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ITMA 322 APRIL 2005

ITMA 322 APRIL 2005

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CASE COMMENTS<br />

Evidence filed by the parties<br />

The applicants’ evidence in support of honest concurrent<br />

use of the mark consisted of a witness statement<br />

by Ms Sharon Kelly, the director of the applicants’<br />

company. Ms Kelly stated that the trade mark EXCEL<br />

has been used by the applicants in the United<br />

Kingdom for bicycles since 1996 and the turnover was<br />

12.5 million pounds in five years from 1998 to 2002<br />

and an amount of £300,000 was spent on promotions<br />

and advertisements; and 19,000 to 44,000 bicycles<br />

were sold in each of those years.<br />

The applicants also submitted copies of advertisements<br />

in Makro Mail together with the copies of<br />

invoices.<br />

The opponents evidence were mainly witness statement,<br />

stating that the substantial use of the applicants’<br />

mark commenced only in 1998 and that they<br />

have not used the mark alone, but with logos or with<br />

another word, and finally that the trade mark is not<br />

distinctive and therefore turnover figures were not<br />

sufficient to make it stand out in the market place.<br />

Decision of the hearing officer<br />

The hearing officer commented that the applicants<br />

had not used the EXCEL mark alone, but in combination<br />

with another word, such as, EXCEL STARBURST,<br />

EXCEL REVOLUTION, EXCEL BLACK BULLET.<br />

The hearing officer observed that the opponents<br />

had withdrawn the opposition under EXEL trade<br />

mark but he remained quiet regarding opponents’<br />

request for reconsideration of the issue. He observed<br />

that the goods were identical. He held that the opponents’<br />

trade mark APOLLO EXCEL was inherently<br />

distinctive. He observed that the similarities of the<br />

mark outweigh the differences and if the applicant<br />

had sought registration of the mark actually used, the<br />

outcome might have been different. He held that<br />

there is a likelihood of consumers being confused into<br />

believing that the goods provided by the applicants<br />

are those of the opponents or provided by some<br />

undertaking linked to them.<br />

Appointed Officer’s decision in appeal<br />

The applicants had contended that the hearing officer<br />

did not refer to the CODAS case and neither did he<br />

give reasons for the same, which is important for<br />

arriving at a decision on the likelihood of confusion.<br />

The Appointed Person agreed with the applicants and<br />

in this regard referred to the decision in English v<br />

Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 605,<br />

[2002] 1 WLR 2409, in which the Court of Appeal has<br />

stated that the giving of reasons is the fundamental<br />

part of the judicial process. The Appointed Person<br />

decided to treat the appeal as re-hearing. He also criticised<br />

that the opponents’ solicitors did not take issue<br />

with the correctness of CODAS as a matter of law. He<br />

observed that no argument was presented based on<br />

Road Tech Computer Systems Ltd v Unison Software (UK)<br />

Ltd [1996] FSR 805. The Practice Direction states: “If an<br />

application which has been accepted on the basis of honest<br />

concurrent use is then opposed, the mere fact of honest concurrent<br />

use will not save the application from refusal”.<br />

This was referred in CODAS case.<br />

The Appointed Person decided that the applicants’<br />

evidence does not show that there is no likelihood of<br />

confusion. He stated that the hearing officer had correctly<br />

assessed the likelihood of confusion based on a<br />

comparison between the mark applied for registration<br />

and the earlier trade mark “assuming normal and fair<br />

use of the marks on a full range of the goods covered<br />

within the respective specifications”. The Appointed<br />

Person pointed out that this is a hypothetical test,<br />

which does not necessarily correspond to the use that<br />

the parties have actually made use of the respective<br />

marks. He also referred to the comments made in the<br />

context of infringement by Laddie J in Compass<br />

Publishing BV v Compass Logistics Ltd [2004] EWHC<br />

520 (ch), [2004] RPC 41 AT [22]-[23].<br />

The Appointed Person stated that the applicants<br />

couldn’t rely on the CODAS case, because in that the<br />

applicant and the opponent had concurrently used<br />

their marks for upwards of 14 years. The respective<br />

marks were CODAS and CODA for computer software.<br />

The parties had traded in different markets and<br />

there was no evidence of confusion. It was proved in<br />

CODAS that the respective marks have been able to<br />

function as trade marks in the market without any<br />

confusion.<br />

The Appointed Person stated that there is no evidence<br />

to show that the opponents had been using the<br />

mark during most of the period in which the applicants<br />

claim to have been using their marks (1996 to<br />

1998). Therefore, he decided that it is impossible to<br />

conclude that the use of the two marks that has been<br />

made shows that there would be no likelihood of confusion<br />

if the opponents’ mark were to be used normally<br />

and fairly in respect of the full range of goods<br />

for which it is registered.<br />

The Appointed Person stated that the opponent is<br />

entitled to appeal against the hearing officer’s interpretation<br />

of section 7 that Exel SA’s registration cannot<br />

be relied upon. He commented that the opponents’<br />

position was that of a defendant in a criminal<br />

case who enters a guilty plea after an adverse ruling<br />

by the judge on a point of law. The applicants’ solicitors<br />

argued that they would be unfairly prejudiced if<br />

opponents were permitted to rely on Exel SA’s registration<br />

because they would be deprived of an opportunity<br />

of adducing evidence, seeking their consent or<br />

attacking the validity of the registration. The<br />

Appointed Person agreed to the opponents’ solicitors’<br />

point that they could have done these things before<br />

the hearing. He decided that the opponents could rely<br />

upon EXEL trade mark even if they were not the registered<br />

proprietors. He referred to BALMORAL Trade<br />

Mark [1999] RPC 297 and cf WILD CHILD Trade Mark<br />

[1998] RPC 455. He commented that it is unnecessary<br />

for him to consider whether section 7(2) is inconsistent<br />

with the Directive as suggested in Kerly’s 13 ed.<br />

The Appointed Person held that the Exel SA’s trade<br />

mark EXEL is very similar to the applicants’ EXCEL<br />

trade mark and the goods in EXEL, which is “land<br />

vehicles” would also cover “bicycles” and therefore<br />

are identical to the goods in the applicants’ mark.<br />

The applicants were ordered to pay the costs.<br />

Comments<br />

Trade mark owners should be careful with marks containing<br />

solely parts of registered marks without any<br />

additional element. EXCEL would have been success-<br />

16 <strong>ITMA</strong> Review December <strong>2005</strong>

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