combating terrorism and its implications for the security sector - DCAF

152
ist missions. When present, these linkages are precarious, generally
range from ideological solidarity to logistical cooperation, and occasionally
entail operations. Nonetheless, they constitute a clear threat,
since they broaden the terrorist support base and sphere of action.
State sponsorship, which is a notable exception and not the rule, is
more readily available to terrorist groups having a dual structure: an
overt one for sociopolitical action and a covert one for terrorism itself.
State sponsorship for subnational terrorist groups is generally
self-serving and predicated upon plausible denial.
• Probe exploitable terrorist structural and operational weaknesses and
failures. Assess vulnerabilities by evaluating funding resources, recruiting
methods, communication networks, storage facilities, and
other resources to uncover potential vulnerabilities. Terrorist groups
thrive primarily on the elements of initiative and surprise, both of
which are highly dependent upon clandestine structures and dynamics.
At the same time, these groups are subject to constraints exploitable
by counterterrorism agencies. The necessarily clandestine nature
of terrorist aggregations is a double-edged sword. Living hidden requires
discipline, commitment, and the ability to cope with stress.
The application of security rules, particularly compartmentalization,
must be constant: there is no room for exceptions or relaxation. Terrorist
groups must also foreclose internal dissent and schisms. Likewise,
the mood and reactions of supporters and sympathizers must
always be gauged by the terrorist core. Indiscriminate recruitment
can also constitute a fatal flaw. Personnel renewal is a challenge. Finally,
failure to achieve its ultimate radical or revolutionary goal
within the expected time frame can prove to be devastating to any
terrorist group. Counterterrorist agencies must be prepared to exploit
all of these factors.
• Determine the type and extent of counterterrorism assistance available
from the governments of allied and friendly states. States often
entertain different perceptions – accompanied by conflicting national
interests and priorities – regarding the threat of terrorism and, more
so, the adoption of suitable countermeasures. Unanimity or divergence
of views among states contribute to strengthening or weakening
the operational options of international and domestic terrorist
groups as well as their respective supporters, particularly sponsor
states. Concurrently, the absences of international or, at a minimum,
regional consensus, seriously downgrade the options available to the
counterterrorist agencies of single states.