symbolic elements of everyday culture - MTA Szociológiai ...

● KAPITÁNY ÁGNES – KAPITÁNY GÁBOR ● Theses about “Kadarism” ●
several reports revealed, a declared expanded scope of movement in fact increased self-censorship: we are
allowed to say whatever we want, if only in a limited way and in main terms, so we do not need to
undertake open confrontation.)
Even a disarmed adversary will remain a foe. Moreover, by simultaneously oppressing both past and present,
the regime proliferated in adversaries: some challenged it on account of the withering past, others, on account
of the present.
The era of „national unity” of Kadar was limited by two quasi division (in fact if we look beyond the narrow
sense boundaries of the period, it separates two quasi national unities). The two lines of quasi division are
Kadar's ascent to power at the end of 1956, and his funeral. Public opinion differs on both counts. We can
recall the war of billboard slogans in late 1956 („Long Live Kadar”, „Long Fear Kadar”, „Don't Fear Kadar”,
„Why shouldn't Kadar Fear?” „Kadar Shouldn't Fear for Anything” . In Hungarian: “Éljen Kádár – Féljen Kádár
– Ne féljen Kádár – Miért ne féljen Kádár – Semmiért ne féljen Kádár. = The text was becoming longer every
day). The funeral of Janos Kadar was a response to the memorial funeral of Imre Nagy. Apparently, both
events gave rise to a similar division of the population as a civil war: Kadar's supporters on this side,
adversaries on the other. This, however, is only a quasi-division: in the first case Kadar was not yet an
alternative, while at the time of his burial he was obviously no longer one. In 1956, Kadar relying on realist
middle classes and thereby creating „national unity” was the standard of an extreme stratum whereas at the
time of the political changeover he was a mere memory of stability. (Obviously, the overall accord prior to
1956 and in 1989 wishing for a political change with unanimous will was also an indication of a quasi-unity. In
both 1956 and 1989, the unanimous wish for a change in fact denotes a multitude of aspirations, sometimes
opposite in nature.) In this respect, Kadar managed to create a relative social peace at the end of the first third
of the interim period because his „realistic” conservatism disregarded the new momentum of co-operative
organisation and the consequent racing urbanisation, it leaves the components of „the social structure”
essentially intact. (His „realistic” alignment towards the centre is also marked by his ability to make future-
oriented strata accept the idea that he progresses and at the same time he could convince past -oriented
groups of his intent to use viable elements of the past, while his real aspirations in fact aimed at neither
direction.)
The policy of „realism” had a major drawback. Once it loses power, it loses the very essence of legitimacy; a
realist who is no longer able to exercise power is not a realist any more.
A much analised tactic of the Kadar era was the fragmenta tion of society, locking individuals in
micro worlds. This individualisation obviously helped society to turn towards capitalism, as the
existing capitalism was more advanced in terms of living standards as well as the development of
individuality and the scope of individual movement compared to the sophisticated (administrative
economist) socialism. In the battle in the individual's soul it is capitalism that wins. Kadar himself
and his closest followers obviously never thought of the restoration of capitalism. Still it is not an
accident that the economist and sociologist elite supporting Kadar and in their wake, the apparatus
becoming more and more „enlightened” in fact made decisions which pointed in that direction
essentially almost from the very beginning.
Ultimately, the politics whose major goal was the stabilisation of the regime grew the basis of its
own destabilisation: Hungary saw the evolution and ultimate conclusion of processes which in
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