M - Technische Universität Dresden

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cover! emb! key! Steganography Steganography: Secrecy of secrecy" key! stegotext! embedding! extracting! sender! recipient! attacker! • exactly the same# • cannot be detected# • as much as possible# no changes# cover*! emb! 104
cover! emb! key! Steganography Steganography: Watermarking and Fingerprinting" key! stegotext! embedding! extracting! sender! recipient! attacker! • correlation is enough# • some 100 bit are enough# possibly severe changes# cover*! emb*! 105
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Security in Computer Networks Multi
Page 3 and 4:
Equivalence of Encryption Systems a
Page 5 and 6:
message 1 message 2 message 3 messa
Page 7 and 8:
Invisible implicit addresses using
Page 9 and 10:
Fault tolerance (and countering mod
Page 11 and 12:
time Proof of anonymity for a RING
Page 13 and 14:
S i-1 Two RINGs operating if no fau
Page 15 and 16:
..... ... ..... ... ..... ... stati
Page 17 and 18:
S 1 S 2 S 3 S 4 S 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
Page 19 and 20:
S 1 S 1 (X+Y)-X = Y Pairwise superp
Page 21 and 22:
S 1 S 2 S 3 S 4 S 5 7 1 15 1 4 1 1
Page 23 and 24:
local superposition mod 2 L 0 1 ...
Page 25 and 26:
Proof of sender anonymity: proposit
Page 27 and 28:
Information-theoretic anonymity in
Page 29 and 30:
t-s t-s Let t-s be the first point
Page 31 and 32:
31 Blob := committing to 0 or 1, wi
Page 33 and 34:
Blobs based on asymmetric encryptio
Page 35 and 36:
Checking the behavior of the statio
Page 37 and 38:
Fault tolerance: 2 modes of operati
Page 39 and 40:
Protection of the communication rel
Page 41 and 42:
Properties of MIXes MIXes should be
Page 43 and 44:
Maximal protection Pass through MIX
Page 45 and 46:
Indirect re-encryption scheme for r
Page 47 and 48:
d s k s 3 3 Indirect re-encryption
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Indirect re-encryption scheme maint
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Breaking the direct RSA-implementat
Page 53 and 54: Fault tolerance in MIX-networks (1)
Page 55 and 56: attacker model expense per user Com
Page 57 and 58: OSI layers 7 application 6 presenta
Page 59 and 60: Tolerating errors and active attack
Page 61 and 62: Network structure • • Solution
Page 63 and 64: Time-slice channels (1) station R M
Page 65 and 66: Connection configuration later (1)
Page 67 and 68: Query and superpose to receive the
Page 69 and 70: Outlook (1) Using the network trans
Page 71 and 72: Radio networks (1) Difference to wi
Page 73 and 74: No movement profiles in radio netwo
Page 75 and 76: Security properties of digital paym
Page 77 and 78: Pseudonyms: Linkability in detail D
Page 79 and 80: 79 Pseudonyms: Use across different
Page 81 and 82: Authenticated anonymous declaration
Page 83 and 84: Security for completely anonymous b
Page 85 and 86: Security for completely anonymous b
Page 87 and 88: P Z B P Z ¬ Basic scheme of a secu
Page 89 and 90: p B [ 3 ] p B E (Y,t) p Z B (X,t)
Page 91 and 92: x, (h(x)) s text with signature and
Page 93 and 94: p B ¬ authentication of ownership
Page 95 and 96: 95 Secure and anonymous digit. paym
Page 97 and 98: legal certainty vs. liability onlin
Page 99 and 100: Role pseudonyms (business-relations
Page 101 and 102: Cryptography and the impossibility
Page 103: cover! emb! key! Steganography key!
Page 107: Proposals to regulate cryptography
Page 110 and 111: Key Escrow encryption without perma
Page 112 and 113: Key Escrow encryption without perma
Page 114 and 115: Symmetric authentication → Encryp
Page 116 and 117: Key exchange without message exchan
Page 118 and 119: Digital Signatures Key Escrow witho
Page 120 and 121: Encryption# symmetric # Authen-# (M
Page 122 and 123: (Im-)Possibility to regulate anonym
Page 124: (Im-)Possibility to regulate anonym
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M - Technische Universität Dresden

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