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Lecture Note 15: Social Cost Benefit Analysis - University of ...

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from an extra unit <strong>of</strong> income. How much lower depends on the curvature <strong>of</strong><br />

the function g, i.e., how fast marginal utility falls with income. It would seem<br />

reasonable to say that a function g exhibits more inequality aversion if marginal<br />

utility <strong>of</strong> income falls fast with income than when it falls slowly. After all, in<br />

the later case, it does not really matter at the margin if there are big income<br />

inequalities or not, while in the former case it does matter a great deal. The<br />

speed at which marginal utility falls is controlled by the second derivative <strong>of</strong> the<br />

function, i.e., by @2 g<br />

@y 2 = ay a 1 . We could, <strong>of</strong> course, use the (absolute) size <strong>of</strong><br />

the derivative as our measure <strong>of</strong> inequality aversion, but such a measure would<br />

not be invariant to a positive monotonic transformation <strong>of</strong> the utility function.<br />

So it is better to normalize by the marginal utility to get a measure <strong>of</strong> inequality<br />

aversion that is invariant to such transformations. This motivates the de…nition<br />

given in equation (20). 3 With a function such a g that got constant relative<br />

inequality aversion, inequality aversion is captured by one parameter a and the<br />

larger a is, the more inequality aversion there is.<br />

Now, let us get back to the distinction between consumption and utility<br />

inequality aversion. This is best illustrated by considering three di¤erent cases.<br />

1. Case 1: Utilitarian social welfare function and individual utility functions<br />

with constant relative inequality aversion. A utilitarian social welfare<br />

function is linear in the utility <strong>of</strong> each individual, so it exhibits no utility<br />

inequality aversion: the utility <strong>of</strong> one individual is a perfect substitute for<br />

that <strong>of</strong> another and the marginal social welfare <strong>of</strong> an increase in the utility<br />

<strong>of</strong> some individual is the same as for any other individual (and typically<br />

normalized to be equal to 1). If the individual utility function is <strong>of</strong> the<br />

type<br />

Uh = xh 1<br />

1<br />

1<br />

(21)<br />

then it exhibits consumption inequality aversion (and more so, the bigger<br />

is 0). This consumption inequality aversion is inherited by social<br />

welfare function, which in this case, then, exhibits consumption inequality<br />

aversion but not utility inequality aversion. We can write the social welfare<br />

function as<br />

HX HX<br />

SW F = Uh =<br />

xh 1<br />

1<br />

1<br />

: (22)<br />

h=1<br />

2. Case 2: Individual utility functions are linear in consumption (Uh = x h 1)<br />

and the social welfare function is <strong>of</strong> the following type:<br />

SW F =<br />

h=1<br />

HX (Uh) 1<br />

h=1<br />

1<br />

: (23)<br />

3 If you are familiar with the de…nition <strong>of</strong> risk aversion, you will see the similarity to that<br />

concept.<br />

8

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