combating terrorism and its implications for the security sector - DCAF

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sortium since its early days, DCAF was willing to collaborate with the Combating Terrorism Working Group for the 2004 Annual Conference. The topic for the security sector panel at the Annual Conference was easily found: “Combating Terrorism and Its Implications for the Security Sector,” with a special focus on the implications for armed forces in selected cases. The current publication goes beyond the armed forces, and gives examples of the implications for other security sector actors such as border guards, police, intelligence services, Gendarmerie Nationale, parliamentarian control, and international humanitarian law. Most of the articles were provided by members of the PfP Consortium for the Annual Conference. They give a broad overview and collection of the major aspects, but it is not alleged to be inclusive, exhaustive, or coherent in its approach to the problems posed. DCAF thanks the Swedish National Defence College, not only for its expertise on the subject and its representation in the Consortium’s Security Sector Reform Working Group, but especially for being a partner in contributing to the current publication. 11
Terrorism and the International Security Agenda since 2001 ALYSON J. K. BAILES Introduction: Action, Reaction, Re-evaluation The use of terror as a weapon against enemies, in the sense of an excess of brutality designed to shock and intimidate, is probably as old as mankind. It is still a ubiquitous phenomenon in every kind of conflict, and few if any actors can claim never to have resorted to it. What we refer to today as “terrorism” is generally understood to be something much more specific: the activity of groups that for a political/ideological rather than criminal purpose employ violence against non-combatants in non-war circumstances and often against an ultimate target that is stronger than themselves. This is admittedly an imprecise, inexpert description, and the experts themselves have never managed to find a formal, legal definition of terrorism that can be universally agreed upon and universally applied. 1 Nevertheless, the international community has been sufficiently aware of terrorism as a threat to security, and sufficiently united as to its undesirability, to take concrete measures against it since at least 1937. 2 In more recent times, waves of terrorist action and corresponding peaks of international concern can be identified from all three of the closing decades of the twentieth century. The radical effect of one day’s events—the attacks carried out by Al Qaeda on 11 September 2001 against the United States—on the world’s thinking and behaviour thus calls for a special explanation, over and above the fact that they came after some years of global decline in terrorist activity. It may be found in the nature of the attacks, their target, and of the subsequent reactions. First, the destruction of New York’s World Trade Centre and the assault on the Pentagon by flying hijacked civilian aircraft into them horrified and gripped the world’s imagination, through the magnitude of the loss of life and material destruction, the use of aircraft as weapons, 1 See G. Simpson, “Terrorism and the law: past and present international approaches,” SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Armament, Disarmament and International Security (OUP for SIPRI), August 2003. 2 When the League of Nations adopted a Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. 12
Page 1 and 2: COMBATING TERRORISM AND ITS IMPLICA
Page 3 and 4: Publishers: Swedish National Defenc
Page 5 and 6: 8. Combating Terrorism and Its Impl
Page 7 and 8: armed forces, and an emphasis on sp
Page 9 and 10: oughly assess the threat, b) to ens
Page 11: Preface ANJA H. EBNÖTHER The highl
Page 15 and 16: driven also by deliberate U.S. effo
Page 17 and 18: In the first flush of antiterrorist
Page 19 and 20: worth stressing: namely that a grea
Page 21 and 22: European Union. The European Parlia
Page 23 and 24: the West’s own terrorist enemies.
Page 25 and 26: though it would have been worth ack
Page 27 and 28: Historical Origins of the British A
Page 29 and 30: The Principle of Minimum Force The
Page 31 and 32: In all of the army’s history of i
Page 33 and 34: ture on socialization, to be “sti
Page 35 and 36: the key, but escalation by only one
Page 37 and 38: without trial hundreds of Catholics
Page 39 and 40: The forces of other nations operati
Page 41 and 42: the same social class: “in the Br
Page 43 and 44: an on-the-ground rapport that devel
Page 45 and 46: principle that hard and fast rules
Page 47 and 48: gree, transnational terrorism is su
Page 49 and 50: havoc and harm at will. Their opera
Page 51 and 52: Thus, if tourists are targeted in t
Page 53 and 54: to become a dangerous challenge for
Page 55 and 56: Although preemption has been widely
Page 57 and 58: investment, 140 tremendous effects
Page 59 and 60: The Post-Madrid Face of Al Qaeda 14
Page 61 and 62: sociated groups with origins in the
Page 63 and 64:
ope, the United States, Canada, Aus
Page 65 and 66:
injustices attributed to the West i
Page 67 and 68:
minish. Even if Al Qaeda is complet
Page 69 and 70:
The security of a nation has always
Page 71 and 72:
tion, and [the sharing of] Informat
Page 73 and 74:
Once the threat is clearly understo
Page 75 and 76:
Rather than laying down formalised
Page 77 and 78:
has to be handled through other cha
Page 79 and 80:
Terrorism and Parliamentary Control
Page 81 and 82:
cably linked. As a consequence, par
Page 83 and 84:
Israeli-Palestinian conflict had li
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answers to concrete crises, it prov
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2. Terrorists try to change the pol
Page 89 and 90:
criminal codes. The Commission also
Page 91 and 92:
cretion in imposing a sentence belo
Page 93 and 94:
- Expansion of the intelligence and
Page 95 and 96:
- Implementation of the EU protocol
Page 97 and 98:
The Aftermath of Madrid Deeply shoc
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and political fragmentation and dis
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APPENDIX 1 International convention
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Combating Terrorism and Its Implica
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tating a wide multinational and mul
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Polish Armed Forces was formulated
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new corps of soldiers: professional
Page 111 and 112:
and Polish command. Within the area
Page 113 and 114:
The structure of the MND included n
Page 115 and 116:
The Effect of the Antiterrorist Cam
Page 117 and 118:
or any other type of modern militar
Page 119 and 120:
ity of the MND to assist Iraqi auth
Page 121 and 122:
to even inside open Western societi
Page 123 and 124:
keeping operations. Correspondingly
Page 125 and 126:
In 2001, new reforms of the militar
Page 127 and 128:
area will significantly improve the
Page 129 and 130:
cooperation in fighting terrorism r
Page 131 and 132:
tion and suppression of internation
Page 133 and 134:
the agencies, either through timely
Page 135 and 136:
Defeating Terrorist Organizations T
Page 137 and 138:
do this, the international communit
Page 139 and 140:
ities, and the probable use of weap
Page 141 and 142:
The protracted struggle with the ir
Page 143 and 144:
Soft links: This category character
Page 145 and 146:
Human Intelligence Collection Count
Page 147 and 148:
Recruiting citizens who have ethnic
Page 149 and 150:
empower the intelligence and securi
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• Determine the presence of one o
Page 153 and 154:
152 ist missions. When present, the
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though ignorance of the terrorist g
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The relationship of intelligence co
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Intelligence services themselves ar
Page 161 and 162:
effort to avoid mistakes. Economies
Page 163 and 164:
and collectors can no longer functi
Page 165 and 166:
164 threats in the air, water, or f
Page 167 and 168:
ability of individual initiative to
Page 169 and 170:
Policing Terrorism: Rhetoric and Im
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how they work. The tendencies liste
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e characterized as terrorism, legit
Page 175 and 176:
Intelligence The police collect int
Page 177 and 178:
Harnessing or drawing the police in
Page 179 and 180:
that the state and its agencies can
Page 181 and 182:
them another lever for asserting au
Page 183 and 184:
The Contribution of Border Security
Page 185 and 186:
The events which followed 9/11 have
Page 187 and 188:
territorial integrity, and was eith
Page 189 and 190:
ports as transit points for illegal
Page 191 and 192:
Cooperation and the Quality Cycle A
Page 193 and 194:
The Implications of the Fight Again
Page 195 and 196:
194 - Subdivision of Public Securit
Page 197 and 198:
Intelligence The intelligence is wo
Page 199 and 200:
The Targeting of the Terrorist Thre
Page 201 and 202:
ing of the sea. The maritime Gendar
Page 203 and 204:
Taking into account the entire rang
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tant military personnel, who are se
Page 207 and 208:
ders. The Gendarmerie is extremely
Page 209 and 210:
Since the end of the Cold War, seve
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Related Issues and Uncharted Territ
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7. Promotion of measures to ensure
Page 215 and 216:
ers without sacrificing anything bu
Page 217 and 218:
ments.” 243 But if governments ar
Page 219 and 220:
While no authoritative figures are
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(SAS), Special Boat Squadron (SBS),
Page 223 and 224:
Buying private military providers a
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oversight. A policy that defers to
Page 227 and 228:
A Lawful Fight Against Terrorism? P
Page 229 and 230:
General of the League of Arab State
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pears to be moving in the wrong dir
Page 233 and 234:
esponse to the increasingly tough m
Page 235 and 236:
no political tools to achieve this
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among nations and peoples in their
Page 239 and 240:
Other Charter of the United Nations
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Conclusions AMBASSADOR DR. THEODOR
Page 243 and 244:
ial structures all the way down to
Page 245 and 246:
to include the Mediterranean and Mi
Page 247 and 248:
Security and Governance (Nomos, 200
Page 249 and 250:
Minister of Defence from 1995 to 19
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