3. Nuclear weapons - NRDC Document Bank - Natural Resources ...

However, after much controversy and criticism, Secretary of State Shultz
announced that while a 'broader interpretation' of the treaty was 'fully
justified', the USA would honour the 'restrictive interpretation of the treaty's
obligations'. This decision could be reversed at any time.
SALT II compliance
The SALT II Treaty, signed by the superpowers in 1979, formally expired at
the end of December 1985. Although never ratified by the USA (and
consequently not ratified by the USSR), each state repeatedly pledged to abide
by its provisions, provided the other state did the same.
Currently, the USA has about 2000 operational delivery systems accountable
under SALT, whereas the USSR has about 2500, a number which would
have been reduced to below the 2250 limit had the USA ratified the treaty.
Both parties have taken measures to comply with the provisions of SALT I and
II, including deactivating older delivery systems when new ones have been
introduced. For example, the USSR and the USA have both deactivated
submarines to compensate for new deployments. There is no doubt that the
main provisions, setting numerical limits on strategic nuclear weapon systems,
have been observed.
On a number of occasions the present US Administration has accused the
USSR of not complying with specific SALT II provisions. Its strongest
accusation concerns the new Soviet mobile SS-25 single-warhead missile,
which Defense Secretary Weinberger called 'an unquestionable violation of
Soviet assurances given to us under the SALT II accord'.128Under SALT II,
both parties are limited to developing and deploying one 'new type' of ICBM.
The USSR announced that its one permitted 'new' ICBM is the SS-24 missile
with 10 MIRV warheads. But the USA claims that the SS-25, which was first
deployed in 1985, constitutes a second 'new' ICBM, thus violating SALT II.
The USSR states that the SS-25 is a permitted modification of an earlier Soviet
missile, the SS-13. SALT II does permit modification of missiles that were
flight-tested before May 1979ifthe changes fall within certain percentage limits
of missile characteristics such as length, diameter, launch-weight and
throw-weight. The USA maintains that even if the SS-25 is a modification of the
SS-13, its single re-entry vehicle weighs less than half of the missile's
throw-weight, in violation of a treaty obligation. The issue rests on whether the
USA knows enough details about both missiles to press its allegations.
A second SALT II compliance question concerns the Soviet Union's
commitment not to increase the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles
(SNDVs) in its arsenal. The United States charged in its 23 December 1985
compliance report that the Soviet Union has deployed SNDVs above the 2504
total deployed when SALT II was signed in 1979. However, according to the
US Joint Chiefs of Staff, as of 1 January 1986 the Soviet Union had 2477
SNDVs.129
Another issue which has been raised by the US Administration concerns the
encryption of telemetric data produced during Soviet missile tests. According
to the treaty, national technical means of verification must not be impeded