the unknown campaign of the Russian troops south of Dunai The ...

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V.B.Kashirin
The Dobrudzha Expedition in autumn 1916: the unknown campaign of the
Russian troops south of Dunai
The field of political and military history of the Great War has been
ploughed several times over by researchers, and it therefore may surprise many
historians in the West that in the chronicles of Russia‟s efforts of that period there
are still whole campaigns which remain unknown even to specialists. One such
dark spot is the expedition of the 47 th Army Corps, led by general of the infantry
A.M.Zaionchkovskii, in the autumn of 1916 to Romanian Dobrudzha, after the
opening of the Romanian Front.
This expedition became a totally different and very specific campaign of the
Great War. It was a true “battle of the people”, as on this small piece of land
between lower Dunai and the Black sea, units of Bulgarians, Germans and Turkish
armies, representing the forces of the Central Alliance, fought against the Entente
troops of Russians and Romanians, as well as the 1 st Serbian volunteer division
from the corps of Zaionchkovskii, which included Serbs, Croatians, Slovenians,
Bosnians, Czechs and Slovaks.
The opposing sides fought in a sparsely-populated hilly steppe, in a region
lacking water and in extremely unfavorable sanitary-epidemiological conditions. In
addition, although Romania was the junior ally, the Russian 47 th corps was
subordinated to the Romanian High command, and Russian units fought on the
territory of an allied but foreign state, far from its own sources of supply and
reinforcements, collaborating with an alien, sometimes even hostile population
(Romanian, Bulgarian, Tatars). This campaign was also special because Russians
and Bulgarians, the sons of two brotherly nations, fought bitterly against each other
for the first time since the time of the Dunai expedition of Prince Sviatoslav in the
X century.
The majority of nations, whose troops participated in the Dobrudzha
campaign, covered those events in detail in their military-history works and
memoirs. A number of memoirs and works on the Dobrudzha autumn expedition

2
came out in the Third Bulgarian Kingdom before its collapse in 1944. The 8 th and
9 th volumes of the unfinished 10 volume official history of Bulgaria‟s efforts in the
First World War were completely dedicated to it. 1 The combined length of the two
volumes came to 1700 pages. Very valuable are the memoirs of General Toshev,
commander of the 3 rd Bulgarian army in Dobrudzha, and other prominent
Bulgarian military commanders of that campaign – Todor Kantardzhiev, Aleksandr
Kisiov. 2 Several books have been published on the various regiments and divisions
of the Bulgarian army which fought on the Northern front in 1916. In the era of
socialism in Bulgaria any mention of fighting between Russian and Bulgarian
troops was practically impossible. However, in present day Bulgaria the 1916
campaign in Dobrudzha has attracted a lot of interest amongst historians, which is
can be seen by the publication in Bulgarian in 1996 and 2007 of solid academic
works dedicated to the 80 th and 90 th anniversary of the capture of Turtukai and
victory in the Dobrudzhan War. 3 A general military-political outline of this
campaign is provided in the final volume of academic of the BASc Georgi
Markov‟s trilogy on the history of Bulgaria during a period of wars 1912–1918. 4
In Romania and Turkey detailed official histories of the combat efforts of
Romanian and Ottoman troops have been written a long time ago. 5 In Yugoslavia,
numerous valuable memoirs and academic works dedicated to the Serbian
volunteer groups formed in Russia during the First World War, primarily the 1 st
Serbian volunteer division, which participated from the start in the Dunai
campaign until mid October 1916, suffering great losses, have been published. 6
And only in Russia the battles of Dobrudzha remain practically an unknown
page in the history of the First World War. In 1922, a very short outline of the
operation on the Romanian front written by a military expert F.I.Vasiliev was
published. 7 A.M.Zaionchkovskii was himself planning to publish an article entitled
“The campaign in Dobrudzha” in one of the issues of “Voenno-istoricheskii
sbornik”, 8 but did not do so before his death in 1926. The fate of his manuscript is
unknown. However, in 1933 brigadier-commissar S.R.Budkevich, staff member of
the Revolutionary military council, who had previously held high posts in the

3
soviet military intelligence service, published Zaionchkovskii‟s report to the Tsar
on the Dobrudzha operation, which he had written on 20 October 1916,
immediately after his removal from the post of commander of the 47 army corps,
in “Krasnyi arkhiv”. 9 At the end of October this report was presented to the
Emperor via the Grand Prince Aleksandr Mikhailovich and up to this day has
remained as the only source known to historians of the Dobrudzha expedition of
the Russian troops in 1916.
Since then not a single special study has been published on the operation of
the Russian forces on the Romanian front in 1916–1917, and in particular, on the
right bank of Dunai. In the period after the Second World War Russian historians
specializing in international and Balkan history, F.I.Notovich, V.A.Emets,
Iu.A.Pisarev, V.N.Vinogradov have written concrete studies on the history of
Balkan states in 1914–1918 and on the diplomatic struggle for the Balkans in those
years. However, up to this day none of the historians had specifically studied the
land campaign of Russian forces in Dobrudzha. Some related questions, have in
part been touched upon in the factual articles of O.R.Airapetov on the Balkan
strategies of the Entente and its enemies in the First World War. 10 A prominent
specialist on the naval history, D.Iu.Kozlov, wrote a whole book on “Navy in the
Romanian campaign 1916–1917”. 11 This study tackles more closely the fight in
Dobrudzha in the autumn of 1916 and practically ends the question of the
participation of the Black sea fleet. G.D.Shkundin, specialist in Bulgarian history,
has devoted a whole range of well researched studies to the political relations
between Bulgaria and the Entente powers, including Russia in the First World
War. 12
In the West, the campaign of 1916 on the Romanian front has only been
analyzed by the well known American historian Glenn Torrey. One of his articles
is devoted to the Russian-Romanian military collaboration in 1916, where the
problem of operations in Dobrudzha is touched upon. 13 However, Torrey in this
and in his other works tends to reproduce the Romanian point of view, virtually
agreeing with it. This clearly lowers the objectivity of his assessment, including the

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actions of Zaoinchkovskii corps, which is partly the result of Torrey‟s weak
knowledge of Russian sources.
A huge number of documents on the history of the Dobrudzha campaign is
held in the fonds of Russian state archives; first of all – in the Russian State
Military History archive (RGVIA), in the fonds of Supreme Headquarters (Stavka,
f. 2003), Main Administration of the General staff (GUGSh, f. 200), headquarters
of the South-western Front (f.2067), headquarters of the Odessa Military District
(f.1837), headquarters of the 47 th Army Corps (f. 2270) and other units which took
part in that expedition, as well as the personal fonds of M.V.Alekseev (f.55) and
A.M.Zaionchkovskii (f.69). The documents in RGVIA contain a huge amount of
information on the campaign of the Russian forces in Dobrudzha, including their
epic struggle, terrible suffering and eventual failure. This material deserves a
separate book, and we hope that one day this will happen. In this paper we will
concentrate on some of the most important strategic problems of preparing and
conducting the military expedition of Russian forces beyond Dunai in the autumn
of 1916.
***
As early as October 1915, after Bulgaria‟s entry into the war on the side of
the Central powers and Turkey, the Russian High Command began, rather late, to
plan an expedition to the Balkans. For this event, in the borders of the Odessa
Military District, a separate 7 th army, consisting of three army corps, a separate
rifle division, one cavalry division and two Cossack brigades, in total numbering
120 thousand men, was formed once again. At the time, Romania refused to allow
Russian forces to pass through its territory, in order to invade Bulgaria, so Stavka
and the Staff of the 7 th army began preparing for a landing operation on the
Bulgarian Black Sea shore. However, due to a shortage of intelligence, lack of
developed plans, and the unpreparedness of troops and navy for a landing
operation it was decided to abandon the idea of invading Bulgaria. Instead, the 7 th
army was sent to the South-Western front, where it took part in the unsuccessful
attack on the river Strypa in Eastern Galicia in December 1915. 14

5
In the autumn of 1915 it became clear that one of the main conditions for
Romania to enter the war on the side of the Entente would be a dispatch of a
considerable number of Russian troops to its border with Bulgaria in Dobrudzha.
At a meeting of front commanders on 14 February 1916 15 it was decided that in
case of an alliance with Romania, a special army numbering 3 army corps, would
be formed for the defense of Dobrudzha and led by general D.G.Shcherbachev. 16
However, after the start of the Russian offensive on the Austro-German front plans
to release such a large force for Dobrudzha were forgotten.
All subsequent discussions and planning by the Russian Staff of the possible
expedition to Dobrudzha was inseparably linked to the negotiations on concluding
a military alliance with Romania. The process of its preparation and agreement has
a rather extensive historiography. Here we will only touch upon those question
connected to the conditions of dispatching Russian expeditionary forces to
Dobrudzha. At the start of 1916 the representatives of the Romanian command
insisted on sending to the border with Bulgaria a large grouping of Russian forces,
numbering around 250 thousand men. However, the Russian authorities pointed
out that this did not correspond to the aims of the fight in the main Austro-German
front nor to the size of the Dobrudzha theater of war itself.
Negotiations on the alliance with Romania and the working out of the
conditions of the military convention improved sharply after the arrival in
Bucharest on 31 January of a new Russian military attaché, Colonel
A.A.Tatarinov, who replaced the discredited B.A.Semenov. Already, on 5 March
1916 Tatarinov reported to Alekseev of his conversation on 2 March with the
general secretary (and de facto head) of the war ministry of Romania, general
Dimitru Iliescu. He declared that the Romanian army was ready to launch an
offensive using large forces on the line Gimesh–Kronstadt–Germanstadt, but on
the condition that Russian forces take upon themselves the defense of Dobrudzha.
From their side, the Romanians could help, in the words of Iliescu, by leaving two
reserve divisions on the border and the solid structure of tete-de-pont at Turtukai,
Silistria, Chernovoda and Girsovo, which were being quickly fortified at the time.

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To which Tatarinov replied, that Russia could take responsibility for the defense of
Dobrudzha on the condition that Romania launch an attack in Transilvania and
place several Romanian divisions under Russian command. However, Tatarinov in
his conversation with Iliescu underlined that Russian troops will not be able to
hold the line along the Romania-Bulgarian border itself. His interlocutor
immediately agreed and said that for the defense of Dobrudzha the allied troops
could retreat to the line Mangalia–Karaomer–Airiakioi–Ol‟tino, which at the time
was being heavily fortified. This was roughly the line which M.V.Alekseev
considered optimal. 17 After this, with the permission of the Romanian authorities
Tatarinov made a secret reconnaissance visit to Dobrudzha to carry out an
inspection of the area and the fortification works.
With the increasing success on the South-Western front, Stavka put ever
more pressure on the authorities in Bucharest to lower their demands on sending
Russian troops to Dobrudzha. On 17 June Tatarinov sent the following telegram to
Alekseev: “During our last conversation with Iliescu I told him that now, when
there were absolutely no German forces on the Romanian border, which are all
pinned down by our allies at the Salonika front, Romanian demand for a
considerable number of our troops for the defense of Dobrudzha will be considered
by us an excuse to avoid entering the war. To this Iliescu assured me, that he
understands, that now the question of six–seven Russian divisions no longer
stands, but all the same, the dispatch of two infantry divisions with cavalry is
desired». 18
The Russian high command wanted to reduce even this number of troops for
Dobrudzha. In a draft project of the military convention with Romania, drawn up
by Alekseev, the 11 th paragraph stated: «For the reinforcement of Romanian troops
acting in Dobrudzha, the Russian high command is sending to this region one
infantry and one cavalry division». 19 But a Russian contingent of such strength did
not suit the Romanians and the bargaining continued. In the Romanian proposed
text of the convention it was stated that Russia obliges to place under the command
of the head of the Romanian army a corps numbering, at least 50 thousand people

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– 2 infantry and 1 cavalry division. Alekseev proposed to rewritten this condition
in the following way: «Paragraph three should be limited to the number of
divisions without mentioning the number of people, for the figure 50 000 will
oblige us to send a third infantry division, which under the current conditions will
be difficult to do». 20
At the same time as conducting negotiations with Romania, the Russian
military authorities were preparing for the possible expedition to the south of
Dunai by gathering and making available the required information amongst the
troops. At the end of 1915 and the first few months of 1916 the General Staff,
Staffs of the Odessa Military District and the Special Dunai Expeditionary force
(EON) prepared and published a whole range of booklets dedicated to the
Bulgarian and Romania forces, as well as other possible theatres of military
operations of Russian troops in the Balkans. 21 Particularly important was the
republication of the fundamental military-geographic and statistical work of
M.I.Zankevich “Dobrudzha”, 22 as well as the issue of a military dictionary from
Turkish, Bulgarian and Romanian languages. 23 Finally, the typolithography of the
staff of the Odessa District published a brochure “Description of the offensive of
Russian troops in Dobrudzha, comprised on the orders of the Staff of the Odessa
Military District by captain Bazarevich. June-July 1916”. This work by
V.I.Bazarevich reflects, better than any other, the existing notions in Russian
Headquarters of the possible character and aims of the operation in Dobrudzha.
The above brochure pointed out that the primary objective of the Russian
detachment, numbering two corps, should be the Medzhidie valley in the central
part of Dobrudzha, located about 6–7 crossings away from the Russian crossing of
the shore of Dunai. This valley was crossed by a strategically important railway
line Chernovoda – Medzhidie – Konstantsa, it was the shortest road to the central
part of Romania and to its only equipped Black sea port, via the single bridge
(Chernovodskii) on the whole of lower Dunai. The main objective of the Russian
troops was to reach, as quickly as possible, the Medzhidie valley and occupy the
defensive positions along the front of about 60 versts, since Romanians will not

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able to hold south of the valley for long against the German-Bulgarian forces. To
solve this problem the Russians had to concentrate the expeditionary forces on the
lower Dunai in advance. The promising Bazarevich also described the transfer of
part of the units by sea to Konstantsa. 24 In general, his prognosis came true, as in
the first days after Romania entered the war its troops began to suffer terrible
defeats on the border with Bulgaria, on the right flank of the Dobrudzhan front.
May–June 1916 was the time of great victories of the Russian arms against
the Austrians, and it was becoming clearer in Stavka that under the influence of
this success, the negotiations regarding Romania‟s entry into the war in the near
future will be favorably concluded. While waiting for the forthcoming signature of
the military convention with Romania, Stavka decided to start the practical
preparations of the expeditionary corps for the campaign to Dobrudzha. In the first
days of July 1916, Alekseev telegraphed the commander of the South-Western
Front A.A.Brusilov:
«It looks like we can hope that Romania will join our alliance and at the end
of this month or the beginning of August declare war on Austria and Bulgaria.
They will leave up to one hundred thousand men in Dobrudzha and direct up to
250 thousand to Transilvania, though the demarcating line between us will be
Dorna-Vatra, Bystritsa, Simosh valley, Zhibo, Debrechin. We will have to dispatch
to Dobrudzha, apart from a Serbian division, one infantry division and one cavalry
or Cossack division. The transport of the Guards, 3 rd corps allows us to remove
these units from the South-Western Front. I ask that you work out the details,
prepare the men for the divisions in Bessarabia, so that at the first sign of the
Romanian decision we can move the troops into Dobrudzha. The entrance of
Romania will strongly change the situation and a certain weakness of the front will
be fully compensated». 25
According to the Russian command, they had one month to work out the
general plan of operations on the Dobrudzhan theatre, to form the expeditionary
corps and to carry out various preparatory measures. A distinguishing feature
during the preparation of the expeditionary corps was that the measures planned by

9
the command were constantly revoked, one order was followed by a counter order
and as a result confusion was rife.
The formation of the corps, at first referred to in the correspondence as
“Special” and only later the 47 th Army corps, was entrusted to the Staff of the
South-Western front. Apart from the Serbian volunteers, the planners intended to
include the 4 th Finnish rifle and Ussuriisk horse division in the corps ranks.
Particularly difficult was the selection of the corps commander. The Russian
expeditionary forces had to fight on foreign territory and be subordinated to the
higher Romanian authorities. The commander of the corps had to know foreign
languages, at least French, and possess enough diplomatic tact, in order to form a
relationship with the Romanians and the subordinated to him Serbs. The
commander became general from the infantry A.M.Zaoinchkovskii (1862–1962) at
the time commander of the 30 th army corps.
***
Andrei Merdardovich Zaionchkovskii was an outstanding military
commander, who later added fame as a prominent military historian of Russia in
the XX century. He was born on 8 December 1862 in a family of a State
Councilor. On completing the Bakhtin military gymnasium in Oryol in 1879, he
entered the Nicholas Engineer School and on 5 august 1882 graduated as a second
lieutenant into the 5 th sapper battalion. In 1886–1888 Zaionchkovskii successfully
completed the course at the Nicholas Academy of the General Staff, finishing it in
the first category and was transferred to the corps of the General Staff. After that
his career developed quickly and brilliantly at various capital headquarters, in the
presence and under direct command of commanders of imperial birth. The next
decade and a half he occupied posts in the headquarters of Guards corps, 1 st army
corps, and St.Petersburg Military District, was a staff officer for special
assignments of the commander of this Military District, Grand Prince Nikolai
Nikolaevich, and was attached to the Grand Prince Mikhail Nikolaevich. During
the Russo-Japanese war Zaionchkovskii distinguished himself, whilst in charge of
the 85 th Vyborg regiment and 3 rd Siberian infantry division. For his combat

10
performance he was promoted to the rank of general-major and awarded the order
of St. Stanislav 1 st category with swords and with swords to the order of St.
Vladimir 3 rd category and golden weapon. In February 1906 Zaoinchkovskii was
given the command of Leib-Guard Egerskii regiment and from that moment
onwards moved up the ladder of exclusively combat and not staff posts. From July
1908 until May 1912 he held the prestigious and important position of commander
of the 1 st brigade of the 1 st Guards infantry division – the famous “Petrovskoi
brigade”, which was comprised from the leib-guards of Preobrazhenskii and
Semenovskii regiments and counted amongst its ranks representatives of the
noblest families of the Empire. On 30 July 1912 Zaionchkovskii was appointed
head of the 37 th infantry division in the XVIII army corps of the St.Petersburg
Military District. In the summer of 1914 he left for the front as head of this
division and successfully commanded it during the first seven months of the Great
War, and then on 10 March 1915 was given the command of the 30 th Amy Corps
and on 27 March confirmed in this post by an imperial order. 26
Service and private papers of A.M.Zaionchkovskii, which have been
deposited in his personal and other archives, paint him as a man and military
commander of outstanding qualities with a difficult personality. He was extremely
ambitious, spoiled by success, knew his own worth, was very demanding towards
his subordinates, knew how to adapt to his superiors, but when necessary could
poignantly argue with them. He was jealous of the successes of his colleagues,
whether real or exaggerated. Good with the pen, he did not spare any ink and
enjoyed using the written word to prove to his superiors his version of events as
well as to criticize others. Despite all this, he was an excellent combat commander
and strict, but caring chief to his subordinates. Although, he also enjoyed giving
the latter a good dressing down in his brilliantly written orders and directives.
In the ranks of the 9 th and later 8 th armies of the South-Western front the 30 th
corps of Zaionchkovskii (secondary mobilization 27 71 st and 80 th infantry divisions)
managed to achieve prominent victories in both defensive and offensive battles
against the Austrians on the higher Dnestr and Prut as well as Volyn and near

11
Lutsk. 28 From 31 August his corps was part of the 8 th army of general
A.A.Brusilov, who thought highly of Zaionchkovskii. Brusilov wrote in his
memoirs: “I was very pleased with this appointment, as I had known
Zaionchkovskii for a while and considered him an excellent and intelligent general.
He had many foes, especially amongst his colleagues from the General Staff.
Although, in general, the officers of the General Staff supported each other and
helped out during difficult times, Zaionchkovskii was an exception in this respect,
and I rarely saw anyone attacked as much as him. I can only explain this by his
mindset which was very malicious and often wicked and he offended many of his
staff comrades with his malice. To this description one can add that he was a very
nimble character, never letting people put him down and always showed himself at
his best. As for me, I always valued him and considered him to be one of the best
military commanders despite his shortcomings. Who doesn‟t have any? His virtues
considerably outweighed his weaknesses». 29
By an Imperial order on 10 April 1916, Zaoinchkovskii was promoted to the
rank of general of the infantry with seniority from 10 June 1915. 30 During the
Brusilov offensive, Zaoinchkovskii‟s corps was once again at the forefront of the
main strike, on the Kovel direction, on the right flank of the 8 th army. Having
forced the river Styr he became bogged down in persistent fighting for the left
bank of the river Stokhod, where he fought heroically and suffered great losses. At
the height of the operation Zaoinchkovskii, true to himself, believed that he was no
longer needed by the new commander of the 8 th army A.M.Kaledin, with whom he
apparently developed a mutual misunderstanding. In a private letter to Brusilov he
asked to be transferred to another army and pointed out that he had promised
earlier to give him a corps of soldiers of regular mobilization. 31
It was at this time that Stavka was deciding on the formation of the
expeditionary corps for the campaign in Dobrudzha. A commander was needed
and fate pointed to general Zaionchkovskii, who had always been on good footing
with Brusilov. The latter wrote: «I was asked to choose and name a corps
commander for the Dobrudzha corps. The difficulty lay in the fact that it was not

12
enough to select a good combat general, but he had to be an agile character who
could not only get along with the corps and Romanian authorities, but also exert a
certain amount of influence on them. I selected general Zaionchkovskii, because as
it seemed to me, he answered all the above criteria. This appointment severely
disappointed the general and he immediately tried to excuse himself from it,
claiming that with such a weakened number of Russian troops, which he was
given, he would not be able to hold high the flag of the Russian Army and he needs
at least 3-4 infantry divisions of top quality. Otherwise he risks being humiliated
and his conscience cannot take on such a responsibility». 32
Major-general Nikolai Petrovich Polovtsev, Chief of Staff of the 5 th
Caucusus Army Corps was appointed Chief of Staff of the expeditionary force to
Dobrudzha. A.A.Svechin, in his memoirs, gave him a deadly description: «A
person with great funds and no brains, a horse guardsman at the start of his career,
this representative of the Russian aristocracy was given an evaluation of “poor”
during his trial four month command of an infantry battalion before the war, which
was almost unheard of in a career of an officer of the General Staff. But no matter
how much the Main Administration of General Staff desired to get rid of this half-
cretin it was unable to do so because of his connections». 33 Polovtsev was given
the post of Chief of Staff of the 47 th army corps and only at the height of the
campaign in Dobrudzha was he replaced by general N.A.Monkevits, one of the
most talented officers of the General Staff of his era, who before the war was head
of the military intelligence service of the Empire.
Another big problem was the fact that the staff of the 47 th army corps was
formed not as that of separate corps. However, by the second week of the
campaign the Romanian command created a mixed Dobrudzhan army and put
Zaionchkovskii in charge. As a result, he was forced to combine the post of
commander of the army and commander of the 47 th corps, thereby formally in
charge of himself. The staff of the corps fulfilled the functions of the staff of the
whole army; his officers worked day and night, “at full stretch” and they were still
unable to cope. 34 In addition, they had to go as instructors to various Romanian

13
units which were tactically outdated, unfamiliar with the latest innovations in the
fields of artillery, field fortifications and communications. As a partial solution to
the problem, the 47 th corps was given the status of a separate corps, which implied
a larger staff administration and more positions. However, the filling up of
vacancies of the new staff was accompanied by unavoidable delays. As a result, at
the height of military operations in Dobrudzha, Zaoinchkovskii‟s staff experienced
a sharp shortage of prepared personnel. Moreover, the 47 th corps did not posses
enough telephones, telegraphs and radiotelegraphs. This was particularly sharply
felt in conditions when the Bulgarian and Turkish populations in the rear, cut out
whole versts of cable and brought down telegraph poles. The administration of
troops was often paralyzed, and to restore communications Russian command had
to resort to old ways with the help of a courier.
Together with the Serbian volunteer division of colonel Stefan Hadzic the
corps should have been formed from the 61 st infantry division of lieutenant-general
P.N.Simanskii, 64 th infantry division of lieutenant-general A.E.Zhdanko, 3 rd
cavalry division of lieutenant-general E.A.Leontovich, Black Sea horse regiment
of Prince A.S.Eristov as the corps cavalry, as well as a whole number of various
technical and auxiliary units. However, the mentioned 64 th infantry division was
located on another part of the front and never actually entered the ranks of the 47 th
army corps.
In a letter to Alekseev, dated 18 July, Zaionchkovskii wrote, that he only
agreed to take up command, as he was expecting to receive into his corps the
infantry divisions of V.I.Selivachev or N.A.Monkevits and the Ussuriisk horse
division of A.M.Krymov. He considered these commanders to fully satisfy the
requirements for this difficult task. Instead of the above, as it became known to
him, the corps was getting the second line 61 st infantry division of Simanskii.
Before meeting this unit Zaoinchkovskii considered it and its commander far from
excellent in terms of combat qualities. Nonetheless, during heavy fighting in
September and October 1916 it was this division which became the nucleus and
main combat force of the 47 th corps and Dobrudzhan army. By early August, the

14
61 st division counted amongst its ranks 16 battalions, 291 officers (184 of them
warrant officers), 14 208 bayonets, 4 740 auxiliary people and 1 460 additional
men, as well as 48 machine guns and 12 grenade launchers. The artillery counted
42 officers and 36 guns. 35
In the same letter from 18 July, Zaoinchkovsii pointed out to Alekseev that
the Special corps was going to fight on foreign territory and represent the whole
Russian army in the Balkans. The corps commander was especially worried by the
absence in his command of police and gendarme units and prepared rear
institutions, without which he could not guarantee order in the rear and was afraid
that any mishap could cause serious friction with the Romanian authorities. Highly
probable was a confrontation with the Bulgarians, who out of political and
psychological reasons would want to gain victory against the Russians in the first
battles. Zaionchkovskii wrote that he fully understood Alekseev‟s desire to give
Romania as little as possible of Russian troops. However, in his opinion, sending a
corps to Dobrudzha in such a state meant immediately putting it in a very difficult
position. Zaoinchkovskii offered the following concrete measures: to replace the
61 st infantry division with the 4 th Finnish rifle or the 71 st infantry division; he said
that the latter two divisions knew him and he knew them. Also, the corps
commander asked permission to take with him from his previous 30 th corps police
units, gendarmes hundreds and convoys, which he himself formed and instructed.
With them he promised total order in the rear. Finally, Zaionchkovskii asked to
form as soon as possible and to full capacity all the rear institutions for the Special
Corps. 36 Unfortunately, the questions raised by the commander regarding the
organization of the rear were never sorted out, which had detrimental
consequences, especially during the first two months of fighting in Dobrudzha.
On 10 August, right before the start of the expedition, Zaionchkovskii again
wrote to Alekseev, trying to convince him of the harmfulness of the whole concept
of an expedition to Dobrudzha, in the form that Stavka had ordered it. He declared:
«It seems to me that the 47 th corps and general Zaoinchkovskii are the bone that
has been thrown to Romania so that it would enter the war on the side of the

15
Entente. This bone has been given out for good, it has been crossed out from the
Russian armed forces, and if there is some gain from it in the future, then it will be
put down to an unexpected turn of events”. 37 Zaoinchkovskii categorically rebelled
against the idea of subordinating Russian corps to a Romanian command and
pointed out the dangers, connected with sending a corps far from its own borders
and without supplies, to a foreign territory without an equipped rear, and with
sanitary-epidemiological problems. «I will resist, with all the measures available to
me, the burdening of Russian corps with such tasks, which give off a smell of
picking up chestnuts for the Romanians using Russian hands, and all the more
serving the tranquility of Romanian troops by wasting blood and strength of my
corps for no purpose», – promised Zaoinchkovskii. 38
The text of a reply, written by the hand of general V.E.Borisov, a close aide
and adviser to the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief on strategic matters,
has survived in Alekseev‟s personal archive. In his reply Borisov, in a mentors
tone categorically denied Zaionchkovskii‟s criticism, that his corps was being torn
away from the Russian army and left at the mercy of fate. The strategic position of
the corps, was proclaimed to be safe by Alekseev‟s thanks to the possibility of
unimpeded retreat, if necessary, to Konstantsa, Izmail and Girsovo. 39
After such an exchange of letters, the friction and disagreements between
Zaionchkovskii and Alekseev became permanent; both generals, despite a
difference in military positions continued to send each other rather sharp
telegrams. This conflict which continued right up to Zaionchkovskii‟s departure
from the post of commander of the 47 th corps and of the Russo-Romanian
Dobrudzhan army in mid October 1916, in many ways contributed to the
unsuccessful outcome of the expedition.
The structure and quality of the units of the 47 th corps caused serious
misgivings for Zaionchkovskii. But a much more serious cause of alarm and
danger for the corps commander and many other representatives of the military
authorities was Stavka’s decision to include in the expeditionary forces a Serbian
volunteer division. A short note on this little known in Russian and tragically

16
famous in Serbia unit, which was destined to play a special role in the events of the
Dobrudzhan campaign.
On 11 January 1916 Alekseev sent a telegram to Odessa to general
M.I.Ebelov and the Staff of the South-Western front: «In order to assist the Serbian
army it is decided to form from those Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian POWs who
are willing a detachment, which as a result will be sent to join the Serbian army». 40
It was expected that the number of volunteers could number 10–20 thousand. The
actual formation of the detachment was entrusted to a group of Serbian officers led
by Major Zhivoin Peiovich. General Ebelov was given the task of general control,
deployment and supplies of the volunteer detachment, which was formed on the
example of Russian field infantry division, composing 4 three-battalion regiments.
Local authorities decided to form the Serbian detachment in Odessa and its
nearest surroundings. Soon, groups of volunteers, officers and lower ranks,
gathered in POW camps, began arriving to Odessa from rear military districts.
Work on forming the detachment began to grow. Serbian detachment (later a
division and two division corps) was considered to be a part of the Serbian
Kingdom army, temporary placed in the ranks of the Russian armed forces. The
POW soldiers of the detachment swore allegiance to king Peter I Karageorgievich.
All the inner paperwork of the volunteer units was conducted in the Serbian
language.
For the Serbian government in Corfu the formation of a volunteer division in
Russia was a huge military and political event. The future division not only
promised to became a serious addition to the Serbian armed forces, but also a clear
example of the unification of all south Slavs under the scepter of
Karageorgieviches. The Serbian authorities tried to provide the strongest and most
secure commanding personnel for the division. Stefan Hadgic, a colonel of the
General Staff was appointed by a decree of Crown Prince Alexander as head of the
Serbian volunteer division, with colonel Dragutin Kushakovich and major-colonel
–Voin Maksimovich as his assistants. A further 31 officers of the Serbian army
were assigned to various brigade, regimental and battalion positions. In addition,

17
46 subaltern-officers in the Serbian service were appointed to fill the positions of
company commanders and adjutants; 13 military officials occupied various
administrative posts; 5 military medical students were intended for posts of
medical assistance. Moreover, an additional 23 NCOs and privates were dispatched
from Corfu to the volunteer division. Hadgic himself and a large group of Serbian
officers, officials and lower ranks loyal to him, set off to Russia from England via
Sweden, on 17 March 1916. The first group of officers from Corfu arrived in
Odessa, via Petrograd and Mogilev on 14 April. On the same day the formation of
the staff of the division began, located in house number 31 on Pushkinskaia street.
Junior commanding posts were to be filled with POWs from the Austrian army. All
the ranks of the Serbian volunteer division received Russian uniforms; and only
instead of service caps the quartermaster service provided them with field cap-
shaikachi. Military ranks in the division corresponded to the existing one in the
royal Serbian army.
On 15–16 May the first three regiments of the Serbian volunteer division
swore their allegiance to King Petr, the fourth followed on 14 June. Thus, the
formation of units with men was complete. This was done rather easily, but
supplying the division with weapons, equipment and other materials proved to be
much harder and was painfully slow. When the division set of for the Dobrudzhan
front it counted in it ranks 625 officers, 35 officials, 17232 lower ranks; 1842
horses and 56 machine guns. 41 Immediately after the formation of the division the
authorities in Odessa began forming another Serbian volunteer division, which was
known as No 2, while Hadgic‟s division came to be known as the 1 st Serbian
volunteer division. Both of the divisions were joined to form a volunteer corps,
which was headed by the „iron general‟ Mikhailo Zhivkovic who left Corfu for
Russia at the end of July 1916. However, only the 1 st Serbian division managed to
take part in the Dobrudzhan campaign.
As planned by the Russian command, the division was armed with Austrian
trophy Manlicher rifles. However, the ammunition of cartridges was given without
charges, which is also stated in the memoirs of the volunteers and Russian

18
documents. 42 Magazine rifles turned into single loading ones, and when extracting
cartridge cases got lodged in the empty magazine and to get it out one had to turn
the rifle upside down with the sight facing the ground, holding it horizontally. 43
According to the memoirs of one Bulgarian officer, instead of bayonets soldiers of
the Serbian division carried rusty pieces of iron, which were tied to the gun. 44 Up
to their departure to the front in Dobrudzha the 1 st Serbian division did not receive
any artillery. Already after landing on Romanian territory on 23–25 August from
Reni they were sent, on barges, the infantry mountain artillery and the 4 th light
mortar military groups. Throughout the whole Dobrudzha campaign, the Serbian
division did not possess proper artillery, which could fulfill the difficult tasks of a
modern war,
Thus, at first glance, the 1 st Serbian volunteer division was a young
formation, with heterogeneous personnel and with unknown combat and moral
qualities, poorly armed and badly equipped, practically without artillery and
special technical means. Despite this, or probably because of it, general Alekseev
made the fateful decision, as early as June 1916, to specifically send the Serbian
division on the difficult Dobrudzhan expedition. Its formation and the discussions
of conditions for Romania‟s entry into the war on the side of the Entente were
conducted at the same time, so it is no surprise that the Russian High command
had the idea of including Hadgic‟s division in the expeditionary forces. It is
unknown who first came up with this plan, but general Alekseev supported it right
from the start, despite the drawbacks of the idea, already at that time obvious to
many. On 29 June 1916 he reported to Brusilov: «We are working hard on forcing
the Romanians to join us. The Serbian division will then be sent immediately to
Dobrudzha, and you will have to attach a cavalry or Cossack division». 45 It‟s not
difficult to understand which considerations drove the Chief of Staff to the
Supreme Commander. In Alekseev‟s eyes, the Serbian division was not only
weaker than Russian second line troops, but, also, even compared to the militia
units of the Russian Army. Alekseev preferred to send to Dobrudzha specifically

19
Serbs, so as not to disturb a single Russian division from the more important to
him theater of military operations.
Alekseev was always stubbornly consistent in his strategic views and
decisions, both correct and flawed ones. He perceived the dispatch of Russian
troops to Dobrudzha as a necessary political measure, as a sort of military “bribe”
to the Romanian ally. And, since Bucharest insisted on having two infantry and 1
cavalry division of Russian troops in Dobrudzha, Alekseev decided to include in
this number the Serbian volunteer division – i.e. to trick the Romanians, using
Balkan methods with a tricky and resourceful Balkan ally.
From the start of preparing the campaign to Dobrudzha the possible
participation of the Serbian Division in it became a topic of serious debate amongst
the Russian High Command. Nobody could predict how this formation would
prove itself on the field of battle, which mood would dominate amongst the men
and officers. On 20 July quartermaster-general of the South-Western front
N.N.Dukhonin asked the Chief of Staff of the Odessa Military District general
N.A.Marks for a favour – to provide a true evaluation of the Serbian Division, its
morale and the reliability of its ranks. 46 The next day Marks answered: «Having
foreseen your question, I closely studied the personnel of the Serbian Division,
visited their camp, training, and even invited them to see me. All the regimental,
battalion and half of company commander are Serbs from Corfu, the rest are POW
officers, the majority of whom signed up, it seems, to improve their position, and
the news of the campaign was not received with the same jubilation as by the
native officers, yet it is highly probable that, with few exceptions, most of the
corps will fight willingly against the Bulgarians. I spoke to Hadgic before the
departure of the divisional staff, he is sure of the personnel, but added that in case
of anything, he will shoot the first waverer in the head himself. […] Regarding the
lower ranks, the existing mistrust held by society has no foundations. The soldiers
happily greeted the news of the campaign, and the commanders of units are
convinced of their conscientiousness. Only those not afraid for their family and
property volunteered for the division. The same belief was held by our artillery

20
colonel, who organizes the machine gun teams, where all the officers are native
Serbs, and all the lower ranks POWs. There were 83 deserters in the three months;
some returned, saying that they left to earn some money. […] My personal opinion
is that in case of a successful advance of Russian forces, the division, with an
excellent personnel of native officers, will get involved in combat work». 47
But a much bigger doubt were the political consequences of sending a
Serbian Division to Dobrudzha, which many farsighted people, aware of the
Balkan political situation and acquainted with the character of south Slavs warned
against. An experienced Russian intelligence agent Franz Kral, a former chairman
of the executive of the Society of Czech colonies in Bulgaria, as early as 10 May
1916, wrote in a report to Rear-admiral M.M.Veselkin: «Many talk about how
Bulgarians will come over in droves if they are facing Russians. Probably, I think
so too, but only in if the Russians are not mixed with Romanians; it would be even
worse if Russians were fighting together with Serbs». 48 These words of a Czech
patriot were underlined and on the margins someone wrote: “All turned out to be
true». The gloomy prophecy of Kral fulfilled itself completely; Russian command
managed to implement the worst of all the possible options.
The personnel of the expeditionary corps and especially the inclusion of the
Serbian Division deeply troubled general Zaoinchkovskii himself. It is worth
noting the following comments made by the commander of the 47 th corps in a
private letter to A.A.Brusilov, which was sent from Odessa to the headquarters of
the South-Western front in Berdichev on 28 July 1916. Zaoinchkovskii wrote:
«The question of the Serbian Division particularly bothers me, and perhaps,
it won‟t harm to report to General Alekseev. The dispatch of a Russian corps to
Dobrudzha undoubtedly has as its main objective not a physical enlargement of the
Romanian forces, but something else – something political. Indeed, the appearance
of a Russian corps on the border with Bulgaria will be a big trump in the hands of
the Russophile Bulgarian party, and understandably, the rifles in the hands of many
Bulgarians will start to shake at the sight of Russian troops. But the presence
under the same Russian banners of Serbs will be a huge trump in the hands of the

21
Russophobic Bulgarian party and at the sight of their viscous enemies, the
Bulgarian rifles shaken before the Russians, with anger will be grasped tightly
against the Serbs. While the political significance of the Special corps will come to
nothing. It is my conviction that Serbians should be sent to the Caucasus. I have
decided to keep them in reserve until the behavior of the Bulgarians is being
determined. I will release them only when it will become evident, that I will have
to go through Bulgaria with fire and sword, and that little brothers have no desire
to surrender in masses to their liberators». 49 Later in the same letter the corps
commander continued: «I have found out with horror that possibly the 64 th division
will leave me temporary, which completely deprives me of the opportunity of
keeping Serbs in reserve as I proposed». 50
Zaionchkovskii fully understood that the appearance of Serbs on the front
line in Dobrudzha would finally and irrevocably bury all expectations, connected
with favorable political and psychological effects of the arrival of a Russian corps
on the Bulgarian border. He was justifiably concerned that there would be a
completely opposite outcome. But in a reply to this letter Brusilov simply
telegraphed on 31 July, that Stavka’s Chief of Staff was aware of all the
circumstances and composition of the Serbian Division. The decision to send the
south Slav formation to Dobrudzha was already made.
Objections, from a political point of view, to send the division of Hagic to
the border with Bulgaria were voiced by the Russian foreign ministry. On 1 August
1916 deputy minister A.A.Neratov wrote to the director of the diplomatic section
of Stavka N.A.Basili: «According to the Serbian envoy, Serbian formations
organized in our country for a joint operation together with our forces in
Dobrudzha against the Bulgarians are being concentrated in Reni. Due to repeated
indications from general Alekseev of his desire to attract Bulgarians onto our side
please let him know, that in my opinion, the presence of Serbian armed forces on
the Bulgarian border to a great extent could obstruct the execution of his
intentions, as a mutual hatred between Serbs and Bulgarians will inevitably bring
to military action amongst them». 51

22
But the answer from Stavka stated: «The Chief of Staff does not consider it
possible to agree with the stated opinion, as the Serbian Division is subordinated to
a Russian general, is in the ranks of a Russian corps and is made up off elements
not belonging to the Kingdom (of Serbia-V.K.)». 52
Mikhail Vasil‟evich Alekseev was capable of carrying out a phenomenal
amount of work, intelligent, logical, rationally thinking military figure with a broad
experience staff work both in war and peace. However, despite this, he was
stubborn, mistrustful of the advice given by others and impatient with objections.
Having already taken the decision to send the Serbian Division to Dobrudzha, he
could no longer give it up, even under the most reasonable and obvious arguments.
In rejecting them, the most prominent strategist of Nicholas II‟s reign spoke of the
most absurd things. In theory, Alekseev declared that having formed a division
within the units of the Russian Army and under a Russian general the Serbs would
cease to be Serbs. Or, at least the Bulgarians would cease to consider them as such.
In addition, Stavka’s Chief of Staff spoke as if forgetting that Stefan Hadzic‟s
division was officially called „Serbian Volunteer‟, that its soldiers spoke in Serbian
and wore shaikachi caps; finally, that although, it was formed from Habsburg
subjects, but under the banner of uniting south Slav lands under the specter of the
Serbian kin Petr. Who could the Bulgarians see in the ranks of the division but
their fierce enemies-Serbs?
In the course of the Dobrudzhan campaign soldiers of the Serbian Volunteer
Division, with their heroic fighting and terrible losses, proved the total
groundlessness of all previous worries of the Russian command in the their combat
qualities and loyalty. All the Russian commanders highlighted the unrivalled
bravery and stoicism of the units of Hadzic‟s division. But the price for this
monumental stress was the quick and total depletion of the division, which lost in
one and a half months of fighting 80% of its members and as a result, its fighting
capacity. After unsuccessful battles during the defense of the Kobadin fortified
position, in the first decade of October, the division counted in its ranks only 2042
bayonets. 53 On 11 October colonel Hadzic reported to Zaionchkovskii:

23
«I have the honour in informing Your Excellency, that as a result of heavy
losses, suffered by my division from 24 August until now, as well as due to
physical and moral exhaustion, and constant retreats in the last six days, the
volunteers of my division have lost their firmness in combat. This is mainly in part
because they are volunteers. Every one of them knows that if they are captured or
became wounded they will be hanged. Until now there have been many cases of
suicide of both wounded and healthy because of this fear. One such incident I saw
personally with the Chief of Staff on the 9 th of this month, near the village of
Murfatlar. Today, the commander of the 1 st regiment reported to me that 5 of his
officers volunteers left the regiment last night, from the shooting line, most
probably because they lost all hope in victory and were afraid to be taken prisoner.
This division until know gave all that it could give. Now it is no longer able to
participate in further operations, due as much to its number as well as its moral
condition. It must be immediately sent to rest». 54 After this the Hadgic‟s division
was moved into reserve and did not take part in any further combat in the
Dobrudzha campaign.
***
From the military point of view the Serbian Division fully justified Stavka’s
decision to send it south of Dunai; from the political-confirmed all the worst fears.
The fighting in Dobrudzha became a fight to complete destruction; the mutual
hatred and cruelty of the adversaries grew in a spiral fashion. Diplomat
S.G.Bogoiavlenskii (former Russian vice-consul in Filippopole) sent to the
disposal of the Russian military agent in Bucharest, reported to the Foreign
Ministry on 1 September 1916: «The animosity of Bulgarians against the
Romanians and Serbs, is evidently reflected on our troops. According to the
information here, the Bulgarian agents have managed to organize an almost
military rebellion in Romanian Dobrudzha. Not only in Turkish settlements, but
the Bulgarian population (even women and children) shoot from around corners,
attack individual soldiers, finish off the wounded and so on. Of course, such

24
behavior arouses indignation amongst our and Serbian troops, which only further
embitters both sides». 55
Nevertheless, it is important to note that although the fighting on the front
line was mutually ruthless, cruelty did not transform into brutality. The Slav
warriors in Dobrudzha, at times, demonstrated nobleness towards the vanquished.
Refuting rumours that the enemy desecrated bodies of fallen soldiers,
Zaoinchkovskii on 6 October telegraphed general M.I.Ebelov: «Nothing of the sort
concerning the mutilation of bodies took place, on the contrary, there are cases of
good treatment of our wounded and prisoners». 56 In his memoirs, Sava
Stoianovich, a Bulgarian officer with a Serbian surname, remembered that the
German general-field marshal A von Mackensen ordered all Slav prisoners from
the Serbian Volunteer Division to be handed over to Austro-Germans for
execution. But the Bulgarian soldiers and officers tried, in every way possible, to
obstruct this order, outraged by the intention of Germans to deal with their
prisoners captured in battle. 57 On the other hand, such cases were very rare as
Hadzic‟s volunteers did not surrender or take prisoners themselves.
***
At 11:30 on 4 (17) August 1916 in the city of Bucharest, in the house of
Vintila Bratianu, the brother of the prime minister, in the presence of just a few
people, in total secret, a political agreement and military convention between
Romania and the Entente countries was signed. 58 The main conditions of the
military convention were as follows. Romania agreed to mobilize all its land and
naval forces and enter the war against Austria-Hungary no later than 15(28)
August 1916, 8 days after the start of the offensive of the allied Salonika army. The
Russian army had to operate actively on the whole of the Austrian front, especially
in Bukovina. According to article 3 of the convention, Russia promised to send to
Dobrudzha 2 infantry and 1 cavalry division for joint operations against the
Bulgarian army with the Romanians.
At 21:00 on 14(27) August 1916 the Romanian kingdom declared war on
Austria-Hungary; midnight marked the start of the first day of mobilization of the

25
Romanian army. Already on 14 August, as envisioned, the expedition of Russian
forces to Dobrudzha began. At 18:00 on that day, after a celebratory church service
in honour of the passage of Russian troops in 1828, the regiments of the 3 rd cavalry
division began the crossing to the Romanian bank of Dunai across the pontoon
bridge erected by Russian engineers, near the Ferapont‟evskii monastery. There
was an arch on this bridge, decorated with Russian and Romanian flags and an
inscription «To fame and victory». The inhabitants of the south bank of Dunai,
mainly Russian sect migrants, triumphantly greeted the soldiers of Leontovich. 59
Thus, on this warm summer evening of 14 August 1916, in an atmosphere filled
with confidence in their strength and expecting success, the campaign of the
Russian expeditionary force to Dobrudzha began in earnest.
The Russian plan of the expedition to Dobrudzha was fairly simple. Since
one of Romania‟s conditions to enter the war was the participation of Russian
forces in the defense of Dobrudzha, Alekseev agreed to send an expeditionary
corps. It was assumed that this corps, numbering 2 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions
would operate together with the Romanian forces of similar number and under
Romanian command. The Russian Staff command believed that the mission would
be purely defensive. The divisions of general Zaoinchkovskii were supposed to
move to the positions on the south approach to the Medgidie valley, which were
earlier fortified by the Romanians, and there protect from an expected Bulgarian
attack the Chernovoda–Konstantsa railway. Moreover, a big emphasis was placed
on the fact that the Bulgarian forces, due to political and psychological factors
would not energetically attack the Russian positions. This would have allowed not
only to secure the south borders of Romania, but to tie down large forces of the
Bulgarian army and thus to ease the offensive operation of the allied Salonika
front. However, the strength and speed of the first attacks of the Bulgarian 3 rd army
of General Stefan Toshev quickly set off a whole range of military catastrophes in
the Romanian army. The biggest of them was the fall of Turtukai fortress, which
the Bulgarians took on the 6 th day of the war with Romania with a brilliant assault.
The 40 thousand garrison of this «pre-bridge fortification», which did not even

26
have a bridge over Dunai, was lost, and 30 thousand men surrendered to the
Bulgarians. This predestined the abandonment without a fight of the second tete-
de-pont near Silistria. In this situation the Romanian command decided to throw
Zaionchkovskii‟s corps into an offensive with the aim of drawing part of the
Bulgarian forces and covering the retreat of the Romanian troops from Turtukai
and Silistria. This was a rushed and improvised change to the initial plan of the
operation. The Russian division became immediately drawn into persistent combat
with the Bulgarian army, and this made it impossible to avoid any confrontation on
the border with Dobrudzha.
The third cavalry division of Leontovich, which became the vanguard of the
47 th corps, was the first to advance towards the Bulgarian border, protecting the
units of the 61 st infantry and Serbian Volunteer Division, which followed it. On 22
August the first military confrontation of the Dobrudzha campaign between
Russians and Bulgarians took place. Near the settlement of Kodzhalar (30 km to
the north-west of Dobrich) a mounted patrol of the 3 rd Novorossiisk dragoon
regiment hacked to pieces a Bulgarian mounted patrol; 4 lower ranks and an
officer, which as it turned out had completed the Elisavetgrad Cavalry Military
School were taken prisoner. 60 This minor skirmish became a prologue to the great
tragedy of brotherly killing of two slav people, two related armies.
Only the arrival of the Russian corps of Zaoinchkovskii allowed the allies to
consolidate along the Kobadin line (from the Dunai city of Rasov to lake Tuzla
near the Black sea coast) and to continue the fight to the south of Dunai. In the
course of these battles from the end of August until the start of October Russo-
Serbian-Romanian forces swung several times from defense to attack. After the
first unsuccessful attempt of Zaoinchkovskii‟s forces, on 23–25 August, to capture
the city of Dobric, in order to ease the position of the allied Romanian units, they
were forced to retreat to the Kobadin fortified position. Here the troops of the
Dobrudzhan army on 5–6 September successfully repelled the first attack of the
Bulgarian-German forces, suffering considerable losses. However, after this,
general Zaoinchkovskii, having overestimated his success, tried to launch an

27
offensive himself, with the aim of thrusting back the enemy, moving the military
operations onto his territory, towards the important centers of Northern Bulgaria.
This offensive of the Dobrudzhan army turned into an intense six day battle (18–23
September) and ended with an insignificant advance into a hilly steppe (up to 10
km on the eastern flank and in the centre), while the conquest of the space came at
the cost of great losses, practically bleeding white the main forces of
Zaionchkovskii – the 61 st infantry and Serbian divisions. This to a great extent
predetermined the eventual unsuccessful outcome of the expedition.
The biggest strategic miscalculation was the shortage of the Russian forces
assigned to the defense of Dobrudzha. This is best summed up by the fact that very
soon the higher standing Russian headquarters began to send to Dobrudzha new
units and formations. Initially, the 47 th corps had 2 infantry and 1 cavalry division,
or 28 battalions and 30 squadrons and hundreds. Later in September 1916, the
115 th infantry, 3 rd rifle and 8 th cavalry division (which was immediately transferred
on to the left bank of Dunai) arrived in Dobrudzha. Zaoinchkovskii telegraphed
Alekseev on 15 September: «Since we are already involved in Dobrudzha, until the
total conquest of Bulgarian, Russian forces need to play an important role here,
that‟s why it seems necessary to have enough manpower now». 61 He continued in
the next telegram: «For rest and the execution of passive tasks I have 80 battalions
of Romanians, and for active tasks only 40 battalions of Russian and Serbs ». 62
From a purely military point of view Stavka made a great error by assigning
such a small number of cavalry forces to the Dobrudzha campaign. The positional
trench war on the Austro-German front made the magnificent cavalry of the
Russian army, the largest and strongest in Europe, redundant. Autumn of 1916
provided a unique opportunity to use it in the conditions of maneuverable warfare
in the Dobrudzhan steppe, ideally suited for large cavalry masses. The Russian
command sent only one division to Dobrudzha – the 3 rd cavalry, but at the same
time dispatched general A.A.Pavlov, commander of the VI cavalry corps, one of
the best leaders of cavalry, to command a certain combined Russo-Romanian horse
detachment. Zaionchkovskii was perplexed about this appointment and reminded

28
Stavka that he only had one cavalry division, and that to have two generals on one
division was not good and that there is no point in tearing away from the Austro-
German front such a prominent military commander as Pavlov for such a small
cavalry force. 63
From the start of the campaign the Bulgarians had one and a half divisions
of cavalry on the right bank of Dunai; however their regiments were made up of 4
squadrons, whereas the Russian regiments of the 3 rd cavalry division had 6
squadrons. Zaoinchkovskii was forced to disperse the Romanian brigade of
kalarashi (a low quality cavalry of the militia type) amongst the Romanian
divisions as cavalry. Thus, Russian and Bulgarian strategic cavalry on the
Dobrudzhan theatre were initially practically equal. In the headquarters of the 47 th
corps this alignment of forces was perceived as unfavourable. In one telephone
conversation with the Staff of the South-Western front colonel A.A.Tatarinov
underlined that, the Bulgarian cavalry in Dobrudzha was behaving impudently, not
only taking on the attacks of the Russian cavalry on their puny horses but also
trying to attack the infantry. In Tatarinov‟s opinion, the Bulgarian cavalry had to
be taught a lesson so that any desire for such activities is killed off. 64 On 10
September Zaoinchkovskii telegraphed Brusilov that the situation would change
completely, if he was sent 2 cavalry divisions, which were standing idly on the
Russian Northern front. With them Zaoinchkovskii promised to push the enemy
out of the entire Dobrudzha, even with the available infantry forces. 65 However, he
never received the much sought cavalry reinforcements. Towards the end of the
Dobrudzhan campaign Russian cavalry was one and a half times smaller than the
enemy‟s. In other words, the Russian Command itself surrendered its superiority in
cavalry to the enemy and as a result, provided the Bulgarian military-patriotic
literature with the opportunity to extol in the heroism of general Ivan Kolev and his
cavalry in 1916.
A forced error was the decision to subordinate the Russian corps to the
Romanian Supreme Command, and as a result the forces of Zaoinchkovskii
repeatedly found themselves in difficult positions because of gross errors of

29
Romanian generals and low combat qualities of the Romanian troops. Once on
Romanian territory the 47 th corps was put into the 3 rd Romanian army of general
Mikhail Aslan, which protected the border with Bulgaria along the Dunai and in
Dobrudzha. Very soon the Romanian supreme command decided to dump the
command of operations in Dobrudzha, and with this aim created a new
Dobrudzhan army of mixed composition, of which Zaoinchkovskii was made
commander. His army and the Romanian 3 rd army were joined together under the
command of general A. Averescu, the new head of the 3 rd army, which now acted
on the left bank of Dunai. The commander of the Dodrudzhan army was forced to
execute the egoistical and erroneous orders of the Romanian Supreme Command
and Averescu, against the possibility of which he had earlier passionately spoke
against in his arguments with Alekseev.
The military authorities in general, were able to deal with the provisional
and sanitary-medical aspects of the campaign in Dobrudzha. Thus, by 14 October
in the units of the 47 th corps there were only 5 people ill with cholera and 15 with
typhoid fever. 66 Thanks to the strict preventative measures of Zaoinchkovskii it
was possible to avoid the spread of epidemic illnesses in his units, despite the fact
that they had to operate in one of the most inauspicious, in this respect, corners of
Europe, where in 1854 almost an entire French division died from cholera.
The culmination of the whole campaign in Dobrudzha came with the second
attack of the Bulgarian-German-Turkish forces on the Kobadin foritified position
on 6–12 October 1916, which ended in its breach and the capture of the
Chernovody–Konstantsa railway line, which crossed Dobrudzha from west to east.
The main cause of the failure to defend the Kobadin position was the slow arrival
of reinforcements to the Dobrudzhan army, in comparison with the speed of enemy
strengthening on the same front. An intelligence report of the 47 th corps on 3
October very precisely noted that the enemy on the Dobrudzhan front was made up
of: the Bulgarian 1 st , 4 th , 6 th , 12 th , infantry and 1 st cavalry divisions, German 217 th
infantry division, Turkish 15 th and 25 th infantry division, with the total strength of
85-87 battalions and 24 squadrons. 67 According to the official Bulgarian statistics,

30
the Bulgarian 3 rd army of Toshev numbered 1 333 officers and 58 397 lower
combat ranks, as well as 186 officers and 11188 lower ranks of the Turkish corps
and 9 battalions of the 217 th German division before the offensive. 68 To
counterbalance these forces Zaionchkovskii could only provide a total of 54
thousand soldiers. 69 Taking into account the weakness of the fortified positions of
the Dobrudzhan army, the low stoicism of the Romanian troops and the superiority
of the enemy in heavy artillery, the chances of repelling the second offensive on
the Kobadin line were initially very low.
There was also a critical shortage of field engineers: in September
Zaoinchkovskii only had 3 sapper companies for 3 infantry divisions, but without
an engineer park. With these means and forces the 47 th corps was supposed to
fortify the front which was spread over 80 vertsts, without any Romanian help in
the engineering department. 70 As a result, the notorious Kobadin fortified position
of the Dobrudzha army, whose breach is extolled in the Bulgarian military-history
literature, presented only one line of trenches, and in places was not even defended
by barbed wire. 71
At the same time, the Russian and Romanian command displayed
unexplained uncertainty, first sending reinforcements to Zaoinchkovskii then
recalling them. On 25–26 September the Dobrudhzan army was joined by the 3 rd
Russian rifle division, on which Zaionchkovskii placed high hopes. But already on
4 October, just two days before the start of the enemy breach of the Kobadin
fortified position, this division by the demand of the Romanian command was
transferred to the north, to the Carpathians. When it became absolutely clear that a
catastrophe was unfolding in the south of Dunai, the command decided to quickly
redeploy the 3 rd rifle division back to Dobrudzha, together with the IV Siberian
army corps. On 10 October their head brigades were introduce into battle, literally
from the echelons, but it was already too late; the situation could not be saved.
***
After the fall of the Kobadin positions, the port of Konstantsa and the
approaching railways, the conflict continued in the northern part of Dobrudzha, but

31
it no longer carried such an intense, fierce character because it was no longer
connected with major strategic and operational objectives. At the end of December,
the last units of Russian troops returned to the left bank of Dunai. The expedition
to Dobrudzha in the autumn of 1916 became the last campaign beyond the Dunai
of the Russian Imperial Army and a sort of conclusion of the 200 hundred year
policy of the old Russia on the Black sea – Balkan direction. The result was
justifiably sad, because it was the fruit of a whole range of military and political
mistakes, which intertwined with each other and together increased the
consequences. And for this reason the campaign of the Russian troops in
Dobrudzha deserves a further detailed study by historians. Being fairly isolated and
clearly limited in the chronological respect, it is a perfect local object for
researchers as an example of the flaws and defects of the military system of
administration of the late Russian Empire, as well as its stronger side, which the
Russian army still possessed several months before the revolutionary collapse.
1
Българската армия в Световната война 1915–1918 г. Т. VIII. Войната срещу Ромъния през 1916 година.
Подготовка на войната и Тутраканската операция. София, 1939; Т. IX. Настъплението на III армия в
Добруджа. София, 1943.
2
Тошев, Стефан. Действията на III армия в Добруджа през 1916 година. Отговор на писаното за българите в
мемоарите на Генерал Лудендорфа. София, 1921. Переизд.: Тошев, Стефан. Действията на III армия в
Добруджа през 1916 година. София, 2007; Кантарджиев, Тодор. Добрич – Кубадин – Кюстенджа – Бабадаг –
Тулча – Исакча – Гарван. София, 1925; Кисьов Ал. Генерал Колев и действията на 1. конна дивизия в
Добруджа през 1916. година. София, 1928.
3
Тутраканската епопея и освобождението на Добруджа. Тутракан, 1996. Тутраканската епопея и войната на
северния фронт 1916–1918 година. Сборник с изследвания. Съставители Петър Бойчев, Володя
Милачков.Тутракан, 2007.
4
Марков, Георги. Голямата война и Българската стража между Средна Европа и Ориента 1916–1919 г.
София, 2006. С. 15–72
5
Birinci Dünya Harbi. Avrupa Cepheleri (Romanya Cephesi). Ankara, 1967. România in războiul mondial, 1916–
1918. Vol. 1. Bucureşti, 1934. România in anii primului război mondial. Vol. 1. Bucureşti, 1987. P. 337–383.
Kiriţescu, Constantin. Istoria războiului pentru întregirea României 1916–1919. Vol. 1. Bucureşti, 1989. P. 306–
390.
6
Jугословенски добровољачки корпус у Русиjи. Прилог историjи добровољачког покрета (1914–1918).
Београд, 1954; Добровољци у ратовима 1912–1918. Доживљаjи и сећања. Београд, 1971; Jугословенски
добровољци у Русиjи 1914–1918. Приредио Н. Поповиħ. Београд, 1977; Поповиħ, Никола. Односи Србиjе и
Русиjе у првом светском рату. Београд, 1977. С. 263–305, 389–425.
7
Васильев Ф.И. Стратегический очерк войны 1914–1918 г.г. Румынский фронт. М., 1922.
8
Там же. С. 10.
9
Записка ген. А.М. Зайончковского о Добруджанской операции 1916 г. // Красный архив. 1933. Т. 3(58). С.
24–45.
10
Айрапетов О.Р. Балканы. Стратегия Антанты в 1916 году // Вопросы истории. 1997. № 9. С. 48–60; Он же.
На Восточном направлении. Судьба Босфорской экспедиции в правление императора Николая II //
Последняя война императорской России. Сборник статей под ред. О.Р. Айрапетова. М, 2002. С. 158–261; Он

32
же. Балканы в стратегии Антанты и ее противников (1914–1918 гг.) // Новая и новейшая история. 2003. № 5.
С. 191–224
11
Козлов Д.Ю. Флот в румынской кампании 1916–1917 годов. СПб., 2003.
12
Шкундин Г.Д. Болгарская дилемма в дипломатической стратегии Антанты (октябрь 1915 года) // Первая
мировая война. Пролог XX века. М., 1999. С. 166–182; Он же. Разделяй и властвуй! Вопрос о сепаратном
мире с Болгарией в политике держав Антанты (октябрь 1915 – март 1916 г.). София, 2007; Он же. Не
замочить ли нам Кобурга? Болгария в российской военной стратегии и политике весной 1916 года // Родина.
2009. № 6. С. 54–59.
13
Torrey, Glenn E. Indifference and Mistrust: Russian-Romanian Collaboration in the Campaign of 1916 // Torrey,
Glenn E. Romania and World War I: a Collection of Studies. Iaşi – Oxford – Portland, 1998. P. 231–251.
14
Подробнее см.: Каширин В.Б. Несостоявшаяся экспедиция русских вооруженных сил на Балканы осенью
1915 года // Новая и новейшая история. 2004. № 6. С. 175–203.
15
Здесь и далее все даты приводятся по Юлианскому календарю, то есть по старому стилю.
16
Клембовский В.Н. Стратегический очерк войны 1914-1918 гг. Часть 5. Период с октября 1915 г. по
сентябрь 1916 г. Позиционная война и прорыв австрийцев Юго-Западным фронтом. М., 1920. С. 17.
17
РГВИА. Ф. 2003. Оп. 1. Ед. хр. 1897. Л. 51–51об. А.А. Татаринов – М.В. Алексееву. № 35153.
18
РГВИА. Ф. 2003. Оп. 1. Ед. хр. 1897. Л. 174. А.А. Татаринов – М.В. Алексееву. 17 июня 1916 г. № 167.
19
РГВИА. Ф. 2000. Оп. 1. Ед. хр. 3092. Л. 61–62.
20
Там же. Л. 69.
21
Краткие сведения о болгарской армии в военное время. [Одесса], 1915. Дополнения и изменения к
кратким сведениям о болгарской армии в военное время издания Разведывательного Отделения Штаба VII-й
армии 1915 года. [Одесса], 1916. Болгарская армия в 1914 году. Перевод иностранного издания. [Одесса],
1916. Краткие сведения о Румынской армии. Составлено по данным к 1 августа 1916 г. [Одесса], 1916.
Болгария. Военно-статистическое описание. Ч. 1. Район Восточной Болгарии. Пг., 1916. Маршруты по
северо-восточной части Болгарии. Одесса, 1916.
22
Занкевич [М.И.]. Добруджа. Военно-географический и военно-статистический очерк. Пг.: Военная
Типография Императрицы Екатерины Великой (в здании Главного Штаба), 1916.
23
Военный переводчик с Русского языка на Турецкий, Болгарский и Румынский. Издание Отдела Генерал-
Квартирмейстера Главного Управления Генерального Штаба. Пг., 1916
24
РГВИА. Ф. 2067. Оп. 1. Ед. хр. 572. Л. 275–291. Брошюра «Описание условий наступления русских войск
в Добруджу, составленное по распоряжению Штаба Одесского военного округа генерального штаба
капитаном Базаревичем. Июнь–июль 1916 года». Одесса, 1916.
25
РГВИА. Ф. 2067. Оп. 1. Ед. хр. 3059. Л. 1. М.В. Алексеев – А.А. Брусилову. Б.д. № 3525.
26
Список Генерального Штаба. Исправлен по 1-е Июня 1914 года. (С приложением изменений,
объявленных в Высочайших приказах по 18 Июля 1914 г.). Пг, 1914. С. 113. РГВИА. Ф. 69. Оп. 1. Ед. хр. 84.
Л. 10–10об.
27
Части и соединения второй очереди были образованы при всеобщей мобилизации в июле 1914 года путем
выделения т.н. скрытых кадров из частей мирного времени и пополнения их запасными до штатов военного
времени. Изначально второочередные войска имели более слабые командные кадры, большее количество
запасных старшего возраста и худшую техническую оснащенность, по сравнению с частями 1-й очереди.
Однако к концу 1916 года эти различия давно стерлись из-за многократного обновления состава частей.
28
РГВИА. Ф. 69. Оп. 1. Ед. хр. 84. Л. 27–30. «Записка для памяти командира XXX-го армейского корпуса
генерал-лейтенанта Зайончковского».
29
Брусилов А.А. Мои воспоминания. М., 2001. С. 148.
30
РГВИА. Ф. 69. Оп. 1. Ед. хр. 84. Л. 97.
31 Там же. Л. 131–131об.
32 Брусилов А.А. Указ. соч. С. 194.
33 Свечин А.А. Искусство вождения полка по опыту войны 1914–18 гг. Т. 1. М.; Л., 1930. С. 23–24.
34 РГВИА. Ф. 69. Оп. 1. Ед. хр. 85. Л. 353–361. Разговор А.М. Зайончковского со штабом Юго-Западного
фронта по прямому проводу 27 августа 1916 г.
35 РГВИА. Ф. 1837. Оп. 1. Ед. хр. 423. Л. 369.
36 РГВИА. Ф. 69. Оп. 1. Ед. хр. 85. Л. 332–334. А.М. Зайончковский – М.В. Алексееву. 18 июля 1916 г. Б.н.
37 Там же.
38 Там же.
39 Там же. Л. 44-45. Черновик ответа на письмо Зайончковского. Б.д. Без подписи. Рукой В.Е. Борисова.
40 РГВИА. Ф. 1837. Оп. 1. Ед. хр. 166. Л. 1.
41 Поповиħ, Никола. Односи Србиjе и Русиjе... С. 288.
42 РГВИА. Ф. 1837. Оп. 1. Ед. хр. 647. Л. 479.
43 РГВИА. Ф. 1837. Оп. 1. Ед. хр. 166. Л. 184.
44 Стоянович, Сава. Оръдията през декември. Румънският ни фронт 1916–1917. София, 1993. С. 95.

33
45 РГВИА. Ф. 1837. Оп. 1. Ед. хр. 166. Л. 36 а–36 б. М.В. Алексеев – А.А. Брусилову. 29 июня 1916 г. № 981.
46 Там же. Л. 126. Н.Н. Духонин – Н.А. Марксу. 20 июля 1916 г. Б.н.
47 Там же. Л. 127–128. Н.А. Маркс – Н.Н. Духонину. 21 июля 1916 г. № 06710.
48 АВПРИ. Ф. 135. Оп. 474. 1916–1917 гг. Ед. хр. 228. Л. 9–16об. Ф. Краль – М.М. Веселкину. 10 мая 1916 г.
Б.н.
49 РГВИА. Ф. 2067. Оп. 1. Ед. хр. 3059. Л. 150–153 об. А.М. Зайончковский – А.А. Брусилову. 28 июля 1916
г. Б.н.
50 Там же.
51 АВПРИ. Ф. 151. ПА. Оп. 482. 1916 г. Ед. хр. 3792. Л. 22. А.А. Нератов – Н.А. Базили. 1 августа 1916 г. №
3528.
52 Там же. Л. 25. Н.А. Базили – А.А. Нератову. 3 августа 1916 г. № 907.
53 РГВИА. Ф. 1837. Оп. 1. Ед. хр. 166. Л. 195–195об. С. Хаджич – М. Живковичу. 21 октября 1916 г. Б.н.
54 РГВИА. Ф. 2270. Оп. 1. Ед. хр. 13. Л. 81–81об. С. Хаджич – А.М. Зайончковскому. 11 октября 1916 г. №
917.
55 АВПРИ. Ф. 151. ПА. Оп. 482. 1916 г. Ед. хр. 3792. Л. 74–74а. С.Г. Богоявленский – А.М. Петряеву. 1
сентября 1916 г. Б.н.
56 РГВИА. Ф. 69. Оп. 1. Ед. хр. 85. Л. 258. А.М. Зайончковский – М.И. Эбелову. 6 октября 1916 г. № 405.
57 Стоянович, Сава. Указ. соч. С. 92.
58 Царская Россия в мировой войне. Т. 1. С предисловием М.Н. Покровского. Л., 1925. С. 230. Виноградов
В.Н. Румыния в годы первой мировой войны. М., 1969. С. 159.
59 РГВИА. Ф. 2067. Оп. 1. Ед. хр. 3058. Л. 67–70.
60 РГВИА. Ф. 2067. Оп. 1. Ед. хр. 405. Л. 4. Н.П. Половцов – Н.Н. Духонину. 22 августа 1916 г. № 1136.
61 РГВИА. Ф. 69. Оп. 1. Ед. хр. 85. Л. 154–158. А.М. Зайончковский – М.В. Алексееву. 15 сентября 1916 г. №
341.
62 Там же. Л. 159. А.М. Зайончковский – М.В. Алексееву. 15 сентября 1916 г. № 342.
63 РГВИА. Ф. 2067. Оп. 1. Ед. хр. 3059. Л. 374–375. А.М. Зайончковский – А.А. Брусилову. 10 сентября 1916
г. № 336.
64 РГВИА. Ф. 2067. Оп. 1. Ед. хр. 3058. Л. 217–224. Разговор А.А. Татаринова со штабом Юго-Западного
фронта. Б.д.
65 РГВИА. Ф. 2067. Оп. 1. Ед. хр. 3059. Л. 374–375. А.М. Зайончковский – А.А. Брусилову. 10 сентября 1916
г. № 336.
66 РГВИА. Ф. 2270. Оп. 1. Ед. хр. 62. Л. 50–50об. Приказ 47-му армейскому корпусу № 65. 14 октября 1916 г.
67 РГВИА. Ф. 2003. Оп. 1. Ед. хр. 1116. Л. 86–87. Н.А. Монкевиц – М.С. Пустовойтенко. 3 октября 1916 г. №
2542.
68 Българската армия в Световната война 1915–1918 г. Т. IX. Настъплението на III армия в Добруджа. София,
1943. С. 606.
69 РГВИА. Ф. 2067. Оп. 1. Ед. хр. 405. Л. 264–265. А.М. Зайончковский – М.В. Алексееву и А.А. Брусилову.
28 сентября 1916 г. № 386.
70 РГВИА. Ф. 69. Оп. 1. Ед. хр. 85. Л. 142. А.М. Зайончковский – А.А. Брусилову. 10 сентября 1916 г. № 335.
71 См., например: РГВИА. Ф. 2003. Оп. 2. Ед. хр. 180. Л. 261–268. Фрейман А.К. «Краткий отчет о действиях
115 пехотной дивизии в Добрудже в Сентябре и Октябре месяцах 1916 года». 18 ноября 1916 г.