Smash Pacifism - Warrior Publications
Smash Pacifism - Warrior Publications
Smash Pacifism - Warrior Publications
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Immediately after the May 7 rioting, King and an<br />
entourage visited pool halls and canvassed Black<br />
communities, appealing for peace and shepherding people<br />
off the streets of Birmingham. All protests had been<br />
cancelled. But it was too late—the<br />
genie was out of the bottle. The Black<br />
rebellion emanating from Birmingham<br />
sent shock waves across the country<br />
and terrified the white ruling class:<br />
“Anxious voices made<br />
themselves heard within the Kennedy<br />
administration. Secretary of State<br />
Dean Rusk described the racial flareup<br />
as 'one of the greatest issues that<br />
we have had since 1865' [the US Civil<br />
War] His assistant G. Mennen<br />
Williams, the former governor of<br />
Michigan and a longtime advocate of<br />
civil rights, feared a complete<br />
breakdown in law and order: 'the<br />
possibility that the inter-action of<br />
fervent demonstration and brutal<br />
repression would reach such a pitch that public peace and<br />
safety would be endangered beyond reasonable control.'<br />
Berl Bernhard, the staff director of the US Civil Rights<br />
Commission... believed the nation was 'torn by racial<br />
insurgency.'<br />
“During a tense meeting at the White House nine<br />
days later, Robert Kennedy [US attorney general] warned<br />
the president that 'Negroes are now just antagonistic and<br />
mad... You can't talk to them... My friends all say the Negro<br />
maids and servants are getting antagonistic.' Bruce<br />
Marshall, Robert Kennedy's most trusted Justice<br />
Department colleague, compared the recent outbreak of<br />
violence with past crises in Alabama and Mississippi.<br />
'There we had a white mob against a Negro,' he noted, with<br />
sharp clarity. 'Here we have a Negro mob against whites.'”<br />
(The Bystander, pp. 3-4)<br />
Robert Kennedy later stated:<br />
“'There is obviously a revolution within a<br />
revolution in the Negro leadership,' he reflected in 1964.<br />
'We could obviously see the direction of... King going away<br />
from him to some of these younger people, who had no<br />
confidence in the system of government.' It was essential,<br />
he thought, to ensure the confidence of the black<br />
population...”<br />
(To Redeem the Soul of America, p. 136)<br />
For the presidency of John F. Kennedy, civil rights<br />
instantly became the number one issue in the country. After<br />
having delayed any substantial constitutional reform on<br />
civil rights since the supreme court decision of 1954, and<br />
nearly 10 years of nonviolent civil disobedience, by May 22<br />
the President was ready to push through Congress a civil<br />
Medgar Evers, NAACP organizer in<br />
Mississippi, killed in June 1963.<br />
48<br />
rights act meeting many of the demands of the reformist<br />
civil rights groups.<br />
On June 9, 1963, speaking at a conference of US<br />
mayors in Honolulu, Kennedy warned that “the time for<br />
token moves and talk is past.” During his televised address<br />
to the country, June 11, 1963, he<br />
stated the situation bluntly:<br />
“The fires of frustration<br />
and discord are burning in every city,<br />
North and South, where legal<br />
remedies are not at hand. Redress is<br />
sought in the streets, in<br />
demonstrations, parades, and<br />
protests which create tensions and<br />
threaten violence and threaten<br />
lives...”<br />
(The Bystander, p. 423)<br />
But the government's<br />
effort to bring the people off the<br />
streets and into the meeting rooms<br />
failed. Anger again flared after<br />
Medgar Evers, an NAACP organizer<br />
in Mississippi, was shot and killed, in June 1963:<br />
“The escalation of violence prompted G. Mennen<br />
'Soapy' Williams, the assistant secretary of state, to issue<br />
the direst of warning on June 15 [1963]. 'We still have a<br />
situation of crisis proportions,' he cautioned the president.<br />
'The grass roots of the Negro population is clearly<br />
aroused... Unless there is a satisfaction of the legitimate<br />
Negro aspirations the situation will be fraught with<br />
danger... Temporizing will only lose the confidence and<br />
support of the responsible Negro and give the extremists... a<br />
chance to seize the initiative'... “<br />
(The Bystander, p. 425)<br />
In regards to the protest movement that swept the<br />
South following the May 1963 Birmingham riots,<br />
“King's involvement was slight... and staff<br />
member[s]... acted as roving plenipotentiaries [an official<br />
with total authority], alternately troubleshooters and<br />
troublemakers... In many cases, however, SCLC was<br />
playing second fiddle to SNCC or CORE. Even in<br />
Savannah, it's most successful campaign, SCLC's role was<br />
mainly supportive, the energy and drive coming from a<br />
largely independent local organization. Critics began to<br />
question the SCLC's effectiveness. It seemed to specialize<br />
in “a few showy projects,” leaving to others the arduous,<br />
painstaking, and unspectacular job of organizing the black<br />
community.”<br />
(To Redeem the Soul of America, p. 142)<br />
In fact, the Savannah campaign, where the local<br />
Chatham County Crusade for Voters had initiated a<br />
campaign against segregation, was another example of the<br />
strength of diversity of tactics involving militant resistance.