Not a Zero-Sum Game - Ludwig von Mises Institute

NOT A ZERO-SUM GAME
tially the case for voluntary exchange in general: no one freely
enters into an exchange, whether as buyer or seller, unless he
expects to emerge better off as a result of that exchange. Further-
more, the ability to exchange a single product one has produced
for the many things one would like to consume makes possible the
division of labor and the manifold expansion of production capac-
ity that it permits. There is no economic reason why these gains
do not apply equally to potential traders on different sides of nation-
al boundaries.
The political liabilities associated with free trade stem from the
vigorous competition it promotes. Competitors who do not pro-
vide the best deal for consumers fail. Far from sugarcoating this
unwelcome fact, free trade demonstrates it in no uncertain terms.
Rather than looking to improve their own shortcomings, many of
the losers in the competitive process seek to derail the process.
They seek to ensure that they provide customers the best deal not
by improving the package they provide, but by getting the govern-
ment to hamper the ability of their competitors to provide a bet-
ter deal. Foreign competitors make an especially easy target for
such government restrictions.
Thus, government restrictions on international trade are of a piece
with domestic restrictions on competition. They share the same
goal: to redistribute income from the many to government's cho-
sen few and to substitute its own preferred allocation of resources
for that of the market. Indeed, by restricting trade with foreign-
ers, governments close off an important means of mitigating the
impact of their domestic restrictions. This is what John T. Flynn