Maciej Górny War between allies. Polish and Ukrainian scientists ...

Maciej Górny
War between allies. Polish and Ukrainian scientists 1914-1923
Both Polish and Ukrainian political activists perceived the First World War as a possibility to
improve their international position, if not by gaining full independence than by renegotiating
the status of territories inhabited by Poles and Ukrainians. Although in the case of Poland
significant political factions supported both Central Powers and the Entente, clearly a pro-
Austrian, respectively pro-German orientation prevailed. Ukrainian politicians were restricted
in their choices by the fact that Russia denied the very existence of the Ukrainian nationality.
In consequence the Polish Naczelny Komitet Narodowy formed the most active group, having
its own military unit, the Legiony, serving as a part of Austro-Hungarian army. The Ukrainian
political representation in Austria was formed paralelly as Holovna Ukrains‟ka Rada with its
own unit within the Habsburg armed forces – the Ukrains‟ki Sičovi Stril‟ci. In addition the
representation of Russian Ukrainians named Sojuz Vyzvolennija Ukraïni was formed, much
less conservative then its Austrian compatriots and aiming mostly at closest cooperation with
Germany. Both organizations were united into Zahal‟na Ukrains‟ka Rada. 1 From the German
side and with German financial support both Polish and Ukrainians activists were involved in
the Liga der Fremdvölker Russlands, along with the politicians representing other non-
Russian nationalities of the Empire. The activities of the League culminated in the
Nationalitätenkonferenz in Lausanne in June 1916. 2 To complete the picture, some of the
deputies of the Austrian diet run their own political actions.
This roughly sketched organizational basis has been an object of historical interpretation since
the end of war in East Central Europe. In the Polish as in the Ukrainian historiography those
activities were perceived as stages on the path toward the solution of the national question.
Surely, only the Polish ones led to the victory, but otherwise the similarities prevail over
differences. The main arenas of Polish and Ukrainian war activity were: a) military actions
directed against Russia; b) attracting the support of Polish and Ukrainian prisoners of war; c)
1
Peter Borowsky, Deutsche Ukrainepolitik 1918 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Wirtschaftsfragen,
Lübeck-Hamburg: Matthiesen, 1970, p. 33-35.
2
Seppo Zetterberg, Die Liga der Fremdvölker Russlands 1916-1918. Ein Beitrag zu Deutschlands antirussischen
Propagandakrieg unter den Fremdvölkern Russlands im Ersten Weltkrieg, Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen
Seura, 1978, passim.
[1]

propagandistic activities among domestic and foreign opinion in support of one owns case and
against Russia. Two of those points were fulfilled by the cream of Polish and Ukrainian
political pamphletists including esteemed scientists. This allows me to see the Polish and
Ukrainian activities in the context of Krieg der Geister, a conflict led mostly by German and
French scientists and men of culture. Yet, the ideological war of Poles and Ukrainians had
some distinctive features. In the following remarks I will concentrate on several historical and
anthropological theories and arguments that permeate many of the publications. I will not,
however, offer an in-depth analysis of Polish and Ukrainian political programs of period
under scrutiny.
Surely, for both sides Russia was the biggest threat and the main war enemy. Accordingly, it
was also one of the main topics of Polish and Ukrainian war publications. The axiom for
almost all of them was the Asiatic character of Russia. In 1917 Polish historian Feliks
Koneczny pointed at chaotic course of Russian history. 3 History had an impact on the local
population. According to Koneczny it was formed out of two substantially different ethnic
groups: Finnic and Turanic tribes on the one hand and the Slavs on the other. As a result „The
whole civilization stacked half way, unfinished, unfulfilled. This mixture was too rough and
became a […] mechanical instead of a chemical mixture – quite differently from the Western
nations”. 4 Similar idea was central in Jan Karol Kochanowski‟s Polska w świetle psychiki
własnej i obcej. According to the Warsaw historian Russia represented a nomadic element in
respect to its historical and anthropological content. 5 Similar interpretation could be found in
1916 booklet by Ukrainian Viennese deputee L‟onhin Cehel‟skyj. He pointed at the long run
intermarriage between Russian Slavs and Tchoudes as a source of racial difference between
the initial purely Slavic population of Rus‟ (and consequently that of Ukraine) and modern
Russians. 6 In contrary to Russia, Ukraine – as stated by an Ukrainian scientist from L‟viv
university – never ceased to be the core of Slavic ethnographic territory. 7 For Dmytro Doncov
as for many other authors the main difference between East Central Europeans and Russian
was of a psychological nature. Ukrainians (or Poles, in the works of Polish authors)
represented individuality in sharp contrast to the Asiatic, Oriental or even – as in the works by
3
Feliks Koneczny, Dzieje Rosyi, t. I (do roku 1449), Warszawa: Spółka Wydawnicza Warszawska, 1917, s. 1.
4
Tamże, s. 4.
5
Jan Karol Kochanowski, Polska w świetle psychiki własnej i obcej. Rozważania, Częstochowa: A. Gmachowski,
1925 (II wyd., pierwsze ukazało się w 1920 r.), s. 202.
6
Льoнгiн Цeгeлcки, Pycь-Укpaïнa a Mocкoвщинa-Pocciя. Icтopичнo-пoлїтичнa poзвiдкa, Цapгopoд 1916, p.
30.
7
Stephan Tomaschiwskyj, Die weltpolitische Bedeutung Galiziens, München: F. Bruckmann, 1915, p. 15.
[2]

Doncov - Buddhist features of Russia. 8 It was characteristic for all of the abovementioned
authors to use the term “Moscow” (Moskwa, Moskva, Moskale) parallel to or instead of the
name Russia, indicating that the latter had been usurped by the tsarist regime and falsely used
to describe a nation Mongolic in ethnic and cultural respects. 9
Logically, all the interpretations of Polish and Ukrainian history were formulated clearly with
bias on their role as “antemurale” against the Asiatic-Russian aggression. For the brilliant
Ukrainian historian the whole past of his nation was “eigentlich die Geschichte der
Verteidigung Westeuropas vor der asiatischen Invasion mit dem Blut und der Energie des
ukrainischen Volkes”. 10 Similar role was attributed to the Poles by many other authors,
including Oskar Halecki, who polemised directly against Hruševs‟kyj. 11 Following the same
logic the Bolshevist revolution has been interpreted as a next logical step in the historical
evolution of Russia. 12
Already here a sharp conflict between Polish and Ukrainian authors can be traced. According
to Aleksander Brückner, a renowned professor at the Berlin university, all the nationalities of
imperial Russia with the exception of Poles willingly participated in the war against Germany.
Ukrainians (though he preferred the name used in the Russian nationality policy Małorusy
Little-Russians) existed only in Galicia, with no prospects of extending their nationality to the
East. In contrary, the Poles were biologically and culturally doomed to fight for Eastern
individualism, rationalism and progress against the Eastern mysticism, despotism and
stagnation. 13 The same idea was formulated even more brutally by the nationalist politician
Stanisław Głąbiński: “Es ist Tatsache, daß die verbündeten Armeen auf ihrem Siegeszug
keine “Ukrainer”, sondern ausschließlich Polen, Juden und Russen angetroffen haben”. 14 He
accused the Ukrainian activists of mystification aiming in fact at the division of Galicia and
creating the new Ukrainian Kronland. The core of the whole Ukrainian war activity was,
according to Głąbiński, an anti-Polish action of small group of Galician „Ukrainophiles‟ with
no connection to their contested compatriots in the East: “Die galizischen Ukrainophilen, die
8 Dmytro Donzow, Die ukrainische Staatsidee und der Krieg gegen Rußland, Berlin: Carl Kroll, 1915, p. 63; idem,
Nacjonalizm, ed. Wiktor Poliszczuk, Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2008, p. 202-202.
9 See for example M. Kouchnire, L’Ukraine, l’Europe Orientale et la Conference de la Paix, Paris: Bureau de
Presse Ukrainien, 1918, p. 17.
10 Michael Hruschewskyj, Geschichte der Ukraine. Teil I, Lemberg: BBU, 1916, p. VI.
11 Oskar Ritter von Halecki, Polens Ostgrenze im Lichte der Geschichte Ostgaliziens, des Chelmer Landes und
Podlachiens, Wien 1918, p. 38-41.
12 Дмитpo Дoнцoв, Пiдcтaви нaшoi пoлiтики, Biдeнь 1921. P. 4-5.
13 Alexander Brückner, Die Slawen und der Weltkrieg. Lose Skizzen, Tübingen: Mohr, 1916, p. 39.
14 *Stanisław Głąbioski+, Die Ukraina. Ein Problem oder ein Phantom? Von einem österreichischen Polen, Wien
1918, p. 12.
[3]

durch den “Bund zur Befreiung der Ukraina” in der ganzen Kulturwelt so großen Lärm
geschlagen haben, befinden sich mit den russischen Ukrainern […] in einem krassen
Widerspruch”. 15
But denying the prospect of winning the Russian Ukraine for the Central powers was not the
only anti-Ukrainian propagandistic activity. Chronologically first was an accusation of
disloyalty on the part of Galician Ukrainians under the Russian occupation. According to
Yaroslav Hritsak, the reaction of Austrian military authorities in many respects resembled that
of Russia. „Ruthenian treason‟ was thus a counterpart of „Mazepinism‟ – a principal distrust
towards the inhabitants of eastern Galicia. 16 Some Polish nationalist authors fueled this
campaign with harsh accusations. Głąbiński referred for example to the town of Satanow,
where “ukrainische Bewohner in meuchelmörderischer unqualifizierbarer Weise unsere
Armee überfielen und Verrat auf Verrat häuften”. 17 The Ukrainian answers were oft two
kinds. Some authors, like Cehels‟kyj, criticized the Poles for false accusations and again
attested the inborn hostility between Ukraine and Russia. 18 Others reversed Polish arguments.
This latter tendency remained the main axis of Dmytro Dorošenko‟s interpretation of the
Russian occupation in Galicia written as late as 1941: “Mit dem Einmarsch der russischen
Truppen in Lemberg wurden […] ukrainischen Buchhandlungen […] geschlossen und
versiegelt, während die polnischen weiter geöffnet bleiben durften. Die ukrainische Schulen
mußten ihre Pforten schließen, während die polnischen den Unterricht fortsetzen konnten.
[…] Indessen war die Haltung gegen die örtlichen Polen eine vollkommen duldsame, die
polnische Sprache war überall anerkannt, die Verordnungen der russischen Behörden
erschienen gleichzeitig in russischer und polnischer Sprache“. 19 It is characteristic for all
narratives of this kind that the national categories were adapted according to current needs. In
Dorošenko‟s case the name „Ukrainians“ appeared in the context of political persecution
under the Russian occupation. Whenever it was impossible to attribute the suffery to his own
nation, he used the term “inhabitants”. So, the information concerning approximately 12
thousand deported members of L‟viv‟s elite, with all probability of Polish nationality, has
been described in the quoted book as referring to the “inhabitants” of the city.
15
Ibidem, p. 53.
16
Jarosław Hrycak, Historia Ukrainy, 1772-1999. Narodziny nowoczesnego narodu, transl. Katarzyna Kotyoska,
Lublin: IEŚW, 2000, p. 121.
17
*Stanisław Głąbioski+, Die Ukraina…, p. 44.
18
Longin Cehelskyj, Die großen politischen Aufgaben des Krieges im Osten und die ukrainische Frage, Berlin
1915, p. 30.
19
Dmytro Doroschenko, Die Ukraine und Deutschland. Neun Jahrhunderte deutsch-ukrainischer Beziehungen,
München: Ukrainische Freie Universität, 1994, p. 181-182.
[4]

Ironically, the loyalty competition of Polish and Ukrainian Habsburg subjects soon took a
reverse course. As soon as the failure of Central powers turned into reality the old facts and
interpretations gained the opposite meaning. In the political literature accompanying the
negotiations in Paris the loyalty toward Habsburgs was an argument against the Ukrainian
independence and for inclusion of Eastern Galicia into the emerging Polish state. 20 The
Polish-Ukrainian hostilities surely outlived the war between Austria-Hungary and Russia.
Even before the final dissolution of the Monarchy it was replaced by the new regular war in
Galicia between the army of the Western Ukrainian People‟s Republic and Polish citizens of
the capital city later supported by regular Polish forces.
In the following remarks I will focus on several central points of the Polish-Ukrainian
ideological conflict. As their analysis will show, the context of their publication is of
secondary importance. The same topics, positions and discursive strategies have been used in
the period of – theoretical – Polish-Ukrainian brotherhood of arms and later, in the period of
the declared war between both states.
It was quasi natural for almost all borderlands that their historical and statistical
interpretations varied according to the nationality of the authors. Galicia did not form an
exception in this respect. It must have been obvious for any observer that here the Ukrainian
arguments were considerably weaker. Nevertheless, they were presented with great
conviction. As noticed by Kušnir, “Die Ukrainer wurden nicht nur von ihren russischen
Feinden um die Freiheit, sondern auch von der Geschichtswissenschaft um ihre Geschichte
gebracht”. 21 Cehels‟kyj advocated the theory of brutal Ukrainian conquest of wild Finnic
Russia. Even the Russian self-description proved this theory, identified as “the Slaves of
Rus‟”. 22 Enlightened by the Western cultural influence Kiїv differed radically from Muscovy,
vegetating in the civilizational sense until the reforms of Peter the Great. Even the Polish
authors – Kušnir refers to a romantic historian Joachim Lelewel – admitted that and
furthermore, they willingly accepted ancient Ukrainian cultural superiority over the Polish
lands. 23 More elaborated picture of ancient Ukrainian civilization was delivered by
20
Wincenty Lutosławski, Eugeniusz Romer, The Ruthenian question in Galicia, Paris 1919, p. 13.
21
Wladimir Kuschnir, Die Ukraine und ihre Bedeutung im gegenwärtigen Krieg mit Russland, Wien:
„Ukrainische Rundschau“, n. d., p. 10.
22
Льoнгiн Цeгeльcький, Caмocтiйнa Укpaїнa, Biдeнь: Coюз визвoлeння Укpaїни, 1915, p. 5.
23 Kuschnir, Die Ukraine… p. 11.
[5]

Hruševs‟kyj, who pointed at the patriarchal – and thus different not only from the „Turainian‟
but also from Polish – social and moral order manifested by the subordination of women. 24
The glory of Ukrainian mediaeval history legitimized both the conquest in Russia and the
future division of Galicia into Polish and Ukrainian parts. In a popular booklet directed to the
German soldiers Cehels‟kyj informed that to the north from Carpathians and to the east from
Vistula and San “Das Land ist ukrainisch, hat nur überall eine fremde Oberschicht von
Großgrundbesitzern, Kaufleuten, Dorfgastwirten, Wucherern, Dorfschenkern und Beamten”. 25
Cehels‟kyj used the highly contested Russian data from early 20 th century, when the
Brest‟/Brześć district had been incorporated into the Russian lands and forcefully Russified.
His own invention was to claim the Ukrainness of all the inhabitants identified then as
Russians and to add several hundred thousand to achieve a proud 1 million Ukrainians west of
the river Bug. 26 The range of Ukrainian territorial aspirations reached thus approximately 80
kilometers to the East from Warsaw including nearly half of the claimed Polish territories. As
one of his Polish critiques noticed, even the Shtetls of Eastern Poland had been identified as
Ukrainian towns, rounding up those “Ukranian reunions”. 27
It is intriguing that none of Polish or Ukrainian authors noticed the parallelism of territorial
aspirations on both sides. In Leon Wasilewski‟s popular history of the Polish eastern
provinces one could find the same arguments as in the books by Hruševs‟kyj or Cehels‟kyj.
The Poles – as he claimed – belong to those few nations inhabiting the same territory from the
times immemorial. Their Eastern provinces have been peacefully colonized and heroically
defended. The local Ruthenian population simply subordinated to the more elaborate
civilization: “Die aus Byzanz entlehnte Kultur der Ruthenen […] erwies sich im Wettkampf
mit der abendländischen Kultur der Polen als der schwächere Teil”. 28 Cehels‟kyj‟s and
Hruševskyj‟s thesis on the cultural superiority of Ukrainians had been overshadowed by the
predominant theory of Polish cultural mission. Interestingly enough, Polish authors eagerly
used arguments popular in the German nationalist discourse. Władysław Studnicki described
24
Hruschewskyj, Geschichte…, p. 45 and 50.
25
Longin Cehelskyj, Was soll jeder Soldat über die Länder nördlich der Karpaten und östlich des Weichsel- und
Sanflusses wissen?, Berlin: Carl Kroll, 1915, p. 6.
26
Longin Cehelskyj, Chelmland und Wolhynien, „Ukrainische Nachrichten“ Nr. 48, 14 August 1915.
27
Stanisław Niedzielski, Das erlöste Chełmland, Lemberg: aoe, 1915, p. 6 and 23.
28
Leon Wasilewski, Die Ostprovinzen des alten Polenreiches (Lithauen und Weissruthenien, die Landschaft
Chełm, Ostgalizien, die Ukraina), Krakau: NKW, 1916, p. 7 and 17.
[6]

Poles as “die kulturelle Triebkraft des Landes”. 29 Many other Polish authors did not even
bother to collect any historical arguments supporting the Polish right to the East, except from
the obvious postulate to reconstruct the old Polish statehood within the borders from 1772. 30
Both sides did their best to attract international attention and support. Special role was thus
played by journals published in German, French and English as well as by foreign specialist
supporting one of the „national cases‟. The Ukrainian authors enjoyed support of a renown
Berlin and Viennese geographer Albrecht Penck – a fact deeply regretted by Wasilewski in
the journal “Polnische Blätter”. 31 On the other side, the professional status of Aleksander
Brückner gave a special meaning to his anti-Ukrainian theses. Consequently the readers of
“Ukrainische Rundschau” might have won an impression he is at least equally as dangerous
for the Ukrainian case as the Russian empire. 32 This might have been caused by the contrast
of Brückners attitude with the general pro-Ukrainian sympathy in Germany. As suggested by
Peter Borowsky, social radicalism of the Sojuz Vyzvolennija Ukrajiny corresponded with
German plans in the East by far better than with the Austrian policy. 33 One should also add
that pro-Ukrainian opinions were easy to combine with anti-Polish resentments. 34
“Osteuropäische Zukunft”, journal published by German adherents of the Ukrainian
movement, advocated Ukrainian rights to the Kholm/Chełm disctrict. 35 The maps of future
Ukraine published by German authors usually included territories to which also the Polish
side raised its right. 36 German political reviews “Der Panther” and “Das größere Deutschland”
published several articles by Doncov, consequently accusing Poles of pan-Slavist
sympathies. 37 An author of “Politisch-anthropologische Monatsschrift für praktische Politik,
für politische Bildung und Erziehung auf biologischer Grundlage” (the follow-up of Ludwig
29
Władysław von Studnicki, Die polnische Ostmarkenfrage. Denkschrift für deutsche Staatsmänner, Warschau:
Deutsche Staatsdruckerei (als Manuskript), p. 21.
30
See. Włodzimierz Wakar, Polska, Warszawa: Jakowicki, 1916, p. 8.
31
Leon Wasilewski, Ein berühmter Eiszeitforscher und die polnisch-ukrainische Sprachgrenze. „Polnische
Blätter. Zeitschrift für Politik, Kultur und soziales Leben“, XII (1918), Nr. 100, 15 August 1918, p. 64-66.
32
See: Naturam si expellas furca, “Ukrainische Rundschau” XIII (1915) Nr. 3, p. 128f, Eine deutsche Rede in
schwerer Zeit, UR 1915 Nr. 5-6, p. 283-285.
33
Peter Borowsky, Deutsche Ukrainepolitik 1918 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Wirtschaftsfragen,
Lübeck-Hamburg: Matthiesen, 1970, p. 34.
34
Ernst Hunckel, Mitteleuropa und die Polenfrage, „Der Panther“ 4 (1916), 8, p. 1002-1013 commented on the
Polish-German relations in the war and after the victory: „Die Erfüllung der Wehrpflicht berechtigt keinen Teil
der Bevölkerung zu Forderungen von Gegenleistungen, die überdies im vorliegenden Falle nur auf Kosten und
zum Schaden des Staates, der ein deutscher Nationalstaat ist, möglich wäre“ – p. 1011.
35
Frank Schupp, Das Cholmerland, „Osteuropäische Zukunft” 1 (1916) Nr. 5, p. 54-55.
36
See Ekkehard Ostmann, Rußlands Fremdvölker, seine Stärke und Schwäche, München: J. F. Lehmann, 1915.
37
Dmytro Donzow, Das veränderte Rußland, „Der Panther” 4 (1916), 2, p. 169-184; idem, Das Wesen der
polnisch-russischen Rivalität, „Der Panther“ 4 (1916), 8, p. 1014-1024; idem, Polnisch-Ukrainisches, „Das
größere Deutschland“ 1915, Nr. 48, p. 1596-1600.
[7]

Woltmann‟s „Politisch-Anthropologsche Revue“) summed up this German attitude writing
that “Die Schaffung der freien Ukraine würde die höchste Krönung des deutschen Werkes im
Osten bedeuten”. 38
Whereas the Ukrainian propagandistic activities in Germany have been more than fruitful,
both influencing German politics and attracting the public attention, Poles clearly dominated
the topic in the Western countries. Numerous publications on the “Ruthenian question in
Galicia”, published both for the Western audience and for the reading public of Central
powers, characterized the local situation in the region as an unsolvable nationality mixture
with cultural and economic domination of the Polish element. 39 According to the
anthropologist Jan Czekanowski, Ruthenia and Lithuania represented transitory territories
without dominant majority groups. 40 The local Ruthenian population was unable to develop a
higher culture of their own. Thus, it was necessary to accept the Polish domination in the East
at least as long as no other elite will be able to replace it. Czekanowski clearly denied the
intellectual quality of the existing Ukrainian national movement. 41 A humoristic clue of this
Polish-Ukrainian debate took place in April 1919 when American negotiator in Versailles
responsible for the problem of Poland‟s eastern border Robert Howard Lord compared the
nationality maps of Galicia delivered by the Polish delegation with those produced by
Ukrainian political representation. Czekanowski‟s theory of “line of equilibrium” between
Polish and Ukrainian territories in Galicia proved to be nothing more than a fake statistics and
a game of colours: both Polish and Ukrainian geographers marked as their national territory
all districts with more that 25 % of their compatriots. Polish red overlapped with the
Ukrainian blue, a shameful experience for the cartographers, as professor of the university in
L‟viv Eugeniusz Romer reported in his diary. 42
The disgraceful end of statistical speculations discredited one of the main argumentative
strategies in the Polish-Ukrainian conflict. Nationality statistics offered „hard‟ data, easy to
present as objective knowledge. This was not the case with mediaeval history or speculations
38
Wilhelm Marks, Die Ostflügel des deutschen Mitteleuropas, “Politisch-anthropologische Monatsschrift für
praktische Politik, für politische Bildung und Erziehung auf biologischer Grundlage” 15 (1916-1917), 12, p. 661.
39
See Wincenty Lutosławski, Eugeniusz Romer, The Ruthenian Question in Galicia, Paris 1918, p. 9-18; Les
confins orientaux de la Pologne, Paris 1919; see also Franz Kwilecki, Polen und Deutsche gegen Rußland, Berlin:
Germania, 1915, p. 19.
40
Jan Czekanowski, Stosunki narodowościowo-wyznaniowe na Litwie i Rusi w świetle źródeł oficjalnych, Lwów:
Książnica Polaka, 1918, p. 41.
41
Idem, Études de civilisation comparée (Polonais, Ruthènes et Allemands), Paris: Henri Barrère, nd, p. 16.
42
Eugeniusz Romer, Pamiętnik paryski (1918-1919), ed. Andrzej Garlicki, Ryszard Świętek, Wrocław:
Ossolineum, 1989, p. 293.
[8]

over the cultural development of the forefathers. However, there was another scientific
discipline capable of supplementing or even replacing nationality statistics.
Racial anthropology has been introduced into the Polish-Ukrainian conflict almost
simultaneously with the outbreak of war. In 1914 basic publication by L‟viv geographer
Stepan Rudnyc‟kyj characterized Ukrainians as representing purer race than their both great
neighbors: Russians and Poles. He denied any Mongolic influence on the Ukrainian racial
type, found it nevertheless in Polish and Russian case, both representing so called
“Weichselrasse”. 43 Those theses were illustrated with biometric data based on Russian
anthropological research from the early 20 th century. As frequently in the case of racial
categorizations, differences between groups under scrutiny have been commented as gigantic
even though numerically negligible. Two years later Rudnyc‟kyj elaborated thoroughly on the
same topic, publishing in Ukrainian in liberated L‟viv. 44 He decisively criticized usage of
anthropological arguments by non-professionals as well as false theories of Polish and
Russian anthropologists perceiving his compatriots as a racial mixture. According to
Rudnyc‟kyj, Ukrainians represented the Dinaric race, identified in 1900 by Joseph Deniker. 45
However, Deniker perceived the Balkans as the main Dinaric territory, admitting only smaller
Dinaric islands in Eastern Europe. Rudnyc‟kyj „rounded up‟ his previous findings to correlate
the racial territory with the postulated borders. As such, local Dinaric population was
characterized by rounded skull, well-proportioned tall figure and dark pigmentation. Contrary
to their Mongolized neighbors, it represented purely Slavic racial type. Rudnyc‟kyj admitted
that some of the Ukrainians look differently but he attributed this fact to their foreign descent.
The „pure‟ Dinaric Ukrainians “possess a big advantage over those admixtures, for their racial
type dominates over the whole Ukrainian territory”. 46 Logically, the anthropologist
recommended intermarriage with Nordic Germans, Czechs and Dinaric Southern Slavs and
disapproved those with the actual Ukrainian neighbors: Poles, Russians, Jews and Romanians:
“All those combinations are contrary to the rules of national eugenics”. 47 Sadly, the thin layer
43
Stefan Rudnydkyj, Ukraina und die Ukrainer, Wien: Verlag des Allgemeinen Ukrainischen Nationalrates, 1918,
p. 12-13.
44
Cтeпaн Pyдницкий, Чoмy ми xoчeмo caмocтiйнoї Укpaїни, Львiв: Cвiт, 19942 .
45
Joseph Deniker, Les races et les peuples de la terre. Éléments d’anthropologie et d’ethnographie, Paris:
Schleicher Frères, 1900.
46 Ibidem, p. 49.
47 Ibidem, p. 306.
[9]

of Ukrainian intelligentsia tends precisely to those mixtures, marrying Poles, Russian and
Jews instead of, say, Scandinavians. 48
The argumentative power of racial anthropology was based – as problematized by Rudnyc‟kyj
– in its biometric standards. It is brilliantly expressed in his comment to the tiny index of
anthropological data of „standard‟ Poles, Russians and Ukrainians: “Those three rows of
numbers collected by biological science speak for huge volumes. […] Those few numbers
show in the most convincing manner that we, the Ukrainians, are independent nation, neither
Polonized Muscovites, nor Russified Poles, an independent nation even from the racial point,
which couldn‟t be said about the Poles or Russians”. 49
Rudnyc‟kyj‟s arguments have been adopted by Ukrainian and pro-Ukrainian authors.
Cehel‟s‟kyj included them into his interpretations of mediaeval Ukrainian history. Rudnyc‟kyj
himself presented his theories to the German-reading public in “Osteuropäische Zukunft”. 50
The association of Ukrainians with the Dinaric race have been broadly accepted, alongside its
positive treats. This was particularly the case of all those authors, who themselves belonged to
the nations associated with this racial type. Austrian anthropologist Gustav Kraitschek
characterized it as follows: “Die „dinarische‟ Rasse scheint der nordischen in manchen
Eigenschaften recht nahe zu stehen, an Organisationstalent aber hinter ihr zurückzubleiben“. 51
Also Fritz Lenz, later on one of the chief Nazi Rassenforscher, described Ukrainians as
Dinaric, contrary to the „Turanian‟ Russians and to the Poles, who composed a mixture of
Nordic, Turanian and Mediterranean racial elements of Tatar origin. 52 Konrad Guenther went
so far to corroborate the Nordic racial character of the Ukrainians – again in opposite to their
neighbors. 53 According to this university professor from Freiburg im Breisgau, the Ukrainian
prisoners of war, he had had an occasion to observe, were in their mass blond with a thin layer
of dark-complexioned descendants of ancient Asiatic aggressors. 54 The majority of German
and Austrian authors devoted to the question of Ukrainian population and territory slicked to
48
Ibidem, p. 308.
49
Ibidem, p. 47.
50
Stefan Rudnyckyj, Zur Landes- und Volkskunde der Ukraine, „Osteuropäische Zukunft” 1 (1916), 22, p. 347-
350.
51
Gustav Kraitschek, review of: Eugen Fischer, R. F. Graebner, M. Hoernes, Th. Mollison, A. Ploetz,
Gustav Schwalbe, Anthropologie, Leipzig-Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1923, „Mitteilungen der
Anthropologischen Gesellschaft in Wien“ LIII (1923), 3-4, p. 223.
52
Fritz Lenz, Die nordische Rasse in der Blutmischung unserer östlichen Nachbarn, „Osteuropäische Zukunft” 2
(1917), 2, p. 17-22.
53
Konrad Guenther, Die Ukrainer, „Osteuropäische Zukunft” 2 (1917), 11, p. 169-172.
54
Idem, Zur Rassen- und Völkerfrage im Osten, „Osteuropäische Zukunft” 3 (1918), 10, p. 107-110.
[10]

the Dinaric theory, referring not only to the question of race but also, for example, to
linguistic problems and extensively quoting Rudnyc‟kyj‟s German publications. 55 Logically,
as stated by E. Bugge, Dinaric Ukrainians were related to the South Slavs and thus their
language should be perceived as South Slavic rather than East Slavic, conforming their
essential difference from both Russians and Poles. 56
Racial categorizations played an important role in the war propaganda. In the case of Stepan
Rudnyc‟kyj they delivered arguments supporting the Ukrainian political interests. Not
surprisingly, alongside with the positive characteristics of the Dinaric race a negative
description of Polish and Russian racial types completed the map of East Central Europe. As
their main feature so called „Mongolization‟ was attested. The importance of this argument
should not be underestimated. As recently shown by Andrew Evans, Austrian anthropologists
participating in the giant research project of collecting and analyzing biometrical data of
prisoners of war tended to differentiate racially Russians from those Slavic nationalities,
whose members served in the Austro-Hungarian army. 57 The aim was to consolidate the
nationalities by constructing the joint front against Asiatic aggression. The Mongolic features
of Poles attested by Rudnyc‟kyj logically questioned their ability to compose part of this
crusade.
Naturally, such an accusation couldn‟t go without answer from the Polish side. Stanisław
Głąbiński characterized Rudnyc‟kyj‟s theory as an “anthropological swindle”. He criticized
the application of biometrical data collected by anthropologists in Russian part of Ukraine to
the inhabitants of Eastern Galicia. 58 According to this author “Es ist doch aus der Geschichte
bekannt, daß auf dem heute von Kleinrussen bewohnten Gebiete zahlreiche und verschiedene
Volksstämme wohnten, die sich mit vielen eingewanderten Stämmen und fremden Rassen
(Mongolen, Tataren, Wallachen) vermischt haben […]; es ist daher keine Rede davon, daß
55
See Alfred Arnold, Die Ukraina und der Krieg, „Politisch-Anthropologische Revue“ XIII (1914), 9, p. 463-465.
See also Karl Nötzel, Die Unabhängigkeit der Ukraine als einzige Rettung vor der russischen Gefahr. Zugleich
eine Würdigung der Kulturaufgabe Österreichs, München-Leipzig: Hans Sachs, 1915; Felix Hänsch, An der
Schwelle des größeren Reichs. Deutsche Kriegsziele in politisch-geographischer Begründung, den Wollenden
unter seinen deutschen Mitbürgern dargestellt, München: J. F. Lehmann, 1917, p. 117n; Max Friedrichsen, Die
Grenzmarken des Europäischen Rußlands. Ihre geographische Eigenart und ihre Bedeutung für den Weltkrieg,
Hamburg: L. Friederichsen & Co., 1915, p. 89-91; Rudolf Stübe, Die Ukraine und ihre Beziehungen zum
osmanischen Reiche, Leipzig: Veit & Co., 1915, p. 5-8; Paul Ostwald, Die kraine und die ukrainische Bewegung,
Essen: G. D. Baedeker, 1916, p. 8-9.
56
E. Bugge, Name, Abstammung und Sprache der Ukrainer, „Zeitschrift für Ethnologie” 50 (1918), p. 212-214.
57
Andrew D. Evans, Anthropology at war: World War I and the science of race in Germany, Ann
Arbor, Mich., 2002, 235.
58
*Stanisław Głąbioski+, Ukrainische Phantasien. Kultur-politische Streiflichter. Von einem österreichischen
Polen, Wien 1918, p. 3.
[11]

man den ‚Ukrainern„ einen besonderen Rassentypus ernst zuschreiben könnte. […] Die
Ukrainer bilden daher keine besondere Rasse, haben auch […] keine gemeinsame
Vergangenheit, keine gemeinsame Kultur; eben damit hängt der Mangel einer gemeinsamen
Bezeichnung dieses Volksstammes zusammen“. 59 The dominating Polish interpretation
perceived Ukrainians and Russian as close relatives, speaking with words of Wacław Schmidt
“racial, religious, political and economical constitutive part of Russian imperial subject”. 60
Similar was the stance of Aleksander Krzeczunowicz, who – ironically – repeated Ukrainian
arguments by admitting the civilizational impact of Kiev over Moscow. In polemics with
Rudnyc‟kyj he logically assumed that modern Russians descended from Kievian colonists
thus constituting racial unity. 61
Naturally, neither racial differences between Poles and Ukrainians, nor their historical and
civilizational achievements were among the main problems of the armed conflict in Galicia
that started in November 1918 with the proclamation of Ukrainian independence in L‟viv.
The situation was highly unstable, state and science structures in statu nascendi and even
national affiliations had to be redefined according to new conditions. Instead, both sides
devoted themselves to most rudimental campaign against Ukrainian, respectively Polish war
atrocities, mixing descriptions of real sufferings with phantasy, as it could have been observed
before during the propagandistic war between Central powers and Entente.
Interestingly enough, the state-sponsored anthropology in post-war Austria and in Poland did
not follow the same path, they had chosen prior to 1918. In the works of Hella Pöch the
Mongolization of Ukrainian refugees from Wolhynia has been attested, quite contrary to the
unifying tendency of Austrian war anthropology, including her deceased husband Rudolf
Pöch. 62 On the other hand, prominent anthropologists in the independent Polish state finally
accepted the Dinaric character of the Ukrainian racial type. In the works of Jan Czekanowski
and Ludwik Jaxa Bykowski Dinaric character of the Ruthenians was associated with typhus
inclination to incendiary, being part of Ukrainian rural tradition. 63 Ukrainian nationalist
authors incidentally referred to this topic, attributing the positive features of Dinarics on their
compatriots. According to such German authors as Hans F. K. Günther or Eugen Fischer, the
Dinaric race shared many features of the Nordics thus being second-best possible European
59
*Stanisław Głąbioski+, Die Ukraina…, p. 18.
60
Wacław Schmidt, Czego chce Rosya, Lausanne: „Przegląd Polityczny“, 1917, p. 23.
61
Aleksander Krzeczunowicz, Przyszłośd Słowian i kwestia ruska w Galicji i na Podolu, Kraków 1919, p. 22.
62
Hella Pöch-Schürer, Beiträge zur Anthropologie der ukrainischen Wolhynier, „Mitteilungen der Anthropologischen
Gesellschaft in Wien” 56 (1926).
63
Jan Czekanowski, Zarys antropologji Polski, Lwów: K. S. Jakubowski i S-ka, 1930, p. 450-452.
[12]

acial group and thus willingly accepted biological identity. 64 The racial argument has been
also part of Ukrainian political discourse in the sense given by Rudnyc‟kyj. Short before the
outbreak of the Second World War Rostislav Iendyk in the preface to his translation of
Günther repeated his old accusations of Ukrainian intelligentsia, which – instead of following
the eugenic principles – mixes with foreign elements and neglects its duties. 65
Historiography of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict rather marginally refers to the propagandistic
efforts of both sides, to which many serious scientists and authors were committed. The main
axis of the analyses forms quite clearly German Ukrainian policy, referred to either as an art
of imperialism or – rather awkwardly – as “moralistic offensive” against the Russian
empire. 66 In any of those cases the active role of the Ukrainian authors is of secondary interest
whereas their interplay with Poland remains unnoticed. Most authors, to mention Claus
Remer, Hans Beyer or Peter Borowsky, Maciej Kozłowski, Tomáš Zahradníček, Aleksy
Deruga, Józef Lewandowski or Rafał Galuba concentrate on political problems solely, leaving
aside the intellectual dimension of Polish-Ukrainian and German-Ukrainian relations. 67
Consequently, a question of efficiency of the Ukrainian and Polish propaganda still lacks
serious analysis. In the literature we can come across quite opposite opinions. “Highly
efficient” in Zahradníček‟s opinion, it has had only a limited impact on German readers
according to Remer. Author of the best synthesis of Liga der Fremdvölker Russlands safely
avoids any estimation of that question. 68 One of few authors who studied this problem deeply
notices anthropological motifs of the Ukrainian publication as representation of the European
Zeitgeist. 69 I am of the opinion, that this assumption deserves attention. Looking at Stepan
Rudnyc‟kyj‟s or Alexander Brückner‟s works in the context of great international politics is,
64 See for example Hans F. K. Günther, Kleine Rassenkunde Europas, München: J. F. Lehmann, 1925, p. 56-57;
Eugen Fischer, Spezielle Anthropologie: Rassenlehre, in: Anthropologie, ed. Eugen Fischer, Leipzig-Berlin: B. G.
Teubner, 1923, p. 152-153.
65 Pocтиcлaв Єндик, Biд пepeклaдчa, in: Гaнc Ф. Гiнтep, Paca пoдpyжжя вождь, Lwów 1939, p. 3-12.
66 Walter Mogk, Paul Rohrbach und das „Größere Deutschland”. Ethischer Imperialismus im Wilhelminischen
Zeitalter. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Kulturprotestantismus, München: Wilhelm Goldmann, 1972.
67 Hans Beyer, Die Mittelmächte und die Ukraine 1918, München: Isar, 1956 [Zeitschrift für Geschichte
Osteuropas, Beiheft 2]; Peter Borowsky, Deutsche Ukrainepolitik 1918 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der
Wirtschaftsfragen, Lübeck – Hamburg: Matthiesen, 1970 [Historische Studien, 16]; Claus Remer, Die Ukraine im
Blickfeld deutscher Interessen. Ende des 19. Jahhunderts bis 1917/18, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1997;
Maciej Kozłowski, Między Sanem a Zbruczem. Walki o Lwów i Galicję Wschodnią 1918-1919, Kraków: Znak,
1990; Tomáš Zahradníček, Jak vyhrát cizí válku. Češi, Poláci a Ukrajinci 1914-1918, Praha: ISV, 2000; Aleksy
Deruga, Polityka wschodnia Polski wobec ziem Litwy, Białorusi i Ukrainy (1918-1919), Warszawa 1969; Rafał
Galuba, „Niech nas rozsądzi miecz i krew…” Konflikt polsko-ukraioski o Galicję Wschodnią w latach 1918-1919,
Poznao: wydawnictwo Poznaoskie, 2004.
68 Seppo Zetterberg, op. cit.
69 Rudolf A. Mark, Zur ukrainischen Frage im Ersten Weltkrieg: Flugschriften des ‘Bundes zur Befreiung der
Ukraine’ und ihm nahestehender Publizisten 1914-1916, „Zeitschrift für Ostforschung” 33 (1984), 2, p. 203.
[13]

however, too wide and too narrow at the same time. The propagandistic activities described in
my paper might not have had much influence on the policy of Germany, Austria, France,
Great Britain or the USA. Their meaning becomes more evident, if we look at them in a
different context.
From the very beginning of the First World War, a mobilization of intellectuals accompanied
military actions. Nationalist mobilisation of German professors in the first months of the war
and even before: in the first decade of the 20 th century, has been topic to many publications.
In October 1914 thousands of scientists signed memoranda condemning France and England
and declaring the “German militarism” fair struggle for universal values. 70 On the other side
of the front Henri Bergson announced the war a struggle against the barbarians and used the
academic authority to announce Germany a nation of wilds. 71 Among various motifs which
accompanied the phenomenon of the Krieg der Geister, important role was played by the
völkisch-racial complex of ideas. Rüdiger vom Bruch points at the aggressive representations
of racial thinking in the pre-war congresses of literary scientists and sociologists. Notions of
Volkstum, race, nation and Kultur enriched the vocabulary of social scientists far beyond the
circles of organised movement for racial hygiene. 72
It is this context in which the Ukrainian-Polish intellectual struggle should be looked at. The
efforts of Polish and Ukrainian authors deserve proper acknowledgement. Though not so
ambitious as the German-French Krieg der Geister or the Austro-Hungarian anthropological
prisoners of war research, they referred to the same sorts of scientific arguments and applied
smoothly newest scientific fashion. In this respect Stepan Rudnyc‟kyj‟s racial theory deserves
special attention, surely not because of its factual content but rather to its modernity and
ability to skilfully popularise owns theory on the international level. Obviously, the social and
cultural development of East Central Europe might have not been adequate to the dynamics of
the West. Yet, the intellectuals were able to catch up both in the times of peace and in the war.
Even if some of those intellectuals imports seem now of questionable value.
70 See Tollmien, Cordula (1993). „Der „Krieg der Geister“ in der Provinz – das Beispiel der Universität Göttingen
1914-1919“. Göttinger Jahrbuch 41, 137-173. The fundamental works on the militarisation of German
professoriate are vom Bruch, Rüdiger (1980). Wissenschaft, Politik und öffentliche Meinung. Gelehrtenpolitik im
Wilhelminischen Deutschland (1890-1914). Husum: Matthiesen and his Gelehrtenpolitk, Sozialwissenschaften
und akademische Diskurse in Deutschland im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 2006.
71 Rürup, Reinhard (1984). „Der „Geist von 1914“ in Deutschland. Kriegsbegeisterung und Ideologisierung des
Krieges im Ersten Weltkrieg“ in Ansichten vom Krieg. Vergleichende Studien zum Ersten Weltkrieg in Literatur
und Gesellschaft, ed. Bernd Hüppauf (Königstein: Forum Academicum), 22-23.
72 vom Bruch, Gelehrtenpolitk, 121.
[14]