M - Technische Universität Dresden

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Analogy between Vernam cipher and superposed sending K M M 1 K -K 01 10 00 11 00 11 01 10 01 10 01 + + + + 01 + 01 10 00 11 K + M = C M = C - K abelian group M 1 + K = O 1 M 2 - K = O 2 24
Proof of sender anonymity: proposition and start of induction Proposition: If stations Si are connected by uniform randomly distributed keys Kj which are unknown to the attacker , by observing all the Oi , the attacker only finds out Mi about the Mi . Proof: m=1, trivial step m-1 m ∑ i 25
Page 1 and 2: Security in Computer Networks Multi
Page 3 and 4: Equivalence of Encryption Systems a
Page 5 and 6: message 1 message 2 message 3 messa
Page 7 and 8: Invisible implicit addresses using
Page 9 and 10: Fault tolerance (and countering mod
Page 11 and 12: time Proof of anonymity for a RING
Page 13 and 14: S i-1 Two RINGs operating if no fau
Page 15 and 16: ..... ... ..... ... ..... ... stati
Page 17 and 18: S 1 S 2 S 3 S 4 S 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
Page 19 and 20: S 1 S 1 (X+Y)-X = Y Pairwise superp
Page 21 and 22: S 1 S 2 S 3 S 4 S 5 7 1 15 1 4 1 1
Page 23: local superposition mod 2 L 0 1 ...
Page 27 and 28: Information-theoretic anonymity in
Page 29 and 30: t-s t-s Let t-s be the first point
Page 31 and 32: 31 Blob := committing to 0 or 1, wi
Page 33 and 34: Blobs based on asymmetric encryptio
Page 35 and 36: Checking the behavior of the statio
Page 37 and 38: Fault tolerance: 2 modes of operati
Page 39 and 40: Protection of the communication rel
Page 41 and 42: Properties of MIXes MIXes should be
Page 43 and 44: Maximal protection Pass through MIX
Page 45 and 46: Indirect re-encryption scheme for r
Page 47 and 48: d s k s 3 3 Indirect re-encryption
Page 49 and 50: Indirect re-encryption scheme maint
Page 51 and 52: Breaking the direct RSA-implementat
Page 53 and 54: Fault tolerance in MIX-networks (1)
Page 55 and 56: attacker model expense per user Com
Page 57 and 58: OSI layers 7 application 6 presenta
Page 59 and 60: Tolerating errors and active attack
Page 61 and 62: Network structure • • Solution
Page 63 and 64: Time-slice channels (1) station R M
Page 65 and 66: Connection configuration later (1)
Page 67 and 68: Query and superpose to receive the
Page 69 and 70: Outlook (1) Using the network trans
Page 71 and 72: Radio networks (1) Difference to wi
Page 73 and 74: No movement profiles in radio netwo
Page 75 and 76:
Security properties of digital paym
Page 77 and 78:
Pseudonyms: Linkability in detail D
Page 79 and 80:
79 Pseudonyms: Use across different
Page 81 and 82:
Authenticated anonymous declaration
Page 83 and 84:
Security for completely anonymous b
Page 85 and 86:
Security for completely anonymous b
Page 87 and 88:
P Z B P Z ¬ Basic scheme of a secu
Page 89 and 90:
p B [ 3 ] p B E (Y,t) p Z B (X,t)
Page 91 and 92:
x, (h(x)) s text with signature and
Page 93 and 94:
p B ¬ authentication of ownership
Page 95 and 96:
95 Secure and anonymous digit. paym
Page 97 and 98:
legal certainty vs. liability onlin
Page 99 and 100:
Role pseudonyms (business-relations
Page 101 and 102:
Cryptography and the impossibility
Page 103 and 104:
cover! emb! key! Steganography key!
Page 105 and 106:
cover! emb! key! Steganography Steg
Page 107:
Proposals to regulate cryptography
Page 110 and 111:
Key Escrow encryption without perma
Page 112 and 113:
Key Escrow encryption without perma
Page 114 and 115:
Symmetric authentication → Encryp
Page 116 and 117:
Key exchange without message exchan
Page 118 and 119:
Digital Signatures Key Escrow witho
Page 120 and 121:
Encryption# symmetric # Authen-# (M
Page 122 and 123:
(Im-)Possibility to regulate anonym
Page 124:
(Im-)Possibility to regulate anonym
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M - Technische Universität Dresden

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