Assessing the Strategic Impact of Service Culture on ...

Final Draft
incompatible with culture and that are subsequently deprived <strong>of</strong> funding and
attention. 133
Proposed changes to military or o<strong>the</strong>r structures that run counter to core value sets are unlikely to meet
with success. The norms te<strong>the</strong>red to those values will be instinctively defended, whe<strong>the</strong>r or not <strong>the</strong>
actor is consciously aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> principled foundation upon which <strong>the</strong>y rest. “Traditional beliefs and
behaviors frequently are more than merely habitual; <strong>the</strong>ir persistence is likely to be recorded in, and
possibly policed by, an ethical code that expresses cultural attitudes towards right and wrong that may
well reflect assumptions long unchallenged and <strong>the</strong>refore unexamined.” 134
The values <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps’ holds dear may be amplified or, conversely, threatened by irregular
warfare. Distilling <strong>the</strong> most relevant value variables will require an examination <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps
pr<strong>of</strong>essed values as well as those found at <strong>the</strong> grassroots level in symbols, ritual, icons, and legends.
What sorts <strong>of</strong> warfare do Marines deem honorable? Does counterinsurgency fit this bill? Are hero
stories told <strong>of</strong> counterinsurgency episodes? What actions or characteristics are valued in <strong>the</strong> tale? Are
<strong>the</strong>se sufficient to inspire competency in counterinsurgency warfare, or do competing and more
privileged values come under threat should <strong>the</strong> Corps move this direction? The results <strong>of</strong> this
assessment will <strong>of</strong>fer strategists some idea <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps trajectory and <strong>of</strong> irregular practices that are
likely to find a sound fit in Devil Dog quarters.
Perceptual Lens
Every individual, every society, employs filters in order to impose meaning and to interpret events – a
perceptual lens. Beliefs (accurate or misinformed) and experiences or <strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> experience, color <strong>the</strong>
way <strong>the</strong> world is viewed. As is widely understood, behavior is based on <strong>the</strong> perception <strong>of</strong> reality, not
reality itself. Perceptions <strong>of</strong> “fact,” <strong>of</strong> our own histories, <strong>of</strong> our image abroad, <strong>of</strong> what motivates o<strong>the</strong>rs,
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> capabilities <strong>of</strong> our leadership and our national resources, and o<strong>the</strong>r security-related ideas, all play
a strong role in forming what each regime believes to be rational foreign policy.
Alastair lain Johnston sums it quite nicely: “Ahistorical or ‘objective’ variables such as technology,
capabilities, levels <strong>of</strong> threat, and organizational structures are all <strong>of</strong> secondary importance: it is <strong>the</strong>
interpretive lens <strong>of</strong> strategic culture that gives meaning to <strong>the</strong>se variables.” 135 The concept is important
enough to have been included in Snyder’s first explanation <strong>of</strong> strategic culture:
It is useful to look at <strong>the</strong> Soviet approach to strategic thinking as a unique “strategic
culture.” Individuals are socialized into a distinctively Soviet mode <strong>of</strong> strategic thinking.
As a result <strong>of</strong> this socialization process, a set <strong>of</strong> general beliefs, attitudes, and behavioral
patterns with regard to nuclear strategy has achieved a state <strong>of</strong> semi-permanence that
places <strong>the</strong>m <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> “culture” ra<strong>the</strong>r than mere “policy.” Of course, attitudes may
133
Jeffrey W. Legro, "Which Norms Matter? Revisiting <strong>the</strong> "Failure" <strong>of</strong> Internationalism," International
Organization Vol. 51, No.1 (Winter 1997): 36.
134
Colin S. Gray, Perspectives on Strategy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2013):
unpublished manuscript: 211.
135
Alastair lain Johnston, Cultural Realism: <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> and Grand Strategy in Chinese History,
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995): 1.
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