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Commercial Legal And Institutional Reform (CLIR) - Economic Growth

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COMMERCIAL LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM<br />

Diagnostic Assessment Report for the Republic of Bulgaria March 2002<br />

Addressing this tax avoidance problem in a legal reform program focused on collateral<br />

law is complicated, and its resolution requires a larger reform agenda. The problem<br />

implies a number of other issues, including the tax rate. While assessments of the fiscal<br />

system were beyond the scope of this task, the level of tax avoidance and the relatively<br />

large informal economy suggest that the tax rate is too high for current economic<br />

conditions. Analysis of the cost of tax avoidance is required to determine whether<br />

lowering taxes will lead to increased compliance and higher overall revenues. 8<br />

Another business issue affecting bank lending is that a great percentage of those seeking<br />

loans are startups and new companies with no established credit history to support<br />

lending without high levels of collateral and guarantees. Coupled with the fact that<br />

pledges are difficult to enforce and thus do not necessarily provide adequate security,<br />

many banks are not interested in extending loans.<br />

This problem is further compounded by the lack of proper loan evaluation skills in the<br />

banking community and the lack of credit-seeking expertise among potential borrowers.<br />

Bankers interviewed from all banks noted that few loan officers are capable of properly<br />

reviewing loan applications (including business plans, balance sheets, tax statements, and<br />

other documentation of financial viability) and making a sound, market-based<br />

determination of creditworthiness. Little credit information is available, unless provided<br />

by the borrower, so the risk of fraud is perceived as high. 9 Risk evaluators are in short<br />

supply. Moreover, the inexperienced private sector lacks expertise in preparing loan<br />

applications and demonstrating cash flow, profitability, or other indices of potential<br />

success. These factors combine to depress new lending, especially when banks have the<br />

option of safe investments in government bonds and foreign money markets.<br />

Despite these negatives, there are strong positives. First, trade associations other than the<br />

Bankers Association are actively pursuing reform. The Bulgarian Investors Association<br />

is assisting members in obtaining financing by supplying historical financial and<br />

corporate information on its members through an Internet Web site, including balance<br />

sheets for at least five years on the older companies. It also provides letters of<br />

recommendation for its qualified members to banks, and negotiates with banks to offer<br />

better rates to members. The association regularly publishes information on banking and<br />

financing and even posts current deposit and loan interest rates on its Web site for public<br />

comparison. It has the capacity to assist in or lead the development of computerized<br />

8 During the 1980s, Brazil faced similar problems. High taxes, plus poor enforcement mechanisms, led to<br />

high rates of avoidance. Companies that complied with the law were at a severe competitive disadvantage<br />

to the majority of their noncompliant competitors. Brazil lowered the rates from 30 percent to 50 percent<br />

down to 10 percent, which was approximately the cost of multiple bookkeeping and other noncompliance<br />

mechanisms, so that there was no longer an economic advantage to avoidance, especially when factoring in<br />

the risk of audit. The result was the largest collection of revenues in Brazilian history, despite a 60 percent<br />

to 80 percent reduction in the tax rate.<br />

9 One interviewee opined that the lack of credit information available is in part a deliberate policy of the<br />

older banks. The theory (unconfirmed) is that banks have actually opposed publicly available credit<br />

information because they preferred to use the lack of information to pawn off their bad customers on other<br />

banks, evidently by letting them obtain loans elsewhere to pay off existing bad debts without competitors<br />

finding out about the credit risks.<br />

Booz Allen Hamilton<br />

Page 32

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