Interim Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel - Woods Hole Research Center

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Executive Summary xiii ures could be undertaken without interfering with ongoing efforts toward deregulation of the electricity market. Transportation of spent nuclear fuel can be highly controversial, raising political, legal, and institutional issues that require intensive effort to resolve. Managing transportation in a way that builds public support, particularly in countries like the United States, where spent fuel has to be transported long distances through many local and state jurisdictions, and where public distrust of nuclear institutions is very high, poses an enormous political and institutional challenge. Resolving it requires implementation of stringent safety procedures; intensive discussion and interaction with the public and with state and local officials to resolve concerns; and careful attention to designing optimal routes. International Approaches Proposals for international sites for storage or disposal of spent fuel and nuclear waste pose a complex mix of potential advantages and disadvantages, and face significant obstacles. On balance, it would be highly desirable to establish one or several such facilities over the next two decades. Each country that has enjoyed the benefits of nuclear energy bears the responsibility for managing the resulting wastes. But this does not preclude the possibility that cooperation among countries could improve efficiency, reduce proliferation risks, and provide other benefits, if managed appropriately. Each proposal related to international storage or disposal of spent fuel and nuclear wastes is unique, poses different issues, and needs to be evaluated carefully on its merits. The obstacles to establishing such an international facility are substantial, and while there has been greatly increased interest in such ideas in recent years, it remains unclear whether these obstacles can be overcome in the near term. If appropriately managed, such sites could contribute both to stemming the spread of nuclear weapons and to the future of civilian nuclear energy. Advanced countries with large and sophisticated nuclear programs, such as the United States and Japan, should continue to plan on storing and disposing of their spent fuel and nuclear wastes domestically. Both the United States and Japan have the technical capacity and wealth to manage their own storage facilities and repositories. While we would not rule out the possibility that some limited amount of Japanese spent fuel might be sent to an international site, the primary focus in Japan, as in the United States, should remain on domestic options for managing spent fuel and nuclear wastes. Both countries have a responsibility to manage the wastes resulting from the large quantities of nuclear electricity they have produced, and the issue is too pressing in both countries to delay the search for domestic solutions until an international option may become available. Establishing one or more international storage facilities could make it possible to remove spent fuel from countries of proliferation concern and enhance transparency and confidence-building in spent fuel management. The 1990s witnessed a number of cases in which nuclear material was removed from particular countries to reduce proliferation risks, and more such cases can be expected. An international storage facility would provide a ready site for accepting material in such situations. Moreover, if an international system was established for spent fuel storage, including one or more international sites, the resulting increased international information about and control over spent fuel management could contribute to building confidence and reducing international concerns. Over the long term, establishing one or more international disposal sites is essential, at least for material from countries with small nuclear programs and geologies poorly suited to permanent disposal. It will simply not be practical to establish a geologic repository in every country that has a nuclear power reactor or a research reactor. Eventually, some form of international disposal site or sites will be needed. The ultimate trend should be toward consolidating spent fuel in a smaller number of locations worldwide. Proposals for international sites in Russia pose especially complex issues. Such a facility could make a substantial contribution to international security and would deserve support if several criteria were met— but these will not be easy to meet. Russia is in the process of debating possible changes to its laws that would allow it to become a host state for spent fuel from other countries. A variety of different specific
xiv approaches have been proposed, each raising different issues. Russia’s Ministry of Atomic Energy strongly supports entering this potential market, while Russian and international environmentalists are strongly opposed. Such a facility would deserve support if: • Effective arrangements (including independent regulation) were in place to ensure that the entire operation achieved high standards of safety and security; • A substantial portion of the revenues from the project were used to fund disarmament, nonproliferation, and cleanup projects that were agreed to be urgent, such as securing nuclear material and eliminating excess plutonium stockpiles; • The project did not in any way contribute to separation of additional unneeded weaponsusable plutonium, or to Russia’s nuclear weapons program; and • The project had gained the support of those most likely to be affected by it, through a democratic process, including giving them ample opportunity to ensure that their concerns were effectively addressed. Whether an arrangement that meets these criteria can be put in place in Russia—and what the reaction will be if a proposal advances which meets the first three criteria but not the fourth—remains to be seen. Recommendations We recommend that: • Interim storage, designed to last for perhaps 30-50 years (though with flexibility to shorten that time to match the progress of permanent solutions) should be pursued as the best near-term approach to managing a large fraction of the world’s spent fuel, including much of the spent fuel in the United States and Japan. • Capacity for interim storage of spent fuel should be substantially expanded—in Japan, in the United States, and in the rest of the world. INTERIM STORAGE OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL • Approaches to establishing interim spent fuel storage facilities should be based on the principles of flexibility, transparency, democracy, and fairness—making use of the approaches outlined in the modified Facility Siting Credo to the extent possible. • In particular, the degree of secrecy and reliance on hidden negotiations in past siting efforts should be substantially reduced, with all key information about proposed facilities, including potential options for benefits to host communities, made available to those potentially affected. • Approaches to establishing interim storage should be designed so as not to undermine progress toward acceptable solutions for spent fuel management and nuclear waste disposal. • In particular, when spent fuel is placed in interim storage, sufficient funds should be set aside to implement permanent management approaches at a later time, so that a future generation will not be stuck with the bill. • In both the United States and Japan, the respective responsibilities of government and private industry in managing spent nuclear fuel should be clarified, and the possibility of establishing some limited interim storage capacity at centralized sites to address particularly urgent storage needs should be considered. • In both the United States and Japan, the policy-making process for management of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear wastes should be improved, making possible an in-depth consideration of all the relevant factors in deciding on the best approach to managing each type of nuclear material, with interim storage of spent nuclear fuel as one central element of a larger back-end strategy. • In both the United States and Japan, additional steps should be taken to address the concerns of local communities hosting nuclear facilities—both existing facilities and
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48 waste. The NWPA set firm timetab
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50 Onsite Fuel Storage Controversie
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52 to cover the cost of geologic di
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54 Many spent fuel storage debates
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56 Finally, the U.S. experience dem
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60 ment context, national governmen
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64 may have broader interests in bu
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68 and populations are fiercely opp
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70 Past and Current Proposals Conce
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72 Palmyra Atoll, an uninhabited U.
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74 ates, an international waste-man
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84 worked hard to convince Russian
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5. Key Issues, Tensions, and Approa
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6. Conclusions and Recommendations
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The Project on Socio-technics of Nu
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