot project involving training at the<br />
Rural Technology Centre, Sodo, and subsequent loans to individuals setting up in business. Training<br />
was provided to 226 beneficiaries, in bamboo work, tailoring, weaving, spinning, woodwork,<br />
beekeeping and pottery. Loans for subsequent business development amounted to EB 55,456<br />
(approximately US$8,000), three percent of the target, in total over the entire project period. The<br />
Women Income Generating Activities (WIGAs) performed much better providing 7,600 loans (76<br />
percent of the target) to women.<br />
Institutional Capacity Building<br />
11. Capacity-building, through training and provision of physical resources, was a major aspect of<br />
the project. Explicit capacity building inputs focused on Southern Region Agricultural Bureau<br />
(US$2.80m, 12 per cent of total budget) to enable the Bureau to deliver support to the SCs and CBE<br />
(US$0.39m, two per cent) to provide effective rural finance to the SCs. But there were significant<br />
allocations also to the other Regional Government organs involved (Water, Health, and Roads), as<br />
well as to the cooperatives themselves.<br />
12. As far as physical resources are concerned, the project provided large numbers of vehicles (65<br />
cars, three buses, 300 motorcycles), as well as office accommodation, office equipment and roadbuilding<br />
equipment. Perhaps unsurprisingly, disbursement for these items proceeded quickly, with<br />
2 Members of the partnership included: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Bureau of Finance<br />
and Economic Development, Bureau of Agriculture and rural Development, Southern Nations, Nationalities and<br />
Peoples Regional State (SNNPRS), Department of Cooperatives, SNNPRS, Rural Women’s Affairs Team,<br />
SNNPRS, Bureau of Health, SNNPRS, Bureau of Water Resources, SNNPRS, Planning and Programme<br />
Department, Rural Roads Authority, SNNPRS, Sodo Rural Technology Centre, Commercial Bank of <strong>Ethiopia</strong>,<br />
Omo Microfinance Institution, the Association of <strong>Ethiopia</strong>n Microfinance Institutions, Former <strong>SOCODEP</strong><br />
Project Director, field presence officer, and the <strong>IFAD</strong> Country Programme Manager.<br />
ix
large overdrafts on the vehicles and equipment category being highlighted in the 1997 and 1998<br />
United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) Supervision Reports.<br />
Road Construction (US$4.70m, 21 per cent)<br />
13. The target at Appraisal was for the rehabilitation and heavy <strong>main</strong>tenance of a total of 700 km of<br />
rural roads, to a design standard that would permit labour-based <strong>main</strong>tenance. In the end, 122 km was<br />
constructed, to a higher standard (and consequently higher unit cost) than originally agreed. Thus<br />
reducing the amount of construction and rehabilitation possible and requiring machine-based<br />
<strong>main</strong>tenance in the future.<br />
Veterinary Revolving Drugs Fund (US$1.89m, 8 per cent)<br />
14. This was intended to be a complement to other project activities – specifically to help to protect<br />
the livestock which were involved in ox loans and credit for small ruminants. The first purchases of<br />
drugs under this component were delayed significantly, taking place in 2001, and resulted in only<br />
about 19 per cent of the budgeted funds being disbursed by the time of closure of the project loans.<br />
Water Supply, Health and Basic Sanitation (US$4.02m, 18 per cent) – Belgium Survival Fund<br />
(BSF) Funded<br />
15. Despite the assessment of a pre-Appraisal mission in 1993 that “…water supply is not a major<br />
problem in many parts of the project area … and in areas where needs are pronounced several NGOs<br />
are providing assistance”, a formulation mission addressing this and the wider issues of health and<br />
sanitation was sent in 1996 and the component commenced in 1999. This component has performed<br />
well meeting its targets related to health services (through construction, rehabilitation, equipping and<br />
training) and construction of water supply points in the 8 component Woredas.<br />
B. Assessment Relevance, Effectiveness and Efficiency<br />
16. Relevance. <strong>SOCODEP</strong> addressed some real needs of the rural poor in southern <strong>Ethiopia</strong> (need<br />
for credit, need for improved market access, need for better health services and environmental health)<br />
and it was consistent with the government’s regionalization programme. At the time of design the<br />
rhetoric of the new Government and the framing of the new legislation made working through service<br />
cooperatives attractive and promising. However the use of service cooperatives as the channel for<br />
services to the poor turned out to be a significant design weakness. Similarly, the project had limited<br />
choices for partners with rural finance experience and should have been addressed with greater<br />
seriousness.<br />
17. Effectiveness. The Project achieved some, but not all of its objectives. The Specific Objectives<br />
(SO) 1, 3, and 5 were mostly not met. These include SO1, providing a model for developing <strong>Ethiopia</strong>n<br />
cooperatives under the new legislation, SO3 strengthening the Southern Regional Agricultural Bureau<br />
(SRAB) to carry out its mandate with respect to cooperative development, and SO5 relief of livestock<br />
health constraints, particularly with respect to draught animals, through provision of veterinary drugs.<br />
Specific Objectives 2, 4, 6 and 7 were met to varying degrees and include SO2 increasing capital and<br />
income among the rural poor in the project area through off-farm income-generating activities, SO4<br />
providing credit to meet financial requirements for agricultural inputs and draught oxen and facilitate<br />
the supply of inputs through support to local traders and cooperatives, SO6 improving access of rural<br />
families to services and markets by rehabilitating and <strong>main</strong>taining rural roads, and SO7 (BSF<br />
Component) reducing the burden of disease in eight woredas of the <strong>SOCODEP</strong> area.<br />
18. Efficiency. Given the difficult operating environment in <strong>Ethiopia</strong> the project could have been<br />
more efficient if it had been more realistic and less ambitious. The vast geographic area, poor<br />
infrastructure and communication meant that the projected resources were not optimally used. Also,<br />
the overall emphasis on the Project’s numerical outputs (i.e. exceeding the number of restructured<br />
cooperatives) rather than the quality of those outputs, has resulted in a significant amount of wasted<br />
resources. As a result, many of the project’s activities were diluted to the extent that they failed to<br />
x
achieve their intended outcomes. Efficiency would have been greatly enhanced if the project design<br />
had concentrated on a smaller project area, involving a smaller number of SCs, and provided greater<br />
intensity of effort and resources.<br />
Cooperatives Restructuring<br />
C. Project Impact by Component<br />
19. The number of cooperatives restructured through <strong>SOCODEP</strong> under the new legislation<br />
exceeded the Appraisal target by about 30 per cent. However, the quality of the restructuring and reorientation<br />
undertaken has not translated into an effective cooperatives sector in the project areas. The<br />
cooperatives encountered in this evaluation, and many others for which data was obtained, are<br />
suffering significant problems of poor management, misappropriation of funds and de facto<br />
bankruptcy. The findings of the evaluation in this regard are not new. To quote the internal review of<br />
the project carried out in 1999: “…with such limited capital, unprofitable business, increased<br />
misappropriation, weak management, absence of member education, and poor participation of<br />
members, the conceptual framework of promoting economically viable cooperatives … could not be<br />
achieved.” 3 Three years later, at the time of closure of the <strong>main</strong> loans, the situation had not changed<br />
significantly: “…the state of some cooperatives restructured under the project appear to be weak and<br />
in the worst case on the verge of bankruptcy … most restructured cooperatives critically need the<br />
support of the project …” 4 . In short, although <strong>SOCODEP</strong> re-registered about 267 cooperatives under<br />
the new law, it failed to re-orient the officers and members of those organisations, and leave behind a<br />
strong and sustainable cooperatives sector.<br />
Credit Delivery<br />
20. The disbursement of loans achieved approximately 30 per cent of its target. Although many<br />
cooperatives and individuals received and benefited from loans, many of the target populations did<br />
not. Loans for cooperatives’ own businesses were generally unsuccessful. Because the cooperatives<br />
found that they could not compete with the leaner and fitter private sector, the majority of these<br />
ventures failed, and the cooperatives failed to repay their loans. Loans to individuals were generally<br />
much more successful, with ox loans being particularly popular (although the required ox insurance<br />
was not popular, and it failed to pay out in the majority of cases of mortality). Loans to women for the<br />
multiplication and fattening of small ruminants were also especially valued, and repayment rates were<br />
high. In general, repayment of loans was better in the western part of the project area than in the east<br />
and south-east.<br />
21. CBE learned in the course of the project that provision of rural microfinance is a very different<br />
activity to the provision of commercial, urban, loans. It found it was ill-equipped to manage this<br />
project component, and it withdrew in 2002. The transfer of this component to the Region’s only Omo<br />
Micro Finance Institution (OMFI) in the last few months before closure of project loans was the only<br />
solution to a crisis. Because of the difficulties experienced by CBE, and the poor performance of<br />
many of the cooperatives, the opportunities for cooperatives or individuals to access further loans has<br />
been curtailed. Real benefits enjoyed by individuals made a difference for a time, but they may not<br />
have brought about lasting change.<br />
Promotion of Off-farm Income Generating Activities<br />
22. Small enterprise promotion was undertaken through a pilot project involving training at the<br />
Rural Technology Centre, Sodo, and subsequent loans to individuals setting up in business. The<br />
impact of this activity on a few individuals was significant; however, the extent of that impact was<br />
negligible.<br />
3 SNNPRS Cooperative Office (1999) Comprehensive Analaysis of Current Situation and Requirements of<br />
Cooperatives in <strong>SOCODEP</strong> Areas, April 1999, Awassa.<br />
4 UNOPS Supervision Report, April 2002.<br />
xi
Institutional Capacity Building<br />
23. A great deal of training was carried out (estimates suggest that nearly 57,000 individuals<br />
received some form of training). Individuals have benefited to some extent, but the ability of the<br />
project stakeholder institutions to perform more effectively, during and subsequent to the project, is<br />
questionable. A lasting impact on the institutions involved has been severely undermined by the<br />
capacity buildings component’s ad hoc nature 5 and by the frequent Government restructuring and redeployment<br />
of personnel.<br />
24. <strong>SOCODEP</strong>’s capacity-building efforts largely ignored issues of attitude change, organizational<br />
reform, and policy dialogue. These were major omissions.<br />
Road Construction<br />
25. The roads built are of good quality and have benefited those people living near them. The<br />
Roads Authority has been left with a useful pool of heavy equipment for future road construction<br />
work. As far as <strong>SOCODEP</strong> outcomes are concerned however, the aim of this aspect of the project was<br />
to extend access to markets for cooperatives and their members. As with other project components, a<br />
few people have benefited from the component, and its <strong>main</strong> shortcoming has been its limited reach.<br />
Veterinary Revolving Drugs fund<br />
26. The component was able to provide temporary relief for the few participants who were able to<br />
access the fund. At the time of the evaluation, drug shortages were being felt, and animal health<br />
problems were <strong>report</strong>ed to be increasing, especially in those areas where tyrpanomiasis is prevalent.<br />
Water Supply, Health and Basic Sanitation (US$4.02m, 18 per cent) – BSF funded<br />
27. In some respects the WSBHS component has delivered the most visible and potentially<br />
successful aspects of the entire project, with its most effective aspects being the strengthening of<br />
health services (through construction, rehabilitation, equipping and training) and construction of water<br />
supply points in the eight component Woredas. However, the functional sustainability of water points,<br />
and the utilisation of improved excreta disposal facilities at household level, are areas of concern. In<br />
particular, user fees for water point <strong>main</strong>tenance are too low, and access to spare parts for hand pumps<br />
is extremely problematic.<br />
Integration Across Components<br />
28. <strong>SOCODEP</strong> was a multi-component project, involving at least 7 Regional Government organs 6 ,<br />
three financial institutions 7 , and numerous other stakeholders 8 . There were important potential<br />
synergies between components and stakeholders. The cooperatives were fundamental. Their capacity<br />
to function as viable democratic business entities would determine the extent to which all the<br />
individual project beneficiaries would gain. In the event, their lack of effective re-orientation and<br />
capacity-building has limited the extent to which individual men and women have enjoyed the benefits<br />
of cooperative membership. Credit disbursement depended on the sound functioning of both the<br />
cooperatives and CBE, as the financial intermediary. Neither the cooperatives nor CBE were effective<br />
in channelling loans to individual members. Institutional strengthening of Government organs was<br />
greatly limited in its impact, because of the unsystematic and incomplete way in which it was done,<br />
and because of frequent Government restructuring. Supply of veterinary drugs, construction of roads,<br />
enhancement of health services, and construction of water supplies and sanitation facilities were<br />
5 The evaluation team could find no evidence of any systematic training needs assessment.<br />
6 Those responsible for Agriculture, Cooperatives, Veterinary Services, Water, Health, Finance & Planning,<br />
and Roads, organised in different ways at different times.<br />
7 CBE, OMFI, and <strong>Ethiopia</strong>n Insurance Corporation.<br />
8 Cooperatives and their members, contractors, and consultants.<br />
xii
carried out as separate activities, and in the case of the first two, very little was actually achieved. The<br />
potential synergies were not realised, and the project as a whole could not be described as integrated.<br />
D. <strong>SOCODEP</strong> Assessment<br />
29. Table 2 summarizes the ratings attributed to the project by the evaluation, with the average<br />
ratings given to project evaluated in 2005 for comparison. On many criteria <strong>SOCODEP</strong> scored one<br />
point under the 2005 average. Impact on physical, financial and human assets is comparable with 2005<br />
averages, but the performance of the Southern Region Government is assessed as particularly below<br />
the 2005 average. Because of fundamental weaknesses in project implementation, caused partly by<br />
unrealistic design, partly by insufficiently decisive management, partly by insufficient political<br />
commitment, and partly by externalities including frequent Government restructuring and reshuffling,<br />
<strong>SOCODEP</strong> is assessed overall by this evaluation as ‘Moderately unsuccessful’ (rating of 3).<br />
Table ES2. <strong>SOCODEP</strong> Project Performance: Rating Summary<br />
Evaluation Criteria<br />
Project performance<br />
<strong>SOCODEP</strong> Rating<br />
2005 Project<br />
Evaluations Average<br />
Relevance 5 5<br />
Effectiveness 3 4<br />
Efficiency<br />
Partner performance<br />
3 4<br />
<strong>IFAD</strong> 3 4<br />
Government 3 4<br />
BSF 4 -<br />
UNOPS<br />
Project impact<br />
4 4<br />
Agriculture Productivity 3 -<br />
Physical and Financial Assets 3 4<br />
Human Assets 4 4<br />
Institutions and Services 2 -<br />
Social Capital and Empowerment 2 4<br />
Food Security 3 4<br />
Environment and Common Resource<br />
4 4<br />
Base<br />
Markets 2 -<br />
Overall impact 3 -<br />
Sustainability 2 4<br />
Innovation, Replicability and Scaling-Up 3 4<br />
Overall assessment 3 -<br />
Source: The Evaluation Mission 2007<br />
V. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND KEY ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE<br />
A. Conclusions<br />
30. As with most multi-component projects, the project performance and impacts of <strong>SOCODEP</strong><br />
have been mixed. There seems little doubt that the Project has had a net benefit to the Region, to<br />
individuals in Government, and to some of the target beneficiaries. The key questions relate to<br />
understanding how the benefits could have been greater, and what lessons can be learned for present<br />
and future projects in <strong>Ethiopia</strong> and further a field.<br />
31. Context. <strong>SOCODEP</strong> was one of the first significant internationally funded interventions in<br />
<strong>Ethiopia</strong> following the fall of the former Marxist-Leninist regime (the Derg) in May 1991. The Project<br />
aimed to respond to the then new legislation concerning Cooperatives, which ostensibly set out a<br />
means of turning the former Government-imposed and politically-dominated Producer Cooperatives of<br />
xiii
the Derg into farmer-owned viable business entities serving their members’ interests. In particular, it<br />
aimed to make rural finance (specifically micro-credit) available to so-called Service Cooperatives and<br />
their members.<br />
32. Design. The Project aim, as described in paragraph 31, was an imaginative attempt to respond<br />
to the then new legislation concerning Cooperatives. However, this was an ambitious and in hindsight<br />
an unrealistic goal. A number of factors contributed to the difficulties faced by the <strong>SOCODEP</strong>. First,<br />
the Region’s size, diversity, poor infrastructure and poverty posed numerous development challenges.<br />
Second, the project underestimated the obstacles to and rate of beneficial change and the capacity of<br />
the government for implementation in the post Derg period.<br />
33. Quality of project delivery. <strong>SOCODEP</strong> concentrated on delivery of numerical outputs, such as<br />
cooperatives restructured, credit disbursed, trainings delivered, drugs purchased, ilometres of road<br />
constructed, water points built, and so on. Insufficient emphasis was placed on the quality of these<br />
outputs. For example, insufficient consideration was given to the intensity and duration of activities<br />
required to achieve the desired quality standards. In particular, the human factor of individual and<br />
group (community, cooperative, institution) attitudes were addressed minimally. For example, the<br />
design was too optimistic about the speed with which the former model of cooperatives, centrally<br />
controlled by the government, could be turned around into a member-owned and member-controlled<br />
viable business model. To turn around a failing, politically-established cooperative to become a viable<br />
business serving its members, or to bring about community ownership and management of a water<br />
point demanded a great deal of attention to quality of the investment, not just numbers.<br />
34. However, some of the activities such as upgrading of health facilities and training of staff and<br />
community health workers performed better.<br />
35. Relevance, effectiveness, efficiency. The project objectives and activities were relevant to<br />
needs of the rural poor in southern <strong>Ethiopia</strong> (e.g., in terms of the need for credit, improved market<br />
access, better health services and environmental health) and were consistent with the government’s<br />
regionalization programme. The Project was moderately ineffective achieving some, but not all of its<br />
objectives. Similarly, the project was moderately inefficient. Given the difficult operating environment<br />
in <strong>Ethiopia</strong>, the project could have been more efficient if it had been more realistic and had less<br />
ambitious objectives and coverage. The vast geographic area, poor infrastructure and communication<br />
meant that the projected resources were not optimally used.<br />
36. Sustainability. <strong>SOCODEP</strong>’s benefits are unlikely to continue, partly due to the lack of a<br />
defined exit strategy. Moreover, institutional sustainability is limited and on-going access to credit,<br />
and water supply is not assured.<br />
37. Innovation. At the time of design, <strong>SOCODEP</strong>’s focus on cooperatives and credit represented a<br />
response to the apparent liberalization of national politics and economics, and to the change in<br />
cooperatives legislation. Unfortunately, the country context changed rapidly and the design became<br />
less relevant given the new context. Despite the positive efforts at the Mid-term Review (MTR), the<br />
design adjustments were not adequate given the changing realities. On another issue, the BSF<br />
component introduced an effective monitoring and evaluation system, which however was not<br />
integrated into the other project components. As the project was overstretched and its components<br />
were not integrated, <strong>SOCODEP</strong> offered little opportunity for the learning being generated to be feed<br />
back into the project. Hence, the evaluation considered the project to be moderately unsuccessful in<br />
terms of innovations, replicability and upscaling.<br />
38. Policy dialogue. <strong>SOCODEP</strong> was largely responsive to policy changes and government-led<br />
restructuring. There is little evidence however of the project contributing to <strong>IFAD</strong>’s effective<br />
engagement in policy dialogue in the country.<br />
39. Participation. Probably the single greatest assurance of sustainability at the level of households<br />
and communities is through real commitment to beneficiary participation. However, the evaluation<br />
found that ensuring beneficiary participation in an area with a weak tradition of participation is<br />
xiv
challenging and requires greater commitment in terms of time and resources. As such, approaches<br />
which build on existing social capital (i.e., using indigenous Community Based Organizations), rather<br />
than working through structures imposed from above and outside the beneficiary communities, are<br />
most likely to succeed in the short and long term.<br />
40. Integration. This evaluation <strong>report</strong> has highlighted at a number of points the lack of integration<br />
between the numerous stakeholders and components within <strong>SOCODEP</strong>. Although integration is not<br />
easy, particularly given the restructuring of government organs and redeployment of personnel, it is<br />
the only way to create synergies which can maximize the impact of limited budgets.<br />
41. Management. The management model used by <strong>SOCODEP</strong> limited its effectiveness and<br />
responsiveness to rapid contextual changes that occurred during project implementation. The Project<br />
Coordinator, attempted to harmonize and synchronize the work of several Government organs and<br />
other stakeholders over whom he has no real authority. And support from <strong>IFAD</strong> through supervision<br />
mission mounted annually by the designated cooperating institution the United Nations Office for<br />
Project Services (UNOPS) was insufficient. However, it should be recognized that during the time of<br />
<strong>SOCODEP</strong>, <strong>IFAD</strong> did not have modalities such as direct supervision or field presence to support<br />
project implementation. Although, <strong>IFAD</strong> was responsive in using the tools it had at the time, for<br />
example by undertaking an early and useful MTR and facilitating the inclusion during implementation<br />
of the important BSF component.<br />
42. Weak linkages between partners during implementation. The linkages between the key<br />
stakeholders have <strong>main</strong>ly been achieved by the efforts of the Project Coordinators (four in total, at<br />
various stages of the Project), <strong>IFAD</strong>’s Country Programme Manager (CPM), and UNOPS. The Project<br />
Coordinator’s role was challenging because of his inherent lack of authority, and the CPM’s role is<br />
distant from the day-to-day project management issues to do more than provide general support and<br />
guidance. Also, annual visits by a cooperating institution are insufficient to rescue an underperforming<br />
project. Consequently, the effectiveness of the partnership was limited. Partnership with<br />
the private sector was not a viable option in the early years of the Project, but this option could have<br />
been pursued as implementation progressed. The extent to which partnerships outside of the project<br />
were developed by the implementing stakeholders is limited.<br />
B. Recommendations<br />
43. Design. It is recommended that consideration be given to interventions which are far more<br />
focused in terms of numbers of beneficiaries to be reached and geographic coverage, within the overall<br />
framework of <strong>IFAD</strong>’s targeting policy. This would ensure greater synergies across activities and<br />
ultimately deeper impact on rural poverty. Similarly, the project duration should be long enough to<br />
achieve the desired results and in particular take into account the time needed to implement attitude<br />
and cultural changes. Project management structures should be kept simple to ensure the integration<br />
and harmonization among different implementing agencies.<br />
44. Quality of Project Delivery. It is recommended that greater attention be given in future project<br />
design and implementation to country context issues, and the identification of indicators of quality,<br />
and actions necessary to achieve real and lasting impact, alongside those relating to numerical outputs.<br />
45. Policy Dialogue. It is recommended that more explicit attempts be made to engage in policy<br />
dialogue with Government and other development actors, where appropriate and required involving a<br />
wider range of national and international specialists, rather than just <strong>IFAD</strong> and cooperating institution<br />
staff.<br />
46. Participation. It is recommended that future <strong>IFAD</strong>-funded projects and programmes in<br />
<strong>Ethiopia</strong> pay more attention to people’s participation, especially as it has not been a tradition of<br />
development practice in <strong>Ethiopia</strong> in the past.<br />
47. Integration. In future multi-component projects, it is recommended that greater attention be<br />
paid to the linkages between the components and between those agencies responsible for delivering<br />
xv
them. The evaluation team is in favour of projects which involve multiple components addressing the<br />
diverse needs of target populations – but the difficulties of integrating such efforts should be carefully<br />
considered.<br />
48. Management. Management is more than coordination or supervision, and it should be<br />
addressed with greater rigour in future projects and programmes particularly in challenging contexts as<br />
found in <strong>SOCODEP</strong>. Projects need to be much more decisively managed. It is recommended that new<br />
approaches be explored, either through <strong>IFAD</strong> itself taking a more hands-on role during execution,<br />
facilitated by the Fund’s field presence officer, which allow closer monitoring and follow-up to<br />
implementation.<br />
49. Role of the field presence officer. The field presence officer can, among other tasks, provide<br />
implementation support to <strong>IFAD</strong>-funded operations and has the potential to enhance partnerships and<br />
policy dialogue in <strong>Ethiopia</strong>. Hence, the country presence should be further strengthened, so that it can<br />
play a greater role in enhancing <strong>IFAD</strong>’s development effectiveness in <strong>Ethiopia</strong>.<br />
C. Questions for the Forthcoming Country Programme Evaluation (CPE)<br />
50. In view of the CPE for <strong>Ethiopia</strong> which is planned for 2007, a number of key questions arise<br />
from the present evaluation, which should be addressed in that context. These are:<br />
• Have the present project identification, formulation and appraisal processes encouraged the<br />
setting of unrealistic targets and spreading project of activities too thinly? If so, how can<br />
these tendencies be avoided in future?;<br />
• Are the existing project identification, formulation and appraisal processes sufficiently<br />
participative, in a country in which participation is not a strong tradition? If not, can they be<br />
made more so?<br />
• To what extent have the detailed capacities of project stakeholder institutions been routinely<br />
assessed at the formulation stage, in order to design appropriate capacity-building<br />
programmes? What improvements can be made to this process?<br />
• What has been the impact of the BSF contributions in <strong>Ethiopia</strong>? How can the partnership be<br />
enhanced in future activities?<br />
• How can the present model of project management and supervision be modified to create a<br />
significantly greater degree of the Programme Coordination Unit (PCU) authority and<br />
effectiveness, without de-coupling projects from the implementing institutions? Should<br />
separate project management structures be set up, perhaps using consulting firms, or can the<br />
existing PCU framework be made more effective? How could the field presence officer be<br />
more effective? What model best fits the <strong>Ethiopia</strong>n context? Should clearer guidelines be<br />
framed, setting out responsibilities for taking actions on supervision and MTR<br />
recommendations? Where does the buck stop in terms of project management?; and<br />
• In view of the weak performance of Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) in some <strong>Ethiopia</strong>n<br />
projects, how can a monitoring culture be encouraged, and how can manageable frameworks<br />
be developed and implemented for monitoring of project performance, reflecting both<br />
quantitative and qualitative achievements?<br />
xvi
Federal Democratic Republic of <strong>Ethiopia</strong><br />
Southern Region Cooperatives Development and Credit Project<br />
(<strong>SOCODEP</strong>)<br />
Completion Evaluation<br />
Agreement at Completion Point<br />
I. BACKGROUND AND CORE LEARNING PARTNERSHIP<br />
1. The Southern Region Cooperatives Development and Credit Project (<strong>SOCODEP</strong>) was one of<br />
the first significant internationally funded projects in <strong>Ethiopia</strong> following the fall of the former Marxist-<br />
Leninist regime (the Derg) in May 1991. The Project aimed to respond to the then new legislation<br />
(Proclamation 85/1994) concerning Cooperatives, which set out a means of turning the former<br />
Producer Cooperatives into farmer-owned viable business entities serving their members’ interests. In<br />
particular, it aimed to make rural finance (specifically micro-credit) available to so-called Service<br />
Cooperatives and their members.<br />
2. The project was implemented in the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State<br />
(SNNPRS), which is one of the four largest Regions in <strong>Ethiopia</strong> and is probably the most diverse<br />
Region in ethnic terms, and it contains some of the most remote and wettest parts of the country.<br />
<strong>SOCODEP</strong> was fully implemented from September 1994 until December 2005. More specifically, the<br />
components funded by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (<strong>IFAD</strong>) (excluding the<br />
water, sanitation and health component) were implemented from September 1994 to July 2002, a total<br />
of nearly 8 years with the Mid-term Review (MTR) at the end of 1996. Work on the Belgium Survival<br />
Fund (BSF) component (i.e., the one on water, sanitation and health) commenced in November 1998<br />
and continued until the Project was finally closed in December 2005. The responsibility for<br />
implementing the project changed several times, but began with Southern Regional Agricultural<br />
Bureau (SRAB) and eventually migrated to the Bureau of Finance and Economic Development<br />
(BOFED). The evaluation of the project was conducted in late 2006/7 by <strong>IFAD</strong>’s Office of Evaluation<br />
(OE).<br />
3. Following usual practice for OE evaluations, a Core Learning Partnership 1 (CLP) was<br />
established providing critical inputs at key stages in the evaluation, including comments on the <strong>main</strong><br />
evaluation deliverables.<br />
II. MAIN EVALUATION FINDINGS<br />
4. Design. The Project aim, as described in paragraph one, was an imaginative attempt to respond<br />
to the then new legislation concerning Cooperatives. However, this was an ambitious and in hindsight<br />
an unrealistic goal. A number of factors contributed to the difficulties faced by the <strong>SOCODEP</strong>. First,<br />
the Region’s size, diversity, poor infrastructure and poverty posed numerous development challenges.<br />
Second, the project underestimated the obstacles to and rate of beneficial change and the capacity of<br />
the government for implementation in the post Derg period.<br />
1 Members of the partnership included: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Bureau of Finance<br />
and Economic Development, Bureau of Agriculture and rural Development, SNNPRS, Department of<br />
Cooperatives, SNNPRS, Rural Womens Affairs Team, SNNPRS, Bureau of Health, SNNPRS, Bureau of Water<br />
Resources, SNNPRS, Planning and Programme Department, Rural Roads Authority, SNNPRS, Sodo Rural<br />
Technology Centre, Commercial Bank of <strong>Ethiopia</strong>, Omo Microfinance Institution, the Association of <strong>Ethiopia</strong>n<br />
Microfinance Institutions, Former <strong>SOCODEP</strong> project Director, field presence officer , and the <strong>IFAD</strong> country<br />
programme manager.<br />
xvii
5. Quality of project delivery. <strong>SOCODEP</strong> concentrated on delivery of numerical outputs, such as<br />
cooperatives restructured, credit disbursed, trainings delivered, drugs purchased, kilometres of road<br />
constructed, water points built, and so on. Insufficient emphasis was placed on the quality of these<br />
outputs. For example, insufficient consideration was given to the intensity and duration of activities<br />
required to achieve the desired quality standards. In particular, the human factor of individual and<br />
group (community, cooperative, institution) attitudes were addressed minimally. For example, the<br />
design was too optimistic about the speed with which the former model of cooperatives, centrally<br />
controlled by the government, could be turned around into a member-owned and member-controlled<br />
viable business model. To turn around a failing, politically-established cooperative to become a viable<br />
business serving its members, or to bring about community ownership and management of a water<br />
point demanded a great deal of attention to quality of the investment, not just numbers.<br />
6. However, some of the activities such as upgrading of health facilities and training of staff and<br />
community health workers performed better.<br />
7. Relevance, effectiveness, efficiency. The project objectives and activities were relevant to<br />
needs of the rural poor in southern <strong>Ethiopia</strong> (e.g., in terms of the need for credit, improved market<br />
access, better health services and environmental health) and were consistent with the government’s<br />
regionalization programme. The Project was moderately ineffective achieving some, but not all of its<br />
objectives. Similarly, the project was moderately inefficient. Given the difficult operating environment<br />
in <strong>Ethiopia</strong>, the project could have been more efficient if it had been more realistic and had less<br />
ambitious objectives and coverage. The vast geographic area, poor infrastructure and communication<br />
meant that the projected resources were not optimally used.<br />
8. Sustainability of the <strong>SOCODEP</strong>’s benefits are unlikely to continue, partly due to the lack of a<br />
defined exit strategy. Moreover, institutional sustainability is limited and on-going access to credit,<br />
and water supply is not assured.<br />
9. Innovation. At the time of design, <strong>SOCODEP</strong>’s focus on cooperatives and credit represented a<br />
response to the apparent liberalization of national politics and economics, and to the change in<br />
cooperatives legislation. Unfortunately, the country context changed rapidly and the design became<br />
less relevant given the new context. Despite the positive efforts at the MTR, the design adjustments<br />
were not adequate given the changing realities. On another issue, the BSF component introduced an<br />
effective monitoring and evaluation system, which however was not integrated into the other project<br />
components. As the project was overstretched and its components were not integrated, <strong>SOCODEP</strong><br />
offered little opportunity for the learning being generated to be feed back into the project. Hence, the<br />
evaluation considered the project to be moderately unsuccessful in terms of innovations, replicability<br />
and upscaling.<br />
10. Policy dialogue. <strong>SOCODEP</strong> was largely responsive to policy changes and government-led<br />
restructuring. There is little evidence however of the project contributing to <strong>IFAD</strong>’s effective<br />
engagement in policy dialogue in the country.<br />
11. Participation. Probably the single greatest assurance of sustainability at the level of households<br />
and communities is through real commitment to beneficiary participation. However, the evaluation<br />
found that ensuring beneficiary participation in an area with a weak tradition of participation is<br />
challenging and requires greater commitment in terms of time and resources. As such, approaches<br />
which build on existing social capital (i.e., using indigenous Community Based Organizations), rather<br />
than working through structures imposed from above and outside the beneficiary communities, are<br />
most likely to succeed in the short and long term.<br />
12. Integration. This evaluation <strong>report</strong> has highlighted at a number of points the lack of integration<br />
between the numerous stakeholders and components within <strong>SOCODEP</strong>. Although integration is not<br />
easy, particularly given the restructuring of government organs and redeployment of personnel, it is<br />
the only way to create synergies which can maximize the impact of limited budgets.<br />
xviii
13. Management. The management model used by <strong>SOCODEP</strong> limited its effectiveness and<br />
responsiveness to rapid contextual changes that occurred during project implementation. The Project<br />
Coordinator, attempted to harmonize and synchronize the work of several Government organs and<br />
other stakeholders over whom he has no real authority. And support from <strong>IFAD</strong> through supervision<br />
mission mounted annually by the designated cooperating institution the United Nations Office for<br />
Procurement Services (UNOPS) was insufficient. However, it should be recognized that during the<br />
time of <strong>SOCODEP</strong>, <strong>IFAD</strong> did not have modalities such as direct supervision or field presence to<br />
support project implementation. Although, <strong>IFAD</strong> was responsive in using the tools it had at the time,<br />
for example by undertaking an early and useful MTR and facilitating the inclusion during<br />
implementation of the important BSF component.<br />
14. Weak linkages between partners during implementation. The linkages between the key<br />
stakeholders have <strong>main</strong>ly been achieved by the efforts of the Project Coordinators (four in total, at<br />
various stages of the Project), <strong>IFAD</strong>’s Country Programme Manager (CPM), and UNOPS. The Project<br />
Coordinator’s role was challenging because of his inherent lack of authority, and the CPM’s role is<br />
distant from the day-to-day project management issues to do more than provide general support and<br />
guidance. Also, annual visits by a cooperating institution are insufficient to rescue an underperforming<br />
project. Consequently, the effectiveness of the partnership was limited. Partnership with<br />
the private sector was not a viable option in the early years of the Project, but this option could have<br />
been pursued as implementation progressed. The extent to which partnerships outside of the project<br />
were developed by the implementing stakeholders is limited.<br />
III. KEY RECOMMENDATIONS AGREED BY PARTNERS<br />
15. The following recommendations from the evaluation have been agreed upon by the GOE and<br />
<strong>IFAD</strong>.<br />
16. Design. It is recommended that consideration be given to interventions which are far more<br />
focused in terms of numbers of beneficiaries to be reached and geographic coverage, within the overall<br />
framework of <strong>IFAD</strong>’s targeting policy. This would ensure greater synergies across activities and<br />
ultimately deeper impact on rural poverty. Similarly, the project duration should be long enough to<br />
achieve the desired results and in particular take into account the time needed to implement attitude<br />
and cultural changes. Project management structures should be kept simple to ensure the integration<br />
and harmonization among different implementing agencies.<br />
17. Quality of project delivery. It is recommended that greater attention be given in future project<br />
design and implementation to country context issues, and the identification of indicators of quality,<br />
and actions necessary to achieve real and lasting impact, alongside those relating to numerical outputs.<br />
18. Policy dialogue. It is recommended that more explicit attempts be made to engage in policy<br />
dialogue with Government and other development actors, where appropriate and required involving a<br />
wider range of national and international specialists, rather than just <strong>IFAD</strong> and cooperating institution<br />
staff.<br />
19. Participation. It is recommended that future <strong>IFAD</strong>-funded projects and programmes in<br />
<strong>Ethiopia</strong> pay more attention to people’s participation, especially as it has not been a tradition of<br />
development practice in <strong>Ethiopia</strong> in the past.<br />
20. Integration. In future multi-component projects, it is recommended that greater attention be<br />
paid to the linkages between the components and between those agencies responsible for delivering<br />
them. The evaluation team is in favour of projects which involve multiple components addressing the<br />
diverse needs of target populations – but the difficulties of integrating such efforts should be carefully<br />
considered.<br />
21. Management. Management is more than coordination or supervision, and it should be<br />
addressed with greater rigour in future projects and programmes particularly in challenging contexts as<br />
found in <strong>SOCODEP</strong>. Projects need to be much more decisively managed. It is recommended that new<br />
xix
approaches be explored, either through <strong>IFAD</strong> itself taking a more hands-on role during execution,<br />
facilitated by the Fund’s field presence officer, which allow closer monitoring and follow-up to<br />
implementation.<br />
22. Role of the Field Presence Officer. The field presence officer can, among other tasks, provide<br />
implementation support to <strong>IFAD</strong>-funded operations and has the potential to enhance partnerships and<br />
policy dialogue in <strong>Ethiopia</strong>. Hence, the country presence should be further strengthened, so that it can<br />
play a greater role in enhancing <strong>IFAD</strong>’s development effectiveness in <strong>Ethiopia</strong>.<br />
xx
Federal Democratic Republic of <strong>Ethiopia</strong><br />
Southern Region Cooperatives Development and Credit Project<br />
(<strong>SOCODEP</strong>)<br />
Completion Evaluation<br />
Main Report<br />
I. INTRODUCTION<br />
1. This document is the Evaluation Report prepared following the Completion Evaluation Mission<br />
to the Southern Region Cooperatives Development and Credit Project (<strong>SOCODEP</strong>). The mission was<br />
carried out between September 17 th and October 11 th 2006 by a team of four external evaluators 1<br />
accompanied in the field by two officers of the Southern Region Government 2 and assisted in the<br />
Regional capital by the former Project Coordinator 3 .<br />
Interviewing members of the Argoba cooperative, Gimbo Woreda, Kafa Zone<br />
Source: Evaluation Mission 2007<br />
1 Richard Carter, Team Leader; Ayele Gebre-Mariam, Socio-economist; Tsegaye Asfaw, Microfinance<br />
Specialist; and Michael Assefa, Cooperatives and Capacity-building Specialist. Andrew Brubaker was the<br />
Evaluation Officer from OE responsible for the evaluation.<br />
2 Ato Berhanu Asfaw, Cooperatives Promotion Sector Head; Ato Fekadu Tadesse, Rural Women’s Affairs<br />
Team Expert.<br />
3 Ato Shimekit Gebretsadik.<br />
1
II. COUNTRY BACKGROUND<br />
2. <strong>Ethiopia</strong> is a large (1.1m km 2 ), very diverse and extremely poor country and both its population<br />
density and growth rate are higher than the average for east Africa (Table 1). <strong>Ethiopia</strong> was rated 170<br />
out of 177 in the Human Development rankings in 2006. There is little incentive for farmers to<br />
produce surpluses for distant markets where they will receive very low prices, even in areas where this<br />
is possible. Coffee is <strong>Ethiopia</strong>’s <strong>main</strong> export, securing the livelihood of 700-800,000 households. In<br />
the rural areas, over 32m people live on less than US$0.50 per day. Subsistence agriculture is the <strong>main</strong><br />
source of income for 87 per cent of rural households. Agricultural productivity and income levels are<br />
low and fluctuate due to periodic climatic shocks. Livestock (72 per cent of households own livestock)<br />
is the primary asset to cushion weather shocks. Other than climatic variability, the <strong>main</strong> direct causes<br />
of rural poverty are an ineffective and inefficient agricultural marketing system, underdeveloped<br />
transport and communication networks, very basic manual production technologies, limited access of<br />
rural households to support services, and environmental degradation (soil erosion and deforestation).<br />
3. The fundamental causes of poverty however are political, social and cultural. The political basis<br />
of poverty relates to the ways in which power has been exercised by successive Governments –<br />
particularly over land and resources, and in relation to individual freedoms, and the consequent failure<br />
to empower rural households and communities. The social and cultural aspects of poverty concern the<br />
disadvantages which some occupations and most rural women experience in terms of marginalisation<br />
and lack of ready access to health care, education and employment opportunities. Female-headed<br />
households are more likely to be food insecure than male-headed households. Furthermore, the<br />
political and social elements have combined to discourage participation by rural poor people in<br />
decisions that affect their livelihoods.<br />
A. Project Background<br />
4. <strong>SOCODEP</strong>’s origins. <strong>SOCODEP</strong> was one of the first significant internationally funded<br />
interventions in <strong>Ethiopia</strong> following the fall of the former Marxist-Leninist regime (the Derg) in May<br />
1991. The Project aimed to respond to the then new legislation (Proclamation 85/1994) concerning<br />
Cooperatives, which ostensibly set out a means of turning the former Government-imposed and<br />
politically-dominated Producer Cooperatives of the Derg into farmer-owned viable business entities<br />
serving their members’ interests. In particular, it aimed to make rural finance (specifically microcredit)<br />
available to so-called Service Cooperatives and their members.<br />
5. The Principal Objective of the Project was to “increase agricultural productivity and raise<br />
income levels of the rural poor through support to Service Cooperatives’ development in order to<br />
facilitate efficient provision of sustainable services to members”. The Project had 7 specific objectives<br />
which are set out in Table 2 and further elaborated in the reconstructed logframe in Appendix 4.<br />
6. Together these objectives were designed not only to turn Service Cooperatives (SCs) into<br />
effective vehicles for the service of their members, but also to deliver some specific services (road<br />
construction, veterinary drug supply, health facility up-grading, and provision of water supply and<br />
sanitation services) directly through the relevant Government organs. The Water Supply, Health and<br />
Basic Sanitation Component (WSHBS) was separately financed by the Belgian Survival Fund as a<br />
later addition to the Project.<br />
2
Table 1. Statistical Data<br />
Area and Population<br />
Total area 1,127,127 km 2<br />
Population Approx. 74 million<br />
Population density 65 inhabitants/km 2<br />
Average population density for East Africa 43 inhabitants/km 2<br />
Population growth 2.36 per cent per year<br />
Average population growth for East Africa 2.18 per cent per year<br />
Number of ethnic groups > 80<br />
Number of dialects<br />
Economy and Agriculture<br />
Approx. 200<br />
Per cent of population living in rural areas (2003) 84<br />
Contribution of agriculture to GDP 42 per cent<br />
Contribution of agriculture to exports 75 per cent<br />
Per cent total labour force employed in agriculture 81 per cent<br />
Average GDP growth 1993-2003 4.7 per cent<br />
GDP growth in 2005 9 per cent<br />
per cent total land area arable 45 per cent <strong>IFAD</strong><br />
per cent total land area cultivated 9 per cent<br />
per cent cultivated land irrigated
Table 2. <strong>SOCODEP</strong> Objectives<br />
Principal objective: increase agricultural productivity and raise income levels of the rural poor<br />
through support to Service Cooperatives’ development in order to facilitate efficient provision of<br />
sustainable services to members.<br />
SO1 Provide a model for developing <strong>Ethiopia</strong>n cooperatives under the new legislation,<br />
particularly with respect to improvement of financial intermediation services in rural areas,<br />
which could be replicated in other areas of the country.<br />
SO2 Increased capital and income among the rural poor in the project area through off-farm<br />
income-generating activities particularly for women and families in densely populated areas<br />
with limited land for farm expansion.<br />
SO3 Strengthen the SRAB to carry out its mandate with respect to cooperative development.<br />
SO4 Provide credit to meet financial requirements for agricultural inputs and draught oxen and<br />
facilitate the supply of inputs through support to local traders and cooperatives.<br />
SO5 Relief of livestock health constraints, particularly with respect to draught animals, through<br />
provision of veterinary drugs.<br />
SO6 Improve access of rural families to services and markets by rehabilitating and <strong>main</strong>taining<br />
rural roads.<br />
SO7 (BSF Component) Reduce the burden of disease in 8 woredas of the <strong>SOCODEP</strong> area<br />
Source: Appraisal Report and Approach Paper<br />
7. Project targeting. The special programming mission (1991) distinguished between the more<br />
highly populated Woredas on the east side of the project area (Wolayta), where the carrying capacity<br />
of the land was thought to have been exceeded, and “the rest of the project area”, which had been<br />
neglected previously, but where population pressure was less. Poverty was said to be “… widespread<br />
and fairly evenly distributed…”, and consequently it was “… not considered appropriate to further<br />
refine definition of the target group within the project area on the basis of poverty criteria”. Although<br />
the re-assessment of the nuances of poverty within the project area was not a specific objective of the<br />
evaluation, it would appear that this rather general assessment at Appraisal was somewhat simplistic.<br />
8. Project timescale at appraisal. The project was designed to be implemented over a six year<br />
period. On this basis, as the loans became effective in 1994, the project completion would have been<br />
July 2000, with loan closure in July 2001.<br />
9. The project budget at appraisal (Figure 1). At completion actual expenditure was split<br />
approximately 61 per cent from the International Fund for Agricultural Development (<strong>IFAD</strong>), 21 per<br />
cent from GoE, 15 per cent from the Belgian Survival Fund (BSF), two per cent from Commercial<br />
Bank of <strong>Ethiopia</strong> (CBE), and 1 per cent from Beneficiaries.<br />
4
Figure 1. Budget Costs by Component (million US$, total 22.72m)<br />
Water Supply &<br />
San, 2.28 (10%)<br />
Health &<br />
Nutrition, 1.57<br />
(7%)<br />
Roads, 4.70 (21%)<br />
Veterinary Drugs,<br />
1.89 (8%)<br />
Source: Appraisal Report<br />
WSHBS Mgt &<br />
Coordination, 0.17<br />
(1%)<br />
Support to CBE,<br />
0.39 (2%)<br />
5<br />
Training of SCs,<br />
0.95 (4%)<br />
Credit line thro<br />
CBE, 7.68 (34%)<br />
SSE Promotion,<br />
0.29 (1%)<br />
Support to SRAB,<br />
2.80 (12%)<br />
10. A Note on terminology. The <strong>main</strong> form of cooperatives which were established and active<br />
under the previous Government (The Derg), between the 1974 revolution which overthrew Emperor<br />
Haile Selassie and the fall of the Derg in 1991, were known as Producer Cooperatives. These were<br />
instruments of socialism and Government control, and by popular approval they were<br />
comprehensively looted and destroyed by their members when the Derg fell. Service Cooperatives<br />
(SCs) co-existed with the Producer Cooperatives, but did not have the same political significance, and<br />
many continued to function through the political changes and up to the present day. Most SCs are now<br />
referred to as Multi-purpose Farmers’ Cooperatives. The legislation (Proclamations 85/1994 and<br />
147/1998) makes no reference to different named types of cooperatives, while allowing a wide range<br />
of flexibility in terms of objectives.<br />
11. Components. The achievement of the Project objectives necessitated the implementation of 7<br />
key project components, namely:<br />
• restructuring of service cooperatives;<br />
• provision of loans to cooperatives and their members;<br />
• institutional strengthening/capacity-building of project stakeholders;<br />
• setting up a veterinary revolving drug fund;<br />
• rural roads construction;<br />
• rural water supply; and<br />
• improvements to rural health services and sanitation.<br />
12. In section II, the achievements under each of these components, and the degree to which the<br />
specific objectives have been met, are addressed in detail. The wider impacts of the project are<br />
described and assessed in section III.<br />
13. Project stakeholders. The list of Project stakeholders is long, and complicated by the numerous<br />
reorganizations within the Southern Region Government. Figure 2 shows the <strong>main</strong> stakeholders in a<br />
simplified form.
Source: Appraisal Report<br />
Regional<br />
Agricultural<br />
Bureau:<br />
Cooperatives<br />
Promotion,<br />
Sodo Rural<br />
Technology Centre:<br />
Skills Training for<br />
Small scale<br />
Enterprise<br />
Development.<br />
Figure 2. Main Project Stakeholders<br />
Financial<br />
Institutions:<br />
Commercial Bank<br />
of <strong>Ethiopia</strong>, Omo<br />
Cooperatives<br />
and their<br />
Members<br />
14. Organizational structure. The planned organizational structure for the project was as follows:<br />
the Southern Regional Agricultural Bureau (SRAB) would have overall responsibility for the project.<br />
The Project Coordinator would be the Head of SRAB’s Cooperative Promotion Department. A Project<br />
Steering Committee would draw its membership from:<br />
• SRAB Chief (Chair);<br />
• Project Coordinator (Secretary);<br />
• Representative, Ministry of External Economic Cooperation;<br />
• Head, SRAB Planning and Project Services;<br />
• Head, Rural Credit Department, CBE;<br />
• Chief, Regional Finance Bureau;<br />
• Head, Regional Bureau for Planning and Economic Development;<br />
• Chief, Regional Bureau for Public Works and Urban Development;<br />
• Deputy Chief, Field Operations, SRAB;<br />
• Heads of participating Zonal Agricultural offices; and<br />
• Head, Agricultural Inputs Supply Corporation (AISCO) Regional Coordination Office.<br />
15. Numerous changes in organizational structure took place during implementation. These are<br />
outlined in section II.B.<br />
16. Project timescale. With agreed extensions, the original components of <strong>SOCODEP</strong> (that is,<br />
excluding the water, sanitation and health component) ran from September 1994 until July 2002, a<br />
total of nearly eight years with the Mid-term Review (MTR) at the end of 1996. Work on the BSF<br />
component commenced in November 1998 and continued until Project closure in December 2005,<br />
extending the project to 11 years in total.<br />
17. Progress at key steps. The timescale conceals a number of important points related to<br />
implementation and performance over the project period, however:<br />
• by the time of the Mid-Term Review– carried out in November-December 1996, <strong>report</strong> dated<br />
March 1997 – a total of 77 Service Cooperatives had been restructured, only EB 4.975m<br />
(approx. US$790,000 or ten per cent of the US$7.68m originally allocated) had been<br />
disbursed in the form of loans, the veterinary revolving drugs fund had not commenced<br />
operation, and no roads had yet been completed. The water supply, health and basic<br />
sanitation (BSF) component was still three years away from commencement;<br />
6<br />
Regional (Rural)<br />
Roads Authority:<br />
Road Construction<br />
and Maintenance<br />
Regional<br />
Bureau of<br />
Health: Health<br />
and Sanitation<br />
components<br />
Regional<br />
Bureau of<br />
Water<br />
Resources:
• the supervision mission which followed the MTR (October 1997) referred to a situation of<br />
crisis and unacceptably low pace and efficiency; a year later the 1998 supervision <strong>report</strong>,<br />
although presented in a more up-beat manner, clearly indicated poor progress in most<br />
components; and<br />
• even at the time of the March 2002 supervision visit, although “about 225” service<br />
cooperatives had been restructured, still only EB 18.83m (approx US$2.28m) had been<br />
disbursed in loans. This represented 42per cent of the reduced credit line of US$5.42m<br />
recommended by the MTR. The Women’s Income Generating Activities (WIGA) subcomponent<br />
had recorded strong performance, as had the Water Supply, Health and Basic<br />
Sanitation (WSHBS) BSF project. However, only 74.5km of road rehabilitation and heavy<br />
<strong>main</strong>tenance had been completed – 10 per cent of the appraisal target of 250km<br />
rehabilitation and 450km heavy <strong>main</strong>tenance. Four months from planned loan closure in July<br />
2002, US$10.2m (45per cent of the original budget) re<strong>main</strong>ed unspent 5 .<br />
B. Objectives and Methodology of the Evaluation<br />
18. Overall objectives. The <strong>main</strong> objectives of the evaluation were to: (i) assess the performance<br />
and impact of the <strong>SOCODEP</strong> project; and (ii) generate a series of findings and recommendations that<br />
would serve <strong>IFAD</strong>, the Government of the <strong>Ethiopia</strong>, and other donors in designing and implementing<br />
similar projects and programmes in the future. The special focus of the evaluation, as highlighted in<br />
the Approach Paper, was to be on Cooperatives Development, Rural Microfinance, Socio-economic<br />
impact, and Institutional Capacity-Building.<br />
19. Evaluation methodology. The evaluation followed OE’s guidelines for project evaluations. 6<br />
This included making an assessment of the <strong>SOCODEP</strong> project according to internationally recognized<br />
evaluation criteria, namely: (i) project performance, including relevance, effectiveness and efficiency;<br />
(ii) impact on rural poverty; and (iii) performance of partners involved in the project, including <strong>IFAD</strong>,<br />
government institutions, and others.<br />
20. The approach used for the Evaluation Mission therefore was largely a critical review of<br />
secondary data, and triangulation through correlation of different data sources, a field visit to the<br />
project area, semi-structured interviews, focus groups discussions and comparisons with other donor<br />
funded projects namely the <strong>IFAD</strong>/AfDB-funded the Rural Financial Intermediation Project (RUFIP) 7 ,<br />
Netherlands supported the Kafa Development Programme (KDP) 8 , and the United States Agency for<br />
International Development (USAID) supported the Agricultural Cooperatives in <strong>Ethiopia</strong> Project<br />
(A<strong>CE</strong>) 9 . Specifically, the evaluation included key informant interviews which were held with all<br />
relevant Government organs and other stakeholders at National, Regional, Zonal and Woreda levels.<br />
At National level, the Federal Cooperatives Agency, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development,<br />
and Commercial Bank of <strong>Ethiopia</strong> staff were interviewed, as well as personnel from the RUFIP and<br />
the Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance (VOCA) projects. At Regional level, officers from<br />
the Bureau of Finance and Economic Development, Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development,<br />
Bureau of Health, Bureau of Water, Mines and Energy, and the Rural Roads Authority were<br />
interviewed. Government officials were interviewed in two of the five project Zones (Kafa and the<br />
former North Omo – now Gamo Gofa and Wolayta) and one of the two special Woredas (Derashe). A<br />
5 2002 Supervision <strong>report</strong>, paragraph 27.<br />
6 This included assessing the project against internationally recognized evaluation criteria, namely: (i) project<br />
performance, including relevance, effectiveness and efficiency; (ii) impact on rural poverty; and<br />
(iii) performance of partners involved in the project, including <strong>IFAD</strong>, government institutions, and others.<br />
7 Rural Financial Intermediation Project.<br />
8 Kafa Development Programme, formerly Sustainable Poverty Alleviation Kaficho-Shakicho (SUPAK-S)<br />
9 Agricultural Cooperatives in <strong>Ethiopia</strong> project, implemented since 1999 by ACDI/VOCA (a merger between<br />
the NGOs Agricultural Cooperative Development International and Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative<br />
Assistance).<br />
7
total of ten of the original 33 project Woredas were visited, and discussions held with Government<br />
officials. In each Woreda visited, project-assisted cooperatives were identified and interviews were<br />
held with officials and members. In this way a total of 14 cooperatives were visited, and data collected<br />
on many more. Whenever possible loan beneficiaries were interviewed, and their number in this<br />
evaluation exceeds 20. Four of the six project roads were traveled, and three of the Woredas visited<br />
were chosen specifically because of their inclusion of the BSF component.<br />
21. Secondary sources. The evaluation made good use of available secondary sources of data 10 .<br />
The standard project documentation (Appraisal, Mid-Term Review, and Supervision Reports) was<br />
very valuable, but special note is made of the internal <strong>report</strong>s carried out in 1999 11 and 2001 12 , which<br />
contained some very valuable and critical insights, the significance of which appears to have been<br />
somewhat overlooked at the time. The recently completed and extremely thorough external Project<br />
Completion Report (June 2006) was of great value too, especially for its data on Project achievements.<br />
Our assessment ratings have however frequently diverged from those of the external Project<br />
Completion Report (PCR), concurring more closely with those of the MTR, Supervision Reports, and<br />
internal project <strong>report</strong>s. This matter is elaborated further in section II.D of this <strong>report</strong>.<br />
22. Rating scales used. In section III of this <strong>report</strong> the assessment ratings of project and partner<br />
performance and impact follow <strong>IFAD</strong>’s 6-point rating scale, with scores of 6 representing the highest<br />
achievable, and 1 the lowest. The verbal descriptors of the rating scale scores are those set out in the<br />
December 2005 edition of the <strong>IFAD</strong> Office of Evaluation’s (OE) Evaluation Manual 13 .<br />
III. PROJECT PERFORMAN<strong>CE</strong><br />
A. Design Features<br />
23. Country context. Again <strong>Ethiopia</strong> is an extremely poor country and ranks 170 out 177 on the<br />
Human development rankings. <strong>Ethiopia</strong>’s size, diversity, poor infrastructure and poverty pose<br />
numerous development challenges. The worsening trends in population pressure, environmental<br />
degradation, communicable disease and climate instability add to these challenges. Politically,<br />
<strong>Ethiopia</strong> has undergone a virtually continuous process of change since the 1974 revolution in which<br />
Emperor Haile Selassie was overthrown. The Marxist rule of the Derg from 1974 to 1991 led to many<br />
reforms, but the authoritarian use of power over the peasantry did not change, or if anything, it became<br />
more restrictive. After the fall of the Derg in May 1991, a slow process of liberalisation of economy<br />
and political systems has taken place, but there is still a long way to go before the rural population will<br />
be fully able to participate in anything approaching a free market and transparent democratic processes<br />
of government. Thus there is no doubt that <strong>Ethiopia</strong> is a very difficult country in which to make<br />
progress in terms of development and poverty alleviation.<br />
24. Project design context. Most if not all of the development challenges posed by <strong>Ethiopia</strong>’s<br />
context were known in the early 1990s, and recognised in the Appraisal Report. However, in<br />
retrospect, there was an unrealistic optimism about the rate at which beneficial change (e.g. to the<br />
SCs) could take place, and an implicit assumption that the Government institutions involved were<br />
fully committed to that change process.<br />
10 The evaluation notes the limited range of <strong>report</strong>s and other documents available through the project and<br />
partners due to the frequent moving of the project office which made it challenging to find many documents.<br />
However, the core documents were available and provided a sufficient source of secondary data for the<br />
evaluation.<br />
11 Comprehensive Analysis of Current Situation and Requirements of Cooperatives in <strong>SOCODEP</strong> Areas,<br />
April 1999; Brief Summary of Comprehensive Study on the Small Scale Enterprise and Income Generating<br />
Activities, May 1999.<br />
12 A Baseline Survey Report on Small Scale Enterprises in SNNPR, September 2001.<br />
13 <strong>IFAD</strong> Draft Evaluation Manual. Office of Evaluation, December 2005, and subsequent enhancements.<br />
8
25. The Project correctly identified some of the key difficulties of the Region’s farming households,<br />
namely their inability to access credit and some key services, and poor infrastructure. At the time of<br />
design the Project was imaginative in responding to the new Cooperatives legislation which promised<br />
a significant liberalization of the sector and it included six relevant but only loosely integrated<br />
components. However the project design was flawed in a number of important respects, which are<br />
explained in the following paragraphs.<br />
26. The Project area was too large. With its centre in Awassa, the Regional capital, the most distant<br />
parts of the project area were at least two days’ drive away, and often inaccessible in the rainy season<br />
which stretches from April to September (the western parts of the project area are some of the wettest<br />
in <strong>Ethiopia</strong>) 14 . The sheer size of the project area diluted the impacts of nearly all the project activities,<br />
and helped to undermine sustainability. The Project had a scatter-gun effect, delivering significant<br />
benefits to a relatively small number of individuals (a few tens of thousands) within a much larger<br />
population (4-6m population of the project Woredas, out of the Region’s 14.5m 15 people).<br />
27. The Project duration at design was too short. It was entirely predictable that a new Regional<br />
authority, with no experience of handling projects financed by external donors or IFIs, would take<br />
considerable time to get up to speed. The fact that relatively little was achieved between project<br />
commencement in 1994 and the MTR in 1996 is testimony to this. Similar experiences were observed<br />
in the Special Country Programme, evaluated in 2004 16 . Furthermore, there was no effective start-up<br />
phase during which personnel were effectively oriented to the goals and modus operandi of the<br />
Project.<br />
28. The design was over-optimistic about attitude change. The design exhibited too optimistic a<br />
view of the speed with which the former model of cooperatives – instruments of coercion and control<br />
by the former Government – could be turned around into a member-owned and member-controlled<br />
viable business model. Such a change in mind-set, understanding, attitude and practice was never<br />
going to take place quickly. Even now, 12 years after the first reforming legislation, there is a long<br />
way to go.<br />
29. The Project was never fully owned by Southern Region Government. It is understood that the<br />
negotiations which gave rise to <strong>SOCODEP</strong> took place between the Federal Government and <strong>IFAD</strong>,<br />
and that the Southern Region Government was not involved in the process. Furthermore, it was<br />
explained to the evaluation team by senior Government officials that external project financing has<br />
correspondingly reduced Federal and Regional allocations of funding which otherwise would have<br />
been spent at the discretion of the Regional bureaux. These two factors have contributed to a lack of<br />
ownership by the Region. These issues should have been understood and taken into account at the<br />
design stage.<br />
30. The partnerships were too weak given the project complexity. At design, the project was to be<br />
managed from one Government Bureau (SRAB), with major inputs from two other stakeholder<br />
institutions (CBE and the Bureau of Public Works and Urban Development (BPWUD) – later to be the<br />
Roads Authority). The Rural Technology Centre at Sodo was to be involved in the pilot development<br />
of small-scale enterprises. The addition of the BSF component brought in three other Bureaux (Water,<br />
Health, Finance and Economic Development). When CBE withdrew, the Omo Micro Finance<br />
Institution (OMFI) took its place. Project complexity grew, but project ownership and coordination,<br />
and the ability to manage a multi-sectoral project did not.<br />
31. The Project had no single logical framework and its many components and stakeholders were<br />
not well integrated. This was a multi-component, multi-stakeholder project, but its parts and its actors<br />
14 Even in Kaffa Zone, a relatively accessible part of the western side of the project area, one day’s drive from<br />
Awassa, only 4 out of the 10 Woredas were accessible at the time of the evaluation (September-October 2006).<br />
Some parts of the Zone lie up to 3 days’ walk from the nearest road.<br />
15 Population estimate for 2005.<br />
16 http://www.ifad.org/evaluation/public_html/eksyst/doc/country/pf/ethiopia.pdf<br />
9
were never fully harmonized and integrated. The logical framework used in this evaluation, and a<br />
corresponding version used in the external PCR, had to be reconstructed from the narrative<br />
descriptions in the Appraisal documents and MTR Report. The lack of integration 17 of project<br />
components was in large part (but not only) due to the constant restructuring of Government organs<br />
and the consequent redeployment of personnel, a feature of <strong>Ethiopia</strong>’s Government over at least the<br />
last two to three decades.<br />
32. Implementation mechanisms set out at design were bound to weaken effectiveness and impact.<br />
The design was unrealistic about the mechanisms of implementation. Even without the numerous reorganisations<br />
of Government offices and the constant reshuffling of staff which have characterized the<br />
Derg and post-Derg period, the assumption that the Government staff at Regional, Zonal and Woreda<br />
level would effectively implement a new project according to a set of externally introduced ideas and<br />
expectations – including western free-market ideas of business and of cooperative development - was<br />
over-optimistic. The Appraisal Report foresaw this: “Cooperatives Promotion Department (CPD) staff<br />
lack practical business promotion, management and marketing know-how. Their training has been for<br />
cooperatives under a socialistic system, which is no longer relevant in <strong>Ethiopia</strong>, and major<br />
reorientation is required in the context of operations under a market economy”. In reality this major<br />
reorientation never took place.<br />
33. In relation to specific project components, the selection of the CBE as the vehicle for<br />
transferring credit to service cooperatives was a mistake in hindsight. The Development Bank of<br />
<strong>Ethiopia</strong> (DBE) then known as the Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank (AIDB) was an<br />
alternative at the time, having greater experience of providing rural credit services than CBE. The<br />
design of the Veterinary Revolving Drug Fund (VRDF) was extremely cumbersome, as evidenced by<br />
its very delayed commencement (the first drugs being acquired in 2001, 7 years after the Project<br />
began). The inclusion of a rural roads component was a strong design feature, although the assumption<br />
that service cooperative members would <strong>main</strong>tain the new roads was flawed. The later decision to<br />
upgrade the road design standard (from RR 30 to RR 50), with corresponding implications for<br />
construction costs (a 5-fold increase per km) and <strong>main</strong>tenance (non-suitability for labour-based<br />
<strong>main</strong>tenance) produced good quality roads; however, it limited the reach of this project component.<br />
Water supply was deliberately omitted at the design stage, then a few years later introduced through<br />
the BSF component. The BSF intervention, while much more focused (in only 8 woredas rather than<br />
the original 33 of <strong>SOCODEP</strong> as a whole), in effect represented a separate project, having little relation<br />
to the rest of <strong>SOCODEP</strong>. Overall, <strong>SOCODEP</strong> was a multi-component, multi-stakeholder, project,<br />
which began with a focus on Cooperatives and Credit and the corresponding institutional Capacity-<br />
Building, but which, by adding Veterinary Drugs, Roads, and later Water, Health and Sanitation, still<br />
failed to become an integrated project. A notable omission from the project design was that of markets<br />
– for agricultural inputs and outputs, and the products of small-scale enterprises.<br />
B. Implementation and Outputs<br />
34. Project achievements. Table 3 summarizes the <strong>main</strong> project numerical targets and<br />
achievements, which are discussed in the following paragraphs.<br />
35. Institutional structure during implementation. Reference has already been made to the<br />
changes in institutional structure, which took place during the project. The <strong>main</strong> changes are<br />
highlighted here, in order to place the project achievements in context:<br />
• The project as described at Appraisal was to be managed by the Head of the Cooperatives<br />
Promotion Department of SRAB (as Project Coordinator), and guided by a Project Steering<br />
Committee (PSC);<br />
• Over the course of the project, the post of Project Coordinator was held by four different<br />
individuals, each serving for 2-3 years, so interrupting continuity. Successive Supervision<br />
17 Noted also in the 2002 Supervision Report.<br />
10
missions <strong>report</strong>ed on the weaknesses of the project coordination unit and ineffective<br />
guidance by the project steering committee;<br />
• For the first two years of the project a liaison office in Addis Ababa served the <strong>main</strong> project<br />
coordination office in Awassa. This was closed in 1997, against the better judgment of the<br />
United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) 18 ;<br />
• The organ of the Southern Region Government which was central to the functioning of the<br />
project, namely the Cooperatives Promotion Department started out as a department of<br />
SRAB, then became a full Bureau, and subsequently became a department of the Regional<br />
Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development. These re-organizations inevitably affected<br />
the effectiveness of this organ of Government;<br />
• After the MTR, and with the commencement of the BSF component (which involved two<br />
more Bureaux of Regional Government), the PCU migrated from the Bureau of Agriculture<br />
and Rural Development (BOARD) to the Bureau of Finance and Economic Development<br />
(which had been recently created from the two former separate Bureaux of Finance and<br />
Planning). This move was probably necessary because of the widening of <strong>SOCODEP</strong>’s<br />
activities, but it caused some understandable resentment in the Cooperatives Promotion<br />
Office; and<br />
• CBE, as the channel for disbursement of credit to the project cooperatives, soon found itself<br />
in difficulties, recording this in an internal <strong>report</strong> dated January 2001. By July 2002 CBE<br />
terminated all loan disbursements to cooperatives.<br />
36. The frequent changes to the institutional structure of the project, the weak capacity of some<br />
players, the limited real authority of the Project Coordinators, and the influence of those with greater<br />
power, provides the context within which the (limited) achievements of the project should be seen.<br />
18 UNOPS Supervision Report December 1997, paragraph 12.<br />
11
Aspect<br />
Table 3. <strong>SOCODEP</strong> Numerical Targets and Achievements<br />
Appraisal<br />
Target<br />
Revised Target<br />
(at MTR)<br />
12<br />
Achieved<br />
Percentage<br />
of MTR<br />
Percentage<br />
of Appraisal<br />
Cooperatives<br />
Coops restructured (No.) 200 150 267 178 134<br />
Credit<br />
Individual loans for inputs 60000 6,219 10<br />
WIGA loans 10000 7,600 76<br />
Ox loans 50000 14,579 29<br />
Flour mills & maize shellers 170 23 14<br />
Coops with loans for Marketing 75 98 131<br />
Coops with loans for Stores 75 0<br />
Coops with loans for Shops 200 66 33<br />
Credit disbursed (US$m) 7.68 Reduce by US$1.4m 2.96 43 39<br />
Small-scale Enterprise Development<br />
Vocational Training (trainees) 215 316 147<br />
Jobs created 2,100 Negligible<br />
Loans for SSEs (EB) 2,200,000 55,456 3<br />
Veterinary Revolving Drugs Fund<br />
Veterinary drugs (US$m) 1.89 Increase by US$0.58m 0.29 12 15<br />
Roads<br />
Rehab to RR 30 standard (km) 250 Reduced to 125km 122 98 49<br />
Heavy <strong>main</strong>tenance (km) 450 0 0<br />
Health and Sanitation<br />
Health facilities upgraded 8 N/A 8 100<br />
Human RDF locations 8 N/A 8 100<br />
Household latrines 1,000 N/A 2,320 232<br />
Household refuse pits 1,000 N/A 269 27<br />
Water Supply<br />
Waterpoints - new and rehab 164 N/A 171 104<br />
* Source: Appraisal Report, MTR, internal PCR, external PCR<br />
C. Restructuring of Service Cooperatives<br />
37. Restructuring of Service Cooperatives (now known as Multi-Purpose Farmers’ Cooperatives).<br />
At Appraisal it was recognised that the Cooperatives Promotion Division of SRAB had experience of<br />
supporting cooperatives under a socialist economy, but that there was no experience of supporting<br />
cooperatives established “…in accordance with international principles of cooperation”. It was further<br />
recognised that “…even before disturbances at the time of the change in Government, which resulted<br />
in looting and destruction of some cooperatives’ property, SCs were not operating efficiently”.<br />
<strong>SOCODEP</strong> therefore aimed to turn SCs into financially viable autonomous organisations which would<br />
provide sustainable services in the future. The Cooperative Development component of the Project<br />
had three sub-components, namely training, small-scale enterprise promotion, and institutional<br />
support. <strong>SOCODEP</strong> would train and equip Government Cooperatives staff, appoint professional<br />
managers to SCs, train Cooperatives officers and members.<br />
38. The Project more than met its numerical targets in terms of re-organising SCs under the new<br />
legislation. The Appraisal target of 200 cooperatives restructured 19 was exceeded by about 30 per cent.<br />
A great deal of training of SC staff, executive committees and members was also carried out 20 . It is<br />
estimated 21 that almost 57,000 individuals in Government or cooperatives received some form of<br />
19 This target was reduced by the MTR from 200 to 150.<br />
20 Project Completion Report, June 2006, Annex II, Table 2 reproduced as Appendix 2 of this Report.<br />
21 External PCR, June 2006, Annex II, Table 2.
training, varying in duration from one day to two years, and much of the shorter-term training was<br />
targeted at cooperative officers and members.<br />
39. In terms of achievement, it is clear that although the project activities resulted in significant<br />
numerical outputs, the quality of those outputs (the extent of cooperative re-orientation and the<br />
enhancement of business competence) could have been much higher. Comparison of <strong>SOCODEP</strong><br />
activities with those of the USAID-supported VOCA/A<strong>CE</strong> project suggest that an intensive<br />
programme of well-designed and structured training by very experienced individuals, with sound<br />
monitoring and follow-up, was needed to achieve the project goals.<br />
D. Provision of Loans to Cooperatives and their Members<br />
40. Credit. Loans which were initially channelled through CBE (until the withdrawal of this Bank<br />
in 2002), and later through Omo Microfinance Institution (OMFI), were used for two <strong>main</strong> purposes:<br />
(a) financing the activities of the Cooperatives themselves (consumer shops, flour mills, purchase and<br />
sale of agricultural produce), and (b) individual loans to cooperative members (for purchase of work<br />
oxen, purchase of sheep and goats for fattening or rearing, and investment in small-scale enterprises).<br />
Because of the weak business skills of many of the cooperatives, the first of these have been largely<br />
unsuccessful (except in the coffee producing areas, where marketing of coffee has been lucrative),<br />
while many of the individual loans supplied to cooperative members have made a real difference to the<br />
lives of the recipients (see sections II.C and III).<br />
41. Loan disbursement and recovery for cooperative activities (flour mills, consumer shops and<br />
produce marketing) have generally fallen short of target. Initially, the rehabilitation and installation of<br />
160 flour mills was planned, but only 13 new flour mills were installed and 10 were rehabilitated at a<br />
total cost of EB 1.1m. The flour mills performed poorly and the recovery rate of the loans was also<br />
very poor at 47 per cent. The operations of most flour mills were discontinued because of poor<br />
<strong>main</strong>tenance and stiff competition from private flour mill operators. A total of 66 loans were provided<br />
to SCs for operating consumer shops. The total disbursement was EB 2.1m, i.e. 53 per cent of the<br />
EB 4.0m initially budgeted. Although the repayment of the loans was <strong>report</strong>ed to be 93 per cent, at<br />
present most consumer shops are not operational due to lack of <strong>main</strong>tenance and competition from the<br />
private sector. The fact that cooperatives cannot generally compete with the private sector in flour mill<br />
operation and consumer shops is evidence of their lack of business-orientation. In respect to produce<br />
marketing service, 98 SCs received a total loan of EB 2.45m, 130 per cent of the Appraisal target, and<br />
the loan repayment was 77 per cent.<br />
42. Loan disbursement for individual activities of SC members generally did better than those for<br />
cooperative activities, although repayment rates were often low. In particular 7,600 loans to women<br />
for fattening and multiplication of small ruminants, petty trading and other activities were made, and<br />
in their case, repayment rates were high, especially after Omo Microfinance took over from CBE. Box<br />
1 sets out two case studies of women beneficiaries, both of whom benefited from loans supplied<br />
through small group membership along the pattern established by OMFI. These illustrate in a positive<br />
way what is possible.<br />
43. An observation made during the evaluation was that the loan repayment culture differs<br />
significantly between the west and east of the project area. In the west, individuals take great pride in<br />
repaying loans, and they take great care not to risk going to their graves in debt. In the east and southeast<br />
of the project area however this culture does not appear to be so strong, and defaulting is more<br />
prevalent 22 .<br />
22 The reasons for this difference in repayment culture are not clear, but the evaluation team was not the first<br />
to observe it.<br />
13
Box 1. Two Examples from Individual Beneficiaries of OMFI Loans<br />
Lateshe Lache, aged 35, a house wife with six children, with 9th grade education, was a member of<br />
Sake SC in Woyde Woreda in Wolayta Zone. She became a member of one of the groups organized in<br />
the area by the OMFI. Subsequently, she was provided with a loan of EB 500 by OMFI through the<br />
Sake SC to carry out butter trading. She said the loan of the first cycle was properly utilized for the<br />
intended purpose and she made a profit of EB 300. Upon settling her debts, she was again provided<br />
with a second cycle loan of EB 500 for the same type of petty trading activity and managed to make a<br />
profit of EB 360 and fully settled all her debts to OMFI. With a continuous success, she was granted a<br />
third cycle loan of EB 1,000 and <strong>report</strong>edly made a profit of EB 700. Subsequently she repaid all her<br />
debts to OMFI. However, as her business continued to expand, she borrowed for a fourth cycle loan<br />
amount of EB 4,000 to carry out and expand her trade activities, <strong>main</strong>ly the butter and grain trading<br />
activities. Lateshe was extremely happy about her trade business activities and, as a result, she was<br />
highly optimistic for further success in her trade. She said she has a house worth EB 15,000 and other<br />
assets.<br />
Bezunesh Mena, aged 30, a house wife with two children, became a member of Wachiga SC in Sodo<br />
Zuria Woreda in Wolayta Zone. Subsequently, she joined a group organized by OMFI and got access<br />
to a loan of EB 250. She utilized the loan for grain and butter trading activities and made profits. After<br />
one year, she fully repaid her loan, and with the profits she established a small bakery., while<br />
continuing her butter and grain trading activities. Bezunesh has carried out her business activities for<br />
the last ten years, and now she own a house worth EB 10,000 plus 3 cows and a pair of draught oxen.<br />
She also works as a family planning agent in her community and gets EB 75 per month, working two<br />
days per week. However, she spends most of her time attending her usual business activities.<br />
* Source: The Evaluation<br />
44. The total disbursement of the credit component of the project was generally low, both for<br />
cooperative and individual member activities. Table 4 illustrates this for the individual member<br />
activities. Overall, EB 20.7m (approx US$2.96m) was disbursed to and through SCs, representing<br />
about 39 per cent of the target at Appraisal.<br />
45. The project failed to provide a wider range of microfinance services other than credit and ox<br />
insurance. Although <strong>SOCODEP</strong> correctly identified lack of access to credit as a limiting factor for<br />
farmers and cooperatives, and although insurance was a condition of ox loans, other financial services<br />
– especially savings - do not seem to have been considered for inclusion, and the ox insurance<br />
programme did not serve its clientele well 23 .<br />
Table 4. Loans Made Through <strong>SOCODEP</strong> for Individual Activities<br />
Purpose of loan Target at Appraisal Achievement Comments<br />
Input supply<br />
60,000 individual<br />
beneficiaries of input<br />
credit at average of<br />
EB 150 per farmer.<br />
Total loan utilization<br />
EB 2.01m, reaching<br />
6,219 SC members.<br />
22 per cent achievement in terms of credit<br />
disbursed; 10 per cent in terms of<br />
beneficiaries. Recovery rate 68 per cent.<br />
WIGA<br />
Loans to 10,000<br />
women.<br />
7,600 women<br />
recipients (76 per<br />
cent of target).<br />
Average loan EB 300 (approx US$45).<br />
Total disbursed EB 2.2m (approx US$<br />
320,000). Recovery rates 79 per cent<br />
(CBE) and 99.8 per cent (OMF).<br />
SSE<br />
170 enterprises;<br />
2,100 jobs created.<br />
negligible<br />
Only EB 55,456 (approx US$8,000)<br />
disbursed during entire project period.<br />
Draught oxen<br />
50,000 oxen<br />
purchased.<br />
14,579 oxen (29 per<br />
cent of target).<br />
Loan recovery rate 68 per cent; high<br />
mortality (14 per cent); low payout from<br />
insurance scheme.<br />
* Source: PCR and Evaluation<br />
23 The ox insurance scheme was not popular with loan beneficiaries, because it represented an additional<br />
financial burden, and it only paid out in a minority of cases of mortality. This was most likely because of poor<br />
administration of the claim execution process, in which the death of an ox had to be <strong>report</strong>ed to the Cooperative,<br />
cause of death verified by a Veterinary Officer, and completed claim forms delivered to the offices of the<br />
<strong>Ethiopia</strong>n Insurance Corporation.<br />
14
Institutional Strengthening/Capacity-Building of Project Stakeholders<br />
46. Institutional capacity-building. If institutional capacity-building is generally taken as<br />
including changes to the policy environment, organizational reform, putting in place management<br />
systems, technical and management training, provision of physical resources, and changing of<br />
attitudes, then <strong>SOCODEP</strong> only partially addressed the matter of capacity-building of Government and<br />
other stakeholder institutions. <strong>SOCODEP</strong> delivered a great deal of training (see Appendix 2) and<br />
physical resources, to Regional and lower levels of Government, as well as to CBE, OMFI, and SC<br />
personnel and members.<br />
47. Training. In order to strengthen institutional capacity, 23 international and 39 domestic<br />
trainings were delivered to 56,912 trainees from partner bureaux at all levels and SCs executive<br />
committee, staff and members between 1998 and 2005. Eight of the distance learning students from<br />
the Bureau of Finance and Economic Development (BOFED) are still following their MSc study in<br />
Financial Management from UK in 2006, four years after the <strong>main</strong> project loans were closed.<br />
48. At the time of Appraisal, the profound needs for training and re-orientation were clear: “…<br />
Cooperative Promotion Department (CPD) staff lack practical business promotion, management and<br />
marketing know-how. Their training has been for cooperatives under a socialistic system, which is no<br />
longer relevant in <strong>Ethiopia</strong>, and major reorientation is required in the context of operations under a<br />
market economy”. Two years later the mid-term review of the project said that: “…the basic<br />
restructuring and the breaking up of the CPD into different teams requires redesigning the training<br />
programme conceived at appraisal. A comprehensive cooperative promotion and training programme<br />
for the next four years is considered to be necessary and urgent. It will replace all training that was<br />
proposed for the re<strong>main</strong>ing four years at appraisal and has been designed to ‘restart from scratch’”.<br />
49. Physical resources. The stakeholder organisations received a good deal of physical equipment 24<br />
including 65 cars (double cabin pick-ups and land cruiser station wagons) and 3 buses, 300<br />
motorbikes, two newly built offices, computers, office furniture, 6-communication radios, and<br />
different types of audiovisual equipment. Road building equipment including: 9 dump trucks, 3<br />
bulldozers, 3 graders, 2 loaders, 2 rollers, many spare parts and other supplies were provided by the<br />
project. But during this evaluation mission, and as has been the case during the Supervision missions,<br />
the destination of some of the project vehicles was impossible to trace. It was also confirmed by the<br />
Supervision missions 25 and during the evaluation mission that vehicles and other equipment were not<br />
always used for the intended purposes.<br />
Setting Up a Veterinary Revolving Drug Fund<br />
50. Veterinary Revolving Drugs Fund (VRDF). The Veterinary RDF was implemented late in the<br />
project, with the first drugs procurement in 2001. Discussions at Woreda level confirmed that the<br />
acquisition of <strong>SOCODEP</strong> drugs made a significant contribution to the ability of Government<br />
Veterinary personnel to provide treatments, but, as the PCR points out, the procurement process was<br />
initially very cumbersome. Now that the RDF is dwindling, supplies to Woredas are reducing, and the<br />
incidence of animal disease is increasing again.<br />
51. Aim of the component. <strong>SOCODEP</strong> was not directly concerned with livestock production, but a<br />
considerable amount of credit was provided for work oxen, and to women fattening small ruminants<br />
and cattle. The objective of the VRDF therefore was “to provide limited relief of livestock health<br />
constraints, particularly with respect to draught animals, through provision of veterinary drugs”. This<br />
was intended to improve animal health in the project area, verified by reduced mortality rates and<br />
incidence of diseases. The sub-component was intended to back-up the credit activities associated with<br />
the supply of work oxen and women’s income generating activities involving cattle and sheep<br />
fattening. The project was to finance the importation of a limited supply of veterinary drugs and<br />
24 Information obtained from PCU.<br />
25 eg the 2003 Supervision Report, paragraph 30.<br />
15
allowances for veterinary assistance in the project area. The supply of drugs was expected to operate<br />
on a revolving fund basis with the regional veterinarian advising on drugs to be purchased. At<br />
appraisal, it was proposed that the funds allocated for this purpose would be held by SRAB with the<br />
National Bank of <strong>Ethiopia</strong>. The sale and purchase of drugs was to be performed through the Zonal and<br />
Woreda veterinary clinics. All drugs were to be sold to stockowners on a cash basis with a 25 per cent<br />
mark-up. Funds collected from the sales were expected to be reconverted into foreign currency and<br />
deposited in the National Bank of <strong>Ethiopia</strong> (NBE) account and used for future drug purchase.<br />
52. Achievements. The operational modalities for the revolving fund were put in place in 1999.<br />
The Regional BOARD received 6 vehicles and motorcycles to support the WIGA livestock fattening<br />
activities and the administration of the fund. At Zonal and Woreda levels 140 veterinarians and<br />
assistant veterinarians, and 300 veterinary technicians received training on the operation of the<br />
revolving fund. Appropriate receipt and ordering forms for drugs were designed, printed and<br />
distributed at field level. After drug purchase and distribution, follow up field visits were conducted to<br />
check the sales and <strong>report</strong>ing system. According to the veterinary <strong>report</strong>s 313,140 animals have been<br />
treated for trypanosomiasis; more than 20,000 animals were treated for various infectious diseases;<br />
450,000 sheep and goats have been treated for internal parasites; about 500,000 animals have been<br />
treated for external parasites; and more than 10,000 animals have been treated for other diseases. 26<br />
53. Disbursement. A total of EB 10.7m (US$1.89m) was budgeted for the component. Actual<br />
utilization was only EB 2.1m (19 per cent of allocated fund).<br />
Rural Roads Construction<br />
54. Rural roads construction. A total of 6 roads were constructed through <strong>SOCODEP</strong>, to a higher<br />
standard than originally assumed (RR 50 rather than RR 30), and at a consequently much higher unit<br />
cost. This meant that the Appraisal targets had to be revised downwards at MTR. However, despite the<br />
relatively small amount of construction and its scattered nature, the quality of at least the four roads<br />
traveled in this evaluation is good 27 , and the impact on those now able to use them 28 is significant.<br />
Furthermore, the equipment provided to the Roads Authority has allowed it to continue construction<br />
elsewhere, and this is expected to continue for some time to come.<br />
55. A total of 122km of rural road construction was carried out. Table 5 shows the achievements of<br />
this component. Unit costs varied widely, from approximately EB 36,000 (US$4,200) to EB 170,000<br />
(US$20,000) per km.<br />
56. Overall, the roads component, like many of the other components described so far, resulted in<br />
useful achievements, but which fell far short of those anticipated at Appraisal. The <strong>main</strong> reason for<br />
this was the raising of the design standards and hence unit costs of the roads constructed. Furthermore,<br />
while it is acknowledged that <strong>SOCODEP</strong> had little influence on roads policy, a greater effort should<br />
have been made in pursuing a labour-based <strong>main</strong>tenance strategy which would have been more<br />
appropriate for the benefiting communities.<br />
26 <strong>SOCODEP</strong>, undated, Veterinary Component Project Activity <strong>report</strong>.<br />
27 As good, that is, as other non-<strong>SOCODEP</strong> roads travelled. However, gullying and erosion problems are<br />
evident, and <strong>main</strong>tenance is needed.<br />
28 Mostly on foot.<br />
16
Road name<br />
Table 5. Rural Roads Constructed by <strong>SOCODEP</strong> (in km)<br />
Total<br />
length<br />
(km)<br />
Year<br />
started<br />
17<br />
Year<br />
completed<br />
Cost<br />
(EB)<br />
Total<br />
beneficiaries 29<br />
Gazer – Tolta 22.0 2001 2004 3,343,078 29,661<br />
Arba Minch –<br />
Zigiti<br />
21.5 2001 2004 3,657,797 38,900<br />
Chiri - Udadish 22.5 2001 2004 1,916,711 8,920<br />
Shewa - Bench-<br />
Maji<br />
12.0 2002 1998 1,499,238 46,000<br />
Gojeb - Argoba 10.0 1997 1997 357,518 5,373<br />
Wajifo - Boreda 34.0
constructed two motorized water schemes from spring sources and one motorized scheme from a<br />
shallow borehole 31 . In total 171 new or rehabilitated water points were constructed (as against target at<br />
Appraisal of 164).<br />
59. The quality of construction of the water points seen in the evaluation was generally adequate,<br />
but the water points were not well separated from livestock and drainage was poor. Upkeep and<br />
<strong>main</strong>tenance of water points betrayed weaknesses in community ownership and management, issues<br />
which are explored further in section III.<br />
60. Training of local artisans and the community to construct and operate water facilities. A total of<br />
311 members of Community Water Committees received training in the management of water points,<br />
financial management and environmental hygiene, sanitation and health. In year 2000 two water<br />
officers, 5 community organizers, 13 water committees and 15 water scheme operators were trained in<br />
water supply management. In the same year, 175 water technicians and Water Committee members<br />
received training. In 2003, 14 Woreda technicians were trained in the design and construction of water<br />
supply systems 32 . The existing technical manual for the operation and <strong>main</strong>tenance of water supply<br />
and sanitation facilities was simplified and made available to caretakers of water points. At least two<br />
women were included in each Community Water Committee and every participating village was<br />
represented at a community-training workshop.<br />
A Public Tapstand in the Yakima Gravity Scheme,<br />
Ofa Woreda, Wolayta Zone<br />
Source: Evaluation Mission 2007<br />
18<br />
61. Overall, the water supply component<br />
has the potential to deliver significant<br />
benefits to the target populations. Improved<br />
access to better quality domestic water can<br />
lead to significant time savings for women in<br />
particular, and it can contribute to improved<br />
health. However, it is widely recognised that<br />
significant health impacts are only achieved<br />
through an integrated approach to water<br />
supply, sanitation and hygiene promotion.<br />
Because of weaknesses in the integration of<br />
these three aspects, and because of the limited<br />
emphasis on hygiene promotion, the<br />
evaluation team had serious concerns about<br />
impact in this area (on health, in particular).<br />
Furthermore, concerns about functional<br />
sustainability of water supply infrastructure<br />
undermine the limited impacts achieved.<br />
62. Health and sanitation. The construction, rehabilitation and equipping of health facilities, and<br />
the training of staff and community members have no doubt contributed significantly to the<br />
improvement of the health condition of local populations. There has however been little integration<br />
between the activities focused on delivery of health services, and the supposedly health-targeted<br />
activities of sanitation and water supply. In the case of sanitation, the <strong>report</strong>ed high levels of latrine<br />
construction 33 and ownership 34 may have more to do with the Government’s push through the Woreda<br />
and kebele councils to increase coverage quickly, than with the BSF component itself. Some Woreda<br />
officials admit privately that the top-down approach of Government may well be increasing numbers<br />
of latrines, but that usage is another question.<br />
31 <strong>IFAD</strong>, 2006. <strong>SOCODEP</strong> Project Completion Report.<br />
32 <strong>IFAD</strong>, 2006. <strong>SOCODEP</strong> Project Completion Report.<br />
33 Using local materials rather than concrete sanplats.<br />
34 75 per cent in the BSF woredas, according to the BSF Impact Assessment.
63. Health centres and equipment. The health centers at Sawla and Karat were rehabilitated in<br />
addition to a new construction of Health Station at Mure in Offa Woreda. Medical equipment ranging<br />
from basic weighing scales to operating tables was supplied to 3 Health Centres and 2 Health Stations<br />
in order to promote improved health care delivery. Non-medical equipment was also supplied to the<br />
health facilities and to three Zonal health offices. Revolving Drug Funds were set up in 8 health<br />
facilities.<br />
64. Transport and logistical support. Two twin cab pick-ups and 22 motorcycles were supplied<br />
and added to the pool of transport, which distributes drugs and vaccines and is used for the supervision<br />
of health services.<br />
65. Training. Under the health and nutrition sub-component was expected to cover (i) training of<br />
qualified physicians, nurses and anesthetists in emergency surgery; (ii) training of 24 trainers to<br />
provide in service training for health workers; (iii) training of 80 health workers in health<br />
management; (iv) training of 80 health workers and 80 traditional birth attendants; (v) training for 12<br />
nutrition officers; (vi) training for a Monitoring and Evaluation Officer on participatory Monitoring<br />
and Evaluation (M&E) methodologies; and (vii) training for health and administrative staff on<br />
prescriptions and use of essential drugs. 35<br />
66. Results achieved in training health department staff. Nine clinical staff were trained in<br />
anesthesiology; 18 health staff were trained as trainers and 77 were trained in health management.<br />
Nutrition training was provided to 26 nutrition officers and 18 general health staff. Refresher training<br />
was provided in aspects of health service delivery to 86 health workers and 50 sanitation officers<br />
received training on latrine installation and community health activities. A total of 92 environmental<br />
health officers attended refresher training in environmental sanitation, financial management, and the<br />
operation of the drug revolving fund. In addition, the focal person in the Regional Health Bureau<br />
attended a degree course in community health for one year in planning and community organization. 36<br />
67. Results achieved in training the communities. A total of 43 village people were trained to<br />
become Primary Health workers and 21 were trained to become community health agents. An<br />
additional 190 existing Community Health Workers and 42 Traditional Birth Attendants received<br />
refresher training. More than 760 members of the Kebele Health and Sanitation Committees were<br />
trained in basic health and sanitation. The community based voluntary workers have become<br />
community educators, mobilizing the community to promote health and basic sanitation in the<br />
villages. 37<br />
68. Basic sanitation sub-component. A total of 227 demonstration latrines were constructed in<br />
public places such as schools, health facilities, SCs and Kebeles. 2,320 household latrines were<br />
constructed. 68 demonstration public refuse pits and 269 household refuse pits were constructed.<br />
Members of the Health and Sanitation Committees (HSC) carried out campaigns in promoting<br />
sanitation. 38<br />
69. Overall, the health and sanitation component has delivered significant improvements in health<br />
facilities, training and equipment in the 8 BSF project Woredas. However, long-term impact and<br />
sustainability of these interventions are a matter of concern, as all these services need on-going<br />
investment and support.<br />
70. <strong>SOCODEP</strong> achievements. Figure 3 summarizes 20 numerical achievements of <strong>SOCODEP</strong> as<br />
compared to the targets set at Appraisal.<br />
35 FAD, 2006. <strong>SOCODEP</strong> Project Completion Report.<br />
36 <strong>IFAD</strong>, 2006. <strong>SOCODEP</strong> Project Completion Report<br />
37 <strong>IFAD</strong>, 2006. <strong>SOCODEP</strong> Project Completion Report<br />
38 Opp.Cit p.27<br />
19
Achievement as % of<br />
Appraisal Target<br />
Figure 3. <strong>SOCODEP</strong>: Quantitative Achievements against Targets at Appraisal<br />
250<br />
200<br />
150<br />
100<br />
50<br />
0<br />
Coops restructured (No.)<br />
Individual loans for inputs<br />
WIGA loans (No.)<br />
Ox loans (No.)<br />
Flour mills & maize shellers<br />
Coops with loans for Marketing<br />
Coops with loans for Stores<br />
Coops with loans for Shops<br />
Credit disbursed (USDm)<br />
Vocational Training (individuals)<br />
Jobs created<br />
Loans for SSEs (EB)<br />
Veterinary drugs (USDm)<br />
Rehab to RR30 standard (km)<br />
Heavy <strong>main</strong>tenance (km)<br />
Health facilities upgraded<br />
Human RDF locations<br />
Household latrines<br />
Household refuse pits<br />
Water supply points<br />
* Source: Appraisal Report, PCRs, Supervision Reports, and the Evaluation<br />
E. Attaining Project Objectives<br />
71. Specific objective 1. Provide a model for developing <strong>Ethiopia</strong>n cooperatives under the new<br />
legislation, particularly with respect to improvement of financial intermediation services in rural areas,<br />
which could be replicated in other areas of the country.<br />
72. The need for intensive re-orientation over several years, and the very mixed performance of<br />
cooperatives in reality, puts in question the achievement of this objective. Because of weak<br />
management and design flaws, the project failed to provide a replicable model. Even with more<br />
intensive and concerted re-orientation, this evaluation team questions the appropriateness of the<br />
cooperative model, except in situations where cooperatives are demonstrably advantageous, or where<br />
there is no alternative. Cooperatives as businesses retain many of the features of Government-imposed<br />
institutions, namely salaries, per diems, and a bureaucratic mentality. Consequently they often fail to<br />
compete with the private sector.<br />
73. At the end of the <strong>SOCODEP</strong> intervention, Cooperatives are weak. Working Paper 1 Table 1<br />
presents a long list of weaknesses and causes of those weaknesses of 7 cooperatives assessed in the<br />
evaluation. These include inability to compete with the private sector; misappropriation of funds; low<br />
morale; lack of trust between members and cooperative officers; lack of management competence;<br />
lack of full-time managers; and lack of on-going support from the Cooperatives office. Figure 4<br />
summarizes this situation visually. During the evaluation, the opportunity was taken to compare the<br />
approaches of <strong>SOCODEP</strong> and VOCA’s A<strong>CE</strong> programme in regard to the strengthening of<br />
cooperatives. VOCA’s approach is more intensive, more organized, well monitored, and consequently<br />
more effective in building the capacity of its target cooperatives. It should be noted however that<br />
VOCA has been more selective in its choice of cooperatives than <strong>SOCODEP</strong>, focusing on merit rather<br />
than need, and picking the ‘low-hanging fruit’ rather than taking the less discriminating approach of<br />
<strong>SOCODEP</strong>. VOCA did not provide loans to cooperatives, unlike <strong>SOCODEP</strong>. Discussions with the<br />
RUFIP programme revealed that, just as with <strong>SOCODEP</strong>, it is relatively easy to make quantitative<br />
progress in terms of establishing or re-registering cooperatives, but to deliver well-planned and<br />
effective training is much more time-consuming and demanding.<br />
20
No full-time<br />
manager<br />
Poor governance<br />
Misappropriation<br />
of funds<br />
Lack of capital<br />
* Source: The Evaluation<br />
Figure 4. Cooperatives: Findings from the Evaluation<br />
74. In light of the present-day performance of cooperatives, the quality of restructuring and reorientation<br />
of cooperatives delivered by <strong>SOCODEP</strong> has to be questioned. In the eastern and southern<br />
parts of the project area (Wolayta, Gamo Gofa, and the special Woreda of Derashe visited in this<br />
evaluation), many of the SCs are de facto bankrupt, and failing to provide useful services to their<br />
members. In ventures where they compete with the private sector (consumer shops, flour mills) their<br />
overheads exceed the combined profits and overheads of their private sector competitors – hardly<br />
testimony to the business orientation of the cooperatives. In the west of the project area the<br />
cooperatives are in a better state (the team visited Kafa Zone, but it seems that conditions are also<br />
similar in Sheka and Bench Maji), but in areas where the private sector competes, the cooperatives still<br />
cannot do better.<br />
75. At MTR, it was clear that training of Cooperatives members and officers had thus far been<br />
largely ineffective. The MTR Report recommended the urgent redesign and implementation of the<br />
cooperative promotion and training programme, in its own words, “starting from scratch” with the reorientation<br />
and training of individuals from both Government and the cooperatives themselves.<br />
76. Between the MTR and the closure of the project, with the exception of the BSF component,<br />
little appears to have changed. The anticipated institutional capacity enhancement which would result<br />
from training and other capacity-building inputs has failed to adequately contribute to policy changes,<br />
organizational reform, establishment of working systems (including a functioning M&E system), and<br />
changing of attitudes. Furthermore, the partner responsible for cooperative development (the<br />
Cooperative Promotion Department) has been less involved in the international and domestic trainings<br />
than other stakeholders 39 .<br />
77. Training needs assessment. Many of those interviewed during the evaluation expressed the<br />
view that the majority of the trainings (particularly international trainings) were not organized in a<br />
systematic way based on the needs of the project, but rather selected to benefit individuals who in the<br />
end seem to have contributed little to the project. Furthermore, it is evident that the trainings provided<br />
for the SCs did not bring about effective re-orientation and enhanced managerial capacity in the SCs.<br />
39 See Appendix 5.<br />
Low confidence of membership, limited participation by members, poor loan<br />
recovery<br />
Assets looted<br />
following change<br />
in Government<br />
Internal<br />
factors<br />
Weak business and<br />
management<br />
capacity<br />
Ineffective restructuring and lack of follow-up<br />
support<br />
21<br />
External<br />
factors<br />
High <strong>main</strong>tenance<br />
costs of flour mills<br />
Lack of access to<br />
wholesalers<br />
Strong competition<br />
from private sector<br />
Difficulty of<br />
accessing credit<br />
Other external<br />
factors (climatic<br />
and price shocks)
The condition of many of the SCs (described above) is testimony to the limited impact of the training<br />
provided.<br />
78. By 2002, a few months away from closure of the project loans, it was noted that “…the state of<br />
some cooperatives restructured under the project appear to be weak, and in the worst cases on the<br />
verge of bankruptcy. If this is allowed to continue, such cooperatives may not survive as viable<br />
entities. Moreover, most restructured cooperatives critically need the support of the project, including<br />
training, follow-ups and technical assistance …”. 40<br />
79. In the present evaluation, these concerns about the quality of the cooperatives restructuring<br />
process, and the business viability of the cooperatives were magnified. Restructuring of the service<br />
cooperatives in <strong>SOCODEP</strong> has contributed little to their transformation from the mentality of a<br />
command economy to that of the free market. Out of seven SCs visited in the eastern part of the<br />
project area, none were functioning before the establishment of a cooperative union in Wolayta Zone<br />
in 2005. Most 41 of the cooperatives in Konso, Arba Minch Zuria and Chencha Woredas are not<br />
functioning. Almost all suffer from high levels of outstanding debt. In the western project Zones,<br />
cooperative performance is better, with lower levels of debt, and continued functioning of some<br />
services. Table 3 illustrates the situation for 5 SCs in Arba Minch Zuria, Chencha, Boreda, and Soddo<br />
Zuria Woredas (Gamo Gofa and Wolayta Zones).<br />
Table 6. Changes in Service Cooperative Performance between 1993 and 2006<br />
Service<br />
Cooperative<br />
Members Cash balance Birr<br />
Outstanding loan<br />
Birr<br />
Misappropriation<br />
Birr<br />
1993 2006 1993 2006 1993 2006 1993 2006<br />
Kolana<br />
Shara<br />
Dega 600 614 11361 22391 2736 63705 3597 0<br />
Eazo 3561 1535 9725 461 0 51603 65113 70380<br />
Gaga Gocho 1004 617 28000 17000 3155 20828 0 14444<br />
Kokate 1552 613 1650 3587 25573 340893 0 40000<br />
Wachiga 1760 1554 940 39235 329363 314161 16420 20000<br />
* Source: The Evaluation<br />
80. In relation to Cooperatives, overall two conclusions may be drawn: (a) <strong>SOCODEP</strong>, like many<br />
projects, placed too great an emphasis on numerical outputs, and too little on the quality of those<br />
outputs; and (b) the general preference in <strong>SOCODEP</strong> for working through cooperatives rather than<br />
considering other groups having greater social capital (such as the indigenous Community Based<br />
Organizations (CBO) which were well established at the time), that would have been a more viable<br />
alternative.<br />
81. Specific objective 2. Increased capital and income among the rural poor in the project area<br />
through off-farm income-generating activities particularly for women and families in densely<br />
populated areas with limited land for farm expansion.<br />
82. The project provided credit to individuals, including women, for a limited period. This has<br />
undoubtedly increased capital and incomes for some individuals through income-generating activities<br />
and small-scale enterprises, although some have failed for lack of markets for their products.<br />
83. Although many individuals benefited from loans provided through <strong>SOCODEP</strong> (Box 2), the<br />
extent of achievement of this objective has been limited because of the under-performance of the<br />
cooperatives re-structuring and credit disbursement aspects of the project.<br />
40 2002 Supervision Report, para 39.<br />
41 Out of 17 in total, 11 are completely non-functional, 4 partly functioning, and 2 functioning satisfactorily,<br />
according to the Woreda Cooperatives Desks.<br />
22
Box 2. Three Case Studies of Women Loan Beneficiaries<br />
Belaynesh Keyito received a loan of EB 240 from a cooperative around Derashe town, Derashe special<br />
woreda. She started selling vegetables and bought one sheep for EB 55 and sold the sheep for EB 175.<br />
With the money obtained, she managed to send her three children to school and feed the family. She<br />
owns farmland in her compound and grows potatoes, maize and onions.<br />
Keito Taya has 3 children (one son, two daughters) and her children do not go to school. Her husband<br />
died some years ago due to fight with a villager. Keito belongs to Mermere Cooperative, Derashe zone<br />
of SNNPR. With a loan of EB 150 she bought one female sheep. The female sheep had 10 offspring.<br />
Two of the offspring had 7 lambs. The eight sheep were exchanged for one ox. She fattened the ox and<br />
sold it for EB 350. With the cash she bought an immature bull for EB 190. The rest of the money was<br />
used for buying food for the household. She bought an ox for EB 400 but the ox died when being<br />
trekked to her home. Later she sold some sheep and bought another ox. Now she owns 8 female sheep<br />
and one donkey. The donkey is used as a beast of burden.<br />
Lomitu Abebe belongs to Baha Cooperative, Decha woreda of Keffa zone. She is 25 years of age and<br />
married and has three children (two sons, one daughter). Two of her children go to school. She<br />
received EB 400 as a loan and bought four sheep for fattening. After repaying the loan she bought two<br />
female sheep. One of the sheep had 6 offspring and the offspring were sold to buy a heifer. The other<br />
had three offspring and the dam was sold. Now she has a heifer and one sheep. Some of the money<br />
from the sheep sales were used for house construction, buying clothes for the family and running a tej<br />
bet. She also sells beer and soft drinks. The family owns a plot of 2000-meter square of land on which<br />
enset, taro, coffee, avocado and banana are grown<br />
Source: The Evaluation<br />
84. OMFI and continued access to credit. The credit repaid to OMFI as a consequence of Project<br />
lending appears not to have been used as a revolving source of credit to the project cooperatives, but to<br />
have been absorbed more generally into OMFI’s funds, and lent onwards through OMFI’s branch<br />
offices. Although this has diluted the impact of <strong>SOCODEP</strong> on its target cooperatives and population, it<br />
has allowed OMFI to extend its operations more widely in the Region. OMFI tends to work, not with<br />
cooperatives, but with small informal groups established by its own branch officials – a better option<br />
than the <strong>SOCODEP</strong> model.<br />
85. The slow rate and low total amount of disbursement of credit would be less of an issue were<br />
there the prospect of further rounds of credit being available to SCs and their members in the future.<br />
However, the financial status of many of the cooperatives rightly disqualifies them from further<br />
lending. This illustrates the fundamental importance of the quality of cooperative restructuring – this is<br />
the foundation on which the rest of the project depended, and it has demonstrably failed.<br />
86. Overall, the credit component of <strong>SOCODEP</strong> has been significantly under-spent, and it has<br />
provided one-off loans with little or no continuity of access to credit. It has consequently been of<br />
limited effectiveness. In retrospect, the channeling of credit through cooperatives (especially those<br />
with the particular political history of those in <strong>Ethiopia</strong>) was probably not the best strategy. The<br />
experience of <strong>SOCODEP</strong> has demonstrated that individuals can make good use of small amounts of<br />
credit and (women especially) repay loans in a timely manner. However, it has also shown that<br />
commercial banks are not necessarily the most appropriate lending organisations for rural credit and<br />
cooperatives are not necessarily the most appropriate channels for lending. The effectiveness and<br />
efficiency with which loans can be disbursed to and recovered from individuals depends to a very high<br />
degree on the competence and professionalism of the intermediary organisations.<br />
87. Specific objective 3. Strengthen the Southern Region Agricultural Bureau to carry out its<br />
mandate with respect to cooperative development.<br />
88. Staff development programmes through well planned practical trainings were anticipated to be<br />
central to the whole <strong>SOCODEP</strong> implementation, with the aim of making the implementing staff<br />
capable of delivering effective support to the SCs. Targeted training of participating cooperatives was<br />
anticipated to lead to their emergence as independent viable business entities operating in a free<br />
market economy by the time the project phased out. This objective has been partly achieved, through<br />
23
provision of physical resources, and through the (temporary) impact of training and project<br />
experience. However, most of the trained and experienced staff have now moved on, and the<br />
extremely high level of Government restructuring and reshuffling has undermined this objective to a<br />
great extent.<br />
89. Training. A great deal of training has been delivered, but it has been of more benefit to<br />
individuals than to the organisations which had responsibility for implementing <strong>SOCODEP</strong>. The<br />
training delivered to cooperatives officers and their members appears to have had little or no impact on<br />
the business viability of these organisations.<br />
90. Training largely benefited individuals. It was evident from the evaluation that the trainings<br />
provided may have significantly benefited individuals (in terms of knowledge or opportunities<br />
advancement) from Government bureaux and SCs. However the benefit to the project and particularly<br />
to the intended project purpose was minimal. The evaluation team was informed 42 that for example out<br />
of 24 staffs of BOFED who have attended 13 types of international trainings; only 9 of them are now<br />
retained by the Bureau.<br />
91. Training in M&E was particularly ineffective. Although the appraisal document clearly<br />
stressed the importance of establishing a sound monitoring and evaluation system right from the<br />
beginning of the project, and most if not all of the subsequent Supervision <strong>report</strong>s reinforced this<br />
point, M&E re<strong>main</strong>ed a major problem area through out the project life 43 . This was despite sending<br />
two former project coordinators for MSc study in UK on Project Planning, M&E. It is still<br />
questionable to what extent this particular training has contributed to the design of an M&E system for<br />
the project.<br />
92. Physical resources. A large number of vehicles and other items of physical equipment (roadbuilding<br />
equipment, office equipment, and a few buildings) have been provided, and these have been<br />
absorbed into the wider activities of the SNNPRS Government and the other institutions involved. No<br />
doubt these have contributed to the enhanced effectiveness of those organizations, but, as several of<br />
the UNOPS Supervision Reports observed, there has also been a good deal of misuse of project<br />
vehicles over the course of the project.<br />
93. Other aspects of capacity-building. The programme of institutional strengthening carried out<br />
through <strong>SOCODEP</strong> failed to address wider issues of Government policy and strategy, organizational<br />
reform, management systems, and fundamental attitudinal change. By restricting capacity-building to<br />
the delivery of training and provision of physical resources, the objective of building Government<br />
capacity to promote cooperative development was largely missed.<br />
94. Capacity-building efforts did not positively influence institutional change. It appears that<br />
institutional capacity-building efforts were restricted to delivery of training and physical resources.<br />
There is no evidence that <strong>SOCODEP</strong> influenced Regional Government policy on cooperatives and<br />
credit, nor that it led to organizational or management system reforms. On the contrary, frequent and<br />
significant organizational changes took place in the organizations implementing the project, and these<br />
had a detrimental effect on the ability of the project to function effectively.<br />
95. In particular, capacity-building activities neglected to address fundamental attitudes. Despite the<br />
recognition of the importance of re-orienting both Government personnel and cooperatives officers<br />
and members, there is no evidence that this took place to any significant degree. To move from a<br />
situation in which cooperatives were viewed as an arm of Government, and in which their<br />
management was similarly bureaucratic, to the perspective in which cooperatives are independent<br />
business entities is a very large step. There is still a long way to go in making this conceptual and<br />
practical change.<br />
42 This was clearly revealed during Oct. 8, 2006 meeting with BOFED Officials.<br />
43 See supervision mission <strong>report</strong>s 2001-2005.<br />
24
96. Overall, institutional capacity-building efforts have resulted in limited outputs for three <strong>main</strong><br />
reasons: (i) they focused on only two of the many relevant aspects of capacity-building, namely<br />
training and physical resources. The issues of attitude change, policy reform and management systems<br />
were not addressed; (ii) training was not planned and delivered systematically according to project<br />
needs, and it probably had more benefit for individuals than for the organizations involved, and for the<br />
project; and (iii) frequent restructuring and reshuffling of Government organs and their personnel<br />
severely limited the effectiveness of capacity-building efforts.<br />
97. Specific objective 4. Provide credit to meet financial requirements for agricultural inputs and<br />
draught oxen and facilitate the supply of inputs through support to local traders and cooperatives.<br />
98. Credit to cooperatives for their own businesses (consumer shops, flour mills, produce<br />
marketing) have mostly been unsuccessful, except in areas of coffee production. Credit through<br />
service cooperatives to individuals for oxen and small ruminants has been much more promising, with<br />
many individuals benefiting. However, the culture of loan repayment has been variable, generally with<br />
those in the western parts of the project area having a better repayment record.<br />
99. Ox loans in particular made a big difference to the farmers fortunate enough to receive them<br />
(Box 3). The <strong>main</strong> shortcoming in relation to meeting this objective was in terms of: (i) relatively<br />
small numbers of loans disbursed, and (ii) lack of continuing access to loans.<br />
100. Overall, the credit component was under-utilized; loans to cooperatives for their own business<br />
activities were largely ineffective; loans through cooperatives to individuals were better used, but<br />
repayment levels (with the exception of loans to women) were not impressive. Arguably the single<br />
most important objective of the project – the delivery of small loans to poor rural farmers – was let<br />
down by its limited reach, low prospects of sustainability and lack of continuity.<br />
Box 3. Four Examples of Ox-loan Beneficiaries<br />
Dana Dedetto is aged 55 years and belongs to Gagagocho Cooperative of Boreda Woreda, Gamo Gofa<br />
zone. He is married and has 6 children (4 sons, 2 daughters). Due to the sudden death of his ox, he<br />
used to cultivate by begging an ox from the community. He took credit for oxen purchase in 1999.<br />
Now he cultivates 2ha of farmland and has set aside 1ha for grazing land. Currently he owns two oxen<br />
and cultivates maize and teff and sells crops after harvest in markets. He sends his four children to<br />
school and two are now employed as civil servants in the Woreda. As a result of the oxen purchase, he<br />
uses improved household utensils and furniture. Instead of the traditional beds made of cattle hides he<br />
uses a modern bed. The household members use plastic items for drinking water instead of pumpkins.<br />
He states that his children are properly fed as well.<br />
Darge Semane belongs to Gebele Beno Cooperative, Derashe Woreda and is 47 years of age. Three of<br />
his children do farm work and one goes to school. He received an ox loan of EB 650, added EB 100 of<br />
his own money, and bought an ox for EB 750. After fattening the ox, he sold it for EB 1400. With the<br />
cash obtained, Darge bought an ox for EB 600, paid EB 77 for insurance of the ox, built a house,<br />
bought clothing for his children and paid for medical treatment. He bitterly complains about the high<br />
insurance cost he paid. As the locality is ridden with diseases, he also bought trypanocidal drugs for<br />
treating his animals from trypanosomiasis. Currently he has one ox and cultivates 1.5ha of farmland.<br />
The <strong>main</strong> crop he grows is maize.<br />
A farmer named Temesgen Kebede lives in Bitta Cooperative, Bitta Woreda of Keffa zone. He<br />
received an ox loan of EB 650 and used the ox for cultivation in the last four years. He has paid the<br />
loan and interest. He has an arrangement with another farmer to cultivate his 2ha of land. He also<br />
owns an enset plot of 0.25ha. Currently he has two oxen and sells grain for buying clothing for the<br />
family and last year sold grain worth EB 1000.<br />
Mammo Bongo is a farmer who belongs to Boha Cooperative, Decha Woreda, in Kefa zone. He is<br />
married and has 6 children (4 sons, 2 daughters) and none of the children go to school. He bought an<br />
ox with a loan of EB 600. After repaying the loan, he sold the ox for EB 880.The cash was used for<br />
treating problems he had on his eyes. Now he has recovered from his illness and is intending to build a<br />
house of corrugated iron sheet.<br />
* Source: The Evaluation<br />
25
101. Specific objective 5. Relief of livestock health constraints, particularly with respect to draught<br />
animals, through provision of veterinary drugs.<br />
102. This component started late, and is now winding down. It provided temporary relief, but now<br />
there is evidence of increasing disease prevalence due to the inability of Government veterinarians to<br />
provide drugs. There are no significant alternative suppliers of veterinary medicines than Government.<br />
A better option than the one pursued in <strong>SOCODEP</strong> would have been the promotion of veterinary drugs<br />
through the private sector.<br />
103. The component only took off toward the end of the project (2000/01). Drugs for relevant<br />
livestock diseases were bought by the government veterinary offices and made available to<br />
stockowners. The government drug supply for a Woreda lasts about six months and drug shortages are<br />
felt from July to September before the fiscal year budget is released. After the closure of the project in<br />
2005, the incidence of diseases is <strong>report</strong>ed to be increasing because the VRDF was dwindling. A better<br />
approach to dispensing drugs to farmers may be the use of Community Based Animal Health Workers<br />
selected from the community by the community and linked to drug vendors in Awassa and Addis<br />
Ababa.<br />
104. Overall, the achievement of the VRDF was limited. It started very late, and by the time of<br />
closure of the project loans it had disbursed a very small proportion of its budgeted funds, despite the<br />
great need for the benefits which it promised.<br />
105. Specific objective 6. Improve access of rural families to services and markets by rehabilitating<br />
and <strong>main</strong>taining rural roads.<br />
106. As far as it went, this component has improved access for many people 44 . Maintenance by<br />
cooperative members alone was never going to be a viable option 45 , and the adoption of the<br />
<strong>SOCODEP</strong> roads into the Regional road <strong>main</strong>tenance programme is a positive feature, as long as<br />
Government budgets permit <strong>main</strong>tenance to actually be carried out. The heavy equipment provided by<br />
<strong>SOCODEP</strong> will continue to be used and <strong>main</strong>tained for some time to come. This element of the<br />
Project does give rise to some environmental concerns however: erosion, destruction of natural<br />
vegetation, lack of restoration of quarries, and abandonment of equipment and materials are among the<br />
negative aspects observed.<br />
107. Design standards and <strong>main</strong>tenance strategies. The <strong>main</strong> issues in the roads component of the<br />
project centre around design standards and <strong>main</strong>tenance strategies. The change to the project design<br />
agreed after the MTR, in which the design standard (and hence unit cost) was increased from RR 30 to<br />
RR 50 46 not only limited the amount of construction possible within a fixed budget, but had<br />
<strong>main</strong>tenance implications too. RR 30 roads were more suitable for labour-based <strong>main</strong>tenance, while<br />
RR 50 roads required heavy <strong>main</strong>tenance by a centralized authority. The expectation at Appraisal that<br />
<strong>main</strong>tenance would be carried out by cooperatives was far-fetched, as it is not only cooperative<br />
members who benefit from such access, but the wider community too. The communities in SNNPR<br />
have allocated one day a week for community endeavours such as access roads construction, school<br />
construction and <strong>main</strong>tenance, health facilities construction and <strong>main</strong>tenance, and soil and water<br />
conservation, which is in line with the construction of roads of RR 30 standard and below.<br />
108. In terms of achieving the project objective, two aspects are relevant. First, the change in design<br />
standard significantly increased cost per km, and so greatly reduced the number of beneficiaries. Only<br />
122km out of a target at Appraisal of 700km was achieved. Second, although the ability of some rural<br />
44 Based on typical population densities, probably around 100 000 people live within 5km of the respective<br />
roads.<br />
45 Especially after the agreed alteration of design specification from RR 30 to RR 50 standard.<br />
46 RR30 and RR50 refer respectively to road designs for 30 and 50 vehicles per day. The designs specify<br />
different standards of drainage structures, gravel thickness and road width. The former RR standards have<br />
subsequently been replaced by a range of functional design standards referred to by DS numbers.<br />
26
people and communities to move themselves and their goods has improved, no other measures were<br />
taken in <strong>SOCODEP</strong> to improve market access. Physical road access is only one necessary (but not<br />
sufficient) condition for achieving better linkages to markets.<br />
109. Specific objective 7. (BSF Component) Reduce the burden of disease in 8 woredas of the<br />
<strong>SOCODEP</strong> area.<br />
110. Probably the greatest effect on health will be through the upgrading of physical health facilities<br />
and staff and community skills. The sanitation component will only have a significant effect if latrines<br />
are actually used, and this is most likely if the Government strategy changes to a more persuasive and<br />
participative approach. The water supply interventions made by the BSF project will have a significant<br />
short-term effect on water quality and access for those living close by, but long term functional<br />
sustainability is in serious doubt.<br />
111. Evaluating health impact is particularly difficult, but the measures taken in the BSF component<br />
at least provide some of the necessary pre-conditions for improved community health. However,<br />
without a significantly increased focus on sanitation utilization, hygiene promotion and water supply<br />
system operation and <strong>main</strong>tenance, these potential health benefits will fail to be realized.<br />
F. Assessment: Relevance, Effectiveness and Efficiency<br />
112. Relevance. <strong>SOCODEP</strong> addressed some real needs of the rural poor in southern <strong>Ethiopia</strong> (need<br />
for credit, need for improved market access including rural roads, need for better health services and<br />
environmental health) and it was consistent with the government’s regionalization programme. At the<br />
time of design the rhetoric of the new Government and the framing of the new legislation made<br />
working through service cooperatives attractive and promising. However the use of service<br />
cooperatives as the channel for services to the poor turned out to be a significant design weakness. At<br />
the time of project formulation, cooperatives were seen as an arm of Government, and public attitudes<br />
to cooperatives would inevitably take a long time to change. As far as the selection of financial<br />
intermediaries is concerned, at the time of project design there was limited choice. However, CBE’s<br />
lack of experience in implementing rural finance, including through cooperatives, should have been<br />
addressed with greater seriousness. Weaknesses in other project design features have been highlighted<br />
above.<br />
113. At a strategic level, the project was mostly consistent with the 1999<strong>Ethiopia</strong> Country Strategic<br />
Opportunities Paper and the 2002 <strong>IFAD</strong> Regional Strategy particularly in its support in developing<br />
rural financial services. Although the strategy provides a larger emphasis on establishing market<br />
linkages. According to <strong>IFAD</strong>’s rating scale therefore we assess <strong>SOCODEP</strong> as ‘Relevant’ (rating of<br />
5) 47 .<br />
114. Effectiveness. The Project achieved some, but not all of its objectives. Table 4 summarizes the<br />
extent to which each of the specific objectives were met, both in quantitative and qualitative terms. As<br />
indicated in Table 7, Specific Objectives 1, 3, and 5 were mostly not met. Specific Objectives 2, 4, 6<br />
and 7 were partially met (to varying degrees). According to <strong>IFAD</strong>’s rating scales therefore we assess<br />
<strong>SOCODEP</strong> as ‘Moderately Ineffective’ (score 3) 48 .<br />
47 “The project objectives are relevant to the needs of the poor or to <strong>IFAD</strong>’s country strategy” (<strong>IFAD</strong> OE<br />
Project Evaluation Guidelines, December 2005)<br />
48 “The project met only a few of its stated project objectives” (<strong>IFAD</strong> OE Project Evaluation Guidelines,<br />
December 2005).<br />
27
Table 7. <strong>SOCODEP</strong>: Achievement of Specific Objectives (see also Table 3 and Figure 3)<br />
Specific Objective Achievement (quantitative) Achievement (qualitative)<br />
SO1. Provide a model for<br />
developing <strong>Ethiopia</strong>n<br />
cooperatives under the new<br />
legislation, particularly<br />
with respect to<br />
improvement of financial<br />
intermediation services in<br />
rural areas, which could be<br />
replicated in other areas of<br />
the country.<br />
SO2. Increased capital and<br />
income among the rural<br />
poor in the project area<br />
through off-farm incomegenerating<br />
activities<br />
particularly for women and<br />
families in densely<br />
populated areas with<br />
limited land for farm<br />
expansion.<br />
SO3. Strengthen the SRAB<br />
to carry out its mandate<br />
with respect to cooperative<br />
development.<br />
SO4. Provide credit to meet<br />
financial requirements for<br />
agricultural inputs and<br />
draught oxen and facilitate<br />
the supply of inputs<br />
through support to local<br />
traders and cooperatives.<br />
SO5. Relief of livestock<br />
health constraints,<br />
particularly with respect to<br />
draught animals, through<br />
provision of veterinary<br />
drugs.<br />
SO6. Improve access of<br />
rural families to services<br />
and markets by<br />
rehabilitating and<br />
<strong>main</strong>taining rural roads.<br />
SO7. (BSF Component)<br />
Reduce the burden of<br />
disease in 8 woredas of the<br />
<strong>SOCODEP</strong> area<br />
* Source: The Evaluation<br />
Numerical targets for restructuring<br />
and re-registering cooperatives were<br />
exceeded (130 per cent of Appraisal<br />
target; 178 per cent of MTR revised<br />
target).<br />
Reach of small-scale enterprise<br />
development sub-component was<br />
very limited. The total amount of<br />
training, and loans disbursed was<br />
very small. Loans to women for<br />
small ruminants were much greater<br />
in number.<br />
Training and vehicles budgets were<br />
disbursed rapidly and fully. Many<br />
trainings were delivered.<br />
Numerical targets were not met.<br />
Total loan disbursement was low,<br />
and number of loan recipients fell<br />
well below target.<br />
Disbursement from the Veterinary<br />
Drugs Revolving Fund was very<br />
late and very limited in total<br />
amount.<br />
The total length of roads<br />
constructed fell well below the<br />
Appraisal target (which was revised<br />
downwards at MTR).<br />
The majority of the quantitative<br />
targets for this component have<br />
been met.<br />
28<br />
Many, if not most, restructured<br />
cooperatives have failed to compete in<br />
their business activities with the private<br />
sector; many are in default of loan<br />
repayments and ineligible for further<br />
credit; many have suffered significant<br />
levels of misappropriation of funds;<br />
members lack confidence in the officers.<br />
Some small businesses have been<br />
assisted to take off, and the loans to<br />
women for small ruminants have been<br />
particularly effective. However,<br />
continuity of access to credit is limited to<br />
the reach of OMFI.<br />
There is little direct evidence with which<br />
to assess the quality of training needs<br />
assessments and trainings delivered.<br />
However, the indirect evidence suggests<br />
that much of the capacity-building effort<br />
has been ineffective.<br />
Cooperative members have benefited<br />
from individual loans, but not from<br />
(failed) cooperative businesses. Loan<br />
repayment rates (with some exceptions,<br />
especially loans to women) have been<br />
poor under CBE.<br />
The Veterinary RDF was partially<br />
effective for a short period. Its demise is<br />
contributing to an increase in livestock<br />
disease.<br />
Those living within a few km of the new<br />
roads have undoubtedly benefited, but<br />
the elevated cost of the higher design<br />
standard adopted has limited the reach of<br />
this component.<br />
The achievement of the component has<br />
established the potential for sustained<br />
health improvements. However, all<br />
aspects require continuing support and<br />
funding for long-term sustainability.<br />
115. Efficiency. Because of the nature of the project no attempt was made to assess the economic<br />
rate of return in the appraisal or completion <strong>report</strong>s. Thus, in the evaluation a number of qualitative<br />
indicators are used to assess the efficiency of the conversion of project funds into outputs and<br />
consequent impact. The four indicators outlined here are well established in project documentation,<br />
and were confirmed during the evaluation mission.<br />
116. First, the project contained a number of unrealistically ambitious design aspects (most notably<br />
relating to the large geographical extent of the project area). The vast geographic area, poor
infrastructure and communication meant that the projected resources were not optimally used.<br />
Second, the overall emphasis on the Project’s numerical outputs (i.e. exceeding the number of<br />
restructured cooperatives) rather than the quality of those outputs, has resulted in a significant amount<br />
of wasted resources. As a result, many of the project’s activities were diluted to the extent that they<br />
failed to achieve their intended outcomes. For example, the generally poor quality of the restructuring<br />
of the cooperatives, and the highly compromised institutional strengthening component weakened the<br />
project significantly. Efficiency would have been greatly enhanced if the project design had<br />
concentrated on a smaller project area, involving a smaller number of SCs, and provided greater<br />
intensity of effort and resources.<br />
117. Third, the regional context and many disruptions caused by changes in Government structures<br />
further limited the ability of personnel to deliver services in an efficient manner (see para 28 and 33).<br />
And fourth, the absorptive capacity of the Government institutions involved was limited to the extent<br />
that significant sums of money re<strong>main</strong>ed unspent at the end of the project. At project completion, in<br />
spite of several extensions to the project completion date, substantial amounts of <strong>IFAD</strong>’s loan funds<br />
and also the BSF grant funds had not been fully utilized (only 68 per cent of the Loan Funds and 93<br />
per cent of the Grant Funds were disbursed).<br />
118. Also, the construction of roads to a higher standard than necessary raised unit costs and limited<br />
the outputs achieved.<br />
119. Some allowance has to be made for <strong>Ethiopia</strong>’s particularly difficult operating environment, so<br />
according to <strong>IFAD</strong>’s rating scales we assess <strong>SOCODEP</strong> as ‘Moderately Inefficient’ (score 3) 49 .<br />
G. Performance of <strong>IFAD</strong> and its Partners<br />
120. Assessment of partner performance. <strong>IFAD</strong>’s Evaluation Manual requires a qualitative<br />
assessment of each partner, and the partnership as a whole, against stated criteria selected from a list in<br />
the manual 50 . In the following paragraphs each partner is considered in turn and assessed on <strong>IFAD</strong>’s<br />
6-point rating scale, and the partnership as a whole is assessed.<br />
121. <strong>IFAD</strong>. As the initiator and <strong>main</strong> source of loan funding for the project, <strong>IFAD</strong> bore an important<br />
part of the shared responsibility for its successful execution. As successive supervision <strong>report</strong>s flagged<br />
similar critical issues (problematic management, political interference, ineffective M&E, questionable<br />
quality of cooperatives restructuring, poor performance of cooperatives, and lack of institutional<br />
ownership of the project), new mechanisms should have been sought to improve project management,<br />
rather than relying on the annual supervision missions by UNOPS. Although <strong>IFAD</strong>’s role was<br />
supportive and responsible – including its initiation of an early MTR and follow-up actions and the<br />
inclusion of the BSF component - it was insufficiently flexible and decisive in responding to the<br />
problems raised by successive Government reorganizations and the <strong>report</strong>ed lack of Government<br />
ownership at the highest levels in the Region. However, it should be recognized that during the time of<br />
<strong>SOCODEP</strong>, <strong>IFAD</strong> did not have modalities such as direct supervision or field presence to support<br />
project implementation. Recognizing the many difficulties faced by the project (e.g. the credit<br />
component) and the limited chance of making dramatic improvements <strong>IFAD</strong> let the project close with<br />
about 35 percent of the <strong>IFAD</strong> loan unspent. Overall, <strong>IFAD</strong> delegated too much responsibility to<br />
institutions which were not well prepared to perform effectively. The evaluation judges <strong>IFAD</strong>’s<br />
performance moderately unsuccessful (rating of 3).<br />
122. Government of <strong>Ethiopia</strong> (GoE). Although GoE observed the loan conditions and participated<br />
in the project implementation, two factors seriously weakened its performance. The first was the<br />
repeated reorganization of Government organs and the reshuffling of Government staff, to the point at<br />
which institutional capacity-building was seriously undermined. Although such reorganizations were<br />
49 “Poor use of resources: unit costs are above those of comparators, and rates of return are lower than<br />
alternative investments and negative” (<strong>IFAD</strong> OE Project Evaluation Guidelines, December 2005).<br />
50 “Participatory, Delegates, Coordination, Communication & Sharing of Information, Flexible, Supportive,<br />
Decisive, Responsible, Learning” (<strong>IFAD</strong> OE Project Evaluation Guidelines, December 2005).<br />
29
the prerogative of Government, little was done to compensate for their negative effects on the Project.<br />
The second factor was the <strong>report</strong>ed lack of political commitment at the level of the Regional Council,<br />
and political interference with the project, to the point that the Project Coordinator’s role was<br />
compromised in the early years of project implementation. At the beginning this was caused by a<br />
disjoint between Federal and Regional Government actions, but even after the Regional Government<br />
signed up to the project this did not significantly improve. CBE and OMFI. Commercial Bank of<br />
<strong>Ethiopia</strong> was insufficiently committed to the goals of the project, and its reach did not extend to the<br />
client groups which were the focus of <strong>SOCODEP</strong>. It had failed to understand the nature of the<br />
business it was entering. As a late arrival (2001) to the project, OMFI was better placed to fulfill its<br />
requirements. It has disbursed loans through service cooperatives, as well as through its own groups,<br />
but since the closure of the <strong>IFAD</strong> loans it has apparently not operated the <strong>IFAD</strong> credit line as a<br />
revolving fund to the <strong>SOCODEP</strong> cooperatives and their members, but rather used the repaid loans to<br />
finance its wider lending programme. Accordingly, the Government’s performance is found<br />
moderately unsatisfactory (rating of 3).<br />
123. Belgian Survival Fund. The performance of BSF can only be assessed indirectly, through the<br />
manner in which the WSHBS component was conducted. The far greater geographical focus (8<br />
Woredas, rather than 33) 51 was no doubt instrumental in BSF’s effectiveness, and the component was<br />
notable for the thoroughness of its capacity-building efforts and the continuity of its technical<br />
assistance. However, the limited degree of integration of the BSF sub-component with the re<strong>main</strong>der<br />
of <strong>SOCODEP</strong>, and the concerns over sustainability of the BSF interventions, led the evaluation team<br />
to reduce what would otherwise have been a high rating to a somewhat lower score. BSF performance<br />
is rated 4 (moderately successful).<br />
124. Cooperating institution (UNOPS). The Supervising Institution is placed in a difficult situation<br />
when its inputs are limited effectively to a single annual visit. The Supervision Mission Reports seen<br />
by this evaluation team have been competently conducted, but the repeated flagging of critical issues<br />
year after year makes it clear that a much stronger hand was needed to manage the project effectively<br />
– not simply loan and project implementation supervision, but strong management and frequent<br />
monitoring of progress. Accordingly, UNOPS performance is considered moderately successful<br />
(rating of 4).<br />
IV. PROJECT IMPACTS<br />
A. Rural Poverty Reduction Impacts<br />
125. Impact do<strong>main</strong>s. <strong>IFAD</strong> considers the wider impact of projects under 9 impact do<strong>main</strong>s. These<br />
are set out in the following paragraphs, with comments on the intended and actual impacts of the<br />
Project. Our evidence base here consists of the beneficiary interviews conducted, review of secondary<br />
data, the evaluation team’s extensive past experience in the Region, and its professional judgments as<br />
to the extent to which findings from a small sample can be extrapolated to the wider population. The<br />
key areas of intended direct impact for <strong>SOCODEP</strong> were those of (a) financial assets (through credit),<br />
(b) physical assets (roads, water and sanitation, health facilities), (c) human assets (skills and<br />
knowledge), (d) institutions and services (strengthened Government organisations and functioning<br />
service cooperatives), and (e) social capital and empowerment (through effective cooperatives).<br />
Through delivering impact in these areas, <strong>SOCODEP</strong> was to have an indirect impact on agricultural<br />
productivity, food security and on market access.<br />
126. Agriculture productivity. This related to one of the two identified higher goals of the Project<br />
(“increase agricultural productivity …”). The greatest impacts in this do<strong>main</strong> relate to the increased<br />
access to work oxen and small ruminants for fattening and rearing (Boxes 1 and 2). This has been a<br />
significant impact at the individual farmer level. However, because overall project impact on<br />
agricultural productivity has been below expectations, the evaluation judges project impact moderately<br />
unsuccessful in this do<strong>main</strong> (rating of 3).<br />
51 Although these were still widely spread geographically.<br />
30
127. Financial assets. Increasing individual financial assets was the second of the two identified<br />
higher goals of the Project (“…and raise income levels of the rural poor…”. In many of the cases of<br />
individual beneficiaries interviewed, increases in personal financial assets were evident. The<br />
expectation was that service cooperatives would be effectively developed, “… to facilitate efficient<br />
provision of sustainable services to members.” In the majority of the cooperatives interviewed, or for<br />
which data were obtained (especially in Gamo Gofa, Wolayta and Derashe), the cooperatives are de<br />
facto bankrupt. Furthermore, the enhancement of individual financial assets has had limited reach and,<br />
for many of those who have benefited, the impact is likely to have been short-lived. Consequently, the<br />
evaluation considers project impact on financial assets moderately unsuccessful (rating of 3).<br />
128. Physical assets. Through accessing credit, cooperatives and their members were able to<br />
increase their physical asset base. Numerous examples were encountered of individual loan<br />
beneficiaries who had, for a time, increased their physical assets (in terms of livestock, housing, and<br />
equipment for small-scale enterprises). See Boxes 1 and 2 for examples. Some communities have<br />
benefited from improved physical assets in the form of rural roads, water supplies and latrines. Their<br />
number however, compared to target beneficiary population, is relatively small. Furthermore, the<br />
questions over sustainability, raised elsewhere in this <strong>report</strong>, threaten long-term impact. Overall,<br />
considering their limited extent, the evaluation still finds project impacts on physical assets moderately<br />
unsuccessful (rating of 3).<br />
129. Human assets. Enhancement of human skills, knowledge and health were explicit aspects of<br />
the Project. Training of Government staff, cooperative personnel and cooperative members had a<br />
small impact, as judged by the effectiveness of the institutions involved. The impact of training given<br />
has to be questioned. On the other hand, the health impact of parts of the BSF component – in<br />
particular the upgrading of health facilities and training of staff and community health workers – had<br />
the greatest potential impact. Project impact on human assets is therefore found moderately successful<br />
(rating of 4).<br />
130. Institutions and services. Institutional strengthening was a specific objective of the Project.<br />
Changes to laws, policies, and “the rules of the game” were not. The impacts of the institutional<br />
strengthening components of the Project were largely lost due to the constant reorganizations and<br />
reshuffling of Government staff. The Project apparently had little or no impact at higher levels of<br />
policy dialogue. Consequently, project impact on institutions and services is found unsuccessful<br />
(rating of 2).<br />
131. Social capital and empowerment. Collective capacity of cooperative members was to be built<br />
under the new law, and through the restructuring process built into the Project. Service cooperatives<br />
(now called multi-purpose farmers’ cooperatives) still represent rather artificial groupings of looselylinked<br />
members. There is little evidence of the social capital of these groups being significantly<br />
enhanced by the Project. Some women (but mostly men) have been personally empowered through<br />
use of individual loans for small ruminants and for small scale enterprise development, but their<br />
numbers are rather small in the context of the population of the project area. In all, project impact on<br />
social capital and empowerment has been far below expectations and is thus judged unsuccessful<br />
(rating of 2).<br />
132. Food security. By implication, <strong>SOCODEP</strong>’s goal was to improve food security among<br />
cooperative members. The Project’s impact on food security was indirect, and inherently not<br />
measurable in this evaluation. However, the possession of work oxen, and the increase in livestock and<br />
other physical and individual financial assets, may be assumed to have had some beneficial impact in<br />
this do<strong>main</strong>. Considering its limited extent, project impact on food security is considered moderately<br />
unsuccessful (rating of 3).<br />
133. Environment and common resource base. <strong>SOCODEP</strong> had no specific objectives in this<br />
do<strong>main</strong>. The Project was generally environmentally benign, neither increasing nor decreasing<br />
people’s access to natural resources. The Roads component may have had a small unintended negative<br />
environmental impact, but this was outweighed by its much greater socio-economic impact.<br />
Environmental impact assessment should be given greater emphasis in this area in future. The<br />
31
evaluation finds project impact on the environment and common resource base therefore moderately<br />
successful (rating of 4).<br />
134. Markets. Attention to markets and market access was an omission from the Project design. The<br />
Project did little to increase access to markets, other than through financing a small amount of rural<br />
roads. Market linkages are crucial to raise small farmers above subsistence level, but the Project<br />
design omitted this key do<strong>main</strong>. Many of those trained in small scale enterprises subsequently failed to<br />
go further, for lack of markets for their products. It should be noted that <strong>SOCODEP</strong> as designed<br />
(covering much too large and disparate a geographical area) could not effectively address marketing<br />
constraints, within its overall budget. However, there could have been opportunities to more directly<br />
address marketing within Special Objective (SO)s 1, 2, 4 and 6 and with a design which was more<br />
focused geographically, and addressing producers’ needs in a more integrated way, should have<br />
considered markets for increased production as well as the outputs of small enterprises. As a result,<br />
project impact on markets is considered unsuccessful (rating of 2).<br />
135. Overall assessment of impact. The <strong>main</strong> beneficial impacts of the Project were largely limited<br />
to those individuals who received loans through cooperatives, or who now benefit from physical<br />
infrastructure and services such as roads and health facilities. In the case of credit, these impacts have<br />
been relatively few in number, and short-lived. The expected impacts in relation to increased<br />
individual financial assets (and consequent improved access to physical assets, agricultural<br />
productivity and food security) were limited in extent and continuity. Some benefits of training<br />
impacted beneficially upon individuals, but, with the exception of the BSF component, training and<br />
capacity-building had limited impact on the institutions involved. Impact on social capital was very<br />
limited, because of the largely ineffective restructuring of cooperatives. Consequently, in relation to<br />
the scale presented in <strong>IFAD</strong>’s Evaluation Manual, overall <strong>SOCODEP</strong> impact is rated as moderately<br />
unsuccessful (rating of 3) 52 .<br />
B. Sustainability and Ownership<br />
136. The inherent unsustainability of projects. Projects are by definition time-limited inputs of<br />
resources to achieve stated goals. While the immediate project objectives may be met, it is unusual to<br />
achieve real and permanent step-changes to institutions, services and the lives of the poor as a<br />
consequence of short projects. Sustainability needs to be designed in from the beginning, and<br />
interventions need to be long enough in duration and with clear exit strategies, or the achievement of<br />
project objectives and impacts quickly fades into history. <strong>SOCODEP</strong> is no exception in having paid<br />
too little attention to these issues.<br />
137. Components of sustainability. The <strong>main</strong> aspects of sustainability relevant to <strong>SOCODEP</strong> relate<br />
to (a) whether or not the enhanced capacity of the Project’s institutional stakeholders (Government,<br />
cooperatives and lending agencies) will enable them to continue functioning over the long term, (b)<br />
whether cooperatives and individuals will continue to have access to credit services, and (c) whether<br />
physical infrastructure (water supplies, roads, buildings, vehicles and equipment) will continue to<br />
function over time.<br />
138. Institutional sustainability. This represents the least sustainable aspect of the Project. The<br />
reorganizations of Government organs and the reshuffling of staff has greatly diluted the enhancement<br />
of institutional capacity. Physical resources provided as part of institutional capacity-building<br />
activities have been of significant assistance, but they have a limited life.<br />
139. Continued access to credit. While the impact of individual loans has in many cases been a very<br />
significant positive aspect of the Project, continued access to credit and other financial services is<br />
more questionable. In its discussions with individual beneficiaries, the evaluation team found little<br />
evidence that those who had benefited once from loans were able to continue to obtain further credit –<br />
52 “The project generated rural poverty reduction impacts in fewer do<strong>main</strong>s than expected (impact do<strong>main</strong>s<br />
that were relevant to the project as per design at the beginning and/or after revision) and to a lesser extent than<br />
expected.” <strong>IFAD</strong> OE Project Evaluation Guidelines, December 2005.<br />
32
despite their generally good repayment record. Many of the cooperatives visited, or for which data<br />
were obtained, are now de facto bankrupt, and therefore ineligible for further loans.<br />
140. Functional sustainability of physical assets. Roads constructed under the Project were<br />
expected at Appraisal to be <strong>main</strong>tained by members of the restructured cooperatives. This was<br />
unrealistic for two reasons, (a) because those benefiting from the roads are a much greater population<br />
than simply the cooperative members, and (b) to expect community members to add an even greater<br />
labour burden to their already over-stretched daily lives was impracticable. The fact that the roads<br />
constructed under <strong>SOCODEP</strong> have been adopted under the Region’s road <strong>main</strong>tenance programme is<br />
actually better assurance of sustainability than relying on community-based <strong>main</strong>tenance. The heavy<br />
equipment supplied to the Region will allow other road construction activities to take place for some<br />
time to come. In regard to water supply, the prospects for on-going functional sustainability of<br />
especially handpumps and gravity water supply schemes are very poor. The financial contribution<br />
made by households for repairs and <strong>main</strong>tenance are based on affordability rather than need, and they<br />
are insufficient to cover the costs of repairs. Furthermore, spare parts are particularly difficult to<br />
obtain, and insufficient attention has been paid to operation and management aspects of this<br />
component.<br />
141. Assessment of sustainability. In view of the very limited sustainability of institutional<br />
strengthening efforts, the limited on-going access to credit, and the unlikely sustainability of the water<br />
supply component, sustainability is assessed overall as unlikely (rating of 2) 53 .<br />
C. Innovation, Replicability and Scaling-Up<br />
142. Innovation. At the time of project design, <strong>SOCODEP</strong>’s focus on cooperatives and credit<br />
represented a response to the apparent liberalization of national politics and economics, and to the<br />
change in cooperatives legislation. The inclusion of the other components (veterinary revolving drug<br />
fund, rural road construction, small-scale enterprise development) was not particularly innovative, and<br />
their lack of integration represented a lost opportunity. The BSF component (water supply, health and<br />
basic sanitation) in effect represented a new project, itself split into three components, and again the<br />
opportunities for integration and synergy were largely lost.<br />
143. Worth mentioning as being innovative at the time in <strong>Ethiopia</strong>, was the effective monitoring and<br />
evaluation system of the BSF component. When the BSF component began it introduced a<br />
comprehensive Baseline Line Survey and before project completion it undertook an Impact<br />
Assessment Study. This M&E system, which did not exist for the other components, formed the basis<br />
for developing trainings, capacity building, learning and measuring results that helped contribute to<br />
the performance of this component. The innovative methodology of the Impact Assessment Study<br />
made extensive use of local knowledge and participation, and used simple, inexpensive techniques for<br />
impact measurement in the field.<br />
144. Knowledge management. The collation and sharing of knowledge among the project<br />
stakeholders was limited by the weak M&E which was repeatedly highlighted in Supervision <strong>report</strong>s.<br />
After the MTR a number of internal assessments were carried out (dated 1999 and 2000), which<br />
presented some critical and insightful views, but the extent to which these led to subsequent action<br />
was limited. The lack of physical availability of internal and external project documentation is a<br />
critical issue. Not surprisingly, the extent to which project experiences were used by project<br />
stakeholders in useful policy dialogue at Regional or higher level was also very limited.<br />
145. Replicability. The same factors which have limited the impact of institutional strengthening and<br />
constrained the quality of many the project actions and outputs re<strong>main</strong> in place today. Were the<br />
Project to be implemented today using similar mechanisms (ie operating through a Project<br />
Coordinating Unit attempting to synchronize and harmonize the work of disparate Government<br />
organs), similar outcomes would result. The model is not replicable.<br />
53 “Hardly any of the supporting factors are in place”. <strong>IFAD</strong> OE Project Evaluation Guidelines, December<br />
2005.<br />
33
146. Scaling-up. The Project was over-stretched in terms of geographical focus, and the quality of<br />
Project outputs suffered at the expense of quantity. It does not represent a successful pilot which can<br />
be usefully scaled-up.<br />
147. Overall assessment. <strong>SOCODEP</strong> had no significant innovative design elements, and in<br />
implementation, little of the learning which was being generated was fed back into the execution of<br />
the Project. There is little or no potential for replication or up-scaling. Therefore, innovation,<br />
replicability and scaling-up are assessed overall as moderately unsuccessful (rating of 3) 54 .<br />
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS<br />
A. Overall Assessment<br />
148. Outreach and targeting. <strong>SOCODEP</strong> was unsophisticated in its targeting. There was little<br />
detailed understanding of the nature and variations of rural poverty within the Project Woredas, and<br />
although some women benefited, their numbers were rather small. Even <strong>IFAD</strong>’s Country Programme<br />
Issues Sheet (May 2006) refers to the view that “…poverty is somewhat evenly spread across rural<br />
areas where 85 per cent of the population live…”, an assertion that is superficially true since most<br />
rural people are very poor, but which hides significant variation, sometimes over small distances.<br />
Furthermore there is also anecdotal evidence of elite capture as the individual beneficiaries of training<br />
and loans were not selected in a uniform and transparent manner.<br />
149. Attaining <strong>IFAD</strong>’s strategic objectives and the MDGs. To the extent that individuals have<br />
benefited from loans, training in small-scale enterprise development, improved water, sanitation and<br />
health facilities, and new roads, <strong>SOCODEP</strong> has gone some way to improving health and education,<br />
and reducing poverty and hunger. This impact has however, generally been relatively short-lived.<br />
150. Overall assessment. Table 8 summarizes the ratings attributed to the project by the evaluation,<br />
with the average ratings given to project evaluated in 2005 for comparison. On most criteria<br />
<strong>SOCODEP</strong> scored one point or more under the 2005 average. Relevance, Impact on physical, financial<br />
and human assets is comparable with 2005 averages, but the performance of the Government is<br />
assessed as below the 2005 average. Because of fundamental weaknesses in project implementation,<br />
caused partly by unrealistic design, partly by insufficiently decisive management, partly by<br />
insufficient political commitment, and partly by externalities including frequent Government<br />
restructuring and reshuffling, <strong>SOCODEP</strong> is assessed overall by this evaluation as ‘Moderately<br />
unsuccessful’ (rating of 3) 55 .<br />
54 “The project had very few innovative elements in the project design and implementation. Lessons that<br />
should have been learnt from the experience were not.” <strong>IFAD</strong> OE Project Evaluation Guidelines, December<br />
2005.<br />
55 “The project was rated just below expectations (category 3) for at least three of the six ratings, but none was<br />
rated highly successful.” <strong>IFAD</strong> OE Project Evaluation Guidelines, December 2005.<br />
34
Table 8. Project Ratings Summary<br />
Evaluation criterion <strong>SOCODEP</strong> rating 2005 project evaluations average<br />
Project performance<br />
Relevance 5 5<br />
Effectiveness 3 4<br />
Efficiency 3 4<br />
Partner performance<br />
<strong>IFAD</strong> 3 4<br />
Government 3 4<br />
BSF 4 -<br />
UNOPS 4 4<br />
Project impact<br />
Agriculture Productivity 3 -<br />
Physical and Financial Assets 3 4<br />
Human Assets 4 4<br />
Institutions and Services 2 -<br />
Social Capital and Empowerment 2 4<br />
Food Security 3 4<br />
Environment and Common Resource Base 4 4<br />
Markets 2 -<br />
Overall impact 3 -<br />
Sustainability 2 4<br />
Innovation, Replicability and Scaling-Up 3 4<br />
Overall assessment 3 -<br />
* Source: The Evaluation<br />
B. Conclusions<br />
151. As with most multi-component projects, the project performance and impacts of <strong>SOCODEP</strong><br />
have been mixed. There seems little doubt that the Project has had a net benefit to the Region, to<br />
individuals in Government, and to some of the target beneficiaries. The key questions relate to<br />
understanding how the benefits could have been greater, and what lessons can be learned for present<br />
and future projects in <strong>Ethiopia</strong> and further a field.<br />
152. Context. <strong>SOCODEP</strong> was one of the first significant internationally funded interventions in<br />
<strong>Ethiopia</strong> following the fall of the former Marxist-Leninist regime (the Derg) in May 1991. The Project<br />
aimed to respond to the then new legislation concerning Cooperatives, which ostensibly set out a<br />
means of turning the former Government-imposed and politically-dominated Producer Cooperatives of<br />
the Derg into farmer-owned viable business entities serving their members’ interests. In particular, it<br />
aimed to make rural finance (specifically micro-credit) available to so-called Service Cooperatives and<br />
their members.<br />
153. Design. The Project aim, as described in paragraph 152, was an imaginative attempt to respond<br />
to the then new legislation concerning Cooperatives. However, this was an ambitious and in hindsight<br />
an unrealistic goal. A number of factors contributed to the difficulties faced by the <strong>SOCODEP</strong>. First,<br />
the Region’s size, diversity, poor infrastructure and poverty posed numerous development challenges.<br />
Second, the project underestimated the obstacles to and rate of beneficial change and the capacity of<br />
the government for implementation in the post Derg period.<br />
154. Quality of project delivery. <strong>SOCODEP</strong> concentrated on delivery of numerical outputs, such as<br />
cooperatives restructured, credit disbursed, trainings delivered, drugs purchased, kilometers of road<br />
constructed, water points built, and so on. Insufficient emphasis was placed on the quality of these<br />
outputs. For example, insufficient consideration was given to the intensity and duration of activities<br />
required to achieve the desired quality standards. In particular, the human factor of individual and<br />
group (community, cooperative, institution) attitudes were addressed minimally. For example, the<br />
design was too optimistic about the speed with which the former model of cooperatives, centrally<br />
controlled by the government, could be turned around into a member-owned and member-controlled<br />
35
viable business model. To turn around a failing, politically-established cooperative to become a viable<br />
business serving its members, or to bring about community ownership and management of a water<br />
point demanded a great deal of attention to quality of the investment, not just numbers.<br />
155. However, some of the activities such as upgrading of health facilities and training of staff and<br />
community health workers performed better.<br />
156. Relevance, effectiveness, efficiency. The project objectives and activities were relevant to<br />
needs of the rural poor in southern <strong>Ethiopia</strong> (e.g., in terms of the need for credit, improved market<br />
access, better health services and environmental health) and were consistent with the government’s<br />
regionalization programme. The Project was moderately ineffective achieving some, but not all of its<br />
objectives. Similarly, the project was moderately inefficient. Given the difficult operating environment<br />
in <strong>Ethiopia</strong>, the project could have been more efficient if it had been more realistic and had less<br />
ambitious objectives and coverage. The vast geographic area, poor infrastructure and communication<br />
meant that the projected resources were not optimally used.<br />
157. Sustainability. <strong>SOCODEP</strong>’s benefits are unlikely to continue, partly due to the lack of a<br />
defined exit strategy. Moreover, institutional sustainability is limited and on-going access to credit,<br />
and water supply is not assured.<br />
158. Innovation. At the time of design, <strong>SOCODEP</strong>’s focus on cooperatives and credit represented a<br />
response to the apparent liberalization of national politics and economics, and to the change in<br />
cooperatives legislation. Unfortunately, the country context changed rapidly and the design became<br />
less relevant given the new context. Despite the positive efforts at the MTR, the design adjustments<br />
were not adequate given the changing realities. On another issue, the BSF component introduced an<br />
effective monitoring and evaluation system, which however was not integrated into the other project<br />
components. As the project was overstretched and its components were not integrated, <strong>SOCODEP</strong><br />
offered little opportunity for the learning being generated to be feed back into the project. Hence, the<br />
evaluation considered the project to be moderately unsuccessful in terms of innovations, replicability<br />
and upscaling.<br />
159. Policy dialogue. <strong>SOCODEP</strong> was largely responsive to policy changes and government-led<br />
restructuring. There is little evidence however of the project contributing to <strong>IFAD</strong>’s effective<br />
engagement in policy dialogue in the country.<br />
160. Participation. Probably the single greatest assurance of sustainability at the level of households<br />
and communities is through real commitment to beneficiary participation. However, the evaluation<br />
found that ensuring beneficiary participation in an area with a weak tradition of participation is<br />
challenging and requires greater commitment in terms of time and resources. As such, approaches<br />
which build on existing social capital (i.e., using indigenous Community Based Organizations), rather<br />
than working through structures imposed from above and outside the beneficiary communities, are<br />
most likely to succeed in the short and long term.<br />
161. Integration. This evaluation <strong>report</strong> has highlighted at a number of points the lack of integration<br />
between the numerous stakeholders and components within <strong>SOCODEP</strong>. Although integration is not<br />
easy, particularly given the restructuring of government organs and redeployment of personnel, it is<br />
the only way to create synergies which can maximize the impact of limited budgets.<br />
162. Management. The management model used by <strong>SOCODEP</strong> limited its effectiveness and<br />
responsiveness to rapid contextual changes that occurred during project implementation. The Project<br />
Coordinator, attempted to harmonize and synchronize the work of several Government organs and<br />
other stakeholders over whom he has no real authority. And support from <strong>IFAD</strong> through supervision<br />
mission mounted annually by the designated cooperating institution (UNOPS) was insufficient.<br />
However, it should be recognized that during the time of <strong>SOCODEP</strong>, <strong>IFAD</strong> did not have modalities<br />
such as direct supervision or field presence to support project implementation. Although, <strong>IFAD</strong> was<br />
responsive in using the tools it had at the time, for example by undertaking an early and useful MTR<br />
and facilitating the inclusion during implementation of the important BSF component.<br />
36
163. Weak linkages between partners during implementation. The linkages between the key<br />
stakeholders have <strong>main</strong>ly been achieved by the efforts of the Project Coordinators (four in total, at<br />
various stages of the Project), <strong>IFAD</strong>’s Country Programme Manager (CPM), and UNOPS. The Project<br />
Coordinator’s role was challenging because of his inherent lack of authority, and the CPM’s role is<br />
distant from the day-to-day project management issues to do more than provide general support and<br />
guidance. Also, annual visits by a cooperating institution are insufficient to rescue an underperforming<br />
project. Consequently, the effectiveness of the partnership was limited. Partnership with<br />
the private sector was not a viable option in the early years of the Project, but this option could have<br />
been pursued as implementation progressed. The extent to which partnerships outside of the project<br />
were developed by the implementing stakeholders is limited.<br />
C. Recommendations<br />
164. Design. It is recommended that consideration be given to interventions which are far more<br />
focused in terms of numbers of beneficiaries to be reached and geographic coverage, within the overall<br />
framework of <strong>IFAD</strong>’s targeting policy. This would ensure greater synergies across activities and<br />
ultimately deeper impact on rural poverty. Similarly, the project duration should be long enough to<br />
achieve the desired results and in particular take into account the time needed to implement attitude<br />
and cultural changes. Project management structures should be kept simple to ensure the integration<br />
and harmonization among different implementing agencies.<br />
165. Quality of project delivery. It is recommended that greater attention be given in future project<br />
design and implementation to country context issues, and the identification of indicators of quality,<br />
and actions necessary to achieve real and lasting impact, alongside those relating to numerical outputs.<br />
166. Policy dialogue. It is recommended that more explicit attempts be made to engage in policy<br />
dialogue with Government and other development actors, where appropriate and required involving a<br />
wider range of national and international specialists, rather than just <strong>IFAD</strong> and cooperating institution<br />
staff.<br />
167. Participation. It is recommended that future <strong>IFAD</strong>-funded projects and programmes in<br />
<strong>Ethiopia</strong> pay more attention to people’s participation, especially as it has not been a tradition of<br />
development practice in <strong>Ethiopia</strong> in the past.<br />
168. Integration. In future multi-component projects, it is recommended that greater attention be<br />
paid to the linkages between the components and between those agencies responsible for delivering<br />
them. The evaluation team is in favour of projects which involve multiple components addressing the<br />
diverse needs of target populations – but the difficulties of integrating such efforts should be carefully<br />
considered.<br />
169. Management. Management is more than coordination or supervision, and it should be<br />
addressed with greater rigour in future projects and programmes particularly in challenging contexts as<br />
found in <strong>SOCODEP</strong>. Projects need to be much more decisively managed. It is recommended that new<br />
approaches be explored, either through <strong>IFAD</strong> itself taking a more hands-on role during execution,<br />
facilitated by the Fund’s field presence officer, which allow closer monitoring and follow-up to<br />
implementation.<br />
170. Role of the Field Presence Officer. The field presence officer can, among other tasks, provide<br />
implementation support to <strong>IFAD</strong>-funded operations and has the potential to enhance partnerships and<br />
policy dialogue in <strong>Ethiopia</strong>. Hence, the country presence should be further strengthened, so that it can<br />
play a greater role in enhancing <strong>IFAD</strong>’s development effectiveness in <strong>Ethiopia</strong>. .<br />
D. Questions for the Forthcoming Country Programme Evaluation (CPE)<br />
171. In view of the CPE for <strong>Ethiopia</strong> which is planned for 2007, a number of key questions arise<br />
from the present evaluation, which should be addressed in that context. These are:<br />
37
• Have the present project identification, formulation and appraisal processes encouraged the<br />
setting of unrealistic targets and spreading project of activities too thinly? If so, how can<br />
these tendencies be avoided in future?<br />
• Are the existing project identification, formulation and appraisal processes sufficiently<br />
participative, in a country in which participation is not a strong tradition? If not, can they be<br />
made more so?<br />
• To what extent have the detailed capacities of project stakeholder institutions been routinely<br />
assessed at the formulation stage, in order to design appropriate capacity-building<br />
programmes? What improvements can be made to this process?<br />
• What has been the impact of the BSF contributions in <strong>Ethiopia</strong>? How can the partnership be<br />
enhanced in future activities?<br />
• How can the present model of project management and supervision be modified to create a<br />
significantly greater degree of the Programme Coordination Unit (PCU) authority and<br />
effectiveness, without de-coupling projects from the implementing institutions? Should<br />
separate project management structures be set up, perhaps using consulting firms, or can the<br />
existing PCU framework be made more effective? How could the field presence officer be<br />
more effective? What model best fits the <strong>Ethiopia</strong>n context? Should clearer guidelines be<br />
framed, setting out responsibilities for taking actions on supervision and MTR<br />
recommendations? Where does the buck stop in terms of project management?; and<br />
• In view of the weak performance of M&E in some <strong>Ethiopia</strong>n projects, how can a monitoring<br />
culture be encouraged, and how can manageable frameworks be developed and implemented<br />
for monitoring of project performance, reflecting both quantitative and qualitative<br />
achievements?<br />
38
Summary of Project Objectives<br />
39<br />
APPENDIX 1<br />
Principal objective: increase agricultural productivity and raise income levels of the rural poor through support to<br />
Service Cooperatives’ development in order to facilitate efficient provision of sustainable services to members<br />
SO1 Provide a model for developing <strong>Ethiopia</strong>n cooperatives under the new legislation, particularly with respect to<br />
improvement of financial intermediation services in rural areas, which could be replicated in other areas of the<br />
country.<br />
O1.1 Service Cooperatives (SCs) restructured and registered under the new legislation<br />
O1.2 Short term technical assistance provided, to facilitate:<br />
- training of the staff<br />
- development of accounting systems in the cooperatives<br />
- development of auditing procedures to be followed by the Cooperatives Promotion Department (CPD)<br />
O1.3 Long term technical advisory support provided to SCs<br />
O1.4 The staff of SCs and Executive Committee members trained to enable them to effectively manage the SCs as<br />
business organizations<br />
O1.5 The members of SCs trained to enable them to actively participate in the decision making processes of the<br />
SCs<br />
O1.6 The CPD staff trained to reorient them in the operation of cooperatives in a free market economy and to<br />
increase their skills in supervision and audit of the SCs.<br />
SO2 Increased capital and income among the rural poor in the project area through off-farm income-generating<br />
activities particularly for women and families in densely populated areas with limited land for farm expansion<br />
O2.1 Growth of new Small Scale Enterprises (SSE) fostered by pilot projects to introduce new business ideas and<br />
providing vocational training<br />
O2.2 The amount and nature of credit services to SC members provided by SCs for SSE activities increased<br />
O2.3 New forms of rural women’s groups capable of promoting development activities and facilitating access to<br />
credit for their members promoted<br />
O2.4 Participating banks’ experience developed and cost effective methods for rural lending to reach small<br />
enterprises and rural women supported<br />
SO3 Strengthen the Southern Regional Agricultural Bureau (SRAB) to carry out its mandate with respect to<br />
cooperative development<br />
O3.1 SRAB’s structural capacity to promote SC development enhanced<br />
O3.2 SRAB’s capacity to monitor and evaluate SC development enhanced<br />
SO4 Provide credit to meet financial requirements for agricultural inputs and draught oxen and facilitate the supply<br />
of inputs through support to local traders and cooperatives.<br />
O4.1 A credit programme is implemented for increasing agricultural development, production and marketing and<br />
improving income levels of the rural poor<br />
O4.2 Technical Assistance (TA) to facilitate training of the CBE staff provided (Rural Banking expert for 3<br />
months)<br />
O4.3 CBE staff trained in rural credit methodologies to improve their skills to effectively implement the credit<br />
programme<br />
O4.4 Transport facilities to CBE to facilitate effective implementation of the credit programme provided<br />
SO5 Relief of livestock health constraints, particularly with respect to draught animals, through provision of<br />
veterinary drugs.<br />
O5.1 Access to veterinary drugs improved<br />
SO6 Improve access of rural families to services and markets by rehabilitating and <strong>main</strong>taining rural roads.<br />
O6.1 Road construction equipment provided to Bureau of Public Works and Urban Development (BPWUD)<br />
O6.2 Improvement of rural road network and access roads to SCs is properly planned<br />
O6.3 250 km of the existing dry season roads rehabilitated to RR-30 standard<br />
O6.4 Heavy <strong>main</strong>tenance on 450 km dry season roads carried out<br />
O6.5 SCs regularly carrying out routine <strong>main</strong>tenance on the 700 kms of roads rehabilitated and heavily<br />
<strong>main</strong>tained<br />
SO7 (BSF Component) Reduce the burden of disease in 8 woredas of the <strong>SOCODEP</strong> area<br />
O7.1 Sustainable and effective water supply provided to 8 woredas of the <strong>SOCODEP</strong> area<br />
O7.2 Basic sanitation facilities provided and used by the 8 woredas of the <strong>SOCODEP</strong> area<br />
O7.3 Institutional capacity of the Regional Water, Mines and Energy Development Bureau (RWMEDB) and<br />
CBOs strengthened<br />
O7.4 Sustainable and effective health facilities provided to 8 woredas of the project area
Water Supply &<br />
San, 2.28, 10%<br />
Health &<br />
Nutrition, 1.57,<br />
7%<br />
Roads, 4.70, 21%<br />
GoE, 4.06,<br />
21%<br />
BSF, 2.94, 15%<br />
Project Costs and Financing 56<br />
Budget Costs by Component (million US$, total 22.72m)<br />
Veterinary Drugs,<br />
1.89, 8%<br />
WSHBS Mgt &<br />
Coordination,<br />
0.17, 1%<br />
Support to CBE,<br />
0.39, 2%<br />
41<br />
Training of SCs,<br />
0.95, 4%<br />
SSE Promotion,<br />
0.29, 1%<br />
Support to SRAB,<br />
2.80, 12%<br />
Credit line thro<br />
CBE, 7.68, 34%<br />
Actual Financing (million US$, total 19.65m)<br />
Beneficiaries,<br />
0.20, 1%<br />
56 Source: Project Completion Report, June 2006<br />
CBE, 0.46, 2%<br />
<strong>IFAD</strong>, 11.99,<br />
61%<br />
APPENDIX 2
<strong>SOCODEP</strong> Timeline<br />
43<br />
APPENDIX 3<br />
Event 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06<br />
<strong>IFAD</strong> Preparation Mission<br />
Pre-Appraisal<br />
Baseline Survey of SCs<br />
<strong>IFAD</strong> Appraisal Mission<br />
Report & Rec of the President to <strong>IFAD</strong>'s EB<br />
Loans effective<br />
SLA for credit line between MOF and CBE<br />
Start-up Workshop<br />
Establishment of PCU at SRAB, CPD<br />
Formulation Mission for WSHBS (BSF) Component<br />
Mid-Term Review<br />
Move of PCU to Bureau of Cooperatives<br />
Start-up Workshop for BSF Component<br />
BSF Grant approved<br />
Move of PCU to BOFED<br />
Baseline Study for BSF Completed<br />
BSF Grant effective<br />
End of project, except Roads and BSF components<br />
Closure of SRS 037-ET and credit part of loan 342-ET<br />
Completion Report by GoE<br />
End of Roads and BSF components<br />
Closure of re<strong>main</strong>ing loans<br />
BSF Impact Study<br />
BSF Grant closed<br />
<strong>IFAD</strong>/UNOPS Completion Report Mission<br />
Completion Evaluation
49<br />
Reconstructed Logframe for <strong>SOCODEP</strong><br />
APPENDIX 4<br />
OVI Targets Data sources (star * means data still<br />
to be collected by evaluation team)<br />
Principal objective: increase agricultural<br />
For different population groups, the poor in particular,<br />
- Socio-economic survey (SES)*<br />
productivity and raise income levels of the rural members and non-members of SCs in the project area: -<br />
poor through support to Service Cooperatives’<br />
development in order to facilitate efficient<br />
provision of sustainable services to members<br />
Yields of <strong>main</strong> crops (maize, teff, sorghum, barley,<br />
pulses and rape seed)<br />
- Product quality<br />
- Production cost<br />
- Labour productivity<br />
- Profitability of agriculture production<br />
- Income level<br />
SO1 Provide a model for developing <strong>Ethiopia</strong>n - Number of financially sustainable restructured 200 - SRAB SC baseline survey; coop<br />
cooperatives under the new legislation,<br />
cooperatives<br />
staff survey (CSS)*; SC financial<br />
particularly with respect to improvement of<br />
<strong>report</strong>s<br />
financial intermediation services in rural areas,<br />
which could be replicated in other areas of the<br />
country.<br />
- Cost of the cooperative development process<br />
- Volume of services provided to SC members (i.t.o.<br />
number of clients, value, units of inputs etc.)<br />
- Financial <strong>report</strong>s<br />
- CSS*; coop members survey<br />
(CMS)*; SC activity <strong>report</strong>s<br />
- Quality of services provided to SC members<br />
- CMS*; CSS*<br />
- Membership (number and nature)<br />
- CSS*<br />
- Nature and extend of replication of the SC<br />
- Cooperative promotion bureau<br />
development model<br />
(CPB) <strong>report</strong>s; national and regional<br />
- Government commitment to restructure SCs and<br />
gov key informants (KI)*<br />
carry trough policy changes<br />
- New laws and regulations in<br />
SNNPR; national and regional gov<br />
KI*<br />
O1.1 Service Cooperatives (SCs) restructured and - Nature and consequences of restructuring<br />
- CSS*; ‘94&’98 coop proclamations;<br />
registered under the new legislation - Consequences of registration<br />
CPB KI*<br />
A1.1.1 Restructuring of SCs - Restructuring process<br />
- CSS*; Project progress <strong>report</strong>s<br />
- Number of SCs restructured<br />
200 (PPRs); CPB KI*; CPB <strong>report</strong>s
50<br />
A1.1.2 Registration SCs - Registration process<br />
- Number of SCs registered<br />
A1.1.3 Appointment of paid SC<br />
- Job description for SC managers<br />
managers in all restructured SCs<br />
(cost partly reimbursed for 3 first<br />
years)<br />
- Selection process<br />
- Number of SC managers appointed<br />
O1.2 Short term technical assistance provided, to - Duration of presence in first year (months)<br />
facilitate:<br />
- Duration of presence in second and fourth year<br />
- training of the staff<br />
(weeks)<br />
- development of accounting systems in the - Application of improved accounting system within<br />
cooperatives<br />
SCs<br />
- development of auditing procedures to be<br />
followed by the CPD<br />
- Application of improved audit procedures by CPD<br />
A1.2.1 Recruitment of 2 training - Relevance of TOR<br />
specialists in cooperatives<br />
management, supervision and<br />
audit<br />
- Timely recruitment<br />
A1.2.2 Development of training<br />
- Adequacy of training needs assessment<br />
programmes<br />
- Training contents and design contributed by TA<br />
A1.2.3 Preparation of curricula and<br />
training materials<br />
- Technical soundness of curricula and materials<br />
prepared<br />
- Pedagogical quality of curricula and materials<br />
prepared<br />
A1.2.4 Training of trainers - Duration of TfT<br />
- Quality of TfT<br />
- Number of trainers trained<br />
- Competence of trainers trained<br />
A1.2.5 Development of accounting<br />
procedures for cooperatives<br />
- Technical soundness of procedures<br />
- Applicability of procedures<br />
200<br />
200<br />
3 m<br />
2 x 2 w<br />
- CSS*; PPRs; CPB KI*; CPB<br />
<strong>report</strong>s; regional cooperative register<br />
- CSS*; PPRs; CPB KI*<br />
- PPRs<br />
- TA <strong>report</strong>s<br />
- CSS*; SC accountancy documents<br />
- CSS*; SC audit <strong>report</strong>s; Auditors*<br />
- Updated TOR for TA<br />
- PPRs<br />
- Needs assessment <strong>report</strong>; CSS*;<br />
CMS*<br />
- Training documents<br />
- Training documents and materials;<br />
trainees*<br />
- TfT <strong>report</strong><br />
- Trainees*<br />
- TfT <strong>report</strong><br />
- Training <strong>report</strong>s; Trainees*<br />
- Accounting manual<br />
- CSS*; SC accountancy documents;<br />
SC accountants*
51<br />
A1.2.6 Development of audit procedures<br />
for the cooperative auditors<br />
- Technical soundness of procedures<br />
- Applicability of procedures<br />
- Audit manual<br />
- CSS*; SC audit <strong>report</strong>s; CPB<br />
auditors*<br />
A1.2.7 Follow up of SCs and CPD - Nature and frequency of follow up - TA <strong>report</strong>s<br />
operations<br />
- CPB KI*<br />
A1.2.8 Provision of guidelines for - Technical soundness of guidelines<br />
- Guidelines<br />
refresher courses<br />
- Applicability and pedagogical quality of guidelines<br />
- Trainees*<br />
O1.3 Long term technical advisory support<br />
provided to SCs<br />
- Duration of presence 2 years - TA <strong>report</strong><br />
A1.3.1 Recruitment of a Cooperatives - Relevance of TOR<br />
- TOR<br />
Expert<br />
- Timely recruitment<br />
- TA <strong>report</strong><br />
A1.3.2 Guidance and technical advice to - Relevance, quality and adequacy of guidance and<br />
- TA <strong>report</strong>; CSS*; CPB KI*<br />
SCs in all aspects of their<br />
operation<br />
advice given<br />
A1.3.3 Technical support to CPD - Relevance, quality and adequacy of technical support<br />
given<br />
- TA <strong>report</strong>; CPB KI*<br />
A1.3.4 Half-year meetings between SC - Frequency and quality of the meetings<br />
2 per - Meeting <strong>report</strong>s; PPRs; TA <strong>report</strong>s;<br />
presidents to discuss operational<br />
issues<br />
- Number of participants<br />
- Relevance of issues discussed and solutions found<br />
year SC activity <strong>report</strong>s<br />
- CSS*; CPB KI*<br />
A1.3.5 Develop a platform for<br />
- Platform/apex body development process<br />
- TA <strong>report</strong>; CPB KI*<br />
organization of an apex body - Nature of the platform<br />
- CPB KI*; CSS*<br />
- Existence and nature of the apex body<br />
- CPB KI*; Apex body documents<br />
O1.4 The staff of SCs and Executive Committee<br />
members trained to enable them to<br />
effectively manage the SCs as business<br />
organizations<br />
- Management capacity of SC staff and EC members - CSS*; CMS*<br />
O1.4.1 Organize 4 training courses for - Training contents and design<br />
- Training preparatory documents and<br />
200 SC managers consisting of a 3<br />
months induction course<br />
- Number and duration of induction courses organized<br />
- Number and nature of participants<br />
4 x 3m<br />
200<br />
materials; trainees*<br />
- PPRs<br />
- Training <strong>report</strong>s
52<br />
O1.4.2 Organize 5 day refresher courses<br />
during subsequent years for SC<br />
managers<br />
O1.4.3 Train other SC professional staff<br />
including storekeepers,<br />
bookkeepers and shopkeepers<br />
O1.4.4 Organize a study tour for 10<br />
officers from the CPD and SC<br />
managers to neighboring countries<br />
O1.4.5 Sensitize and train 200 SC<br />
executive committee members<br />
O1.5 The members of SCs trained to enable them<br />
to actively participate in the decision<br />
making processes of the SCs<br />
A1.5.1 Sensitization/orientation of all SC<br />
members<br />
O1.6 The CPD staff trained to reorient them in<br />
the operation of cooperatives in a free<br />
market economy and to increase their skills<br />
in supervision and audit of the SCs.<br />
- Quality of refresher training needs assessment<br />
- Training contents and design<br />
- Number and duration of refresher courses organized<br />
- Number and nature of participants<br />
- Number, duration and nature of courses organized<br />
- Number and nature of participants<br />
- Number of participants on the tour<br />
- Relevance of visits<br />
- Quality of the organization<br />
- Sensitization/training contents and design<br />
- Nature, number and duration of s/t activities<br />
organized<br />
- Number and nature of participants<br />
- Number and nature of SC members present at<br />
General Assemblies<br />
- Nature of their participation during the GAs<br />
- Nature and frequency of other forms of participation<br />
- SC members’ understanding of SC objectives,<br />
structure and functioning<br />
- SC members’ understanding of their role in SCs’<br />
decision making processes<br />
- Sensitization contents and design<br />
- Nature, number and duration of activities organized<br />
- Number and nature of participants<br />
- Knowledge and skills of CPD staff for managing<br />
cooperatives in a free market economy<br />
- Supervision and audit skills of CPD staff<br />
- Needs assessment <strong>report</strong>; trainees*<br />
- Training preparatory documents and<br />
materials; trainees*<br />
- PPRs<br />
- Training <strong>report</strong>s<br />
- Training preparatory documents and<br />
materials; trainees*; PPRs<br />
- Training <strong>report</strong>s<br />
10 - Tour <strong>report</strong>; PPRs<br />
- Tour preparatory documents; Tour<br />
participants*<br />
- Tour participants*<br />
- S/T preparatory documents and<br />
materials; S/T <strong>report</strong>s; PPR<br />
1000<br />
- CSS*<br />
- CSS*; CMS*; SC activity <strong>report</strong>s<br />
- CMS*; CSS*<br />
- CMS*; CSS*<br />
- CMS*; CSS*<br />
- CMS*; CSS*<br />
- Sensitization preparatory documents<br />
and materials<br />
- Sensitization <strong>report</strong>s; PPR<br />
- CMS*; CPB KI*<br />
- Idem
53<br />
A1.6.1 Organize initial orientation<br />
workshop for all senior staff<br />
A1.6.2 Organize orientation training<br />
course for 15 days for all staff in<br />
the CPD<br />
A1.6.3 Organize 2 month training courses<br />
for 5 persons appointed as<br />
cooperative auditors<br />
A1.6.4 Organize 10 days orientation<br />
course for 23 existing cooperative<br />
auditors<br />
A1.6.5 Organize 15 days orientation<br />
course for 33 cooperative teams<br />
A1.6.6 Organize orientation course in<br />
business management of small<br />
enterprises for zonal and woreda<br />
cooperative promotion marketing<br />
officers<br />
A1.6.7 Organize 5 day refresher course<br />
during each year of project<br />
implementation to all cooperative<br />
promotion staff and Rural<br />
Womens’ Affairs staff<br />
A1.6.8 Organize a study tour by 10<br />
officers from the CPD and SC<br />
managers to neighbouring<br />
countries<br />
- Quality of the WS (organization, interest of subjects,<br />
effectiveness of activities…)<br />
- Number and nature of participants<br />
- Orientation training contents and design<br />
- Number and nature of participants<br />
- Duration of the training<br />
- Audit training contents and design<br />
- Number and nature of participants<br />
- Duration of the training<br />
- Audit orientation training contents and design<br />
- Number and nature of participants<br />
- Duration of the training<br />
- Orientation training contents and design<br />
- Number and nature of participants<br />
- Duration of the training<br />
- SSE management training contents and design<br />
- Number and nature of participants<br />
- Duration of the training<br />
- Quality of refresher training needs assessment<br />
- Training contents and design<br />
- Number and duration of refresher courses organized<br />
- Number and nature of participants<br />
- Number of participants on the tour<br />
- Relevance of visits<br />
- Quality of the organization<br />
158<br />
5<br />
2m<br />
23<br />
10d<br />
15d<br />
10<br />
- Workshop preparatory documents<br />
and materials; WS <strong>report</strong>; WS<br />
participants*; CPB KI*<br />
- WS <strong>report</strong>; PPRs<br />
- Training preparatory documents and<br />
materials; trainees*<br />
- Training <strong>report</strong>s, PPRs<br />
- Training preparatory documents and<br />
materials; trainees*<br />
- Training <strong>report</strong>s, PPRs<br />
- Training preparatory documents and<br />
materials; trainees*<br />
- Training <strong>report</strong>s, PPRs<br />
- Training preparatory documents and<br />
materials; trainees*<br />
- Training <strong>report</strong>s, PPRs<br />
- Training preparatory documents and<br />
materials; trainees*<br />
- Training <strong>report</strong>s, PPRs<br />
- Training needs assessment <strong>report</strong>;<br />
trainees*<br />
- Training preparatory documents and<br />
materials; trainees*<br />
- Training <strong>report</strong>s, PPRs<br />
- Tour preparatory documents<br />
- Tour <strong>report</strong><br />
- Tour participants*
54<br />
SO2 Increased capital and income among the rural poor<br />
in the project area through off-farm incomegenerating<br />
activities particularly for women and<br />
families in densely populated areas with limited<br />
land for farm expansion<br />
O2.1 Growth of new small scale enterprises<br />
(SSE) fostered by pilot projects to introduce<br />
new business ideas and providing vocational<br />
training<br />
- Change in assets and income through the<br />
development of SSEs among different population<br />
groups<br />
- Change in assets and income through the<br />
development of off-farm IGAs among different<br />
population groups<br />
- Change in scope, nature and profitability of SSEs<br />
among different population groups<br />
- Number and nature of SSEs created or supported<br />
- Number of SSE employees<br />
A2.1.1 Information to beneficiaries - Nature of information provided<br />
- Number of recipients<br />
A2.1.2 Study tour to India for 2 RTU - Number of participants on the tour<br />
agents to investigate appropriate<br />
commercial operations<br />
- Relevance of visits<br />
- Quality of the organization<br />
- Lessons learned and used for project support<br />
A2.1.3 Basic business training from ILO - Quality of training needs assessment<br />
for selected RWAD and CPD staff - Training contents and design<br />
- Number and duration courses organized<br />
- Number and nature of participants<br />
A2.1.4 National and international study<br />
tours for entrepreneurs<br />
- Number of participants on the tours<br />
- Relevance of visits<br />
- Quality of the organization<br />
A2.1.5 3 Pilot SSE projects in 5 woredas - Quality of baseline survey<br />
- Number and nature of pilot SSE projects<br />
- Setting up process of the pilot SSEs<br />
- Quality of pilot evaluation and lessons learned from<br />
pilot SSEs<br />
- Dissemination process of pilot experiences<br />
A2.1.6 Investigation of potential to<br />
develop spinning and weaving<br />
- Duration of TA<br />
- Quality of investigation <strong>report</strong><br />
- Dissemination and use of investigation results<br />
- SES*<br />
- Idem<br />
- SES*; CSS*; PPRs<br />
170 - PPRs, SSEs*<br />
2100 - SSEs*<br />
- PPRs<br />
- CMS*<br />
2 - Tour <strong>report</strong>; PPRs<br />
- Tour preparatory documents; tour<br />
<strong>report</strong>; tour participants*<br />
- PPRs<br />
- Training needs assessment <strong>report</strong>;<br />
trainees*<br />
- Training preparatory documents and<br />
materials; trainees*<br />
- Training <strong>report</strong>s, PPRs<br />
53 - Tour <strong>report</strong>; PPRs<br />
- Tour preparatory documents; tour<br />
<strong>report</strong>; tour participants*<br />
3<br />
- Baseline survey <strong>report</strong><br />
- PPRs; SSEs*<br />
- CPB and SC KI*<br />
- Pilot evaluation <strong>report</strong><br />
- PPRs; CPB KI*; SSEs*<br />
1,5m - TA <strong>report</strong><br />
- Investigation <strong>report</strong><br />
- PPRs; CPB KI*
55<br />
A2.1.7 Vocational training to<br />
entrepreneurs/artisans (480<br />
months)<br />
O2.2 The amount and nature of credit services to<br />
SC members provided by SCs for SSE<br />
activities increased<br />
- Quality of training needs assessment<br />
- Training contents and design<br />
- Number and duration of courses organized<br />
- Number and nature of participants<br />
- Amount and nature of credit services provided by<br />
SCs for SSE activities<br />
- Number and nature of credit recipients<br />
- Training needs assessment <strong>report</strong>;<br />
trainees*<br />
215 - Training preparatory documents and<br />
materials; trainees*<br />
- Training <strong>report</strong>s, PPRs<br />
2100 - SCs financial <strong>report</strong>s; CBE <strong>report</strong>s;<br />
CBE KI*; MFI <strong>report</strong>s; MFI KI*<br />
- Idem; CMS*; SSEs*<br />
- CMS*<br />
A2.2.1 Information to beneficiaries - Nature of information provided<br />
- Number of recipients<br />
O2.3 New forms of rural women’s groups capable - Forms of women’s groups joining SCs promoted<br />
- CSS*; women’s groups*<br />
of promoting development activities and<br />
facilitating access to credit for their<br />
members promoted<br />
- Number and nature of women joining these women’s<br />
groups<br />
- Volume of credit extended to women’s groups’<br />
members<br />
- Nature and volume of development activities<br />
undertaken by women’s groups<br />
- Competence of RWAD staff to support women’s<br />
groups<br />
- Women’s groups*<br />
A2.3.1 Information to beneficiaries - Nature of information provided<br />
- Number of recipients<br />
- Women’s groups*; SES*<br />
A2.3.2 Promotion of formation of - Women’s groups formation process<br />
women’s groups<br />
- Women’s groups formation promotion process<br />
- Number and nature of groups formed<br />
A2.3.3 Training of RAWD staff - Training contents and design<br />
- Number of courses organized<br />
- Number and nature of participants<br />
- Duration of the courses<br />
O2.4 Participating banks’ experience developed - Changes in loan recovery<br />
and cost effective methods for rural lending<br />
to reach small enterprises and rural women<br />
supported<br />
- Changes in cost of rural credit<br />
No activities specified at appraisal - -<br />
- Women’s groups*; SCs financial<br />
<strong>report</strong>s; CBE <strong>report</strong>s<br />
- Women’s groups*<br />
- Women’s groups*; RWAD KI*<br />
- Women’s groups*; RWAD KI*<br />
- Women’s groups*; RWAD KI*<br />
- CSS*; RWAD KI*<br />
- Training preparatory documents and<br />
materials; trainees*<br />
- Training <strong>report</strong>s, PPRs<br />
- SC financial <strong>report</strong>s; CBE <strong>report</strong>s;<br />
CBE KI*; MFI <strong>report</strong>s; MFI KI*
56<br />
SO3 Strengthen the SRAB to carry out its mandate<br />
with respect to cooperative development<br />
O3.1 SRAB’s structural capacity to promote SC<br />
development enhanced<br />
A3.1.1 Establishment of PCU (1 PC, I<br />
FC, I PMEO, I RWA, 3 CPD staff,<br />
2 auditors, 3 support staff)<br />
A3.1.2 Acquisition of transport, office<br />
and communication equipment<br />
O3.2 SRAB’s capacity to monitor and evaluate<br />
SC development enhanced<br />
- SRAB’s approach to promote cooperative<br />
development<br />
- SRAB’s performance to promote cooperative<br />
development<br />
- PCU performance<br />
- SRAB’s structural cooperative promotion capacity<br />
- Composition of the PCU<br />
- Clarity of roles of the PCU and its members<br />
- Competence of the PCU members to fulfill their roles<br />
- Adequacy of resources for the PCU<br />
- Number and nature of vehicles acquired<br />
- Number and nature of office and communication<br />
equipment acquired<br />
- Adequacy of equipment acquired<br />
- State and <strong>main</strong>tenance of the equipment acquired<br />
- Information collected, analyzed and disseminated for<br />
management and steering<br />
- Use of information collected for management and<br />
steering<br />
A3.2.1 Development of an M&E manual - M&E indicators developed<br />
- Availability and quality of M&E manual<br />
- Use of M&E manual<br />
- CPB KI*; CSS*<br />
- PPR*; CPB KI*<br />
- PCU members*; CPB KI*<br />
- PCU members*; CPB KI*<br />
- M&E <strong>report</strong>s<br />
- PPRs; CPB KI*<br />
- M&E indicator list<br />
- M&E manual<br />
- CPB KI*; M&E <strong>report</strong>s<br />
A3.2.2 Baseline survey - Availability and quality of baseline survey - Baseline survey <strong>report</strong><br />
- Baseline survey <strong>report</strong><br />
A3.2.3 Collection, analysis and<br />
- Regularity and adequacy of monitoring <strong>report</strong>s at<br />
- M&E <strong>report</strong>s<br />
dissemination of monitoring data different levels<br />
A3.2.4 Follow-up evaluation studies - Number and nature of studies - Evaluation study <strong>report</strong>s; PPRs
57<br />
SO4 Provide credit to meet financial requirements for<br />
agricultural inputs and draught oxen and<br />
facilitate the supply of inputs through support to<br />
local traders and cooperatives.<br />
O4.1 A credit programme is implemented for<br />
increasing agricultural development,<br />
production and marketing and improving<br />
income levels of the rural poor<br />
- Amount of credit provided<br />
- Destination of the credit provided<br />
- Reimbursement rate<br />
- Nature and number of households that received credit<br />
- Nature and volume of credit extended<br />
- Nature and volume activities financed by credit<br />
- SC financial <strong>report</strong>s; CBE <strong>report</strong>s;<br />
CBE KI*; MFI <strong>report</strong>s; MFI KI*;<br />
CSS*; SES*; local traders*<br />
- SC financial <strong>report</strong>s; CBE <strong>report</strong>s;<br />
CBE KI*; MFI <strong>report</strong>s; MFI KI*;<br />
CSS*; SES*; local traders*<br />
A4.1.1 Provision of funds for credit line - Availability of funds to CBE and other MFI - CBE <strong>report</strong>s; CBE KI*; MFI<br />
<strong>report</strong>s; MFI KI*<br />
A4.1.2 Preparation of annual lending<br />
programmes<br />
- Annual lending programmes - Annual lending programmes<br />
A4.1.3 Appraisal of loan proposals - Number and nature of loan proposals<br />
- CBE <strong>report</strong>s; CBE KI*; MFI<br />
- Number and nature of accepted loans<br />
<strong>report</strong>s; MFI KI*; SC financial<br />
<strong>report</strong>s<br />
A4.1.4 Follow-up of loans - Regularity and nature of follow-up - CBE <strong>report</strong>s; CBE KI*; MFI<br />
<strong>report</strong>s; MFI KI*<br />
A4.1.5 Monitoring of credit programme - Regularity and nature of monitoring of the credit<br />
- CBE <strong>report</strong>s; CBE KI*; MFI<br />
implementation<br />
programme implementation<br />
<strong>report</strong>s; MFI KI*; PPRs<br />
O4.2 TA to facilitate training of the CBE staff - Quality of training needs assessment<br />
- Training needs assessment <strong>report</strong>;<br />
provided (Rural Banking expert for 3<br />
months)<br />
- Training contents and design contributed by TA<br />
- Quality of trainings given by TA<br />
- Number and nature of participants<br />
trainees*<br />
- Training preparatory documents and<br />
materials; trainees*<br />
- Training <strong>report</strong>s, PPRs<br />
No activities specified at appraisal - -<br />
O4.3 CBE staff trained in rural credit<br />
methodologies to improve their skills to<br />
effectively implement the credit programme<br />
- Skills of CBE staff to implement credit programme - CSS*; CBE KI*<br />
A4.3.1 Training of 15 CBE loan officers - Training contents and design<br />
- Training preparatory documents and<br />
- Number of courses organized<br />
materials; trainees*<br />
- Number and nature of participants<br />
- Duration of the courses<br />
- Training <strong>report</strong>s, PPRs<br />
O4.4 Transport facilities to CBE to facilitate<br />
effective implementation of the credit<br />
programme provided<br />
- Number and nature of transport means provided - CBE KI*; PPRs
58<br />
SO5 Relief of livestock health constraints, particularly<br />
with respect to draught animals, trough provision<br />
of veterinary drugs.<br />
- Animal heath situation in the project area - SES*<br />
O5.1 Access to veterinary drugs improved - Availability of veterinary drugs in the project area<br />
- Access to veterinary drugs by animal breeders<br />
- Use of veterinary drugs<br />
- SES*<br />
A5.1.1 Preparation of annual demand - Survey design<br />
- Survey design documents<br />
estimates<br />
- Survey results (data collected and analyzed)<br />
- Survey <strong>report</strong><br />
A5.1.2 Establishment of revolving fund - Volume of the fund established<br />
- PPRs; NBE KI*; CSS*<br />
account held by NBE<br />
- Functioning of the fund<br />
A5.1.3 Distribution of drugs. - Volume and nature of drugs distributed - PPRs; CSS*<br />
SO6 Improve access of rural families to services and<br />
markets by rehabilitating and <strong>main</strong>taining rural<br />
roads.<br />
- Number of SCs benefiting from rehabilitated roads<br />
- Number of SCs benefiting from heavy <strong>main</strong>tenance<br />
on roads<br />
- Cost of road improvement works<br />
- Sustainability of road improvements<br />
45<br />
100<br />
- CSS*; PPRs<br />
- Idem<br />
- Project financial <strong>report</strong>s; BPWUD<br />
financial <strong>report</strong>s<br />
- Roads’ actual appearance*<br />
O6.1 Road construction equipment provided to<br />
BPWUD<br />
- Type and number of equipment provided - Equipment*; PPRs<br />
A6.1.1 Preparation of specifications for<br />
procurement of road construction<br />
equipment<br />
- Tender and procurement documents - Tender and procurement documents<br />
A6.1.2 Procurement of equipment - Number of replies from sellers<br />
- Procurement files<br />
- Selection process<br />
- Procurement manual; BPWUD KI*<br />
- Timely delivery of equipment<br />
- BPWUD KI*; PPRs<br />
O6.2 Improvement of rural road network and - Correspondence of plans with project objectives<br />
- BPWUD KI*<br />
access roads to SCs is properly planned - Feasibility of plans<br />
A6.2.1 Preparation of the roads<br />
- Programming approach<br />
- Programme preparatory documents;<br />
rehabilitation and <strong>main</strong>tenance<br />
programme<br />
- Roads rehabilitation and <strong>main</strong>tenance programme<br />
BPWUD KI*<br />
- Programme<br />
O6.3 250 km of the existing dry season roads - Length of dry season roads rehabilitated<br />
250 km - BPWUD <strong>report</strong>s; PPRs; Roads’<br />
rehabilitated to RR-30 standard<br />
- Nature of rehabilitation work<br />
actual appearance*<br />
A6.3.1 Preparation of the rehabilitation - Plans drawn<br />
- Plans and budget documents<br />
works<br />
- Budget estimated
59<br />
A6.3.2 Supervision of rehabilitation<br />
works<br />
O6.4 Heavy <strong>main</strong>tenance on 450 km dry season<br />
roads carried out<br />
A6.4.1 Preparation of heavy and routine<br />
<strong>main</strong>tenance works<br />
A6.4.2 Supervision of heavy and routine<br />
<strong>main</strong>tenance works<br />
O6.5 SCs regularly carrying out routine<br />
<strong>main</strong>tenance on the 700 kms of roads<br />
rehabilitated and heavily <strong>main</strong>tained<br />
A6.5.1 Preparation of routine<br />
<strong>main</strong>tenance works<br />
A6.5.2 Supervision of routine<br />
<strong>main</strong>tenance works<br />
- Number of visits to the works<br />
- Rehab supervision <strong>report</strong>s; BPWUD<br />
- Reporting and feed-back process<br />
<strong>report</strong>s; BPWUD KI*<br />
- Length of roads on which heavy <strong>main</strong>tenance has 450 km - BPWUD <strong>report</strong>s; PPRs; Roads’<br />
been carried out<br />
- Nature of heavy <strong>main</strong>tenance works<br />
actual appearance*<br />
- Plans drawn<br />
- Budget estimated<br />
- Plans and budget documents<br />
- Number of visits to the works<br />
- Rehab supervision <strong>report</strong>s; BPWUD<br />
- Reporting and feed-back process<br />
<strong>report</strong>s; BPWUD KI*<br />
- Actual state of the improved roads<br />
- BPWUD <strong>report</strong>s; PPRs; Roads’<br />
- Regularity and nature of <strong>main</strong>tenance<br />
- Cost of <strong>main</strong>tenance<br />
actual appearance*<br />
- Degree of involvement of SCs in <strong>main</strong>tenance<br />
- CSS*<br />
- Maintenance plans - Plans<br />
- Number of visits to the works<br />
- Reporting and feed-back process<br />
- Rehab supervision <strong>report</strong>s; BPWUD<br />
<strong>report</strong>s; BPWUD KI*<br />
Added components with BSF grant funding since 1999 (as of Grant Agreement):<br />
OVI Targets Data sources (star * means data still<br />
Principal objective: enhance social and economic<br />
standards through improved health and nutritional status<br />
of poor rural households in 8 woredas of the <strong>SOCODEP</strong><br />
area<br />
SO7 Reduce the burden of disease in 8 woredas of the<br />
<strong>SOCODEP</strong> area<br />
- Reduction of water borne disease<br />
- Improved nutritional status<br />
- Improved quality and quantity of assets<br />
- Increased social/human capital through<br />
knowledge and technology transfer<br />
- Increased use of safe water and health<br />
services<br />
- Changes in behaviour due to increased<br />
recognition of good health and hygiene<br />
- Changes in water usage<br />
- Improved institutional capacity to provide<br />
water and health services<br />
to be collected by evaluation team)<br />
- Socio-economic survey (SES)*<br />
- Available government health<br />
figures<br />
- PPRs<br />
- Project M&E<br />
- SES*<br />
- Regional Water, Mines and Energy<br />
Development Bureau (RWMEDB)<br />
figures *
60<br />
O7.1 Sustainable and effective water supply<br />
provided to 8 woredas of the <strong>SOCODEP</strong> area<br />
- Reliability of safe water source<br />
- Accessibility of safe water source<br />
- Changes in time spent collecting water<br />
- Changes in quality and quantity of water<br />
-<br />
- PPRs<br />
- Project M&E<br />
A7.1.1 Construct hand-dug wells - Number of wells constructed 90 - PPRs<br />
- Project M&E<br />
A7.1.2 Protect additional springs - Number of springs protected 90 - PPRs<br />
- Project M&E<br />
A7.1.3 Rehabilitate hand-dug or drilled<br />
wells<br />
- Number of rehabilitated or drilled wells 40 - PPRs<br />
- Project M&E<br />
A7.1.4 Rehabilitate springs - Number of rehabilitated springs 35 - PPRs<br />
- Project M&E<br />
O7.2 Basic sanitation facilities provided and used by<br />
the 8 woredas of the <strong>SOCODEP</strong> area<br />
- Sanitation facilities utilized<br />
- Changes in health practices<br />
A7.2.1 Construct refuse pits and VIP latrines - Number of pits and latrines constructed 1,400 (1,200<br />
of these for<br />
demonstration)<br />
A7.2.2 Conduct public awareness campaigns<br />
to promote improved habitat practices<br />
O7.3 Institutional capacity of the Regional Water,<br />
Mines and Energy Development Bureau<br />
(RWMEDB) and CBOs strengthened<br />
- Number of trainings and quality<br />
- Number of beneficiaries trained<br />
- Water supply and sanitation knowledge and<br />
skills of RWMEDB and CBOs enhanced<br />
- Changes in services provided<br />
- Health centre records *<br />
- PPRs<br />
- Project M&E<br />
- PPRs<br />
- Project M&E<br />
- Training documents and trainee<br />
surveys *<br />
- PPRs<br />
- Project M&E<br />
- SES*<br />
- Available RWMEDB figures<br />
- CBO records *
61<br />
A7.3.1 Provide Training - Number of trainings and quality<br />
- Number of people trained<br />
- Number of community water and health<br />
centre committees established and still<br />
functioning<br />
A7.3.2 Assessment of water capacity of the<br />
area<br />
O7.4 Sustainable and effective health facilities<br />
provided to 8 woredas of the project area<br />
A7.4.1 Renovate, upgrade and equip health<br />
centres<br />
A7.4.2 Equip and supply w/ drugs additional<br />
health centres and health stations<br />
A7.4.3 Provide and train medical and<br />
administrative staff for these primary<br />
health care facilities<br />
A7.4.4 Establish a revolving drug fund at<br />
each facility, including the supply of<br />
impregnated mosquito nets<br />
A7.4.5 Strengthen the institutional capacity<br />
of the RHB<br />
- Training documents and trainee<br />
surveys *<br />
- PPRs<br />
- Project M&E<br />
- Conduct hydro-geological studies - Available RWMEDB figures<br />
- Accessibility of health facilities<br />
- Changes in use of health facilities<br />
(particularly women and children)<br />
- Health centre records*<br />
- SES*<br />
- Number of centres upgraded 2 - PPRs<br />
- Project M&E<br />
- Health centre records*<br />
- Number of centres supplied 6centres<br />
2stations<br />
- Number of trainings<br />
- Number of people trained<br />
- Number of funds established<br />
- Number of beneficiaries participating<br />
- Use of bed nets<br />
- Number of trainings and quality<br />
- Number of people trained<br />
- PPRs<br />
- Project M&E<br />
- Health centre records*<br />
- Training documents and trainee<br />
surveys *<br />
- PPRs<br />
- Project M&E<br />
- PPRs<br />
- Project M&E<br />
- Health centre records*<br />
- SES*<br />
- Training documents and trainee<br />
surveys *<br />
- PPRs<br />
- Project M&E
63<br />
International training<br />
Training Carried Out by <strong>SOCODEP</strong> (Source PCR, June 2006)<br />
Type of Training Function of Trainee Place Trained<br />
No. of Persons<br />
Trained<br />
APPENDIX 5<br />
Year Duration Cost<br />
Financial training Senior bank expert CBE UK 1 1998 5 weeks<br />
Project planning Experts in cooperative office Belgium 2 1999 3 months<br />
Project feasibility studies M&E Windhoek (Namibia) 1 May 2000 18 days<br />
Project management<br />
Financial Controller and<br />
Project Coordinator<br />
Rome and Turin 2 June 2000 1 month<br />
Loan administration<br />
Financial controller and<br />
project coordinator<br />
Nairobi UNOPS 3 2000 1 week<br />
Loan administration<br />
Financial Controller and<br />
Project Coordinator<br />
Nairobi UNOPS 3 2001 1 week<br />
Loan administration<br />
Financial controller and<br />
Nairobi UNOPS 2 2003 1 week<br />
project coordinator<br />
Cooperative training Cooperative experts Kenya, Nairobi 20 2002 1 month<br />
Project management Credit officers of CBE UK Bradford University 2 Sept./01 3 months<br />
Project planning, monitoring and<br />
evaluation<br />
Project coordinator UK Bradford University 1 Sept./01 18 months<br />
Water engineering Focal person Netherlands 1 Sept./03 18 months<br />
Project planning, monitoring and<br />
evaluation<br />
Distance learning<br />
Water engineering<br />
Environmental health<br />
<strong>IFAD</strong> implementation workshops<br />
<strong>IFAD</strong> implementation workshops<br />
<strong>IFAD</strong> implementation workshops<br />
Project coordinator UK Bradford University 1 Sept./03 18 months<br />
Bureau head and experts in<br />
BOFED<br />
Water Experts in Regions<br />
and zones<br />
Focal person from Health<br />
Dept<br />
PCU, FC and cooperative<br />
head of zone and region<br />
PCU, FC and experts from<br />
the regional bureau<br />
PCU, FC and experts from<br />
the regional bureau<br />
UK financial management 11<br />
2004 (2) and<br />
2005 (9)<br />
24 months<br />
and above<br />
India Hydrabad 9 Nov/04 15 days<br />
UK Liverpool 1 Sept./03 18 months<br />
Zimbabwe 10 2000 1 week<br />
Madagascar 7 2001 1 week<br />
Zambia 6 2002 1 week
64<br />
<strong>IFAD</strong> implementation workshops<br />
PCU, FC and BOFED<br />
Bureau heads<br />
Mozambique 4 2003 1 week<br />
<strong>IFAD</strong> implementation workshops<br />
PCU, FC and BOFED<br />
Bureau heads<br />
Lesotho 4 2004 1 week<br />
<strong>IFAD</strong> implementation workshops PCU and FC Rwanda 2 2005 1 week<br />
Exchange visit<br />
Bureau heads water and<br />
health<br />
Tanzania 4 2001 10 days<br />
Training in M&E and impact assessment PCU and FC Tanzania 2 2005 10 days<br />
Domestic training<br />
<strong>IFAD</strong> implementation workshops<br />
Bureau Heads, PCU,<br />
financial controller and<br />
M&E<br />
Addis Abeba 5 1999 5 days<br />
Training of water staff Experts zones and woredas 200 2005<br />
Refreshment training Cooperative staff zones and woredas 476 2002<br />
Refreshment training<br />
Cooperative managers and<br />
shopkeepers<br />
zones and woredas 186 2002<br />
Organisation and management, marketing,<br />
credit and saving cooperative principles<br />
Cooperative staff zones and woredas 574 2002<br />
Experience sharing Committee members western zones 458 2002 1 week<br />
Orientation about cooperatives Cooperative members Service cooperatives 789 2002 1 day<br />
Management of animal health Veterinarians Zones 70 2002<br />
Health and sanitation committee training Village committees Zones 102 2002 3 days 48,490<br />
Hygiene education Community members Zones 27,341 2002 2 days<br />
Women farmers training Female farmers Woredas 1,544 2001 - 119,400<br />
Women affairs expert training Women’s affairs experts 201 2001 3 days<br />
Women’s group managers training Women managers of IGA project zones 54 2001 19,300<br />
Field visits IGA experts project zones 130 cooperatives 2001 23,650<br />
Veterinary technical training Veterinary experts Project zones 300 2001 25,000<br />
Development agent training Development agents Project zones 126 2001 8,200<br />
New experts training Cooperative experts Awassa 8 2001<br />
Committee members exchange visits Cooperative members Woredas 122 2001<br />
Cooperative members training<br />
Peasant Association<br />
members<br />
Cooperatives 10,179 2001<br />
SC shopkeeper training Shopkeepers Cooperatives 36 2001
65<br />
SC new shopkeepers training Shopkeepers Cooperatives 11 2001<br />
SC new managers training Managers Cooperatives 39 2001<br />
SC old managers training Managers Cooperatives 34 2001<br />
Revolving drug fund training Health professionals Zone 34 2001 1 week<br />
Environmental health training Health professionals Zone 23 2001 106,030<br />
Community health agents training Community health agents Zone 5 2001 152,860<br />
Traditional birth attendants training Traditional birth attendants Zone 25 2001<br />
Cooperative staff training Cooperative staff 98 2000<br />
Training committee members Peasant association members 613 2000<br />
Shopkeepers 35 2000<br />
Orientation for cooperative members Cooperative members 11,970 2000<br />
Committee member training Cooperative members 74 2000<br />
Community health agents training Community health agents 5 2000<br />
Traditional birth attendants 25 2000<br />
Public health workers 28 2000<br />
Community health workers training Community health workers 18 2000<br />
Computer training Focal person of health 1 2000<br />
Water supply management training Water officers 2 2000<br />
Community organisers 5 2000<br />
Water committees 13 2000<br />
Water operators 15 2000<br />
Water technicians and water committee<br />
2000<br />
training Staff water committee Tello woreda 42<br />
Staff water committee Konso S. woreda 7 2000<br />
Staff water committee Chencha 49 2000<br />
Staff water committee Offa 21 2000<br />
Staff water committee Sodo 42 2000<br />
Staff water committee Damot Galle 14 2000<br />
Bank and credit disbursement training CBE experts Awassa 10 2000<br />
Cooperative educational training Cooperative staff Zone 149 1998 7 days<br />
Executive members Woreda 368 1998 3 days<br />
Cooperative employed<br />
1998 5 days<br />
workers Woredas 118<br />
Small scale enterprise training cooperative members Sodo town 149 1 1998<br />
FC: Financial Controller, PCU: Project Coordination Unit, BOFED: Bureau of Finance and Economic Development, SC service cooperatives<br />
1 Of those: 81 Small scale enterprises, 8 bamboo works, 7 weaving, 5 beehives, 48 tailoring
Evaluation Mission Itinerary, 18 th September-11 th October 2006<br />
Date Activities<br />
Mon 18 th Sept<br />
Tues 19 th Sept<br />
67<br />
APPENDIX 6<br />
Full team assembles in Addis Ababa. Introductions, logistics, making appointments.<br />
Meetings with MoFED, RUFIP, VOCA, Obtaining fieldwork advance from UNDP. Travel<br />
to Awassa.<br />
Weds 20 th Sept Planning: familiarity with documentation, explanation of OE Evaluation Manual,<br />
understanding of changes at MTR, findings of Supervision missions, content of BSF<br />
component. Arranging meetings.<br />
Thurs 21 st Sept Meetings with Regional Bureau officials (BoARD) and OMFI. Field work planning and<br />
transport logistics. Introduction to Report structure.<br />
Fri 22 nd Sept Meetings with Roads Authority, Bureau of Water Resources.<br />
Sat 23 rd Sept Preparation of invitations for wrap-up meetings. Final field work planning.<br />
Sun 24 th Sept<br />
Mon 25 th Sept<br />
Tues 26 th Sept<br />
Team splits: Socio-economist to Gamo<br />
Gofa Zone and Derashe Special Woreda,<br />
with Expert from Rural Women’s Affairs<br />
Team. Meetings with Woreda officials<br />
and Service Coops in Boreda, Chencha,<br />
Arba Minch Zuria and Derashe. Visits to<br />
BSF activities in Chencha, and roads in<br />
Chencha (Arba Minch-Zigity) and<br />
Boreda Wajifo-Boreda). Travel to Sodo.<br />
Team leader, Coops Specialist and Credit<br />
Specialist to Addis Ababa.<br />
Meetings with VOCA, RUFIP, CBE and<br />
Cooperatives Agency.<br />
Weds 27 th Sept Socio economist travels to Jimma Team leader to Jimma, Coops Specialist and<br />
Credit Specialist to Arba Minch with Expert<br />
Thurs 28 th Sept<br />
Fri 29 th Sept<br />
Sat 30 th Sept<br />
Team leader and Socio-economist in<br />
Kafa Zone. Discussions with Zonal<br />
officials. Visits to Gimbo, Bita and<br />
Decha Woredas. Visit to Gojeb-Argoba<br />
road. Visit to BSF component in Bita<br />
Woreda. Meeting with SUPAKS (now<br />
KDP) CTA. Travel to Jimma.<br />
from Cooperatives Promotion office.<br />
Coops and Credit Specialists to Gamo Gofa<br />
Zonal offices, and Arba Minch Zuria, Chencha<br />
and Boreda Woreda offices. Meetings with<br />
cooperatives in all three woredas.<br />
Sun 1 st Oct Team leader and Socio-economist to<br />
Sodo.<br />
Coops and Credit Specialists to Sodo.<br />
Debriefing for all team members, and planning of re<strong>main</strong>ing fieldwork<br />
Mon 2 nd Oct<br />
Tues 3 rd Team leader and Socio-economist to Coops and Credit Specialists to Damot Weyde<br />
Oct Wolayta Zonal offices, Ofa Woreda, BSF and Sodo Zuria Woredas, and visiting<br />
water supply component and Mure<br />
Health Post. Visit to Sodo RTC.<br />
Drafting of Aide Memoire. Travel to<br />
Awassa.<br />
cooperatives. Travel to Awassa.<br />
Weds 4 th Oct<br />
Thurs 5 th Oct<br />
Fri 6 th Completion of Aide Memoire and despatch to <strong>IFAD</strong>. Meetings with SNNPR Government<br />
Oct<br />
officials and other stakeholders. Drafting of Working Papers.<br />
Sat 7 th Oct<br />
Sun 8 th Preparation of presentations and final arrangements for wrap-up meetings. Meetings with<br />
Oct other key informants.<br />
Mon 9 th Oct Wrap-up meeting for SNNPR Government and other Awassa-based stakeholders. Travel to<br />
Addis Ababa.<br />
Tues 10 th Oct Wrap-up meeting for wider membership of core learning partnership, Addis Ababa. Final<br />
team meeting.<br />
Weds 11 th Oct Team disperses, team leader to UK.
Organisations and Individuals Interviewed<br />
69<br />
APPENDIX 7<br />
Organisation Name and Position<br />
Federal and national level<br />
MoFED Ato Fisseha, Director<br />
MoFED Ato Degene Demissie, International Financial Institutions<br />
Commercial Bank of <strong>Ethiopia</strong> Ato Simon Assefa, Manager SME & Agricultural Loan Division<br />
<strong>Ethiopia</strong>n Cooperatives Agency Ato Bedru Dedgeba Ejabo, Deputy General Director<br />
<strong>IFAD</strong> Ato Abebe, Field Presence<br />
AEMFI Dr Wolday, Founding Director<br />
RUFIP Ato Bahiru Haile, Manager Programme Coordination Office<br />
RUFIP Ato Gedion Mekonnen, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer<br />
ACDI/VOCA Wzo Brutawit Davit Abdi, Country Representative<br />
ACDI/VOCA Ato Hine Hassenu, Head Programme Support Section<br />
ACDI/VOCA Ms Elizabeth Farmer, <strong>Ethiopia</strong> Programme Officer<br />
Southern Region Government<br />
PCU Ato Shimekit Gebretsadik<br />
BOFED Ato Berigude Bancha Bagaje, Head<br />
Ato Mamo Ketti, Dept. Head<br />
Ato Legesse Hailemariam, PR Expert<br />
Ato Zemenu Gebre, Development Cooperative Expert<br />
Ato Shimekit Gebretsadik, PCU Coordinator<br />
Ato Demissie Gebre, Dept. Head<br />
Ato Alemu Belega, Team Leader<br />
Bureau of Agriculture & Rural Development Ato Altaye Aboret, Head, Planning and Civil Service Department<br />
Cooperative Promotion Sector Ato Birhanu Assfaw, Expert<br />
Cooperative Registration and Legal Affairs Ato Woldegiorgis Demore, Team Leader<br />
Cooperative Promotion Department (CPD) Ato Daniel Alemayehu, Acting Head<br />
Ato Daniel Tewolde, Saving & Credit Expert<br />
Rural Women Affairs Wzo. Belaynesh, Team leader<br />
Ato Fekadu Tadesse, Expert<br />
Ato Sisay, Expert<br />
Bureau of Water Resources Ato Menu Abas, Coordinator<br />
Bureau of Health Ato Demissie Bubamo, Environmental Health Team Leader<br />
Rural Roads Authority Petros Gordano, Planning and Programme Department Head<br />
Rural Roads Authority Ato Sisay Belachew Tadesse, Head, Road Maintenance Division<br />
Regional Institutions<br />
OMFI Ato Worku, Acting Head<br />
OMFI Ato Worku G./Yohanes, Manager, Planning & Marketing,<br />
Research Department<br />
OMFI Ato Tamirayehu Meshesha, Auditor, Arba Minch Branch<br />
Rural Finance Service Fund (RFSF) Ato Mathewos Rika, Head<br />
RUFIP Ato Maru Argaw Unit Head, Rural Finance Intermediation<br />
Programme, Awassa<br />
Gamo Gofa Zone<br />
Zonal Government Ato Feleke Meka, Cooperative Promotion Coordinator<br />
Arbaminch Zuria Woreda Cooperative Promotion<br />
& Input Desk<br />
Ato Alemayehu Gezahegn, Representative<br />
Arbaminch Zuria Woreda Omo Micro Finance<br />
Institute<br />
Ato Tamirayehu Mersha, Auditor & Acting Head<br />
Kola Dega Shara SC Ato Manaye Dercha, Accountant<br />
Chencha Woreda Cooperative Promotion & Input Ato Yissak Lema, Cooperative Training Expert<br />
Desk<br />
Ato Demissie Gebre, Input Loan Expert
Eazo Multi-purpose service cooperative Ato Balango Bassa, Vice Chairman<br />
Ato Banga Bale, Secretary<br />
Gaga Gocha Multi-purpose service cooperative Ato Alemayehu Bassaye, Chairman<br />
Ato Gauta Zema, Committee Member<br />
Assistant Vet, Chencha woreda Ato Dagmawi Mammo<br />
Acting Cooperative Head, Boreda woreda Ato Mateos Meskey<br />
Cooperative Organizer, Boreda woreda Ato Tika Wantela<br />
Cooperative Training expert, Chencha Woreda Ato Yishak Lemma<br />
Cooperative Loan expert, Chencha Woreda Ato Demissie Gebru<br />
Cooperative Loan Expert, Chencha Woreda Ato Lamrot Kassaye<br />
Cooperative Team Leader, Arba Minch Zuria<br />
Woreda<br />
Ato Alemayehu Gezahegn<br />
Welayta Zone<br />
Zonal Government Ato Gebru Gebre Meskel, Cooperative Expert<br />
Zonal Government Ato Badi Jebessa, Animal and Fisheries Resources Department<br />
Expert<br />
Zonal Government Ato Surafe Seifu, Cooperative Team Leader<br />
Zonal Government Ato Dessalegn Dache, Water Resources Development Office Head<br />
Zonal Government Ato Melkam Tadesse, Agriculture/Rural Development head<br />
Zonal Government Elfnesh Adey CDC Coordinator<br />
Sodo RTC Principal<br />
Sodo RTC <strong>SOCODEP</strong> Focal Point Officer<br />
Wolaita Zuria Woreda Cooperative Promotion & Ato Petros Dinase, Representative<br />
Input Desk<br />
Ato Wube Gejerso, Input Expert<br />
Damote Woyde Woreda Cooperative Promotion Ato Nega Alemu, Head<br />
& Input Desk<br />
Ato Aklilu, Expert<br />
Girara Multi-purpose service cooperative Ato Tadele Getena, SC Member<br />
Ato Matiwos Zema, SC Member & Guard<br />
Sake Multi-purpose service cooperative Ato Geletu Mega, Secretary for Control Committee<br />
Wachiga Multi-purpose service cooperative Ato Lera Kobote Ex-Chairman (Now Kebele Chairman)<br />
Ato Mena Afamo, SC Member<br />
Kokate Multi-purpose service cooperative Ato Bogale Shiferaw, Accountant<br />
Ofa Woreda Ato Yacob Kaba, Cooperatives Desk<br />
Ofa Woreda Ato Bereket Bekele, Cooperatives Expert<br />
Yakima Cooperative Ato Mamo Tanga, Chair, and Members<br />
Mure Health Post Ato Fisseha Solomon, Nurse<br />
Kaffa Zone<br />
Zonal Government Ato Teshager Semerab, Expert in Animal Health, Kefa Zone<br />
Zonal Government Ato Tashome Mamu, Expert, Cooperatives Desk<br />
Zonal Government Ato Negalign Berhanu, Head Health Department<br />
Zonal Government Ato Meseret Adeko, Head, Water Resources Department<br />
Gimbo Woreda Ato Alemayu Adare, Cooperatives Accountant<br />
Gimbo Woreda Ato Adamsu Tekolla, Assistant Veterinarian<br />
Argoba Cooperative Members<br />
Decha Woreda Ato Fokaru Mohammed, Cooperatives Expert<br />
Baha Cooperative Exec Committee and members<br />
Chena Woreda Ato Girma Giji, Animal Health Technician<br />
Chena Woreda Ato Tefere Agzo, Cooperatives Team Leader<br />
Chena Woreda Ato Kassahun Gezaw, Acting Head, Water Office<br />
Chena Cooperative Members<br />
Chena Woreda Ato Geramo Takele, Head, Health Office<br />
KDP (formerly SUPAKS) Mr Gerard Kiers, Chief Technical Adviser<br />
Derashe Special Woreda<br />
Animal Health Team Leader, Derashe Woreda Mekonnen Tilahun<br />
Cooperative Team Leader, Derashe Woreda Birru Simalew<br />
70
External PCR Team (met in May 2006)<br />
<strong>IFAD</strong> Phillips Young, Team Leader<br />
<strong>IFAD</strong> Miriam Cherogony, Rural Finance Specialist<br />
<strong>IFAD</strong> Fatima Mohammed Ali, Health Specialist<br />
<strong>IFAD</strong> Carl Lachat, Nutrition Specialist<br />
Participants at Wrap-up Workshops<br />
Awassa Workshop<br />
OMFI Ato Worku Gebre Yohannes, Planning & business Development<br />
Manager<br />
Southern Region Roads Authority Ato Petros Godana, Planning and Programming Head<br />
CPAIS Ato Berhanu Asfaw, Cooperatives Promotion Expert<br />
CPAIS Ato Daniel Alemayehu, Cooperatives Promotion department Head<br />
CPAIS Ato Wolde Giorgis Dimore, Cooperatives Regulatory and Legal<br />
Affairs Department Head<br />
Regional Veterinary Team Ato Sisay Kifle<br />
Rural Womens Affairs Team Ato Fekadu Tadesse, Rural Women’s Expert<br />
Water Resources Bureau Ato Menu Abas, Coordinator<br />
BOFED Ato Mamo Ketti, Head NGOs and Development Cooperation<br />
Regional Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Wzo Belaynesh Gelaye<br />
Development<br />
<strong>SOCODEP</strong>/BSF Ato Shimekit G/Tsadick, Project Coordinator<br />
SRA Ato Shemsu Shafi, General Manager<br />
Addis Ababa Workshop<br />
CHF Ms Leslie Gardiner, Program Advisor and Liaison Officer<br />
ECA Ato Bedru Dedgeba Ejabo, Deputy General Director<br />
71
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73<br />
Appendix VIII<br />
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<strong>SOCODEP</strong>/BSF (2005) Health Water Supply and Basic Sanitation Component Impact Assessment<br />
Study Results, December 2005.
<strong>SOCODEP</strong>/BSF Coordination Unit (2003) Southern Region Cooperatives Development and Credit<br />
Project Completion Report, September 2003.<br />
The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, <strong>Ethiopia</strong>, January 2006.<br />
The Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED) and the United Nations Country<br />
Team, Millennium Development Goals Report: Challenges and Propects for <strong>Ethiopia</strong>, Vol. 1,<br />
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UNDP, Human Development Report, <strong>Ethiopia</strong> Country Fact Sheet, 2005.<br />
UNOPS (2002) Southern Region Cooperatives Development and Credit Project (<strong>SOCODEP</strong>)<br />
Supervision Report, April 2002.<br />
UNOPS (2003) Southern Region Cooperatives Development and Credit Project (<strong>SOCODEP</strong>)<br />
Supervision Report, February 2003.<br />
UNOPS (2004) Southern Region Cooperatives Development and Credit Project (<strong>SOCODEP</strong>)<br />
Supervision Report, February 2004.<br />
UNOPS (2005) Southern Region Cooperatives Development and Credit Project (<strong>SOCODEP</strong>)<br />
Supervision Report, June 2005.<br />
USAID, Famine Early Warning Service Network (FEWSNET), <strong>Ethiopia</strong> Food Security Update,<br />
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