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74 SIPRI YEARBOOK 1986 tactical nuclear weapons-those with ranges up to 1000 kilometres. Stage three, beginning no later than 1995, should complete the elimination of nuclear weapons. For the verification of the destruction of nuclear weapons and associated systems, the Soviet Union suggests a number of measures in addition to national technical means, including on-site inspection and other complementary possibilities. The present negotiating stance Figures 3.1 and 3.2 and accompanying text summarize the negotiating proposals of the two sides as of 1 February 1986. Several important issues are discussed below. 1. Although both sides have made proposals for some 'interim' INF agreement, it is clear that they are interested in eliminating these missiles, at least from Europe and perhaps also from Asia. The USA maintains its previous proposal to eliminate all SS-20s, Pershing IIs and GLCMs, the so-called 'zerozero' option. The new Soviet proposal on intermediate-range missiles in Europe, which was included in General Secretary Gorbachev's statement on 15January 1986, appears to be a big change from the Soviet Union's previous position. It offers the complete elimination of the SS-20s in the 'European zone' (presumably those located west of the Urals-243 missiles) in exchange for the removal of the US Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles from Europe. There remains the question of whether it would include also SS-20s located east of the Urals which are targeted on Europe. Further, it has been suggested that it might also include the removal ofthe SS-21s and SS-12 Mod 2s from the GDR and Czechoslovakia.13 4 There is a stipulation that France and Britain should undertake not to increase their nuclear weapon capabilities. One report suggests that this would mean that the United States should not sell its Trident D5 missile to the United Kingdom. The Soviet Union no longer demands equivalence to the French and British nuclear forces, as it did before. There are reports that the Soviet Union would be willing to make some reductions in its SS-20 missiles facing Asia if such reductions are coupled with cuts in US weapons in the Pacific. 135 In further elaboration of the offer, it appears that the Soviet Union is willing to dismantle the infrastructure connected with the SS-20s, as well as the missiles and launchers themselves. This would mean that it would not be possible to redeploy them rapidly from the eastern part of the Soviet Union. Further-although this is not yet clear-it appears that this offer on intermediate-range nuclear forces is not dependent on an agreement that the United States forgoes its SDI programme. 2. With respect to 'strategic' offensive nuclear forces, the USA and the USSR appear to have the same objective-6000 warheads. However, this apparent agreement conceals major disagreement about the definition of 'strategic'. The USSR has maintained for decades that it considers any nuclear weapon that can strike its territory to be 'strategic' and that this should be the agreed definition. The USA basically has a range definition that the USSR has
agreed to in the SALT negotiations-any weapon that can be delivered from 5500 km or more is considered 'strategic'. So the similar figure of 6000 warheads on strategic systems covers very different systems according to which definition is used. The Soviet proposal would include all US systems potentially capable of striking the USSR: intercontinental-range ballistic missiles and bombers, aircraft and missiles of medium range or less in Europe and in Asia (within range of the USSR), and all nuclear-capable aircraft on aircraftcarriers. (The intermediate-range missiles on either side in Europe are dealt with in the separate proposal for their elimination. The fact that the USSR is engaged in separate INF negotiations with the USA calls into question how far it will push this wider definition of 'strategic'.) Unlike the US proposal, the USSR would also include gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles (SRAMs) in addition to the air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) carried on bombers, as well as sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), which make up an increasingly important segment of the US arsenal. 3. The US preoccupation with Soviet heavy ICBMs is seen in several facets of the US proposal: the ICBM warhead limit of 3000, the limit on throw-weight, and the ban on modernizing or replacing the SS-18. Since the Soviet SS-18 force could currently carry a maximum of 3080 warheads, the US proposal requires a cut in this force regardless of what mix of missiles the USSR might choose. The Soviet warhead limit of 3600 on anyone component of the strategic forces would permit all 308 SS-18s to remain only if the vast majority of its other ICBMs were scrapped. In any event, the Soviet offer would also bring down its own throw-weight to a level close to the US limit of about 3 million kg. 4. The Soviet proposals continue to emphasize cruise missiles, calling for a ban on all such missiles except ALCMs with a range of 600 km or less. In this regard the USSR is either currently deploying or preparing to deploy several models of long-range cruise missiles, including ALCMs, SLCMs and GLCMs. The USA continues to exclude SLCMs from any of its proposals, although they can hardly be excluded from either the 'strategic' or 'intermediate-range' categories of weapon. 5. Congress generally supported the idea, following the 1983 Scowcroft Commission suggestion, that both superpowers should move from MIRVed, stationary ICBMs to mobile, single-warhead systems such as the US small ICBM (Midgetman). However, in a surprising policy shift the USA now proposes to ban all mobile ICBMs (including the Soviet SS-24 and SS-25, and any mobile versions of the US MX or SICBM), presumably because they are harder than fixed ICBMs to locate and destroy, or to defend against with a strategic defence system. 6. The United States argues that there is no way in which constraints on strategic defence research can be embodied in a treaty, and that in any case the Soviet Union is also heavily engaged in research on BMO systems-research which (unlike the United States) it does not disclose. Further, the United States points out that it has (for the time being) decided to keep SOl within the 'restrictive' interpretation of the ABM Treaty. However, it will certainly continue to argue that the eventual development of defensive systems is a sensible concomitant of a reduction of offensive systems.
Page 1 and 2: 3. Nuclear weapons Prepared by the
Page 3 and 4: ICBMs The year saw little change in
Page 5 and 6: NUCLEAR WEAPONS 41 Congress than so
Page 7 and 8: During 1985 US ground-launched crui
Page 9 and 10: Table 3.3. US European nuclear mode
Page 11 and 12: Administration. As of January 1986,
Page 13 and 14: Bombers Bison 18-33 Bear A/B/CIG 90
Page 15 and 16: greater throw-weights than their pr
Page 17 and 18: ~ , • ..,vv .•.•.•. SS-N-22
Page 19 and 20: SLBM warheads carried by Delta III
Page 21 and 22: the USA.62 As reported in the SIPRI
Page 23 and 24: in production; in 1984 and 1985 pro
Page 25 and 26: The Harrier GR.5 Strike Fighter mad
Page 27 and 28: for the construction of the first s
Page 29 and 30: medium-range missile, the ASMP, and
Page 31 and 32: unrealistic, France is concentratin
Page 33 and 34: However, after much controversy and
Page 35 and 36: installed in Georgia and Texas may
Page 37: US proposal 9481 ",.... "..........
Page 41 and 42: uildup foreseen' ,Defense Week, 17J
Page 43 and 44: n Bohlen, c., 'Soviets mark victory

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