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Iraq: Presentatbn of UWU CISpanish Draft Securiqr Councii R By Sir Jeremy Greenstock, UK Permnent ReprasenUWe, Counal bnsuttations, 24 February 2003, - I shouid like to explain cerefully to Council colleagues why Viis text is being tabled at this time and in this fom, and what actbnlwe are then proposing. - The CO-Sponsors are convinoed thdt lt-aq is not achieving. nor intending to achieve, the objective ol SCR 1441. 1441 set out that obj8ctive in s W and wmpelling tema: (OPZ) "bringing to ful1 and verified the disamament p ablished by SCR 687". 1441 attractsd warld a just because of Its atter and the ss which led to its adoptiorr, but because its unani message represented a powerful signal that the UN was in controi. The S ncil was challenged by the U§ President to ralse iCs game on its most difficutt agenda item: and, by adopting 1441, it dM so. The Resolution set out the most stringent temis ever decided upon by ttie United Nations for the proces8 of disarmarnent. But them was also an dive branch in 1441 : Iraq was given @very .incentive to rspair its documented non-compliancs. - Today, 15 weeks on from 1441, we are no further advanced toymrds that objedive of oomplete disamment. Indeed, nor is Iraq taking adequate steps to corred its wider breaches of 687, including its continued support for terrorism. The terms of Resolution 1441 are not being respe , and in parts af the current debate not evm being re mem be red. - 1441 deplored 'lraq's past aviour. What we all asksd of Iraq was, firs4 a marked change from its denial and deception of 1091 to 2002, which had already placed B in matetial breach of relevant resolutions; and second, ful1 compliance with and moperation w$h the irnplementation 01 1441. In other words, a decision by Iraq, visibly and unrnlstakabty. to dhrest d Weapons of Mass Deslruction imrnedbtely, unwndbnally and acthiely. That means bringing prosaibed material8 or pmgramrnes to the notie al inspecton and providing a ful! and credible account of Iraq's WMD adbity backed up by dwurnentary evidenw and testimony from personnel. - What 1441 was not was the establishment ol a detective or a containment exercise. Again, the objecti've was to bring disamament to 'wmpletion' field of WMD are instruments for the effedive delivery end ve n of that complete disarmarnent. This has ben #e ase sincs 1991. SCR 687 deda re the location, amounts and types of proscribed items. Iraq was asked to yieM possession of them to UN inspectors tor destrudon, removal or rendering harmless. This time, 12 years on, mere eaw be ris rebeat into procrastination or parliil resuh. The final opportunity atlorded in SCR 1411 was not for ihe Counul to slide bad< into SS, but for imq to remgnise e new dekmination in the Securily Coundl to complete the business in a way whlch represented a complete change of attitude in BagMaB. I
- That has not happened. Let me sey why we at8 convind that Iraq has decided to mmáin in defiancs of the UN: - Firs$, look at the immediste m-up to ths return af inspedom. In 2002, Iraq began seriously to dis~cs the issue of inspectbns only when it realised that we, as tha international cornmunity, muld nat give up on mplete disarmament. For months. Iraq sought to haggk with the Counal, to set preconditions (the '19 questiansn), and to negotiate away its non nce of the past. lraq only ag four days after President Bush's s af 12 September in a cynical attempt to any new resolution strengthening aem. - Second. we hoped - certafnly the United Kingdom hoped - that the adoption of 4441 wouid see a change af heart by the Iraqi regime. Iraq's 13 November letter following the adoption of 1441, ful1 of tirades and complaints. and grudgingly a pung mat muld 'deal with" the resolution, was w ort of the wholehearted cumm*rtment to voluntary disarrnament we had hoped for. r 23 November letter on how 1441 "~ntradicts' international law underiined this. Then Game the responses to the detalled requitements of 1441 - Iraq has produced a 12,000 page declaration that is indisputably inadequate. Dr Blix called I 'rich in volume but poor in new information .. . and pradically devoid d new evidente"; - Iraq has done evetything possible to prevent unrestricted Interviews. withwt Iraqi minders. eavesdropping, or intimidation of potential intervie . UNMOVIC has so far been abk to oonduct only hree private interview - all of which took place with people volunteered by the iraqis and all of which tmk place in #e irnmediate runup to Dr Blix's last visit to Baghdad. Since then nothing; ' - Iraq has dragged b feet on as many other elernents of p ural mperatK>n as possible. lnstead of serious mllaboration wiV, the inspectors, Iraq has tried to make the proces into a lighUy monitored media drcus. with demonstraton ready to herass inspectors if they come too close to hidden material. As Dr BIU! toid the Council on 27 Jsnuary, 'Demonstrations and outbursts ... are unlikeiy to occur without initiativ8 or enmuragement from the avthorities. We must ask ourselves what the motives may be for these eventsw; - Iraq's CO-operation on substanw has been non-existent. Since ins s resumed UNMOVIC have not been aMe to close a single outstanding issue. We not knw what happened to 8,500 litres of anairax, 2.160 kilograms of bacterial growth media. 360 tonnes of bulk chernical warfare agent. 3.000 tonner of precursor chemicals. 1.5 tonnes o! VX neme agent, and 6,SM aemial bmbs- ve never had satisfadory answem about the entire scape of Iraq's BW programme. tkre are now even more unresolved questions: for exarnple, why has Iraq developed a prohibited missile programme and why has it refurbished equiprnent - rocket easttng chambers and chernical processors - destroyed Dy UNSCOM? Does this show anything other than
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Page 9 and 10: MISION Memorandum 1. Ful1 and effee
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