Plaintiffs' reply in support of their motion for partial summary judgment

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Case 2:08-cv-00575-GLF-NMK Document 75 Filed 01/14/10 Page 32 of 54 Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1263 (11th Cir. 2004) (“There are two ways in which an individual may be held liable under § 1983-he may be sued for his own personal actions (‘direct liability’), or, under certain limited circumstances, for the actions of his subordinates (‘supervisoral liability’).”). Similar to a police officer who commits constitutional violations under the supervision of superiors, both Freshwater and school officials may be found liable for his unconstitutional activities. Therefore, whatever the school or school officials’ responsibilities regarding the activities in Freshwater’s classroom, Freshwater cannot redirect the finger of blame to somehow try to establish a controversy of fact. Notably, regarding this finger-pointing, Freshwater provides no legal support for his claim that school ratification or approval of his actions absolves him from liability. In fact, he ignores the very text of Section 1983, which provides: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law [or] suit in equity . . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added); see also First Amend. Compl. (Doc. No. 11) 1-2 (basing the cause of action in 42 U.S.C. § 1983). According to the plain language of the statute, therefore, Freshwater assumes liability as a person who deprived the Dennises of their constitutional rights while acting under color of state law. See, e.g., Wilson v. Luttrell, No. 99- 5459, 2000 WL 1359624 at *8 (6th Cir. Sept. 13, 2000) (finding that a teacher “took advantage of his position” in violation of constitutional rights). The fact that the school or school officials may have had liability as well is of no consequence to Freshwater’s liability for his own conduct. These peripheral concerns do not in any way change the fact that Freshwater remains liable to the Dennises for his actions in his own classroom. 25
Case 2:08-cv-00575-GLF-NMK Document 75 Filed 01/14/10 Page 33 of 54 2. The Dennises Have Standing To Challenge Freshwater’s Violation Of The Establishment Clause. Freshwater also misses the mark by arguing that Zach or his parents lack standing. Not only does standing jurisprudence clearly provide the Dennises with “the rights of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their children.” Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972), but the Dennises have been “directly affected by the . . . practices against which their complaints are directed,” Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 n.9 (1963). As such, the Dennises suffered injuries, these injuries are traceable to Freshwater’s unconstitutional actions, and the relief sought will bring the Dennises appropriate redress for the injuries caused. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (discussing the requirements for standing). 2 a. The Dennises Have Standing To Enforce Their Own Rights As Parents And To Intervene On Behalf Of Their Son. Freshwater fundamentally fails to understand the question of standing here. Courts have long held that “[p]arents have a constitutionally protected interest in guiding the religious future and education of their children.” Doe v. Wilson Co. Sch. Sys., 564 F. Supp. 2d 766, 789 (M.D. Tenn. 2008) (internal citations omitted); see also Fleischfresser v. Dir. of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 1994) (granting parental standing to challenge Establishment Clause violations where they merely “might inhibit their right to direct the religious training of their children”). Courts also recognize that “[s]chool children who are subjected to unwelcome religious exercises 2 As to the standing issue, the arguments here respond only to the factual contentions raised by Freshwater in his Memorandum in Opposition. (See Deschler Mem. in Opp. at 12-16.) It is important to note, however, that standing presents a question of this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the claims presented by the parties at the outset of litigation, not just based on the facts presented by Freshwater in his Memorandum in Opposition or by the Dennises’ in their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. See Cook v. Colgate, 992 F.2d 17, 19 (2d. Cir. 1993) (“[S]tanding doctrine evaluates [a litigant’s] personal stake as of the outset of the litigation.”) As such, many other relevant claims raised by the Dennises at the outset of this litigation but not included in the summary judgment briefing also support their standing under Article III. 26
Page 1 and 2: Case 2:08-cv-00575-GLF-NMK Document
Page 31: Case 2:08-cv-00575-GLF-NMK Document
Page 81: Case 2:08-cv-00575-GLF-NMK Document
Page 86:
Case 2:08-cv-00575-GLF-NMK Document
Page 91 and 92:
Page 96:
Page 99 and 100:
Page 101 and 102:
Page 103 and 104:
Page 105 and 106:
Page 107 and 108:
Page 109 and 110:
Page 111 and 112:
Page 113 and 114:
Page 115 and 116:
Page 117 and 118:
Page 119 and 120:
Page 121 and 122:
Page 123 and 124:
Page 125 and 126:
Page 127 and 128:
Page 129 and 130:
Page 131 and 132:
show all

Plaintiffs' reply in support of their motion for partial summary judgment

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?