combating terrorism and its implications for the security sector - DCAF

intelligence community in the months preceding 9/11 uncovered both
specific shortcomings and systemic weaknesses in intelligence performance
169 and have led to three major findings:
• The new indiscriminate terrorism, as represented by Al Qaeda and its
associates, poses a major threat not only to the United States and its
presence abroad and to the national security of individual nations,
but to regional and international peace and security.
• The traditional counterterrorism approach of viewing terrorism as a
phenomenon, which can be prevented and controlled by better identification
and redressing of grievances, better governance, enhanced
economic development, and measures to win the hearts and minds of
the people, would be inadequate against the new indiscriminate terrorism.
Many of those who have taken to the new terrorism come
from well-to-do families, and economic deprivation and social injustice
were not among the root causes of their terrorism. Since some of
their pan-Islamic objectives—such as the creation of regional Islamic
caliphates ruled according to the Sharia—cannot be conceded by the
international community, there is a need for a more robust counterterrorism
approach to neutralize these organizations.
• The national intelligence agencies, by themselves, however strong
and capable, may not be able to deal with this new threat of international
terrorism. Hence, the need for an interagency framework for
planning, executing, and coordinating counterterrorist efforts, and
improved regional and international intelligence sharing and cooperation
between the intelligence and security agencies to counter these
terrorist networks. Thus, the new terrorism calls for revamped intelligence
apparatuses at the national level and reinforced coordination
mechanisms at the regional and international levels.
But what has been the public perception of the counterterrorism performance
of national intelligence and security services before 9/11 and
thereafter? The common complaint against intelligence and security
agencies in all countries confronted with the scourge of terrorism has
been that the agencies, while effective and efficient in detection and investigation
after a terrorist act has been committed, have been wanting
in their abilities to prevent a terrorist act.
Yet it would be unfair to the intelligence services to say that they are
not able to prevent acts of terrorism through timely intelligence. For
every successful act of terrorism, there are others thwarted by
169 See Best, Richard A., Congressional Research Service Report RL31650, The
Intelligence Community and 9/11: Congressional Hearings and the Status of the
Investigation, updated 16 January 2003.
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