Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen

Because it is a plausible normative hypothesis that we normally ought to have correct attitudes, having
a content-reason for some attitude implies a defeasible holding-reason for this attitude (but not vice
versa). 10
For the ascription of value only content-reasons are decisive.
X is valuable. ↔ X has other properties which provide content-reasons (reasons for the
correctness) for a certain attitude.
One may illustrate the distinction between holding reasons and content reasons referring to the
analogy to reasons for belief. In this case reasons for correctness are substituted by reasons for truth. 11
Pascal’s wager may be used as an example for a holding-reason for a belief: as I would come to
heaven if God existed and I believed in him, I have a reason to believe in him. But obviously this is
not a reason which could render my belief that God exists true and therefore no content-reason. For
this I would rather need conclusive arguments to the effect that the belief is or would be true. 12
Similar in the case of attitudes: content-reasons for an attitude would be arguments to the effect that
the attitude is or would be correct. 13 If we now turn to the example of the evil demon it may be
described as follows: Although I clearly have a reason to prefer the saucer of mud – namely the threat
of the demon –, this is only a holding-reason for preferring. There is no reason for the correctness of
the attitude in question, because a saucer of mud cannot provide content-reasons for preferring it or
render preferring correct. Of course, the subsequent question has to be what would justify the
correctness of preferring: obviously, we should not refer to the property “preferable” in our
justification.
Danielsson and Olson adopt this analogy between truth and correctness from Brentano, who thinks
that correctness is a technical philosophical notion for conative attitudes which is analogous to the
notion of truth for beliefs. Both are fundamentally epistemic notions, which means, that they cannot
satisfactorily be explained without reference to the notion of experiences of evident knowledge. 14
Thus the justification of the correctness of an attitude runs via the experience of evident knowledge.
Danielsson and Olson do not decide on a special account of correctness and they think that they do not
understand the term: content-reasons are epistemic reasons. Danielsson and Olson admit that they are not
entirely happy with the term “content-reason”. See Danielsson/Olson: Brentano and the Buck-Passers, p. 517.
10
Danielsson and Olson refine their proposal by analysing the notion of a holding-reason in terms of the notion
of a content-reason: „To say that there is a holding-reason to have some attitude is to say that there is a contentreason
to favour the occurence of this attitude, or possibly that there is a content reason to disfavour the nonoccurence
of this attitude.“ In the case of the evil demon that means that the holding reason to prefer the saucer
of mud can be explained in terms of a content-reason to favour preferring the saucer. See Danielsson/Olson:
Brentano and the Buck-Passers, pp. 518ff. However, this refinement is not important for the present purposes.
11
There may be reasons for having a belief (e.g. strategic reasons) and there may be reasons for the truth of the
belief (e.g. a conclusive argument). As in the case of attitudes we may differentiate between holding-reasons and
content- or truth-reasons for belief. Having the latter implies defeasible holding-reasons for the belief (but not
vice versa).
12
See Danielsson/Olson: Brentano and the Buck-Passers, p. 516.
13
See ibid., p. 517.
14
See ibid., p. 516.
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