Interim Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel - Woods Hole Research Center

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Chapter 2 / Current Technologies, Economics, and Status of Interim Spent Fuel Storage of spent fuel is mostly done by sea, in ships specially designed to carry spent fuel transport casks. (Transport of spent fuel, plutonium, and nuclear wastes from Japan to Europe and back, however, has been both costly and politically controversial.) Regulation of radioactive material transport is the responsibility of the Ministry of Transportation. The size of the transport ship depends on the local conditions of the ports. The “Rokuei-Maru”-class ship has a capacity of 15-20 casks (about 300 fuel assemblies). In the United States, spent fuel has to be shipped overland by road and rail, passing through many jurisdictions and communities—creating both different technical issues and more complex political issues. Transport Safety With careful attention to safety, including extensive preplanning and effective and independent regulation, transportation of spent nuclear fuel can be accomplished with Figure 2.4: A spent fuel cask loaded on a truck for transport very little risk to the public. Indeed, as the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has pointed out: 41 The safety record for spent fuel shipments in the U.S. and in other industrialized nations is enviable. Of the thousands of shipments completed over the last 30 years, none has resulted in an identifiable injury through release of radioactive material. Recently, the NRC has published detailed new analyses suggesting that the risk is even lower than their previous studies had concluded. 42 In the United States, for example, in roughly 1300 commercial spent fuel shipments between 1979 and 1995 (1045 by highway and 261 by rail), there were 8 accidents, none of which damaged the fuel casks, compromised the shielding, or caused any release of radioactive material. 43 Worldwide, over 88,000 tonnes of spent fuel had been shipped by 1995 by sea, road, and rail, with an excellent safety record. 44 It seems clear that the 41 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Public Information Circular for Shipments of Irradiated Reactor Fuel NUREG-0725, Rev. 11 (Washington, DC: July 1996), quoted in Mark Holt, Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 29, 1998, available at http://www.cnie.org/nle/eng-34.html). 42 Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Discussion Draft: An Updated View of Spent Fuel Transportation Risk: A Summary Paper for Public Meetings (Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2000, available at http://ttd.sandia.gov/nrc/docs/draft.pdf), based on a study prepared for NRC by Sandia National Laboratories: J.L. Sprung et. al., Reexamination of Spent Fuel Shipment Risk Estimates, NUREG/CR-6672 Vols. 1-2, SAND2000- 0234 (Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2000, available at http://ttd.sandia.gov/nrc/docs.htm). 43 NRC, An Updated View of Spent Fuel Transportation Risk, op. cit. 44 IAEA, Survey of Wet and Dry Spent Fuel Storage, op. cit., p. 64. 19
20 dramatically larger-scale fuel shipments required for fossil energy sources, which regularly cause fatalities and largescale environmental damage, represent a greater external cost to society for those energy sources than do the risks posed by transport of spent nuclear fuel. Both the United States and Japan have detailed regulations on spent fuel transport cask safety, based in substantial part on IAEA transport regulations, which require a series of tests of the casks’ ability to survive being dropped from a specified height, rammed by a specified object, immersed to a specified depth, or exposed to a fire of specified temperature and duration without releasing radioactivity. 45 Nevertheless, critics have expressed concern that the regulatory requirements may not be fully representative of some types of transportation accidents, and that the tests conducted to meet regulatory requirements may not be fully adequate to demonstrate compliance. 46 Both the International Atomic Energy Agency and the International Maritime Organization regulate international transportation of spent nuclear fuel. Here, too, extensive tests of casks are required to ensure that they would survive most types of accidents without releasing radioactivity. Critics, however, have argued that these regulations should be more stringent. 47 In April 1988, it was revealed that casks used for transporting spent fuel between Germany, Switzerland, France, and the United Kingdom had levels of radioactive INTERIM STORAGE OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL contamination on the exterior of the casks far exceeding the legal limits. 48 The German Environment Minister announced that the industry had been aware of the excessive radiation since the 1980s, but had failed to inform the government. While the levels of radiation were too low to pose any health hazard to those handling the casks, the revelations were nonetheless a severe blow to the public credibility of the safety assurances provided by the firms and regulatory agencies involved. The head of the German police union announced that his union would refuse to protect further shipments until the issue was resolved, and the German Environment Minister called a halt to all shipments. Nuclear regulators of the four countries involved formed a working group to address the issues raised by the episode, which concluded that while contaminated shipments had been occurring for at least a decade without the public or the workers handling the shipments being informed, “as far as health is concerned, the non-compliance with the . . . standard did not have any radiological consequence.” Moreover, the group concluded that the contamination did not result from leaking from the interior of the casks, but from radioactivity present in the spent fuel pools where the casks were loaded and unloaded, and that with modest improvements in procedures and regulations, it was safe to resume transports. 49 The French and German governments did not reach agreement on resuming transports until early 2001, however, nearly three years after the contamination 45 For the IAEA regulations, see Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, 1996 Edition, Requirements, Safety Standards Series No. ST-1 (Vienna, Austria: IAEA, 1996). The U.S. regulations are 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 71: Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, various years, available at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/CFR/PART073/). Japan incorporated the 1985 edition of these IAEA transport regulations into its domestic regulations in 1991, and is now studying incorporation of the 1996 edition. See Saegusa, Ito, and Suzuki, An Overview of the State of the Arts of Spent Nuclear Fuel Management, op. cit. 46 See, for example, discussion in Holt, Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel, op. cit. The views on transportation safety and security of the Nevada Nuclear Waste Project Office, which has raised some of the most detailed concerns and criticisms regarding current U.S. approaches, can be found at http://www.state.nv.us/nucwaste/trans.htm. 47 See, for example, Edwin Lyman, The Sea Transport of Vitrified High-Level Radioactive Wastes: Unresolved Safety Issues (Washington, DC: Nuclear Control Institute, 1996). 48 For a detailed account of the revelation from the perspective of an industry critic, see Mycle Schneider, “The Contaminated Transport Saga: A Personal Account,” Plutonium Investigation (Paris), May-June 1998. See also the summary of this and related episodes in Kate O’Neill, “International Nuclear Waste Transportation: Flashpoints, Controversies, and Lessons,” Environment, Vol. 41, No. 4 (May 1999). 49 Surface Contamination of Nuclear Spent Fuel Transports: Common Report of the Competent Authorities of France, Germany, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (Paris, France: Ministry of the Environment, October 24, 1998).
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The Project on Socio-technics of Nu
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Interim Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel - Woods Hole Research Center

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